



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
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WINTER 1966

ISSUED AS VOL. 95, No. 1, OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Preface to the Issue "The Negro American—2"

THIS is the second of two volumes that *Dædalus* is publishing at this time on the Negro American. Our concern, as in the earlier issue, is to reflect on the conditions of Negro life in this country today, to consider the prospects for early change, and to devise strategies which will make possible that "fulfillment of rights" which President Johnson spoke of in his Howard University speech of June 1965.

The task of integrating the Negro into American society, despite the judicial decisions and legislative enactments of the last decade, is far from complete. The extent of the separation of the races, both in the North and in the South, is suggested by G. Franklin Edwards in the opening essay of this volume. He sounds a note which other authors repeat: the forces which have operated to isolate and victimize the Negro remain powerful, and only the most persistent efforts on many fronts will serve to diminish their influence.

If these *Dædalus* volumes dwell principally on discrimination in the areas of employment, education, and housing, it is because disadvantage in one is intimately related to lack of opportunity in the others. The Negro American will enjoy the freedom of choice available to the white citizen only when present practices are altered, so that the kind of *de facto* segregation that now exists is significantly reduced. To achieve this objective will not be easy. It will depend on the strict enforcement of statutes by the federal government, on giving a lead to state and local authorities to encourage the invention of new institutional devices to protect and advance the interests of those now deprived, and also on what individuals and groups choose to do to further the general goal of "including" the Negro in American society. The first obligation of those who would work for change is to estimate the nation's resources—material, intellectual, and organizational—which are presently available for these purposes, and to use these to our advantage.

The authors who write about education, John Fischer and Robert Dentler, are not sanguine about the prospects for early integration of schools in ghetto communities; they see, however, what can be accomplished quickly on the periphery of these areas, and what must be done within the slums so that new damage is not inflicted. Only a combination of fiscal, political, and educational interests will compel change; as Mr. Fischer comments: "the knowledge that the Negro's right to education has been restricted is no new discovery, but what is new is the consciousness that what has been withheld from him has impoverished the whole people."

Charles Abrams and Eunice and George Grier write about discrimination in housing and of the urgent need for a program which will make housing available for low-income families at prices they can afford. Mr. Abrams suggests that only the federal government is in a position to provide the cities with the financial help such action requires. Mr. and Mrs. Grier, while accepting the importance of individual initiatives to bring about housing desegregation, believe that the object will be achieved only when federal, state, and local authorities are able to use incentives in such a way, and make resources available on such a scale, that individuals and groups are impelled to do what few are prepared to do at this time.

Discrimination and disadvantage in employment were extensively discussed in our last issue, and proposals were made for their alleviation. The decision to include an article on the Negro businessman in this volume was based on other considerations: the desire to know more about why the Negro has been deterred from going into business and the belief that the creation of a strong Negro business community would have significant effects on the position of the Negro in American society. Eugene Foley, in showing the inadequacy of many of the traditional explanations for the failure of Negroes to establish themselves in business, gives weight to the "all-pervading racism that [has] permeated white America." Suggestions are made about why conditions at this time may be particularly favorable to the establishment of Negro businesses.

So much has been said about the "identity" problems created for those who suffer the kinds of degradation to which many Negroes are exposed, that it seemed important to have an explicit consideration of this matter. Erik Erikson and Lee Rainwater approach the same issue from very different perspectives. Mr. Erikson, warning against the hazards of using the "identity" concept loosely, and disdaining the easy identification of any one tradition

as natural or normal, prefers a formulation which emphasizes a "complementarity of life-history and history," and which takes into account the fact that the struggle in the world everywhere today is for "more inclusive identities." Mr. Erikson refuses to prophesy what the new identity constellation of the Negro American will be, but he assumes that the nucleus "is already clearly suggested by the two words Negro and American."

Lee Rainwater's researches into the lives of lower-class Negro families bring him to write of a slum culture which is "highly destructive to the people who must live in it." As he explains, "... in Negro slum culture growing up involves an ever-increasing appreciation of one's shortcomings, of the impossibility of finding a self-sufficient and gratifying way of living. It is in the family first and most devastatingly that one learns these lessons." Worried lest our growing concern with the "pathology" of the Negro family lead us to the conventional palliatives—"family therapy, family counseling, family-life education, and the like"—Mr. Rainwater scorns such measures and argues that only a plan which deals directly with the socioeconomic distress that has created the mutual self-destruction of the Negro slum world can possibly serve to eradicate it.

Whatever change does occur in the Negro's position over the next decade will necessarily reflect two developments: modification of white attitudes toward him and continued imaginative and effective agitation by civil rights organizations. Paul Sheatsley, basing his study on the public-opinion research of recent years, reviews the substantial changes that have already taken place in white attitudes. Mr. Sheatsley's conclusions are encouraging; he writes: "The mass of white Americans have shown in many ways that they do not want a racist government and that they will not follow racist leaders. Rather, they are engaged in the painful task of adjusting to an integrated society. It will not be easy for most, but one cannot at this late date doubt the basic commitment. In their hearts they know that the American Negro is right."

Kenneth Clark writes of the leadership, strategy, and aims of the major civil rights groups. The fact that these vary in "organizational efficiency as well as in philosophy, approach, and methods" does not appear as a weakness to Mr. Clark. On the contrary, he sees it as evidence of their strength, for it provides the kind of competition that is necessary for their effective operation. It is as reasonable that differing views about strategies should exist among civil rights groups as among other bodies in our democratic society.

Oscar Handlin looks at the matter from another perspective. He is not persuaded that there has been an adequate consideration of the precise meaning of the term "integration," and he questions whether there is sufficient agreement about ultimate goals. In the absence of such agreement, he says, there is an unwillingness to consider the kind of society that we are aiming to achieve, and a confusion about the tactics necessary for improving the condition of Negroes in the immediate future.

The majority of these essays were prepared in time for a conference on the Negro American held at the House of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences last May. Because the discussion on that occasion was candid and open, and because there was no disposition on the part of participants to minimize their differences with each other, it has been thought useful to publish in this volume the full transcript of the conference. Such publication is in certain respects hazardous, for the spoken word is rarely well rendered in print. The decision to publish the transcript was made because the quality of the discussion and the range of new ideas were such that many of those present believed it ought to be available to a wider audience.

May I express again my sincere thanks to those who have made this volume possible. They include the following: Charles Abrams, Daniel Bell, Edwin C. Berry, Wiley Branton, James P. Breeden, Kenneth B. Clark, Oscar Cohen, Robert Coles, Robert Dentler, St. Clair Drake, G. Franklin Edwards, Ralph Ellison, Rupert Emerson, Erik H. Erikson, Rashi Fein, Joseph H. Fichter, John H. Fischer, Harold Fleming, Eugene P. Foley, John Hope Franklin, Paul A. Freund, Clifford Geertz, Eunice and George Grier, Oscar Handlin, Philip M. Hauser, Hudson Hoagland, Everett C. Hughes, Carl Kaysen, Martin Kilson, Max Lerner, Edward H. Levi, Hylan Lewis, Jean Mayer, Robert Merton, Daniel P. Moynihan, Guichard Parris, Talcott Parsons, Thomas F. Pettigrew, Lee Rainwater, Saunders Redding, Peter H. Rossi, William M. Schmidt, Paul B. Sheatsley, James Tobin, John B. Turner, James Q. Wilson, C. Vann Woodward, and Whitney M. Young, Jr.

Finally, a word of thanks to the Carnegie Corporation for its generous support of this undertaking.

S.R.G.

G. FRANKLIN EDWARDS

Community and Class Realities: The Ordeal of Change

ONE OF the paradoxes of American life is that though the Negro is an old-line American he is not yet fully American. His presence in this country antedates that of most immigrant groups, but his career and community life are greatly different from those of immigrants from northern and southern Europe. In terms of the basic socialization processes and the community contexts in which they occur, differences between the Negro and these immigrant groups, including the most recent large-scale arrivals, the Puerto Ricans, are apparent.

Immigrant groups from Europe have followed a somewhat typical process as they moved into the main stream of American life. Most members of these groups entered the work force at the bottom of the economic ladder, as small farmers and as unskilled, semiskilled, and service workers. They lived initially among fellow immigrants in small village communities or in poorer city neighborhoods in which communal institutions helped cushion the cultural shock induced by the differences between life in their countries of origin and life in the United States. Family, church, the foreign language press, and mutual aid organizations helped in the adjustment process. Members of the second and succeeding generations acquired increasing amounts of education and the skills necessary to take advantage of available opportunities; eventually the Americanization process was fairly complete. By and large, members of these groups have assimilated American values and today experience little physical and cultural isolation based upon ethnicity. Although individual members of these groups continue to experience discrimination in the areas of admission to educational institutions, job promotions in industry, and acceptance into voluntary associations, a consciousness of group rejection does not exist. In those

instances where strong in-group community life exists, it is owing more to the persistence of group cohesion than to restraints from without.

In contrast to the pattern of immigrant groups, the Negro has remained socially and morally isolated from the American society. At no time in the almost three and a half centuries of his history in this country has he been "counted in." His caste-like position is owing more to restraints from without than to any centripetal force serving to keep him separated from other groups. He has lived, according to E. Franklin Frazier's characterization, as "a nation within a nation."¹ Robin Williams recently has referred to the general Negro community as "a world in the shadow,"² and James Silver, in describing an extreme instance of a local community's exclusion of Negroes, has referred to the "closed society."³

One basic difference between the Negro and these immigrant groups is that the former served for nearly two centuries as slaves. Although succeeding generations of Negroes acquired increased amounts of education after the Emancipation, access to opportunities commensurate with formal training often was denied because of color. The failure to learn certain basic skills to qualify for jobs in the world of work placed serious limitations upon the horizontal and social mobility experienced by members of the group. As a matter of fact, the social mobility of Negroes up to the present has been determined more by conditions within the Negro community than by those of the broader society. The number and distribution of Negroes within the professions, for example, have been related more directly to the needs of the Negro community for certain types of services than to the demands of the broader society.⁴ It is for this reason that clergymen and teachers, functionaries required by the segregated Negro community, have represented at least one-half of all Negro professional persons at any given period.

The segregation of Negroes from the main stream of American life has produced institutional patterns and behavior which have a bearing upon contemporary efforts to eliminate inequalities between the two major racial groups. The behaviors are expressed as deviations of Negroes from many normative patterns of American life and suggest something of the magnitude of the differentials which must be dealt with if reconciliation, rather than further alienation, is to be achieved.

The contrasts in background experiences between the Negro and immigrant groups raise the fundamental question of whether, given

the promise of recent changes, the Negro will now be integrated into American society in much the same manner as have these other groups. Any strict analogy between the future course of the Negro's relationship to American society and the processes which occurred in the experiences of immigrant groups, however, is subject to serious limitations and error.

The long history of oppression has profoundly affected the Negro's self-esteem. The fears, suspicions and feelings of inadequacy generated in the Negro by his subordinate status are not duplicated in the experiences of immigrant groups. Moreover, color and other physical traits distinguish the Negro sharply from other groups in the society. In the past these characteristics were taken as physical stigmata which reinforced negative attitudes toward the Negro. Sharp physical differences were not present to complicate the relationships of immigrants to American society, although differences in this regard can be observed between the northern Europeans, on the one hand, and southern Europeans and Orientals, on the other.

The attitudes of the Negro toward himself are merely reciprocals of the attitudes of other groups toward him. There always have been serious reservations on the part of American whites regarding the Negro's capacity to live on a basis of equality with other Americans. Such reservations about the potentialities of immigrant groups for assimilation were not held in the same serious way.

Finally, it should be observed that significant advancement in the status of the Negro comes at a time when economic conditions are quite different from those faced by immigrant groups. The great influx of immigrants came at a time when there was a market for agricultural labor and unskilled work and mobility through these avenues was still possible. The Negro today has been displaced from the farm and must now compete for work in an urban market which requires a somewhat higher degree of education and technical skill than was the case a half century ago. Given the present educational and occupational inadequacies of a large segment of the Negro population, the task of overcoming these deficiencies is formidable.

While it is clear that further changes in the status of the Negro will occur in the years ahead, moving the Negro nearer to equality with other Americans, the processes by which this will be achieved are certain to be difficult and tortuous. The remainder of this essay is an elaboration of this viewpoint.

Foremost among the indicators of the social isolation of Negroes is the Negro ghetto. It represents at once the restrictions placed

upon the living space of the Negro minority and, as Kenneth Clark recently has pointed out, a way of life with a peculiar institutional patterning and psychological consequences.⁵ Unlike most immigrant ghettos, which show a tendency to break up, the Negro ghetto, especially in Northern cities, has become more dense.

Karl Taeuber and Alma Taeuber, on the basis of an examination of segregation indices in 109 American cities from 1940 to 1960, note that in 83 of the 109 cities the segregation index was higher in 1950 than in 1940. Between 1950 and 1960, only 45 of these cities showed an increase. But it was observed that cities with already high levels of segregation were prominent among those with increases. A most significant observation is that in recent years Southern cities have had the highest increases in the physical segregation of Negroes, and the South now has the highest index of any region.⁶ This is important inasmuch as in earlier periods Negroes were less segregated in the older Southern cities than in cities located in other regions.⁷

The concentration of Negroes in the central cities of our metropolitan areas and within the inlying cores of these central cities is too well documented to warrant elaboration here. Our concern is with the fact that the areas inhabited by Negroes are inferior in terms of housing quality, recreational facilities, schools, and general welfare services, and that all of these deficiencies contribute to crime, delinquency, school dropouts, dependency, broken families, excessive deaths, and other conditions which represent the "pathology of the ghetto." The pathology is most evident in housing. In 1960, for example, 44 per cent of all dwelling units occupied by Negroes were substandard. Though nonwhites occupied only 10 per cent of all dwelling units, they occupied 27 per cent of those classed as substandard. Thirteen per cent of nonwhites lived in units which were seriously overcrowded, and there was an increase of 85,000 such units occupied by Negroes between 1950 and 1960.⁸

Efforts to break up the ghetto, and hence to ameliorate the pathological conditions generated by it, have not been productive. Attempts by Negroes to leave the ghetto run afoul of a most formidable network of relationships involving brokers, builders, bankers, realtors, and citizens' organizations serving to restrict Negroes to certain neighborhoods.⁹ There is, indeed, a vast profit to be made from slum housing, and this accounts for much of the behavior of some realtors. One study demonstrates that a slum landlord receives fifteen dollars more monthly if a substandard unit is rented to a Negro family than if the same unit were rented to a white family.¹⁰

Myths regarding neighborhood deterioration following Negro occupancy persist, despite empirical studies which expose their fallacious character.

By and large, our urban renewal programs, designed to revitalize the older, more dilapidated areas of our cities, have not succeeded in providing better accommodations in the renewal areas for most Negroes, the majority of the displacees. They have succeeded very largely in having Negroes move into public housing and blighted areas. While in many instances the physical accommodations to which displaced populations moved represent an improvement over their former dwellings,¹¹ segregation has not been lessened. In our metropolitan centers, for example, despite recent efforts to build small, scattered public housing units, most projects constructed under this program have been large in size and have contributed to segregation as they became either nearly all-white or nearly all-Negro.

It is clear that the Negro ghetto, unlike other ghettos, has had great external pressure to keep it "hemmed in." While some of the greater concentration of Negroes in the older areas of our cities stems from income differentials between Negroes and whites, the Taeubers, using data for the city of Chicago, found that income differentials accounted for only 14 per cent of the observed racial segregation in housing in 1950 and 12 per cent in 1960.¹² They further observed that "on every measure—the Puerto Rican population [of Chicago] is less well off—it is less educated, of lower income, more crowded, less likely to be homeowners, less well housed, and lives in older buildings, yet the index of residential segregation for Puerto Ricans is sixty-seven as compared to eighty-two for Negroes.¹³ There is now considerable evidence, also, that after two generations of strong community solidarity Chinese and Japanese communities in our cities show a considerable dispersion.¹⁴

Although in recent years some moderation of the tight housing market has occurred within the central city—thus permitting Negroes to obtain housing left by the whites who moved to the suburbs—the proportion of the suburban population which is Negro has declined steadily since 1900. Negroes have become increasingly locked in the central city, giving rise to the observation that there is a white noose around our central cities. In 1960, Negroes were less than 5 per cent of the population of metropolitan areas outside central cities, but they made up 17 per cent of the central city population of these areas.¹⁵

There is some hope that Executive Order 11063, issued by President Kennedy on November 20, 1962, banning discrimination in housing insured by agencies of the federal government, will have a salutary effect in reducing the degree of concentration and segregation of the Negro population. But skeptics point out that the Order does not cover all home-mortgage insuring agencies of the federal government, the Home Loan Bank Board constituting an important exception, and in recent years a smaller proportion of new construction has been built with federal insurance. Most importantly, the Order is not retroactive, leaving unaffected the housing stock existing at the time of its issuance.

Access by Negroes to much of the newly constructed housing must depend upon the supplementation of the national Order against discrimination by state and local ordinances having the same objective. In recent years there has been an increase in the number of such ordinances. By and large, however, the basic approach of local communities is conciliation of disputes, and much depends upon the vigor with which these local ordinances are enforced if they are to have any significant effect in countering discrimination and reducing segregation.

But significant moderation of Negro concentration and segregation depends upon more than laws against discrimination, however important these may be. The attitudes of both Negroes and whites toward integrated community life are important determinants of the extent to which deconcentration will occur, given enforcement of even the most severe sanctions against discrimination. There is abundant evidence, as mentioned earlier, that myths exist regarding the lowering of housing values and the maintenance of community patterns following invasion by Negroes, and many whites are inclined to move, so that in time complete succession, or turnover of neighborhoods from white to Negro, occurs. On the other hand, there is some resistance on the part of Negroes to moving into areas, especially the suburbs, where few Negroes live. This is particularly characteristic of families with children who must attend school and are dependent on neighbors for play and other social experiences. The well-founded fear of rejection by white neighbors leads to a foregoing of economic advantages which purchases in white areas represent or, in the case of suburban purchases, of a style of living consistent with one's social and economic level. Though numerous white liberal groups, mainly in suburban communities, have organized to encourage Negroes to purchase homes in their neighbor-

hoods, they are often disappointed with the responses to their sincerest solicitations. The centripetal forces tying Negroes to the Negro community are the products of fear and isolated living and are likely to discourage any large exodus of Negroes to suburban communities in the immediate future. Doubtless open-occupancy patterns will result in a significantly larger number of Negroes residing in mixed areas at some future period, but the pattern of increase is likely to be exponential rather than linear.

This continued physical separation of the major racial groups has an impact upon social relationships between them. It limits the number of intimate contacts and the possibilities for understanding which grow out of association. Robin Williams, on the basis of an examination of the patterns of interracial contact in a large number of communities, concludes that the presence of a Negro subcommunity limits Negro interaction with whites, and barriers to communication between the two groups lead to inadequate understanding and to a perception of the other group as hostile.¹⁶ Duncan and Lieberman make the same point in a somewhat different way when they state that segregation is inversely related to assimilation.¹⁷

The growing awareness of the limitations of life in the ghetto, as a result of the influence of mass media, increased physical mobility, and better education, has played a vital part in precipitating the "Negro Revolution." The mass demonstrations for equality of treatment in places of public accommodations, for access to better quality schools, for equal employment opportunities and voting rights are thought of as efforts by Negroes to achieve first-class citizenship. In another sense, they are efforts to overcome the barriers which have isolated Negroes from aspects of American life.

The difficulty of overcoming the problems created by the physical fact of the ghetto is indicated by attempts to improve the quality of education of schools in slum areas. In our large metropolitan cities, because of the segregation in housing and the traditional neighborhood concept of school attendance, a disproportionate number of schools, particularly at the elementary level, becomes predominantly Negro or predominantly white, with the Negro schools being inferior. Opposing theories for dealing with this situation, generally regarded as undesirable, have generated serious community conflicts. There are those who feel that the efforts should be concentrated upon improving the quality of education in these depressed areas by larger allocations for plant improvement, re-

medial work, new curricula, and better trained teachers. Other students of the problem contend that substantial improvement of slum schools cannot be achieved until such schools lose their predominantly Negro or predominantly white character. It becomes necessary in the thinking of the protagonists of this latter view to develop methods for overcoming racial imbalances in the schools. While a variety of techniques have been proposed, each has generated rather serious opposition. It is patent that this problem, one of the serious concerns of the leaders of the Negro Revolution largely because it is tied to segregation in housing, will not be easily solved.

As mentioned previously, the ghetto has not only restricted the interaction of Negroes with other members of the society, and hence symbolized the isolation under which Negroes have lived; but it has also been a primary force in the generation and persistence of atypical institutional patterns which are viewed as dysfunctional in any effort at reconciliation. Doubtless the foremost of these institutions is the Negro family which, because of historical circumstances connected with slavery and the isolated conditions under which Negroes have lived in both urban and rural areas, is characterized by rather significant variations from the dominant American family pattern. It is not so much the differences *per se*, or any mere deviation of Negro family characteristics from those of white middle-class families, but the variations in structural and interactional features known to be desirable in family living which become causes of concern.

The most salient feature of Negro family life which captures the attention of those concerned with integration of Negroes into American life is the degree of disorganization represented by structural breakdown. In only three-quarters of all Negro families, as compared with approximately nine-tenths of all white families, were both spouses present. One Negro family in five (21 per cent) was headed by a female and 5 per cent had only the male head present. Thus one Negro family in four, as compared with one white family in ten, was headed by a single parent. This differential in the percentage of families headed by one parent accounts in part for the fact that in 1960 only one-third of Negro children under eighteen years of age, as compared with one in ten white children of comparable age, lived in families in which only one parent was present.

The assumption underlying the desirability of family unity—the

presence of both spouses—is that on balance the economic, social, and affectual roles may be best discharged when both mates are present in the home. Divorce, desertion, and separation follow the generation and expression of tensions which, even before rupture occurs, reduce the effectiveness with which the mates can discharge the duties and obligations of family life, as well as deny the satisfactions derived from the intimate sharing of experiences and attainment of goals. In essence, the organized and unified family becomes at once a matrix for the personal satisfaction of the marital partners and for the protection, proper socialization, and well-being of their children. This is not to deny that the basic goals of family life, regarding child-rearing and other functions, may not be achieved by the single-parent family. Given the complexities of modern urban life and the established normative values around which the modern family is organized, however, the discharge of family functions may best be achieved when the family is unified.

In analyzing the statistics on the Negro family one becomes aware that the instability of the Negro family unit is greater than is represented by statistics on the percentages of males and females enumerated as widowed or divorced. In 1960, 15 per cent of all Negro males and 20 per cent of all Negro females, though enumerated by the Census as married, were living apart from their mates. The percentage of Negro males separated from their mates is four times as large as the comparable percentage for white males, and for Negro females four and one-half times as large as for white females.

The instability of Negro family life is explained only in part by the historical conditioning of attitudes toward family life, beginning with slavery, when strong family ties were not encouraged and Negroes, as Elkins has suggested, were made dependent upon whites.¹⁸ The phenomenon arises also from forces of contemporary American life which place limits upon the possibility of successful family organization. These are reflected in the statistics on characteristics of the heads of Negro families.

As reported by the last Census, approximately one-half, 48.5 per cent, of the heads of nonwhite (mainly Negro) families had not finished elementary school. Even in urban areas where access to educational opportunities is somewhat greater and school-attendance laws somewhat better enforced than in rural farm and nonfarm areas, two out of five nonwhite family heads failed to reach the last year of elementary school. Of nonwhite heads living in rural nonfarm and rural farm areas, 70 and 80 per cent, respectively, had

failed to attain this level of schooling.¹⁹ The low level of educational achievement for such a large proportion of nonwhite family heads has obvious implications for the cultural life to which the Negro child is exposed in the home and doubtless for the type of motivation the child receives for achievement in school. It also is related to the labor-force participation and income of nonwhites.

In an economy in which automation is rapidly introducing changes in the demand for certain types of labor, the heads of nonwhite families were disproportionately represented in those occupational categories in which fewer workers are required and monetary returns are small. Only 13 per cent of all nonwhite family heads, as compared with 40 per cent of white heads, were in professional, managerial, and clerical occupations for which labor demands are increasing. One in five white heads, but only one in ten among nonwhite, was a skilled worker. Thus, one in four nonwhite heads, as compared with three in five white, were white-collar and skilled workers.²⁰ The heavier identification with semiskilled and unskilled work accounts in part for the nonwhite employment rate being twice as large as the comparable rate of whites and for greater underemployment among nonwhites.

The type of job and both underemployment and unemployment influence the relatively low income of nonwhite family heads. The median nonwhite family income of \$3,465 in 1963 was only approximately 53 per cent of the white family income of \$6,548. More than two-fifths of all nonwhite families (41 per cent) earned less than \$3,000 in 1963, which placed them at the poverty level, and only one in twenty earned \$10,000 or more in the same year.²¹ It is significant to note, in line with our previous discussion regarding the desirability of family closure—both parents in the home—that in 1959 families in which both husband and wife were present in the home had a median income of \$3,633 as compared with a median of \$1,734 for families having a female head.²²

The problems of the Negro family, then, in terms of its instability and the associated phenomena of crime, delinquency, school dropouts, high morbidity and mortality are related to a complex of interwoven factors, of which level of educational attainment and income are important components. The President of the United States, in a historic speech at Howard University in June 1965, pointed to the complexity of the problem by stating that the provision of jobs, decent homes, welfare and social programs, care of the sick, and understanding attitudes are only partial answers to the

conditions of the Negro family.²³ "The breakdown of the Negro family," he stated, "is related to centuries of oppression and persecution of the Negro man. It flows from long years of degradation and discrimination which have attacked his dignity and assaulted his ability to produce for his family."²⁴ The President added that though we know much about Negro family life, other answers are still to be found. For this reason he indicated he would call a White House Conference in the fall to explore the problem further.

A definitive study by Hylan Lewis of child-rearing practices among low-income Negro families in the District of Columbia reveals that there is, indeed, still much to be learned about the operating dynamics and underlying causes of disorganization among such units.²⁵ What often is accepted as knowledge about these families is in fact mythology. It is noted, in the first instance, that these families are not homogeneous as regards their organization, functioning, and ambitions for their children. In many of them considerable strength is to be noted, but the exigencies of daily living often deny the achievement of the parents' most ambitious plans. Though parents set training and discipline goals for their children, these are often undermined by influences beyond their power, and the actual control over their children may be lost as early as the fifth or sixth year.

Investigation reveals that many of these parents, particularly the mothers, are warm, human, and concerned individuals who, despite deprivation and trouble, are persistent in their desires to have their children become respectable and productive citizens and in their willingness to sacrifice for them. The picture contrasts with the common belief that in an overwhelming majority of low-income families parents reject their children and are hostile to them.

Lewis' study raises questions regarding assigned reasons for alleged male irresponsibility toward family obligations and the degree of family concern with pregnancy out of wedlock and illegitimate births. There does appear to be a greater degree of concern by the male regarding his responsibilities and by family members regarding the sexual behavior of their offspring than is commonly recognized. What in fact emerges is that the behavior of these lower-income families is a practical response to untoward circumstances which undermine the well-intentioned, but often unattainable, goals of these units.

The major problems of the Negro family are experienced in urban areas where more than 70 per cent of such families now live.

There has been a heavy migration during the past twenty-five years from farms and small towns to large metropolitan areas. The limited extent to which many of these families can cope with the demands of urban life, given the low educational level and obsolescent skills of the adults, raises serious questions for the American society as well as for the families themselves. The War on Poverty, youth opportunity programs, medicare and other changes in our social security program are certain to exercise some influences in ameliorating existing conditions. But the deep-seated nature of many of those conditions and the personality damage they have produced, as expressed in feelings of powerlessness, hopelessness, and forms of anti-social conduct, give rise to the prediction that no easy solution to problems of the Negro family may be found. This is especially true of those "hard core" or multi-problem families in many of which at least two generations have been dependent on public assistance programs. Present efforts to focus upon the young, as evidenced in Project Head Start and programs for youth, on the assumption that this population is most amenable to change, are based upon sound theory. There remains, however, the complex problem of improving the skills and enhancing the self-esteem of the adult members whose personalities are crystallized and whose levels of expectation have been shaped under an entirely different set of conditions. What is apparent is that the problems of the Negro family are intimately tied to those of the larger community.

The elimination of many of these difficulties depends upon a commitment to invest a great deal more of our resources in improving educational and social services, including more effective family limitation programs. What is indicated is that by opening the opportunity structure and providing both formal and informal education on a more extensive scale through diverse programs, key figures in many Negro problem families will be enabled over time to develop self-esteem and a "rational" approach to urban life, which many students regard as indispensable for successful adjustment to the urban environment. This can hardly occur as long as the present constraints and limitations continue to operate against a large segment of the Negro population or, to put it differently, as long as the isolation of the Negro is continued.

The difficulty of changing existing patterns is evident in a number of current efforts. The Manpower Retraining Program, for example, has encountered difficulty in working with enrollees with less than an eighth-grade education, which would exclude large

numbers of Negro males from successful participation. Of all projects started under the Manpower Development and Retraining Act in 1963, 3 per cent of the enrollees had less than eight years of schooling, while 36 per cent had between eight and eleven years. Fifty-one per cent were high-school graduates, and another 10 per cent had gone beyond the high-school level.²⁶ Educational levels must be raised considerably before some of the disadvantaged can benefit from available training opportunities.

The problems of developing motivation, rather than supplying specific job skills, appear to be even harder to overcome. Charles Silberman, among others, has pointed out that the effort to eliminate poverty must involve the poor in action programs if the motivation to improve their lot is to be realized. Recent controversies over involvement of the poor in strikes, boycotts, and pickets and the use of other techniques to dramatize their condition and counteract feelings of apathy and cynicism have been sharply criticized by local citizens, especially those in the power structure.²⁷

Finally, the bold program advanced by Whitney Young, Executive Director of the National Urban League, calling for a "Marshall Plan" for Negroes as a means of upgrading the competency and well-being of the Negro family, encounters serious opposition.²⁸ The charge of preferential treatment is raised, and this runs counter to the ideology of equal treatment. What is more important is that the practical operation of such a program would encounter difficulty from institutionalized patterns. To request preferential treatment for Negroes in apprentice programs and preferential hiring after completion of training, for example, cross-cuts seniority and other established principles of union organization and practice.

All of the above are mere illustrations of the complications involved in any effort to strengthen the Negro family in particular and to upgrade Negro life in general. They should serve to introduce some caution into the thinking of those sanguine persons who are persuaded that broad-scale and rapid changes are likely to occur in a short period of time. (The position taken here is not an apology for the gradualist position regarding race relations changes. It is, indeed, understandable that civil rights groups must inveigh continuously against the gradualist perspective as a matter of strategy. Our concern is with traditional and countervailing influences which have the effect of slowing the pace at which change might occur.)

The disabilities of the Negro family discussed in the preceding

paragraphs are most characteristic of low-income units. Not all Negro families are affected by inadequate income, education, and employment opportunities, and many of them do not lack strong family traditions. There is a considerable differentiation within the Negro community in terms of status groups and social classes.

E. Franklin Frazier observed that as late as World War I the Negro middle class was composed "principally of teachers, doctors, preachers, trusted persons in personal service, government employees, and a few business men."²⁹ He stated further that:

This group was distinguished from the rest of the Negro population not so much by economic factors as by social factors. Family affiliation and education to a less degree were as important as income. Moreover, while it exhibited many middle-class features such as its emphasis on morality, it also possessed characteristics of an upper class or aristocracy.³⁰

The urbanization of the Negro population, beginning with World War I and continuing to the present, resulted in the formation of large ghettos in Northern and Southern cities and provided the condition for greater occupational differentiation within the Negro community. The differentiation was more pronounced in Northern communities where Negroes had a substantially greater opportunity to enter clerical and technical occupations than was true in Southern cities, and where the large population base provided economic support for a sizeable corps of professional functionaries. Education and income became more important than social distinctions in determining class membership.

The Negro middle class today includes a still relatively small, but expanding, number of persons. If occupation is used as a criterion for determining membership and those in professional and technical, clerical, sales, and skilled occupations are included, only approximately 26 per cent of all nonwhite workers belong to the middle class. White workers in these above-mentioned categories represent 64 per cent of all whites in the labor force.³¹ The contrast between the two occupational structures is further indicated by the fact that the percentage of white workers, taken as a proportion of all white workers, is twice as large as the comparable percentage of nonwhite workers in professional and kindred occupations, and in clerical and skilled work; four times as large in managerial occupations; and three times as large in the sales category.

In none of the specific occupational categories associated with the middle class did nonwhite male workers achieve parity with

white males in median income. The nearest approximation to parity in 1959 was in clerical and kindred occupations in which the non-white male median earnings of \$4,072 was approximately 85 per cent of the white male median of \$4,785. In none of the other categories did nonwhite male workers receive so much as 70 per cent of the median income of white males in the category.³²

The expansion of the Negro middle class has been most marked by accretion of persons in professional, technical, clerical, and sales occupations. This expansion by approximately 300,000 persons since 1940 has been influenced in part by government policy which prohibits those business firms holding contracts with the federal government from discriminating against workers on the basis of race, religion, creed, or national origin. In engineering, architecture, and the natural sciences, occupations oriented to the wider world of work rather than to the Negro community, the increases among Negroes, though small in absolute numbers, have been rather dramatic. Between 1950 and 1960, there was a three-fold increase in the number of Negro engineers. The number of Negro architects increased by 72 per cent, and the number of natural scientists by 77 per cent.³³ This expansion comes at the end of a half century in which Negroes could hardly expect to earn a living in these fields and thus were not encouraged to prepare for entering them.

The number of Negroes in medicine, dentistry, and law, whose services traditionally have been oriented to the Negro community, has begun to increase rather significantly. During the 1950's, physicians increased by 14 per cent, dentists by 31 per cent, and lawyers by 43 per cent.³⁴ More substantial fellowship and scholarship aid, ability to pay for professional education, as well as the opening of the segregated professional schools in the Southern states, have contributed to this result.

It is not only the increase in number of these professionals which deserves attention; the improved opportunities for advanced training and learning experiences are also of importance. On the basis of increased opportunities for internships and residency training, the number of Negro physicians who became diplomates of medical specialty boards increased from 92 in 1947 to 377 in 1959.³⁵ Negro physicians, lawyers, and dentists are admitted today to membership in local societies of national professional organizations in larger numbers and enjoy the privileges these societies provide for continued professional growth.

It should be remembered, however, that these gains, while sig-

nificant in terms of what has occurred in Negro life heretofore, are relatively small. The ratios of the actual to expected numbers of Negroes in middle-class occupations, as measured by the total labor force distribution, are extremely small.³⁶

The differences between Negro and white community life cannot be measured solely by variations in income, occupation, education, and other objective indicators. In assessing the differences, it is important to recognize that the Negro class structure and institutions have emerged in response to segregation and represent adjustments to the isolation under which Negroes have lived. The meaning of relationships within the community and the values placed upon them must be considered.

Frazier has observed, for example, that in the absence of a true upper class based upon old family ties and wealth, the Negro middle class simulates the behavior of the white upper class without possessing the fundamental bases upon which such behavior rests.³⁷ Moreover, segregation has provided a monopoly for many Negroes in business and the professions and has introduced, in many cases, differential standards of performance. This has important consequences for any consideration of desegregation, for those who enjoy a vested interest in the segregated community are not likely to welcome competition from the broader community. The Negro church represents an extreme instance of vested interest in the Negro community and, at the same time, is the most important institution giving expression to the Negro masses. For this reason no degree of acceptance of Negroes by white churches is likely to bring about the dissolution of Negro churches.³⁸

The Negro community doubtless will be the source of social life of Negroes for some time into the future. Sororities, fraternities, clubs, and other organizations will continue to serve a meaningful function. The acceptance by whites of Negroes as fellow workers often bears little relationship to their willingness to share social experiences with them outside the plant or office or to have them as neighbors.

The importance of the Negro community as a source of social life is indicated by the fact that, though the majority of the members of a Negro professional society felt that its members should identify with the local chapter of the national organization representing the profession when the opportunity became available, one-quarter had some reservation about joining and another 5 per cent were opposed to joining. The underlying reasons for reservations

to becoming members of the formerly white organization were that, though Negroes may be accepted as professional colleagues, they would not be treated as social equals and that opportunities for leadership roles would be lost if the Negro association were dissolved.³⁹ What is patently indicated is that most members thought they should have the *right* to membership in the local chapter of the national organization, but they should retain their own association for social and professional reasons.

Despite the effort to conserve the conceived advantages of the Negro community, the larger social forces are introducing changes. Already the small Negro entrepreneurial group is threatened by these forces. Speaking to a group of Negro businessmen in Detroit, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs referred to the disappearance of the monopoly Negroes formerly held in certain businesses.⁴⁰ The impact of desegregation is being felt, he said, in the Negro market, for, as the income of Negro consumers expands, white businessmen become more conscious of the Negro's purchasing power. To this end they have added a cadre of professional Negro salesmen to their payrolls for the specific purpose of developing the Negro market. The success of this undertaking is indicated by the fact that many of the employed Negroes have risen to top executive posts in these organizations. Moreover, Negroes have begun to buy in increasing amounts from shopping centers serving the Negro community and have begun to patronize places of public accommodations other than those traditionally operated by Negroes. This change in consumer behavior represents a steady and gradual erosion of the position of the Negro businessman. The cruelest blow of all, the Assistant Secretary stated, is that "the large life insurance companies serving the market at large are bidding away Negro life insurance salesmen at an increasing rate."⁴¹ These and other changes are certain to influence the structure of the Negro community.

The Ordeal of Change

From observing current developments in race relations and the operation of the larger social forces in our society, it is evident that several basic conditions operate to influence the pattern and pace at which change is occurring. These provide some insight into what may be expected in the future in regard to the general status of the Negro minority; they document the theory of slow and

gradual change for some time to come in most areas and somewhat more rapid change in others.

A first consideration, not prominently mentioned heretofore, is the opposition to change by segments of the white community. Beginning with the school desegregation decision, there has been a mobilization of white community efforts to prevent the attainment of desegregation in many aspects of community life. This opposition has taken a variety of forms: the closing of schools, violence visited upon Negroes, intimidation of Negroes and threats to their job security, the rise of some hate groups—such as Citizens' Councils and Night Riders—and the strengthening of others—such as the Ku Klux Klan—the resurrection of racial ideologies having the purpose of establishing the inferiority of the Negro, and a variety of other techniques designed to slow the desegregation process.⁴²

What is important in this connection is that many of the organizations connected with the opposition have had the support, if not the leadership, of prominent persons in the power structure; many governors, mayors, legislators, and prominent businessmen have all given support to the resistance efforts, owing to political and economic expediency, if not to personal sentiment. Moreover, persons with some claim to scientific respectability in the academic community have contributed to the questioning of whether differentials between Negroes and whites stem from the former's disadvantaged community life or from the Negro's innate biological inferiority.⁴³

There is no doubt that these forces have served to slow the process of desegregation. As late as December 1964, only 2 per cent of Negro pupils in eleven Southern states formerly having segregated school systems were attending schools with whites. If the six Border states where desegregation did not encounter the same serious opposition as in the other eleven states are included in the count, only 11 per cent of Negro pupils attend schools having a mixed population.⁴⁴ This has led to one student's referring to developments in this area as "ten years of prelude," suggesting that the pace may be somewhat more rapid in the future.⁴⁵

There does appear to be a lessening of the opposition in many areas as a result of several important factors. These include self-interest on the part of prominent businessmen, many of whom have spoken out against violence and have used their influence otherwise. The passage of important legislation within the past year—the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—are certain to have an influence in softening open resistance. But doubtless resistance to change will continue in subtle ways, perhaps under a blanket of legitimacy, as in the instance of the large-scale discharge of Negro teachers in Southern states in recent months following the necessity of having to comply with the Commissioner of Education's "Statement of Policies" for enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, by which Southern school systems are expected to make a substantial start toward complete desegregation by September 1965 and to complete the process by the fall of 1967.

A second important force affecting change is inherent in the nature of the phenomenon itself, especially the contribution made by the accumulated disabilities of the Negro family, and in individuals in terms of inadequate education, job skills, housing, patterns of dependency, and low self-esteem. The advancement toward a more equalitarian society depends upon how fully these disabilities can be overcome or eliminated. Any analysis must consider the generational problem, for the extent to which the education and job skills of many adult family heads—those over forty-five, for example—can be improved is problematic.

A stronger basis of hope rests with the generation which begins school under improved educational conditions and whose levels of aspiration will be shaped by a social context which varies considerably from that of the past half century, and may be expected to vary even more in the future. But even under the most favorable circumstances, the improvement of educational qualifications of Negroes to a position of parity with those of whites, an essential factor for job equality, may not be easily achieved. One prominent sociologist on the basis of statistical calculations concluded:

Whatever the future may hold with respect to the on-coming cohorts of young Negroes, the performance to date, together with the postulate that educational attainment is a "background" characteristic [for employment], enables us to make a most important prediction: the disparity between white and nonwhite levels of education attainment in the general population can hardly disappear in less than three-quarters of a century. Even if Negroes in their teens were to begin immediately to match the educational attainment of white children, with this equalization persisting indefinitely, we shall have to wait fifty years for the last of the cohorts manifesting race differentials to reach retirement age.⁴⁶

The achievement of educational and occupational equality is

far more difficult to attain than equal treatment in public accommodations. Many civil rights leaders recognize this and, now that the public accommodations struggle has been successful, consider that the movement has entered a new and much tougher phase.

A third force affecting change is the attitudes held by certain Negroes who either have a vested interest in segregation or are generally fearful of the deleterious consequences desegregation will bring. This has been discussed in an earlier section, and only a further example will be furnished here. As early as 1954 Negro teachers in South Carolina registered great fear over the possible untoward effects of desegregation of the public school system on their professional status as teachers. The chief fears expressed concerned the large amount of possible job displacement, new ways to evade the granting of equality in pay, employment, and benefits, greater demands for professional preparation, and the employment of fewer couples in the school system. Though most of these teachers were ideologically committed to desegregation, their fears regarding their jobs and community relationships with whites suggest that many of them, of necessity, were ambivalent toward desegregation.⁴⁷

It is not likely that these attitudes strongly counteract tendencies to change. Their significance lies more in the manifest desire of Negroes to maintain social distance from whites in community relations as a result of their perception of the adverse use of power by whites.

The most significant influence in determining the pattern and pace of race relations changes is the federal government. The early court decisions, particularly in the area of public accommodations, orders by the executive, and recent legislation by the Congress have had salutary effects in altering disability-producing conditions. With more rigorous enforcement, they are likely to have an even more important influence in the future. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a wedge for undermining, or at least neutralizing, much of the support for denying the constitutional rights of Negroes. The sanctions provided in Title VI of the Act, relating to nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs, is certain to produce a high measure of compliance. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it is expected that between 50 and 70 per cent of eligible Negro voters in the five Deep South states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) will be registered to vote by the time of the 1966 elections.⁴⁸ This result, along with the greater political

consciousness of Negroes throughout the country, is certain to improve the power position of the group and result in the election of large numbers of Negroes to public office.⁴⁹

The change in the position of the government in respect to the status of Negroes results from the altered position of this country in world affairs since the end of World War II and to a substantial shift in public opinion regarding the position of the Negro during that period. It is important, therefore, to view contemporary changes as a part of broader social movements toward improved welfare for the disadvantaged within the country and in the world. These broad forces tend to override resistances, but they are subject to challenges and counter pressures. If viewed in this broad perspective, it is clear that more significant changes which will bring the Negro greater opportunities for participation in our society lie ahead. When, in fact, basic equalities will be achieved cannot be predicted.

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46. Otis Dudley Duncan, "Population Trends, Mobility and Social Change," a paper prepared for the Seminar on Dimensions of American Society, Committee on Social Studies, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, p. 52. (Quoted with the permission of the author.)
47. Hurley Doddy and G. Franklin Edwards, "Apprehension of Negro Teachers Concerning Desegregation in South Carolina," *Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. 24 (Winter 1955), Table 1, pp. 30-31.
48. *The Washington Post*, September 6, 1965, p. 1.
49. For a list of the growing number of Negro office holders, see Harold F. Gosnell and Robert E. Martin, "The Negro as Voter and Office Holder," *Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. 32 (Fall 1963), pp. 415-425.

JOHN H. FISCHER

Race and Reconciliation: The Role of the School

I

WHEN George Counts asked in 1932, "Dare the schools build a new social order?" the response could hardly have been called resounding. A frightened few took the query for a Marxist threat, the Progressive Education Association spent a year reaching a split decision, but the majority even of those who gave it any attention at all dismissed the challenge as educationist hyperbole. Whatever it was the country needed, not many expected to find it in the schools. Two wars, a technological revolution, and a massive social upheaval have put a different face upon the matter. No longer is education the optional affair it was a generation ago. The easy rhetoric about the nation's reliance on its schools has become an uneasy reality.

President Johnson reflected the discovery when he said that "One great truth" he had learned is that "the answer for all of our national problems, the answer for all the problems of the world comes down, when you really analyze it, to one simple word—education."¹ Mr. Johnson is not the first President to speak well of learning. The dependence of democracy on popular education has been a continuing theme in our history. But it was not until the end of World War II that the country began seriously to consider the full implications of that relationship, and later still that it officially acknowledged the corollary proposition that to limit a man's education is to limit his freedom.

The rationale for improving the Negro American's chance to be educated derives from basic principles and well-established practice, but merely to proclaim a new policy of equality is not enough. Steps to equalize the Negro's educational opportunities must be accompanied by prompt and vigorous action to improve his access to those opportunities and to increase the inducement for him to

use them. Until, in all three respects, he is brought to full parity with his white neighbor, the Negro citizen will continue to depress the composite level of American society, and the society to diminish his standing as a man.

As the struggle to secure the Negro's proper place in that society gains headway and success, it becomes steadily more clear that the two great educational handicaps he has suffered—segregated schools and inferior instruction—are so closely interrelated that they can be attacked successfully only when they are attacked simultaneously.

This is not to argue that segregation is the sole deficiency Negro children suffer in school or that only Negro pupils receive inferior education. Nor is it true that every Negro child is being poorly taught or that effective learning is possible only in the presence of white children. It is important to set the facts, the probabilities, and the proposals straight. Not every Negro child lives in deprivation: each year more Negro families join the middle class. Nor is every white child raised in a good home. Slums are often ghettos, but the two are not always the same. Poverty of purse and poverty of spirit often go together, but the exceptions are numerous and important. Yet when all the differences have been explained and all the exceptions admitted, the hard facts of racial discrimination remain to be faced.

Until the present generation, almost every action affecting Negroes as a group in this country, whether taken by the government or by private agencies, has been to some degree discriminatory and quite often hypocritical. The Negro's just cause for pride in the fortitude of his ancestors in no way alters the fact that from the moment of his birth he becomes the product and the victim of his people's history. The scars he carries are difficult to hide and slow to heal.

Assuring the Negro his proper place in American society involves more than opening a few doors, giving everybody his choice, and waiting for what is certain to come naturally. Many of the trends that have influenced the Negro individually and collectively have carried him not toward but away from the main currents of American life. The momentum that has been built up suggests a sociological analogue of Newton's first law of motion. Unless the course that the Negro race has followed for three centuries is altered by the application of external energy, its direction cannot be expected to change. The heart of the integration question is to

determine what forms of energy are most appropriate and how they may be applied to bring the separate courses together. For some Negroes the process is already under way, but for many more significant change awaits intervention on a scale commensurate with the forces that must be checked and redirected. To serve this purpose no agency offers greater promise than the school.

We can begin on the educational task by considering some facts. One is that a school enrolling largely Negro students is almost universally considered of lower status and less desirable than one attended wholly or mainly by white students. Regardless of the quality of the building, the competence of the staff, or the size of classes, a school composed of three-fourths Negro children and one-fourth white children is viewed by members of both races, virtually without exception, as inferior to one in which the proportions are reversed. Whether all such appraisals are valid remains, at least for the time being, beside the point. So often are "Negro" schools inferior and so long have Negro students been assigned the hand-me-downs that unhappy memories and generalized impressions must be expected to persist despite the occasional presence of really good schools in Negro neighborhoods.

The contention that no school of Negro pupils can under any circumstances be satisfactory unless white students enter it is absurd. The argument insults every Negro child and credits white children with virtues they do not possess. But the effort to establish genuinely first-rate schools in Negro communities has been so long delayed that anyone undertaking to demonstrate that an institution known as a "Negro" school can produce first-rate results must be prepared to accept a substantial burden of proof.

A second impressive fact, closely related to the first, is the unfortunate psychological effect upon a child of membership in a school where every pupil knows that, regardless of his personal attainments, the group with which he is identified is viewed as less able, less successful, and less acceptable than the majority of the community. The impact upon the self-image and motivation of children of this most tragic outcome of segregated education emphasizes the dual need for immediate steps to achieve a more favorable balance of races in the schools and for every possible effort to upgrade to full respectability and status every school in which enrollment cannot soon be balanced.

The destruction of the legal basis of segregation by the *Brown* decision in 1954 marked the climax of an obviously necessary first

campaign, but the new problems to which *Brown* gives rise are even more complex than those which preceded it. The task now is not only to end segregation but to correct the effects it has generated. There is little profit in debating whether *de jure* or *de facto* segregation is the greater evil. It was the consequences of the fact of segregation that convinced the Supreme Court that "separate schools are inherently unequal" and led the Court to strike down the laws supporting such schools. Only by a curious twist of logic could it be argued that segregation statutes having been declared unjust, the practice itself may now be condoned.

This is not to deny significant differences between segregation established by law and that resulting from other causes. As the Court itself pointed out, "The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law." But underlying this greater impact is the Court's finding that "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children."

Imperative as the need for prompt desegregation is, it would be irresponsible to attempt to deal with a condition so deeply rooted in practice and custom, and so often due to causes lying beyond the school, without taking account of its complexity. The need for intelligence, imagination, and wisdom in effecting fair and workable reforms can hardly be overstated. Yet, however complicated the situation or the final solutions may be, a firm and forthright confrontation of the problem is essential and is everywhere possible.

Some of the most bitter attacks on school authorities have been occasioned not by their failure to integrate every school, but by their unwillingness even to accept integration as a desirable goal. Among the reasons offered in support of this position, two are especially prominent. One is that the only acceptable basis for school policy is simple and complete nondiscrimination. Unless the school is color-blind, this argument runs, the spirit of the *Brown* decision and the 14th Amendment is violated. What this approach overlooks or attempts to evade is that the consequences of earlier discrimination cannot be corrected merely by ending the practices that produced them, that without corrective action the effects inevitably persist. To teach anyone in a way that influences his further development it is invariably useful and usually necessary to take account of the background he brings to the classroom. So often are the disabilities of Negro students directly traceable to racial factors that a refusal on grounds of equality to recognize such factors in the school is not only unjust; it is also illogical. A phy-

sician reasoning in the same way would deliberately disregard his patients' histories in order to assure them all equal treatment.

A second justification commonly offered for not taking positive action to integrate schools is the lack of evidence that better racial balance leads to better learning, and it must be conceded that solid, objective evidence on this question is difficult if not impossible to find. The number of Negro children from deprived circumstances who have attended schools that were both integrated and educationally sound is still so small and the period of integration so brief that neither provides more than a limited basis for study. Because the Negro children with the longest experience in good integrated institutions have more often come from relatively fortunate and upwardly mobile families, their performance, although interesting, is only partly relevant to the task of equalizing opportunities for those who are both segregated and otherwise disadvantaged.

Moreover, even when better statistical data become available, it should not be expected that they will furnish, *per se*, a firm basis for policy. The purpose of school integration is not merely, or even primarily, to raise the quantitative indices of scholastic achievement among Negro children, although such gains are obviously to be valued and sought. The main objective is rather to alter the character and quality of their opportunities, to provide the incentive to succeed, and to foster a sense of intergroup acceptance in ways that are impossible where schools or students are racially, socially, and culturally isolated. The simplest statement of the situation to which school policy must respond is that few if any American Negro children can now grow up under conditions comparable to those of white children and that of all the means of improvement subject to public control the most powerful is the school. The Negro child must have a chance to be educated in a school where it is clear to him and to everybody else that he is not segregated and where his undisputed right to membership is acknowledged, publicly and privately, by his peers and his elders of both races. Although his acceptance and his progress may at first be delayed, not even a decent beginning toward comparable circumstances can be made until an integrated setting is actually established.

Some important gains may come rather quickly in newly integrated schools, but lasting changes in the deep-seated behavior patterns of children and parents of both races cannot realistically be expected to take place overnight. The effects of fourteen generations of discrimination, deprivation, and separation are not likely

to disappear quickly. What a school has to boast about at the end of the next grading period is somewhat less crucial than what happens to the quality of living in America during the next generation. School integration will, of course, be more productive when parallel improvements are made in housing, economic opportunities, and the general social condition of Negro Americans; but the absence of adequate effort elsewhere only increases the urgency that prompt and energetic action be taken by the school.

The effort to identify and define *de facto* segregation, particularly where school enrollment is predominantly if not wholly of a single race, has led to the concept of racial "balance." While no single ratio of races can be established as universally "right," there is no doubt that when the number or proportion of Negro children in a school exceeds a certain level the school becomes less acceptable to both white and Negro parents. The point at which that shift begins is not clear, nor are the reasons for the variation adequately understood, but the results that typically follow are all too familiar: an accelerated exodus of white families; an influx of Negroes; increased enrollment, frequently to the point of overcrowding; growing dissatisfaction among teachers and the replacement of veterans by inexperienced or unqualified junior instructors.

Although there are no completely satisfactory measures of segregation or imbalance, several tests are applicable. The simplest is to ask whether a particular school is viewed by the community as a "Negro" school. Whether the school is assumed to "belong" to a Negro neighborhood or merely to be the one that Negroes "just happen" to attend, whether it has been provided expressly for a Negro population, or has gradually acquired a student body disproportionately composed of Negroes, the typical consequences of segregation can be predicted.

In gauging the degree of segregation or imbalance, the percentage or number of Negro students in a given building is usually less important than the relation of the school to the entire system of which it is a part. As Robert Carter has so cogently argued, it is the substantial isolation of Negro and white students from each other rather than the numbers involved that produces the implication of differential status and prevents the association that is the indispensable basis for mutual understanding and acceptance.²

One set of guidelines for correcting such situations has been proposed by the New York State Education Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions:

In establishing school attendance areas one of the objectives should be to create in each school a student body that will represent as nearly as possible the cross section of the population of the entire school district but with due consideration also for other important educational criteria including such practical matters as the distance children must travel from home to school.³

Although it would be impossible in a sizable district to create or maintain in every school a student body that reflects precisely the racial composition of the total district, the cross section criterion offers an appropriate yardstick.

Most of the proposals for dealing with the issue attempt to strike workable compromises between desirable ideals and practical possibilities. The same Committee in a 1964 report⁴ defined a school in New York City as segregated when any single racial group comprised more than 90 per cent of the enrollment.

A more flexible criterion was used by Robert Dentler in a 1965 study.⁵ Using the borough as the reference point, he proposed that a school be considered segregated if the proportion of any racial group in its student body is less than half or more than twice the proportion that group represents in the total population. Thus, in Brooklyn, where Negroes comprise 15 per cent of the population, a school would be classified as "Negro segregated" when Negro enrollment reached 30 per cent. Since Puerto Ricans form about 8 per cent of the borough population, a school would be "Puerto Rican" segregated if it enrolled 16 per cent or more pupils of that background. Conversely, a school enrolling fewer than 6 per cent Negro students or 2 per cent Puerto Rican students would be designated as "white segregated." Dealing with the issue in Chicago, Robert Havighurst⁶ defines an integrated school as one enrolling at least 60 per cent white students.

II

The dilemma of definition cannot be entirely avoided, but far more important is the creation and retention of student bodies that will be considered acceptably integrated by the largest possible number of persons in both races. As the New York City report pointed out, an essential test of any plan for desegregation "must be its mutual acceptance by both minority group and whites. It should be obvious, but does not always appear to be, that integration is impossible without white pupils. No plan can be acceptable, there-

fore, which increases the movement of white pupils out of the public schools. Neither is it acceptable, however, unless it contributes to desegregation."⁷

Of the administrative schemes for bringing children of both races together the most widely used is "open enrollment," under which pupils are allowed to transfer from schools that are segregated or overcrowded to others in the district. The receiving school may be one with a better degree of racial balance, or its enrollment may simply be smaller than its capacity. While open enrollment reduces congestion in the sending schools, allows parents wider choice, and improves integration in the receiving schools, its usefulness, especially for poor children, is sharply reduced unless transportation is furnished at public expense. Freedom of choice is also more effective when it is supplemented by special counseling services and by the careful preparation of pupils, teachers, and parents of the receiving school.

In large cities open-enrollment plans have uniformly been found to affect only a small percentage of Negro students. In Baltimore, where relatively free choice of schools (subject to legal segregation) was standard practice before 1954, open enrollment became the sole basis for desegregation following the *Brown* decision. In the school year 1954-55 only about 3 per cent of the Negro students transferred to formerly white schools.⁸ In subsequent years the number of integrated schools and the percentage of pupils enrolled in them steadily rose, but much of the change was due to the continued expansion of the Negro residential areas.

For readily understandable reasons, the free choice policy affects younger and older pupils differently. Most parents, and especially those in restricted circumstances, prefer to send elementary-age children to the nearest school, regardless of its condition. Families in more affluent circumstances are ordinarily willing to accept the added inconvenience and expense of transportation to get their children into better schools, but the regrettable fact is that if opportunity is to be equalized by traveling it is invariably the slum children who must accept the inconvenience of going to where the more fortunate already are.

At the secondary level, distance is less of an obstacle. This is one of the reasons that in New York City in 1963, when 22 per cent of the elementary schools and 19 per cent of the junior high schools were found to be segregated, by the same criteria only one of the eighty-six senior high schools was segregated.⁹

The most tightly structured approach to desegregation, the Princeton Plan, achieves racial balance by pairing adjacent imbalanced schools, the combined attendance areas being treated as a single unit and the pupils being divided between the schools by grade rather than by residence. The advantages are clear: Both schools are integrated, and each is enabled to concentrate upon a narrower span of grades. There are also disadvantages. Travel time is increased for approximately half the children and transportation may be required, each school's established identity and its relations with its neighborhood are altered, and large-scale faculty transfers may be required. In addition, the possibility that white families will choose to leave the community becomes an uncertain hazard in every such situation.

Early and largely impressionistic evaluations of pairing suggest that the device may be more appropriate in smaller communities with only a few elementary schools than in larger places where neighborhood patterns and rates of residential change are more complex. One analysis¹⁰ of the probable result of pairing twenty-one sets of elementary schools in New York City showed that, at most, the proportion of segregated schools would have been reduced from 22 to 21 per cent.

A more comprehensive method of correcting imbalance is the re-zoning of all the attendance areas of a school system in order to obtain simultaneously a viable racial balance and reasonable travel time for all the pupils. Re-zoning and the related practice of revising the "feeder" patterns by which graduates of lower schools move on to junior or senior high schools are usually more practicable in closely populated communities than in less compact suburbs where travel distances are greater.

Among the more recent innovations is the "educational complex" proposed for the New York City schools.¹¹ The term denotes a group of schools serving differing racial constituencies and consisting typically of one or two junior high schools and their feeding elementary units. The attendance areas of the individual schools are not changed, but within the complex a variety of joint activities may be undertaken to bring the pupils, teachers, and parents into closer association. Programs and services that cannot be offered uniformly in all of the schools may be centered in one or two of the buildings and pupils transported to them as necessary. Faculty specialists may be shared by more than one building and common problems met cooperatively. Parents of two or more of the schools

working together may bridge over old neighborhood lines that inhibit communication and joint action. The "complex" offers unusual possibilities for countering the effect of segregated housing. By retaining the advantages of neighborhood schools while introducing the social opportunities of a more diversified community, it offers children and parents a chance to try new experiences without totally abandoning the security of their familiar attachments.

Of all the schemes proposed for desegregating urban schools, the boldest and most imaginative is the educational park.¹² The rationale of the park rests on the hypothesis that the effect on the school of pockets of segregated housing will be offset if an attendance area can be made large enough to include white and Negro populations in balanced proportions. Thus, all the pupils of a greatly enlarged zone, perhaps 10,000 or more (in a medium-sized city, the entire school population), would be accommodated on a single site or park. Within the park, which could range all the way from a 100 acre campus with many separate buildings to a single high-rise structure covering a city block, students would be assigned to relatively small units, each maintained as a separate school in which teachers and pupils would work closely and continuously together. The distribution of students among the smaller units would be made without regard to the location of their homes but with the purpose of making each school as well integrated as possible.

Beyond these general outlines, there is little agreement on what an educational park should be. One view is that the full grade range should be included, from nursery school to community college. Others propose that a park serve one or two levels, perhaps elementary and junior high schools, or a comprehensive secondary program of three, four, or six years. New York City has examined the feasibility of using middle-school parks for grades five to eight, retaining small neighborhood schools for pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, and primary programs.

With such a combination, children and parents would be introduced to the public schools first in their own neighborhoods, where familiar relationships, short distances, and close home-school ties would be at their maximum. In these primary centers each child, depending on his age at entry, would spend four to seven years, and some children a longer period, receiving fundamental preparation that primary education at its best should provide. Remedial

services, compensatory curricula, and enriched programs would be available to all who need them. At the fifth grade, each pupil would move on to the middle-school park where for the first time his classmates, now drawn from a much wider area, would reflect the diversity of a truly common school and, hopefully, a genuinely integrated one. All high schools, under this proposal, would operate under a city-wide policy of free choice for all students, subject only to such restrictions as were needed to prevent overcrowding and to respect requirements for admission to specialized programs.

One criticism of the educational park is the excessively high costs that some associate with it. A single site and the construction required to house 10,000 pupils need be no greater, however, than the combined cost of ten sites and buildings for a thousand pupils each. Indeed, a larger site located on relatively open and cheaper land might well be less costly to assemble than comparable acreage in congested sections. The total operating costs for a single, well-managed park should be lower than those for several separate units. In almost every case, however, a large proportion of the pupils would have to be transported and the cost of that service financed as a new expense. As in any other new venture, the increased outlay required must be set against the anticipated return. In a well conceived educational park the better education and the improved social situation that may be expected offer future assets of substantial value.

Beside the possibilities for accomplishing school integration must be set the deterrents that currently retard the process, of which the most visible and powerful is the concept of the neighborhood school. Although the close identification of a school with its immediate community produces results beneficial to both, the battles now being fought in the name of that relationship, and sometimes for virtual possession of particular schools, obscure fundamental principles. The public school is the property not of its neighborhood but of the school district. Since the district itself is created by the state, it is quite reasonable to argue that both title and control rest ultimately with the people of the state as a whole. However commendable the interest of a neighborhood in its school may be, concern is not to be confused with proprietary control. Subject to the state's supervision, the school board alone is legally empowered to determine for any school whose children shall be admitted and whose excluded.

The neighborhood school is essentially an administrative device

designed to assure all the children of a district equal educational opportunity and equal access to it. When the device ceases to serve those functions, and especially when its use is so distorted that it frustrates rather than furthers the primary purpose, it is the device rather than the purpose that must give way.

It is a curious coincidence that during the very period that city and suburban neighborhood schools have been gaining an almost sacrosanct status, the rural sections in which such schools were first established have been abandoning them. The neighborhood school in its original and most authentic form, the one-room schoolhouse, has been disappearing from the United States at the rate of 3,000 a year for the last half century. Despite understandable misgivings about school consolidation, rural parents by the millions have exchanged their nearby schools and the intensely local form of control many of them embody for the superior instruction and broader educational experiences more comprehensive institutions offer. They have learned that, despite its relative remoteness from the neighborhood, the consolidated school not only provides a broader curriculum, better books and equipment, and abler teachers, but, by drawing its pupils from a wider and more varied attendance area, also furnishes them an outlook upon the world that is impossible in the more homogeneous society of the local school.

City and suburban schools meanwhile have gone in quite the opposite direction, becoming steadily more segregated not only by race but also by social and economic level. The momentum of this movement creates one of the principal forces opposing integration in schools and communities. Combined with more common forms of racial prejudice, segregated housing, and repressive economic practices, the growing social stratification of the public school carries the most serious implications for the future of American society.

Despite the generous lip service that the common school has traditionally received, it is a clear fact that, in many parts of the country, substantial minorities of American children at both extremes of the social scale have not been educated in schools that could, by any reasonable criteria, be called inclusive. Yet the complementary truth is that the vast majority of our citizens, the white ones, at any rate, have been brought up in schools that "everybody" was expected to attend. Whether the connection between such childhood experiences and the health of a democratic society is still or ever was as close as Horace Mann held it to be, is beyond explicit demonstration. But whether an open society can be main-

tained and, even more to the present point, whether a hitherto excluded group can be brought into the full enjoyment of citizenship without the instrumentality of the common school, are questions this country cannot much longer evade. On so complex a matter, clear causal relationships are difficult to establish, but the correlation between the rise of the common school and the development of an open society in the United States is, to say the least, impressive. Before we accept by default or support by intent the trend toward stratified public education it would be well at least to project and appraise the probable consequences.

A second force impeding integration, in certain respects the first writ large, is generated by the growth of solidly white suburban communities around the heavily congested urban centers into which the Negro population finds itself channeled and confined. The "white noose" not only prevents the outward dispersion of Negroes but equally, if less directly, discourages white families from remaining in the city. As population density and neighborhood depression worsen, larger numbers of families with the freedom to choose and the power to act abandon both the city and its schools.

The steady increase of urban segregation, the growing ghettos, and the declining attractiveness of the city for all groups produce problems whose magnitude and complexity carry them beyond the control of separate localities. Every day the deteriorating situation emphasizes more strongly the need for a total reappraisal of city-suburban relationships. If the present trend is allowed to continue, the difficulties that now plague the central city can be expected inevitably—and soon—to trouble entire metropolitan areas. The almost total segregation of the incorporated area, the political entity officially called the city, is hardly an acceptable alternative to the systematic desegregation of the total social and economic network that is in fact the city. It becomes constantly more evident that, unless steps are taken to bring about a better dispersion and integration of Negro citizens throughout metropolitan areas, direct action will be required to equalize educational opportunities and the process of school integration between the cities and their suburbs. This responsibility for re-examining urban-suburban racial imbalance and its locus is implied by a sentence in the *Brown* decision: "Such an opportunity [to secure an education] where the state has undertaken to provide it is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." If the right to equal treatment in the schools, including freedom from racial segregation, overrides, as it does, statutes placing

children in particular schools, the question naturally arises whether that right is to be restricted indefinitely by statutes that fix lines between local jurisdictions.

III

Imaginative and forthright action to bring as many children as possible into integrated schools as rapidly as possible is an urgent necessity, but it would be grossly unrealistic to assume that integration can be accomplished everywhere in the foreseeable future. In the borough of Manhattan 78 per cent of the public elementary-school pupils are Negro and Puerto Rican. Immediate and total integration could be accomplished there only by closing most of the schools in Manhattan and distributing their pupils among the remaining boroughs or by setting up a vast "exchange" system to move hundreds of thousands of children daily in both directions between Manhattan and other parts of the city. Quite aside from the sheer administrative and teaching problems such an operation would pose, little imagination is needed to predict the virtually unanimous objection of parents.

Important progress can be made, however, on the periphery of segregated communities, through the procedures described earlier and by energetic efforts to concentrate on the possible instead of deploring the impossible. When all the possibilities are exploited and new ones ingeniously devised, there will still remain many ghetto schools in which integration is simply not feasible. In those places, the only reasonable action is the massive improvement of schools to educate children where they are.

It is unhappily true, as Kenneth Clark points out,¹⁸ that to ask for good schools in the ghetto is to risk the charge that one acquiesces in segregation. Yet, even though supporting better schools in ghettos has become a favorite ploy of the advocates of separate equality, that fact does not justify neglecting ghetto children. Indeed, many of these children are already so badly victimized by deprivation and neglect that, if integration were instantly possible, strong remedial and compensatory programs would still be necessary to give them any reasonable chance to compete or to succeed.

In designing educational strategies to meet the special needs of Negro ghetto children the public schools are undertaking tasks they have never really faced up to before. The curricula of slum schools have almost invariably been no more than adapted versions of those

designed for middle-class pupils. Even now, a number of the changes being introduced into slum schools involve little more than efforts to apply to the ghetto, although somewhat more effectively and more intensively, the characteristic practices of middle-class schools: smaller classes to teach traditional subjects; more time for reading, using standard readers; increased guidance service employing the customary techniques.

Such projects to multiply and intensify established procedures are by no means wholly wasteful or necessarily wrong. Kenneth Clark¹⁴ insists with considerable justification that the change most needed in slum schools is an elevation of the teachers' expectations of the children. The main reason, he argues, that Negro students rank low academically is that too many teachers and the "system" as a whole consider them uneducable.

However much ghetto children could gain from proper motivation and a decent respect for their potentiality, strong encouragement and high expectation are not enough. No teacher can hope to teach effectively or fairly unless he differentiates between the child whose environment re-enforces the school's influence and the one whose out-of-school world is rarely even so good as neutral and more often is severely damaging. While much can be said for holding both children to the same level of expectation, it is hardly realistic to assume that both will reach it with equal personal effort and the same assistance from the school. The child suffering unusual deprivation would appear obviously to require—and to deserve—unusual attention. The extent to which the special help should be compensatory, or remedial, or unusually stimulating is, of course, a suitable subject of investigation and debate; but that it must be particularly adapted to the child who is victimized by his environment would seem self-evident.

A growing volume of research not only documents the relationship between a child's cultural environment and his school success but also illuminates with increasing clarity the crucial importance of the early years. Benjamin Bloom¹⁵ has examined many of the pertinent studies in the field and estimates that the difference between a culturally deprived and a culturally abundant environment can affect a child's IQ by an average of twenty points, half of the difference being attributable to the influences of the first four years and as much as six points to the next four. After another comprehensive survey, J. McVicker Hunt¹⁶ concludes that while the notion of cultural deprivation is still gross and undifferentiated, the con-

cept holds much promise. He considers it entirely possible to arrange institutional settings in which culturally handicapped children can encounter experiences that will compensate for what they may have missed. Martin Deutsch,¹⁷ whose work has included extended experimentation with such children, has found that those with some preschool experience attain significantly higher intelligence-test scores at the fifth grade than do children of the same background who did not have the experience.

Opinions differ as to the type of preschool program that offers the most fruitful compensation to slum children. One approach assumes that ordinary home-supplementing nursery schools designed for middle-class children will also help the deprived youngster. A second concentrates on preparing the culturally deprived child for school by teaching him to follow directions and to use such things as toys, pencils, crayons, and books. A third approach begins with the view that the culturally deprived child differs fundamentally from others in self-concept, language values, and perceptual processes and offers specialized programs to compensate for the deleterious effects of his lean environment.

While there are still no systematic comparisons of the relative effectiveness of these different programs, two generalizations can be stated with some assurance. One is that preschool programs do appear to be effective in raising intelligence-test scores, vocabulary level, expressive ability, arithmetic reasoning, and reading readiness.

The second is that the results do not run uniformly in one direction. A study made in the Racine public schools¹⁸ reports that:

Potentially the most useful conclusion which can be drawn . . . is that "one shot" compensatory programs would seem to be a waste of time and money. The fact that differences between groups disappeared and that in several areas the rate of growth of both groups regressed during the traditional first grade years supports this contention.

If these implications are supported by future research, it would seem that curriculum revision over the entire twelve year school curriculum is a necessary part of any lasting solution to the basic problem of urban public school education.

The Racine finding bears out what anyone experienced in slum schools would probably have predicted. Any such teacher knows that the moment the child steps outside, at whatever age, he is caught again in the cultural downdraft of the street and all too often of the home itself. Efforts to compensate within the school must, therefore, begin at the earliest possible age and continue with

steady and strong consistency throughout the whole length of the child's school career.

One outstanding example of what may be done in the upper grades was the Demonstration Guidance Project,¹⁹ initiated in 1956 in New York's Junior High School 43 located on the edge of Harlem. The principal aim of the project was to identify and stimulate potentially able pupils and to help them reach levels of performance more nearly consistent with their capacities. The project students, all selected because they were thought to possess latent academic aptitude and most of them from disadvantaged backgrounds, were placed in small classes, given double periods daily in English, and tutored in small groups. Intensive counseling, clinical services, and social work were provided, and regular contact was maintained with the parents. Scholastic achievement was stressed and special efforts made to prepare the students for college or jobs. Visits were conducted to museums, theaters, concerts, the ballet, and places of special interest in New York and elsewhere. The program was continued into the George Washington Senior High School and the last experimental group graduated in 1960. After three and a half years of this special attention, these students, most of whom would ordinarily have been considered poor academic risks, showed substantial gains over their own earlier records, and over the usual performance of students from the same school. Of one hundred five in one group, seventy-eight showed an increase in IQ, sixty-four gaining ten points or more. The median for the entire group rose in the three-year period from 92.9 to 102.2. Against a previous average for their school of 47 per cent, 64 per cent earned high-school diplomas. Three students ranked first, fourth, and sixth in their class; two and one-half times as many as in previous classes went to college, and three and one-half times as many to some form of further education.

On a modified and reduced scale, the Demonstration Guidance Project was subsequently introduced as the Higher Horizons Program to other schools in New York City with results that have been comparably positive if somewhat less spectacular.

IV

Special programs to meet the needs of deprived children have been undertaken in a number of school systems. A project in the Banneker Group of the St. Louis school system has stressed the

teaching of reading, English, and arithmetic. Particular attention was directed to the motivation of the pupils, to setting standards of performance. The support of parents was solicited, and their pride in their children's accomplishments was stimulated. By the end of the third year of the project the achievement of Banneker eighth graders equalled or exceeded national norms in reading and language and fell only one month short in arithmetic. In the years immediately preceding, the comparable scores had ranged from one to two years below the national norms. The theme of the Banneker project is expressed by Samuel Sheppard, the administrator who conceived it, in his instructions to teachers: "Quit teaching by I. Q. and the neighborhood where the child lives. Teach the child all you can teach him."²⁰

Detroit set up a new effort during the 1960-61 academic year with some 10,000 elementary and secondary pupils, mainly in the Negro residential areas, concentrating not only on the children but also on work with parents and teachers. A principal aim was to modify teachers' perceptions of children with limited backgrounds. The program included curriculum revision, re-organized teaching schedules, tutoring, home visiting, and supplementary activities for pupils during after-schools hours and summer months.

A Pittsburgh project centered in the "Hill" district employed team teaching to improve instruction in reading and the language arts.

Virtually every large school system in the country and many of the smaller ones are now attacking the problem of the culturally deprived child, but the volume of well-intentioned activity still substantially exceeds the amount of imaginative and well-designed research that is being done to analyze and appraise the innovations. Until the quality of experimental design and research matches the quantity of sheer energy being devoted to the task, much of the energy is certain to be wasted and potentially valuable information and insights to be lost.

A field in which further study and fresh thinking are badly needed is vocational education, where the long-standing practice of separating vocational students from those in academic programs has more recently been compounded by the effects of racial imbalance. The result has been to render vocational programs in some schools all but useless. The field has suffered also because many schools have adhered too long and too closely to the concepts of curriculum and organization developed forty years ago. The tragically high rate

of unemployment among Negro youth is only one of urgent reasons for the early and thorough reform of this essential part of American education.

In higher education impressive progress in some institutions has diverted attention from the massive obstacles that remain to be overcome. While a detailed discussion of this situation is beyond the scope of this paper it is relevant to emphasize the reciprocal relationship between accomplishments by Negroes in colleges and universities and the improvement of elementary and secondary schools, a prominent element in this relationship being the supply of well-prepared Negro teachers. Hard facts on the relative competence of white graduates and Negro graduates of teacher education programs are not easy to secure, but such evidence as has come to light, most of it subjective, suggests that much remains to be done to equalize the quality of programs and the availability of places in first-rate schools. Despite the fact that thousands of Negro teachers have attained high levels of professional competence and status, many others who hold teaching certificates are unable to obtain employment even in schools that want Negro teachers, because of their inability to compete with other applicants. A largely similar situation prevails in graduate-school admissions.

McGrath's study of Negro colleges²¹ provides part of the explanation and suggests directions in which some of the answers must be sought: the prompt and substantial upgrading of faculties, curricula, libraries, laboratories, and physical facilities of the colleges that serve predominantly Negro student bodies and enroll more than half the Negro college students of the country.

Another important part of the solution must be found in programs in high school and between high school and college to furnish the supplemental instruction that many Negro students require in order to qualify for first-rate institutions. The encouraging reports of such programs as those conducted by the National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students,²² as well as by a number of the institutions themselves, indicate what special effort and thoughtful planning toward that end can accomplish.

"A grand mental and moral experiment," Horace Mann once called free schools,²³ "whose effects could not be developed and made manifest in a single generation."

For the Negro American, the development of those effects has taken a good deal longer—far too much longer—than was required

to make them manifest for his white countrymen. The knowledge that the Negro's right to education has been restricted is no new discovery, but what is new is the growing consciousness that what has been withheld from him has impoverished the whole people.

The argument for enlarging the opportunities and enhancing the status of the Negro minority goes far beyond extending a modicum more of charity to the poor. The appeal to equity and to the humane principles that undergird the democratic enterprise is the heart of the matter, to be sure, but the evidence is now irrefutable that until each American has full access to the means to develop his capacities every other American's chances and attainments will continue to be diminished.

That this relationship should become so critically significant in a time characterized by technological progress may seem paradoxical; yet it is that progress and the insatiable demand it generates for intellectual competence that now re-enforces our long-standing moral obligation to re-examine the standards by which we live as a society.

The detailed problems of procedure which flow from this obligation impose a complex array of tasks upon the network of the arts, the sciences, the humanities, and the professional specialities that contribute knowledge and skill to the educational establishment. But here, too—here especially—the prior question and the transcendent issue are moral: What ought we to be doing?

If the educational and political leadership of the country can muster the strength of conscience to face that query forthrightly and honestly, there are abundant grounds for optimism that the subsidiary tasks will become both more clearly visible and more readily feasible.

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ROBERT A. DENTLER

Barriers to Northern School Desegregation

The Current Scene

NORTHERN PUBLIC schools, from kindergarten to the graduate level, have been racially segregated on an extensive scale since the Reconstruction. Statistics have been collected by communities and states only since the Brown decision in 1954, but these show that *hundreds* of elementary and secondary schools in the Northeast and the Midwest have student bodies composed of more than 90 per cent Negroes.

The racial census released by the New York Education Department in 1962 is typical. Twenty elementary schools outside of New York City had over 90 per cent Negro pupils; forty-six had more than 50 per cent. A total of 103 was 31 per cent or more Negro.¹ And this was true in a state in which the proportion of Negroes within the total population of all but a few communities is less than 15 per cent!

In the largest survey of school segregation in the North to date,² 200 public school systems were studied. These were in towns spread across nineteen states, which included 75 per cent of the Negro population in the North. Some 1,141 schools were listed as having nonwhite enrollments of 60 per cent or more. About 60 per cent of these segregated schools were clustered in six of the larger cities: New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, and Los Angeles. Most of the others were located in other large central cities or in neighboring suburbs. School segregation is thus so pronounced in certain cities in the North that if public schools are placed on a scale from all white pupils to all Negro, the great majority of them will cluster at the far extremes. Mixed student bodies are very uncommon.

However, as the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in June 1965, a public school need not be all or even 80 per cent Negro in order

to be racially segregated. A school is racially segregated if the ratio of Negro to white students is substantially in excess of the ratio common to the community as a whole.³ This definition applies to a school that is 50 per cent Negro in a community where Negroes comprise 20 per cent of the total population. It also includes a school that is 95 per cent white in the same community.

Minority segregated public schools in the North tend quite uniformly to have poorer facilities, less qualified staff, and inferior programs of instruction than majority segregated schools.⁴ Even when differences in facilities are eliminated, minority segregation impedes both teaching and learning. Attendance at a minority segregated public school tends to reinforce the damage already experienced by children maturing in a milieu drenched with discriminatory stimuli. Indeed, attendance at a racially segregated public school is probably harmful whether the segregation is minority or majority. The isolation experienced by students in all-white schools stimulates ignorance, fear, and prejudice, just as it confirms the self-belief in inferiority among students in all-Negro schools.⁵

Protests were lodged by Negro groups against school segregation in the North on many occasions between 1917 and 1954. But the Brown decision brought awareness among educational decision-makers to a new focal point.⁶ Only in the last decade have the gravity and scope of the problem been identified, solutions advanced, and resistance to change mobilized.

We are presently in the eye of a Northern storm of community conflict. The issue has been joined; it has become a one-sided question with but one set of social facts, all of which indicate that Negro racial segregation in schools is bad, and most that white segregation is bad, too. It has become a matter which *must* be dealt with if racial and cultural cleavages are to be resolved and if social inclusiveness within cultural pluralism is to be achieved. Moreover, the elimination of school segregation has, like all serious modern social problems, become an issue illuminated by an awareness of attendant costs: If school desegregation is to be achieved, public education, its political context, and its fiscal support must be changed too, in ways that are demanding, even harsh.

The pace of racial integration in Northern schools has been equivalent to that of integration in Southern schools, although the Southern pace quickened enormously with the incentive of federal aid in 1965. Most cities and suburbs in the six Northern states with a Negro population of 5 per cent or more contain at least one minor-

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ity segregated school. Five to ten of these have been eliminated each year since 1960, while new ones crop up to replace them as populations redistribute. If no new rate of change develops, the North will exhibit deep and extensive racial segregation in its urban schools as late as the middle of the next century.

The Smaller Communities

There is little point in talking about Northern school segregation as a uniform condition. More than two-thirds of all the racially segregated public schools in the North are located in ten of the largest cities. There, population density, the hardening of ghetto boundaries, the class structure, and political organization, all militate powerfully against school desegregation. These must be distinguished from the hundreds of smaller urban communities where desegregation is not only as desirable but more feasible.

The communities in the North where school desegregation has been agreed upon and sometimes implemented effectively are all smaller cities and suburbs. Berkeley, California, is one.⁷ There, the Board of Education authorized a citizens' committee to recommend approaches to the problem of segregation as early as 1958. The committee was established after pressure from the Berkeley chapter of the NAACP. It made several good suggestions, none of which was implemented effectively, however, for several years.

But in 1962, the Berkeley Superintendent, responding to pressure from CORE and to growing convictions about the educational undesirability of school segregation, secured his board's authorization of another citizens' committee. This group worked for nearly a year. It defined *de facto* school segregation as extant in any public school whose white to nonwhite ratio "varies significantly from the same ratio of the District as a whole." With this yardstick, the committee found that three elementary schools, one junior high school, and the high school were not segregated, while sixteen schools were.

The committee asserted that this condition was bad, blamed it on the concept of neighborhood schools and on housing patterns, and proposed ten programs for its elimination. These included redistricting, pairing of some schools, open enrollment, a program of curricular improvement, and the strengthening of services and facilities. Some of these potentially transformative proposals were implemented, including positive, fairly radical changes in the com-

position of junior high schools. Indicative of the mood of the community is the fact that, in 1964, two members of the Berkeley school board were re-elected in a recall election.

White Plains, New York, offers a comparable illustration and, as an Eastern community, is more relevant to the problem of Northern school segregation than is Berkeley.⁸ The Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools in White Plains were aware of "racial imbalance" in their system as early as 1961; they had instituted special services in the one elementary school which was roughly two-thirds Negro, and they had made a few minor adjustments as early as 1962. Beyond a concern with compensatory education and related services, however, there was little professional readiness to define school segregation as salient.

Two forces converged to change this. The Negro leadership of White Plains and the officers of the New York State Education Department in Albany exerted persuasive pressure. The leadership threatened political action, and the state officials offered assistance, advice, and a flow of information showing how school segregation (always referred to in communications as "racial imbalance") impaired public education. The Superintendent and his Board then began carefully planned but prompt, unanimous action to desegregate. They acted during 1964, the same year in which the Superintendent became convinced that "racial imbalance" was a blight on the level of professional performance of his administration and teaching staff. Had this redefinition not occurred, it is unlikely that change would have taken place.

Other small cities have desegregated their public schools during the last five years in response to similar political and educational administrative pressures, or for different yet functionally equivalent reasons. Englewood, New Jersey, and New Rochelle, New York, for example, desegregated under court orders. Other towns have desegregated for essentially social reasons, such as population change, special real-estate conditions, or cultural values. Greenburgh, New York, is a case in point. There, in one of four districts, school integration began early and has become a source of social pride.

From participation in several school desegregation programs in smaller Northern communities, I would speculate that there are some rather uniform conditions under which desegregation becomes *possible* politically and educationally. Negroes must protest in a visible, unequivocal manner. This protest must resonate positively with some segment of the white population which already

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commands the attention of local schoolmen or board members.

Of equal importance is a clear, sufficiently intense stimulus from state or other extra-local authorities. Little change has occurred in Pennsylvania and Illinois, where many smaller cities maintain segregated schools because of weak state educational agencies. It also seems plain from case experiences that a community must be free from a very highly *stratified* class structure grounded substantially in religious or racial groupings. The prospect of too severe a change in the foundations of the local structure of social rewards is relatively certain to prevent school desegregation.

Illustrating Barriers in Smaller Cities

We can best depict these conditions and connect them with impediments to change within the school systems themselves through details from a case study of a smaller city on the Northeastern seaboard which moved to the edge of school integration but then drew back and renewed its efforts to preserve its historic ghetto. We shall call the community "Little City."

Interviews documented the belief that the *status quo* system of race relations persists in Little City, that the system is old and durable, and that most Negroes as well as whites in the community subscribe to and reinforce it, in spite of its disadvantages.

This *status quo* is common to hundreds of established, thriving Northern communities. Under it, Negroes are tolerated by whites and there is cooperation as long as the minorities accept the confines of what is a partial caste system. Whites assume that Negroes "prefer" to live in the Bilbo Area Ghetto (although a few families are sprinkled elsewhere in other low-income blocks). They also presume that Negroes will share unequally in the resources and services of the community, but that few Little City Negroes will ever aspire to upper-level occupational positions. They will instead aspire toward, and then be employed in, service and lower semi-skilled jobs.

There are, in other words, *niches* for Negroes in the residential, resource, and job structures of the community. The value of the *niches* to Negroes is dual. They supply more opportunities than are available in some other localities, and they are equal to those available to a small proportion of low-income whites within Little City. Historically, the *status quo* has been maintained because Negroes have fared better in Little City than they have reason to expect

they might fare elsewhere. In exchange, they have maintained polite civil relations.

This pattern has been challenged in Little City within the last few years. Nearly all Little City parents are aware of this challenge. A majority, regardless of race, try to suppress this awareness by attributing it to the work of CORE or other "outside trouble-makers." The attempt fails, however, for the same parents have internalized the message from the nation at large that a fundamental change in race relations is taking place.

All of the imagery of school segregation among parents concentrates upon the Bilbo Street School and neighborhood, in spite of the zoning change and the fraction of Negroes located in other neighborhoods. Generally, most parents think of Bilbo as having a sound enough physical plant and as *equal* to all other Little City schools in quality of services. Some combine the two ideas and think of the Bilbo School as slightly superior to some other schools. A few Bilbo parents and a smaller minority of others say openly that the Bilbo School staff is inferior and, more significantly, that Negro children are less well educated than whites within the Bilbo School. Most Little City parents favor current school zones and desire *no change* in the future. They view the neighborhood schools as the best of all possible arrangements; they believe that revising the neighborhood concept would reduce Negro progress and produce added evils such as traffic hazards.

A few parents advance the idea that minor additional zoning changes and some "open enrollment" would be appropriate for Little City. About 20 per cent of the tax paying parents *favor* more change than this. Another 20 per cent would resist greater change with vigor, particularly if the concept of the neighborhood school, upon which the residential structure of the town is grounded, were altered drastically.

White parents in Little City, in the main, do not know what would be gained through school desegregation. In view of the saturation coverage of this question through the mass media, this suggests that they do not want to know. Most parents emphasize that Little City neighborhood schools at present all offer the same quality of education, that they use the same books and teach the same subjects. As one white father commented, "What difference would it make if 'they' sat next to a white child? How will they learn more that way?"

A majority of Little City parents believe, according to one of

them, that "There is no racial problem in Little City. Whatever trouble has developed has come from four or five hotheads who have turned this supposed problem into a political football." A Negro mother confirmed this interpretation: "I grew up in Little City and I have several children in school here and the schools give equal opportunity for all." A Negro couple followed this remark with the statement: "There is no racial issue here at all. If some people feel that there is, they are wrong or mistaken."

It is therefore not surprising that most parents see *no need* to search for desegregation. This indifference cuts two ways, however. At least half of the parents are vocally disposed to accept the Superintendent's and the Board's definitions of what is needed. They are tolerant of authority; they prefer clearly stated, authoritatively designed changes. They *trust* those in control of the public schools, and this trust extends into the area of race relations.

If the Board and the Superintendent announce that specific changes—short of radical revision of the neighborhood concept—are necessary, a majority of the parents would accept this definition of the situation at face value. Moreover, most parents believe that such changes are the province of the Board and the staff—that expert and authoritative leadership is requisite to decisions on problems of school segregation.

There are many ways in which segregation and any attempted resolution of it can touch off older social, economic, and religious tensions latent in the social organization of Little City. Neighborhood residents are aware of minute differences between localities; a sharply stratified class structure exists and will undergo stresses with changing racial balances.

In view of the nature and depth of these attitudes, planning for school integration and implementing even part of the plan must depend upon an exceptional convergence of counterforces. Little City, for instance, began to plan for integration because the State Commissioner of Education pressed for such action, because a secure, long-established local superintendent saw the value of desegregation as one part of a program of educational reconstruction, and because civil rights groups mustered an effective protest. These pressures were checked, however, by the death of the superintendent, by simultaneous changes in the composition of the school board, and through the failure of the civil rights supporters to sustain their protest over a two-year period. In other words, the requisite conditions for surmounting an entrenched partial caste

system, even in a single public institution such as education, are so elaborate as to be undone at any turn of events. The attitude structure of the public, Negro as well as white, is an enduring impediment, whether active or passive. In Little City, the views of teachers and other school officers were neither felt nor defined as relevant to the issue.

Fortunately, in the process of persuasion which leads smaller urban communities to decide to integrate public schools, the more salient conditions sometimes compensate for one another. Thus, a highly stratified local population with group interests invested deeply in maintaining school segregation may be moved nonetheless by firm sanctions from a state commissioner or superintendent. In New York State, for example, the present position of the Court of Appeals is that

The Board of Regents, under authority of section 207 of the Education Law, has declared racially imbalanced schools to be educationally inadequate. The commissioner, under sections 301 and 305 of the Education Law, has implemented this policy by directing local boards to take steps to eliminate racial imbalance. These decisions are final, absent a showing of pure arbitrariness. . . . Disagreement with the sociological, psychological and educational assumptions relied on by the commissioner cannot be evaluated by this court. Such arguments can only be heard in the Legislature, which has endowed the commissioner with an all but absolute power, or by the Board of Regents, who are elected by the Legislature and make public policy in the field of education.⁹

Differently weighted influences, then, can combine to induce desegregation of public schools. There is a ceiling on how much any one influence fostering desegregation can compensate for resistances. Even court orders and sanctions from state superintendents are insufficient if no other factors are aligned in support of local change.

Perhaps most important in smaller communities is the fact that technical solutions are available in abundance. Small districts can be merged, zones changed, buses introduced, or schools paired. Old buildings can be revised in use, and new ones can be introduced to provide extra degrees of freedom. Several reasonable courses of action toward school integration are ordinarily apparent.

Moreover, in smaller communities, a board's decision to integrate can be communicated to parents clearly and quickly, in combination with programs of social preparation and civic as well as school staff planning. A touch of ingenuity, or merely the adoption of successful features of neighboring systems, also enables smaller

communities to make school desegregation a time for improving educational programs in general—for upgrading the quality of instruction or staff or facilities. This prospect and stories of success in integration are gradually becoming commonplace in the professional journals and newsletters of teachers and schoolmen, so the trend should quicken over the next few years.

The Big Cities

An improved rate of change in school integration in the smaller communities contributes little to the acceleration of desegregation in the great central cities of the North. While the suburb of Englewood, New Jersey, eliminates a single segregated school and, over a period of a decade, evolves better school services as a result, neighboring New York City will continue to be burdened with hundreds of highly segregated public schools.

There are technical solutions to minority school segregation in the great cities, but they are few in number and generally drastic in effect upon both the clientele and the practitioners. Rezoning, district reorganization, pairing, free transfer, and open enrollment are valuable devices, but to have any effect upon the problem as a whole, these schemes must be applied in a system-wide and combined fashion.¹⁰ No one mechanism among these, and no combination of devices applied in some but not all sublocalities, will result in any significant change. Technical solutions attempted in pilot fashion thus far have failed or have proved ungeneralizable, because of population density in the big city ghettos and because of traffic congestion.

Several partially adequate technical solutions have been proposed for each of the larger Northern cities. The simplest of these is rationally planned assignment of pupils. Philip Hauser and others demonstrated in their report on the Chicago public schools that, if pupils were assigned to schools in terms of proximity and with full but not excessive utilization of seating capacities, many all-white public schools which are underutilized in that city would be desegregated, and many mainly Negro schools which are now overcrowded would be integrated and thinned out.¹¹ Rational use of seating capacity would probably reduce the level of school segregation within any one city by no more than 15 to 20 per cent. But, compared with a condition of no change, that is progress.

A second solution entails revising the building programs of city

systems so that the sites of all new and renovated structures are chosen with a view toward integration. This means a moratorium on the construction of schools *inside* burgeoning ghettos. Students would be transported in increasing numbers to schools located outside their neighborhoods. A third solution combines revision of building plans with the reorganization and combination of existing schools through pairing and complexes. In complexes, a series of neighboring schools engages in staff and student interchange.¹²

The two most promising technical solutions are also the most radical. One is the concept of the education park.¹³ Here, big city systems would abandon neighborhood schools (or use them for very different purposes, such as community centers) and erect consolidated facilities housing from 5,000 to 20,000 students. Such a campus-style institution would be located to draw its students from a very wide residential base, one broad enough, perhaps, to surmount long-term changes in class and ethnic settlements. A second, related idea is to *merge* mainly white suburban school districts with increasingly Negro inner-city districts. District mergers could be achieved by state authorities and could break through ancient patterns of residential restriction.

These proposals imply enormous transformations in the character of public schools. Under contemporary urban conditions, use tends to follow facility. That is to say, if a new kind of physical plant is erected, whether a park, a parking lot, or a new type of school building, enthusiastic users tend to follow. The programs of instruction within an education park, moreover, based as they would be upon new resources of centralized administration and greater staff specialization and flexibility of deployment, would be a major innovation.

For a time, critics of school segregation in the big cities believed the situation to be fairly hopeless. Imaginable solutions like those mentioned above were viewed as infeasible both politically and fiscally. As discontent with urban public schools deepens, and as federal and state aid prospects grow, radical solutions to segregation which have major implications for quality of instruction begin to intrigue critics, specialists, and policy-makers alike.

Not all modes of desegregation contribute to improvement in the quality of public education, nor are technical solutions, by themselves, sufficient to stimulate either integration or excellence of program. If these qualifications are kept in mind, however, it becomes apparent that durable, system-wide excellence in big city schools

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cannot be attained without integration, and that integration can serve not only the ideal of justice but also the urgent goal of better public instruction.

Sources of Resistance in Big Cities

Our view is thus that valuable technical solutions have been proposed and that fiscal resources for using them are becoming available. The political dialogue about school segregation rages in the big cities against this background of possibilities. Yet, little or no integration of public schools is taking place. After ten years of talk and five years of visible struggle, only Detroit among the six largest and educationally most segregated central cities of the North has made some progress. New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, among other major cities, are more severely segregated today than they were in 1954.

Partly, this is the direct outcome of the continuing northward migration of Negro families and the reciprocal flight of whites to the suburbs. Still, the evidence of virtual inactivity among city school boards (or rather the evidence of *no effort* save experiments with open enrollment, rezoning, and a handful of pairings) calls for more than a demographic interpretation.

We must look to the social and cultural bases of Northern big city life to understand why so little change has occurred. In the case of school segregation, especially, we must take into account the political context and the cultural milieu of urban public education. For example, in the great cities, any force toward desegregation is effectively countered by organized opposition. Big city school superintendents, however, get paid more, have better protective clauses in their contracts, command a greater power base, and receive clearer indications of the educational damages resulting from segregation. If a superintendent of a big city did define school segregation openly as a *major* educational issue, change toward integration would occur. Opposition can be squelched with counter-opposition.

Consider Chicago, where the role of the Superintendent, Benjamin C. Willis, illustrates the big city pattern. Superintendent Willis announced in 1963 that he considered proposals for altering neighborhood school boundaries in order to provide free choice to Negroes, or for transferring white students into mainly Negro schools, to be "ominous."¹⁴ He informed his Board of Education that,

in his judgment, the manipulation of attendance and assignment procedures might prove disastrous *educationally*. Radical tensions could increase as a result, he believed, and more white families might move out of the city and into the suburbs.

Plans to desegregate had been accumulating in Chicago since 1960. These were submerged in litigation, direct and occasionally even violent political action, the intervention by invitation and strategic intrusion of social scientists and educational experts from the universities and the nation at large, and upheavals within the Board and the Office of the Superintendent itself.

There emerged from this a characteristic Northern urban pattern. On August 28, 1963, the Chicago Board of Education resolved that some schools in the system were all-Negro in student composition, and that such "separation" might interfere with learning. The Board then appointed a distinguished Advisory Panel, including Philip Hauser, then Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, and Sterling McMurrin, former United States Commissioner of Education. They directed the Panel to suggest remedies.

The gap between Superintendent Willis and his own Board is suggested by one event at the same August meeting. The Board accepted Superintendent Willis's proposal to allow those pupils in the top 5 per cent of the city's high-school students to transfer to another high school—if their present school had no honors program. Even this petty proposal stimulated intense public reaction. After massive white picketing, and after negotiation and review, the parents of several transfer applicants filed suit in the local Superior Court, requesting the judge to issue a writ of mandamus against Superintendent Willis on the ground that he had withheld the certification of transfer. The Appellate Court upheld the order. In reply, Willis resigned in protest over the Court decision in order to show the irreconcilable difference between his Board and himself, for the Board had directed him to transfer the students.

Two days after Superintendent Willis resigned, the Illinois Chairman of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools warned the Chicago Board of Education that the city's high schools might lose their accreditation if he ever found that the Board had infringed on the Superintendent's administrative prerogatives. And, two days after this warning arrived, the Board voted to refuse Superintendent Willis's resignation. Later, the Board voted to reconsider its previous order directing Willis to transfer students. Willis then withdrew his resignation.

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The Advisory Panel on Integration made its recommendations in the early spring of 1964, after weeks of picketing, boycotting of stores as well as schools, and swirling controversy over this issue. Minor parts of the Panel's proposals were adopted by the Board in the fall, but by 1965 there was no indication that any important recommendations would be adopted. The report was *not* endorsed by the Superintendent.

A policy stand on school desegregation has not cost a single Northern big city superintendent his job. Superintendent Willis has been attacked politically for four years for his opposition to desegregation, yet these attacks have done little more than tarnish his professional and public image. New York City Superintendent Calvin Gross did *not* lose his job because of his stand on this issue.

More important is the fact that no Northern big city superintendent has committed himself emphatically to the pursuit of school desegregation. The barriers to school desegregation in large Northern cities will remain a subject of moot speculation until at least one such superintendent does take a strong, positive position and allows others to observe the consequences. The policy recommendations of city school superintendents are more than influential. They are profoundly indicative of changes in school practice, even where they are not determinative.

Sufficient Conditions for Inaction

There is probably one condition which is sufficient to maintain inaction on big city school segregation in the North: If preservation of the *status quo* on this question helps to preserve the present distribution of power in the community, the *status quo* will in all probability be maintained, while the dialogue about segregation continues. Public officials, including superintendents, do not take unnecessary risks. They do not press for significant social changes if the effects upon their own access to authority are not predictable and promising.

There may be no change, then, because the ability of the city superintendent and his board to act on any question of general interest in the community is limited by the risks that the central political agency, usually the office of the mayor, is disposed to take. "In order for anything to be done under public auspices, the elaborate decentralization of authority . . . must somehow be overcome or set aside. The widely diffused right to act *must* be replaced by a unified ability to act."¹⁵

In the case of school segregation, the "unified ability to act" depends upon relations among the superintendent, his board, and the political power structure of the community as a whole. No one of these elements will jeopardize another intentionally, although a mayor or a city council often transfers responsibility for this problem to the board of education in lieu of agreeing to act in unity.

Trivial Institutional Impediments

Teachers and principals play a minor role in the politics of school segregation and desegregation. They are vital to the success of any program of desegregation, for their attitudes and practices either reinforce a positive integrative trend and make an educational opportunity out of it or undermine the worth of any effort.

But their role in the decision process itself is minor. The segregation issue is a general political one, and most school functionaries are disbarred from participation in it except under crisis conditions. Crises include incidents where Negro protest groups have managed to unite with teachers' unions for specific pickets and boycotts; but these are very rare. Moreover, it is seldom obvious in the negotiation of conflicts exactly how the teachers' and principals' own interests are involved. When these are touched upon, substantial mobilization occurs, as with all other urban interest groups.

Junior-high-school principals in New York City, for example, were *not* asked for their opinions about desegregation nor did they place themselves in the dialogue. But when a State Advisory Committee recommended in 1964 that segregated junior high schools should be abolished and the grade structure of all junior highs revised, the stake of the principals was defined. Their current arrangements threatened, these lower-line officers organized and communicated their opposition to change. When the Superintendent made no response, the principals undertook a strong newspaper advertising campaign opposing reorganization.

Headquarters staffs often impede desegregation efforts in less direct ways. The administrative staff officials responsible for planning transportation, pupil assignment, and even renovation and new construction of plants, all make hundreds of technical decisions each year which impede or foster revision of the *status quo*.

Change is costly, not only in money but in demands upon skill. School planners resist alterations in population estimation procedures they have grown accustomed to over the decades "merely"

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because ethnicity and changes in the distribution of minorities have not customarily been considered in detail. If a program of school desegregation involves administrative decentralization, then accountants, other business officers, and related staff workers must make socially costly adjustments that range from changing daily work procedures to changing one's place of work itself.

No values, and no pressures, dominant in the white majority community reward any readiness to change among staff members. The municipal educational bureaucracy, in short, responds much like any other institutionalized establishment. In the case of staff impediments, however, incomplete information, unimaginative assessments of feasibility, and an inability to innovate discourage desegregation more effectively than does the organized opposition of principals.

These resistances to change are trivial in their over-all contribution to the fate of the segregation question both because lower echelons do not have that much influence in policy decisions and because educators themselves are perplexed by competing messages and by a steady change in the salience of the issue *within* their profession. The National Education Association, the teachers' unions, the United States Office of Education, and some of the teacher-training institutions are now at work, through officers in charge of integration or "equal opportunity," emphasizing the importance of the question and the urgency of resolution. On this issue, these agencies work somewhat like the National Council of Churches in its limited bearing upon local Protestant congregations: There is a low ceiling upon the national association's influence.

Prospects for Northern School Desegregation

My argument has been that Northern school desegregation is not difficult to accomplish in smaller cities and suburbs. Where the school superintendents of such communities have allied themselves with state authority and have responded to the protest from their Negro clientele, desegregation has been proven politically safe as well as technically feasible. Moreover, the educational outcomes of most of the efforts to date have been highly encouraging to professionals. News of the revitalization and improvement of staff morale and daily practices within such changing systems is being exchanged constantly at educational conventions and through the professional media.

The major part of the problem centers in a dozen of the largest central cities. In these, very little movement toward desegregation has occurred. The political risks continue to be too high, and the rewards within the educational establishment have not been worth the effort.

The seasonal campaigns of the civil rights and Negro protest groups have become strategic, though insufficient, as a political force. These campaigns are strategic insofar as they maintain the level of priority on the segregation question and even, on occasion, heighten it. They are insufficient—even with annual improvements such as better publicity, broader constituency, and tighter alignment with other interest groups—because the big cities are too divisive and counter-protest is too readily available.

Moreover, school policy-makers know that very few citizens, Negro or white, are as intensely concerned with the educational question as they are with contending issues of housing, crime, and employment. Finally, there is not apt to be enough unity of leadership among Negro groups and politicians to allow for a much greater focus of effort on the school issue than has been achieved to date.

Nevertheless, some big Northern cities are likely to desegregate their public schools when their fiscal dilemmas intensify. Northern-style school segregation is expensive. In the big cities, school funds have been poured into the erection of expensive new plants to accommodate students in the burgeoning residential ghettos.¹⁶ Funds that would once have been used to improve all-white schools in the developing or most desirable real-estate areas must now be diverted. The new ghetto schools that result, moreover, offer little political reward. They are not appreciated because they reinforce the ghetto and because the immediate electorate is a captive constituency that is apathetic about education. In white suburbs, a Negro ghetto school depresses real-estate values in its neighborhood. It is a standing advertisement *against* the educational magnetism to technical and professional workers seeking an alternative to city school facilities. It is often a sign of decadence and commercial deterioration to most whites.¹⁷

In the big cities, the issue has unraveled the sleeve of public education as a whole. For state and local policy-makers, and for chief administrators, school desegregation has great potential significance for the merger of school districts, the progressive consolidation of schools, the revision of grade structures, and whole programs of in-

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struction. The issue also stimulates questions about the quality and equal distribution of facilities, the rights of substitute teachers, the assignment of teachers to one school versus another, and the *stability* of a career in neighborhood-school teaching in general. The dialogue in professional circles, particularly in Northern teacher-training institutions and among education reporters, even penetrates to the question of the *viability* of public education as it is now operated. The alternative most often imagined is one in which the public school system of the big city becomes a semicustodial institution serving the clientele of the welfare department, and where the advantaged white majority has elected either the suburbs or the private schools of the city.

The thesis is that, if public education cannot evolve toward its historic goal of *universality*, it cannot be maintained in its present form as a general municipal service. Much more than the question of racial segregation is involved in this conversation, but no other issue exposes the total dilemma so dramatically.

The most likely future response of educators to the problem of Northern school segregation will be to make important changes, but to make them only in the wake of the current period of identification of the problem, exploration of its implications, and political negotiation. The United States Office of Education's survey of the state of equality of opportunity in American schools, to be conducted under a directive in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, should have influence in this regard. The position of ancillary institutions, from the National Education Association to the Parent Teachers Associations, has just begun to become firm, let alone articulate.

When the question is somewhat commonly stated, and when the problem is extensively and authoritatively identified, some change toward desegregation that is more than random, or more substantial than token, will be achieved. In public school circles, this change will be noted first in the increasingly more open espousal of "racial balance" by Northern superintendents. Superintendents in many communities will acknowledge, through their conventions, journals, and professional associations in particular, that a "balanced system" is being defined as an educationally desirable system. "Racial balance" will come to be viewed as "essential" to quality. As the image becomes rewarding, superintendents will pursue it as their own *if* minority pressures are sustained and if majority resistance dwindles even slightly.

The ability to advance desegregation depends mainly on state

authority and on board and community politics. No social scientist expects a school superintendent to become a culture hero rather than an administrator of a municipal service. But the option to champion desegregation each year becomes less dangerous for superintendents. We should come to a time soon when only the very largest cities of the North, and only a few unaspiring little communities, will still operate segregated schools. The gatekeeper for the institution will be the superintendent.

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17. This is particularly true where an older but contained little Negro ghetto "suddenly" swells with new arrivals. This was the pattern in Englewood, New Jersey, and New Rochelle, New York.

CHARLES ABRAMS

The Housing Problem and the Negro

WHEN Hell broke loose in the Watts area of Los Angeles last August taking 36 lives and injuring close to 1,000 people, reporters were astonished and reformers shocked to find that the area which was the scene of the most expensive riot in United States history was hardly a slum in the usual sense. Instead of rat-infested crumbling tenements on littered streets, the section was made up of small homes mostly about twenty-five years old, many of them surrounded by lawns, and only 20 per cent of them actually dilapidated. In the public mind, the Negro housing problem was therefore discounted as one of the causes of the eruption in favor of hoodlumism, anti-white emotionalism, and poverty.

The rioting in Los Angeles highlighted one of the five fictions that surround the Negro housing problem and still condition federal housing policy. One reason these fictions persist is that officials are not eager to probe too thoroughly into the Negro housing issue, while the vocal Negro leadership has relegated the issue to a low priority in the fight for Negro rights. Yet, until these fictions are put to rest, the Negro's housing problem will remain one of the conspicuous failures in the nation's effort to elevate his status in American life.

The fiction which the Watts area exposed is that the primary aspect of the Negro's housing problem is the slum, that is, insanitary or structurally deficient housing. The fact is that many Negroes do live in slums and some do not. The accelerated movement of whites to the suburbs has been providing Negroes with a wider choice among the leavings, while improved income has enabled others to venture into neighborhoods once inhabited by middle-class whites; thus the houses Negroes occupy are no longer all on the other

side of the tracks but are now part of a mixed inventory. Despite this, the housing problem persists for most Negro families, and in many places it is becoming worse. About half the nonwhite renters in California, for example, and two-fifths of the nonwhite home owners live in substandard houses in contrast to only one-fifth of white renters and one-tenth of white homeowners. The physical condition of the Negro's homes, however, is only one aspect of the Negro's housing conditions. The neighborhoods are run-down; officialdom is less concerned with their maintenance, and their general atmosphere is demoralizing; the schools are segregated and inferior, and so are the recreational, hospital, and social facilities; there are also fewer new buildings erected in Negro areas, even for those who can afford them. Above all, the Negro is discriminated against in almost every aspect of housing and neighborhood life, and he feels it. Urbanization and suburbanization have recast the American scene and redistributed the population into areas inhabited by a new white "élite" and a black unwanted. If poor housing was not the mainspring that touched off the rioting, it certainly has not been a force for advancing interracial harmony—in California or elsewhere.

The 1961 report on "Housing" by the United States Commission on Civil Rights is punctuated by references to housing discrimination in California. Builders refuse to sell Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration homes to Negroes, and lenders are chary of lending them money on mortgages. Negroes have been refused access to houses repossessed by the VA, and the Los Angeles Realty Board has consistently rejected Negro applications for membership. The California Advisory Committee of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights said it was "almost impossible" for minorities to buy homes in new subdivisions. In Northern California, fewer than 100 nonwhites have been able to buy houses in unsegregated tracts in a period during which 350,000 new homes were built. In a check on 117 advertisements for apartment rentals in Northern California, only two were available to Negroes and both were in Negro areas.

Far more serious, however, are the overcrowding within the buildings the Negro occupies and the high proportion of income he pays for rent. A sixth of Los Angeles Negroes, for example, were crowded into the Watts area in conditions four times as congested as those in the rest of the city. A U.S. census survey in March 1965 in the renewal areas of 132 cities showed 36 per cent of the Negroes

paying 35 per cent or more of their incomes for their shelter. Moreover, the isolation of the Negro from the main stream of community life keeps resentment well-kindled and gives Negro mischief-makers little trouble in churning up hate of the white man on the ghetto fringe.

Because official policy still views the slum as a building instead of a condition, a second fiction has worked its way into official housing policy, that the best way to solve the Negro's housing problem is to tear down his slums. Because many of the houses are deteriorated, they have been the primary targets for slum clearance. In the United States, from 60 to 72 per cent of those who have been displaced from their homes by urban renewal projects have been Negroes, while only a tiny fraction of the new houses built on the sites have been open to them. Through May 1962, 5,105 Negro families were evicted by renewal projects in California and 58 per cent of those displaced were nonwhite. In the Western Addition redevelopment area in San Francisco, which had a population of 13,000, about 90 per cent of the children among the evicted families were nonwhite.

The renewal program is not the only or even the main culprit, for code enforcement and displacement for public works have taken an even greater toll of Negro homes. Whatever the motivation, these evictions have been disrupting neighborhood life before it has had a chance to mature. In Stockton, California, a renewal project not only leveled a whole Negro neighborhood but destroyed 32 Negro churches in the process. Negro displacement cannot always be avoided, and renewal of central sections is often necessary to salvage the economies of the beleaguered central cities; but as M. Justin Herman, Executive Director of San Francisco's Redevelopment Agency, told the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights: "Much of the problem is a matter of economics—the inability of families to afford such housing as can be made available in the market today. The biggest problem is the discrimination that exists with respect to non-white persons." Thus, low income, coupled with high housing costs and anti-Negro bias, has been at the root of the Negro's housing problem not only in California but throughout the nation. In 1963, the median Negro income was \$3,465, compared with \$6,548 for white families, and the Negro unemployment rate was twice as high; as a result, many Negro families have found it difficult to secure decent housing even if builders were ready to offer it to them.

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Instead of expanding the number of houses available to the Negro, demolitions have been shrinking the housing supply in sections in which he has established footholds, thereby intensifying his overcrowding. The Negro, crowded into his shelter and paying more than he can afford or facing eviction, continuously eyes the white areas on the borders of his ghetto. This does little to enhance his popularity with his white neighbors—which brings us to a third fiction, that Negroes and whites do not mix and that Negroes will spoil any neighborhood and destroy its social status. This fiction is usually supplemented by claims that, once the Negro establishes a beachhead, more Negroes will follow—which is often the case—causing real estate values to topple—which may or may not be the case.

As long as the Negro had been a small and docile minority in the North, the feeling that Negroes always destroy social status and market values never gained widespread acceptance. "Where the Negro pitches his tent," wrote Jacob Riis in 1902, "he pays more rent than his white neighbor next door and is a better tenant." In Washington, D. C., Baltimore, and Philadelphia, Negroes lived in small clusters near the better white dwellings, and, before 1915, they lived in almost every section in Chicago—a third of the city's Negroes living in areas that were less than 10 per cent Negro-occupied. The Negro's presence in cities rarely caused a white exodus; it would in fact have disturbed the equanimity of the whites in those days if their maids and butlers moved too far from the town houses.

The situation changed in the thirty years following 1910 when 1,750,000 Negroes moved northward. By 1960 the central cities of the twelve largest metropolitan areas accounted for 24 per cent of all United States Negroes. They were then 29 per cent of Detroit's population; 35 per cent of Baltimore's; a quarter of Cleveland's and Philadelphia's; 34 per cent of Newark's; and 55 per cent of Washington, D. C.'s. As the Negroes moved to the cities, they accelerated the white movement to the burgeoning suburbs so that by 1960 less than a third of the urban and suburban whites were living in the central cities. Though they constituted only a ninth of the national population, 78 per cent of all Negroes in the nation's 212 metropolitan areas lived in the central cities compared to only 52 per cent of the whites. Only in the South do more whites still live in the central cities than in the suburbs.

As the Negro's numbers increased and as he moved into the

adjoining sections or made inroads into white sections, the whites moved out in droves. Homes were often offered at bargain prices. Since cause was confused with effect, the Negroes were always blamed for declines in values.¹

As opposition crystallized, racial zoning became the main device to keep the Negro in his place and, when the courts struck it down as unconstitutional, the restrictive covenant was thereafter written into deeds in the effort to maintain white supremacy in neighborhoods. About 80 per cent of the vacant land in Los Angeles was at one time covered by such covenants. When the courts held racial covenants unenforceable, subtler devices were ushered in, including overrigid zoning ordinances sternly enforced against Negroes but relaxed for whites. Condemnation for incinerator dumps or other public works is another current device, while building inspectors and other petty officials are always on hand to harass the Negro who ventures where he is not wanted. When, for example, a private builder announced he would sell a few of his houses to Negroes in Deerfield, Illinois, his site was promptly condemned for a park. When the Ford Motor Company moved its plant from Richmond, California, to Milpitas, and when the union tried to build houses for its Negro workers, the area was promptly rezoned for industrial use. Thereafter came a sudden strengthening of building regulations, followed by a hike of sewer connection costs to a ransom figure. It is not surprising, therefore, that discrimination in housing also reduces the chances of Negro employment; many suburban firms refuse to hire Negroes either for fear of offending the local community or because they know the Negroes will have trouble finding housing.

The big city has thus been performing its historic role as a refuge for minorities, while the Northern and Western suburbs have become the new Mason-Dixon lines of America; of the total suburban population of metropolitan areas with a population of half a million or more, barely 4 per cent are Negroes and a substantial number of these live either in the South or in little fringe ghettos that have precariously survived suburban engulfment.

A fourth fiction is that the federal government is and always has been the prime protagonist of equal rights in housing. One gathers this impression from hearing so often of the law of 1866 which supposedly guarantees the Negro the right to own and lease real property, or the protections of the 14th Amendment, or the recent liberal rulings of the Supreme Court. But the law of 1866 was soon

a dead letter and still is; the 14th Amendment, enacted to protect Negroes, was long used primarily to protect corporations; as for the Supreme Court, up to 1948 it supported the use of the racial restrictive covenant as a private prerogative, and so did the highest courts of twelve states. Although the Supreme Court after 1948 became the spearhead in the drive for expanding the Negro's civil rights, and although general economic improvement has helped raise the Negro's sights, he has made little gain in housing.

One of the reasons is that the federal government, during the New Deal period, not only sanctioned racial discrimination in housing but vigorously exhorted it.² From 1935 to 1950, discrimination against Negroes was a condition of federal assistance. More than 11 million homes were built during this period, and this federal policy did more to entrench housing bias in American neighborhoods than any court could undo by a ruling. It established a federally sponsored mores for discrimination in the suburban communities in which 80 per cent of all new housing is being built and fixed the social and racial patterns in thousands of new neighborhoods.

In 1962, two years after he had made the promise to do so, President Kennedy signed an executive order outlawing discrimination in federally aided housing. By that time, seventeen states and fifty-six cities had passed laws or resolutions against housing discrimination. This movement at the state and local levels originated in New York in the 1940's and spread elsewhere partly as a liberal protest against discrimination in publicly assisted undertakings and partly because the minority numbers were beginning to become more politically significant. But the Executive Order was hardly a prophylactic against the virus that now afflicted American neighborhoods. In the first place, it embraced only about 23 per cent of all new housing construction and only 13 per cent of the housing not already covered by state or local action. In the second place, it explicitly excluded the federally regulated and federally assisted savings and loan associations which are the principal mortgage lenders in the nation. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the order could not crack the vitrified prejudices and fears that had become impacted during the sixteen years of concerted federal anti-Negro policy. Nor has the enforcement of the order done much to secure equal rights to housing in American suburbs. At best, the order manifests a shift from officially sponsored prejudice to an invertebrate morality.

The rising tide of state and local anti-bias laws in housing has

insinuated a fifth fiction into the housing issue, that such state and local anti-bias laws provide the means for ending discrimination. These laws have had educational value, have helped create a better moral climate in some areas, have secured housing for a few upper-income Negro families, and have demonstrated that such laws do not adversely affect property values. But they have brought no solution to the Negro's housing troubles. City anti-bias laws cannot affect the suburbs where most of the exclusionary practices exist. As for state-wide laws, it is all but impossible to buck the concerted power of the suburbs to which the political balance has shifted. Proceedings before anti-discrimination commissions are protracted and costly, and, when a Negro complainant wins a favorable ruling, he must be ready after the long delays to brave the pressures of his hostile landlord, neighbors, and local officials. He must be willing to have his child be the lone Negro child in an all-white school. Most important, he must be financially poised to pay the suburban rents or, if he buys a house, to get a mortgage on it—which is still all but impossible.

The slender hope these laws offer the Negro family is again illustrated in the case of California, where there were two state laws, the Hawkins Act which banned discrimination in publicly assisted housing and the Unruh Act which prohibited discrimination in "all business establishments of any kind whatsoever" and therefore applied to discriminatory practices by real-estate brokers. One reason for the existence of these laws is that the state by 1960 had 1.3 million nonwhites and another 1.4 million of the Spanish-speaking minority, composing a formidable force of voters.

The two laws were hardly strictures which a real-estate owner should have viewed with trepidation. But California has had a long history of anti-racial activities dating from the anti-Chinese campaign of the 1870's and the anti-Japanese outbursts in the decade that followed. Moreover, California's real-estate boards, which compose one of the most formidable lobbies in the state, have continuously favored race segregation. When, for example, the Supreme Court ruled against the racial covenant, the Los Angeles Board was the first to broadcast eight ways of evading the decision. It simultaneously sought a state constitutional amendment to validate the covenant but did not succeed.

The situation changed in 1963 when a local ordinance was introduced in the city of Berkeley—a community generally considered liberal—which proposed to ban racial discrimination by property

owners. Largely because the bill carried a possible prison penalty, it was defeated. The defeat lent courage to California's real-estate interests and, shortly after the Berkeley fiasco, the California Real Estate Association, representing 173 local boards, announced its plan to initiate a constitutional amendment barring any anti-bias laws in housing. The proposed amendment, cleverly framed, provided that

Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.

The California Real Estate Association was soon backed by the powerful National Association of Real Estate Boards which not only gave its nationwide support to its affiliate but also joined the campaign and helped finance it. An advertising agency was hired to guide the campaign, and a fund reported to run well over one million dollars was raised to assure victory.

California now became the battle ground for a nationwide campaign to end, once and for all, the long struggle for equal access to shelter. Anti-Negro propaganda circulated freely, and fear of Negro invasion of white neighborhoods was whipped up throughout the state. As a prominent industrialist put it: "In the real estate industry there were a number who were motivated by racial bigotry, others by their concern for property values and some who won't buck the stream. But at the bottom of it all is racial bigotry."

Proposition 14 rolled up a surprising 4.5 million votes in its favor to less than 2.4 million against it. The votes for the proposition exceeded those polled by President Johnson by more than 350,000. President Johnson received almost 1.8 million more votes than those cast against the proposition, indicating that many voters saw no conflict in voting against Goldwater while protecting their own neighborhoods against the Negro scourge. "People just voted their prejudice" was Governor Brown's private comment.

Proposition 14 was also a great victory for the National Association of Real Estate Boards. Its official code of "ethics" up to 1950 had barred its member realtors from "introducing into a neighborhood members of any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in the neighborhood."³ The association had grudgingly modified its code

of ethics in 1950 on the advice of counsel who may have feared that the Board could be charged with conspiring against the Civil Rights Laws. But despite the modification, there was little evidence that the official view had altered, and, nine days after Proposition 14 was approved, the NAREB Annual Convention in Los Angeles openly resolved that "government should not deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the fundamental right of every person to sell, lease, or rent any part or all of his real property." The Convention called the California victory to the attention of other states "where the freedom of real estate practices may be imperilled."

The battle lines were thus drawn for a nationwide campaign. Detroit and Akron have followed California's example, while in 1965 Ohio, Rhode Island, and Indiana adopted the other course of banning race bias in private home selling and renting, with Maine barring discrimination in apartments only. This mixed record of victories and defeats suggests that, while the average voter will acquiesce when moral leadership is given to an anti-bias law by his legislators or Governor, he will vote his property rights against his moral scruples when put to the test in person. As long as ethical leadership is lacking, the supporters of property rights are in a position to win the tests, particularly if put to the people themselves, as in California.

Access of the Negro to decent housing is becoming the vortex around which his other rights revolve. Without housing in areas of his choice, the right of his child to an unsegregated school is meaningless; his right to a job will be impaired; his right to move and to secure shelter in a decent neighborhood will be an empty shell. The vote on Proposition 14 indicates that racial prejudice is still a potent political commodity in the nation, and it is not at all unlikely that the device may become the legal instrument for pitting the issue of property rights against civil rights in the years to come.

The extent to which the heated contest over Proposition 14 contributed to the anti-white emotions that burst forth into the Watts riot will be hard to assess. But this is certain: housing has and will continue to play a part, if not in Negro outbreaks against the whites, then in white outbreaks against the Negro. American history reveals a long string of such riots, dynamitings, and other forms of violence from the time Negroes began moving North in greater numbers. The toll in deaths and injuries is in the thousands, and property damage is in the hundreds of millions—the Watts riot alone destroyed \$50 million in property. So far, violence has been confined mostly to

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the white sections of cities and to a few communities on the fringe of big cities. But since the urbanization of the Negro will not be complete until he has achieved suburbanization as well, a larger toll of violence can be expected as the Negro improves his income and begins to challenge suburban exclusion.

Although the expansion of the President's Executive Order may bring only a moral victory in the struggle against housing prejudice, moral victories are presently important. As long as the order remains incomplete, there will always be the implication that federal policy is indifferent to housing bias; real-estate groups will continue their efforts to win the right to exclude, school segregation will become the established pattern in the North, and racial frictions will accelerate.

Yet the Negro's housing problem can never be solved by laws and orders alone, for neither laws nor orders can reach the subtler and more effective forms of discrimination. Moreover, since Congress in the Housing Act of 1949 has guaranteed a "decent home in a suitable living environment for every American family" and has become the main force for creating and manipulating environment in the nation, the failure of the federal government to pass laws which relieve the Negro's housing problem is itself a form of discrimination, namely discrimination by omission.

The Negro is only 11.6 per cent of the nation's population, and about half of the American Negroes still live in the South. Although the presence of Negroes appears formidable because of exclusion and their concentration in the major cities, they would hardly be noticed in Northern and Western cities if the suburbs were opened to them, for there simply are not enough Negro families in the country to threaten white areas, even if the Negroes and other low-income families were subsidized to make their move possible.

To deal with the Negro's housing problem—as well as with school segregation—a meaningful housing program is needed for low-income families at costs they can afford. Despite official claims to the contrary, present programs cannot accomplish this. The public housing program hardly scratches the surface, and the local housing authorities that build the projects are generally located in the cities and lack the power to build beyond their legal boundaries. The states which could build without regard to local boundaries will not do so because of suburban opposition. FHA mortgage insurance is designed mostly for builders in suburban areas; besides, the housing it produces is too costly for most Negro families.

The two hundred million dollar authorization in rent supplements made available to families under the 1965 Housing Act represents one of the landmarks in the fight for better housing. Unfortunately, initiation of the housing operations will still depend on the will of private entrepreneurs or nonprofit corporations to venture into suburbia, and it will be a miracle if the program produces more than a token number of suburban dwelling units for Negro families. The best of intentions can always be forestalled by devious zoning ordinances or obstreperous building codes. Much will still depend on how much pressure can be brought to bear on the federal housing agencies so that they will be forced to challenge suburban bias.

The real answer is for the federal government to build directly wherever there is racial exclusion and housing needs for minorities are demonstrated. The federal government should not only insist that equal access to housing be provided in all federally assisted private subdivisions, but it should also combine direct building with rent supplements in order to bring the dwellings in suburbs as well as in cities within the means of lower-income families. Federal home building has a precedent in the housing constructed during World War I by the United States Housing Corporation and in the building of public housing and new towns during the New Deal. After their completion, the houses and new towns were sold as they should be under the formula proposed. Until Congress is ready to move in that direction, Negro slum life and neighborhood and school segregation will persist.

Simultaneously, the federal government must also meet the predicament facing the central cities. The migration into their centers of millions of low-income Negroes, combined with the presence of poor elderly families, is confronting these cities with social and economic problems with which they can no longer cope. Unlike the federal government, these cities cannot go beyond their boundaries in search of new levies to meet their rising costs. Since 1946 their debts per capita have trebled while federal costs per capita have actually gone down. The money which the federal government has given them for public housing and urban renewal is of small help when measured against the new burdens they have had to assume. Nor can they expect much help from the states whose debts have also rocketed and who are similarly limited in their taxing ability.

The much publicized poverty program is less a war on poverty

than a series of well-intentioned skirmishes. Unlike the Peace Corps, it is not designed to assist, expand, and improve existing programs, but to innovate demonstration and pilot efforts. What the cities need are federal funds to support and improve their existing school systems as well as more federal help in meeting their housing, policing, relief, and other commitments.

Urbanization has confronted these cities with new tasks that are national in scope and origin. The Negro housing problem is only one of these concerns, and it involves much more than housing. It is also undeniably linked with making neighborhoods livable, safe, and socially solvent; creating schools, playgrounds, and social facilities which are better and more ample; providing homes that are within a reasonable distance of areas of employment and are within the means of low-income families. In short, the poverty of people and the poverty of cities are parts of the same problem. The plight of the city's people can be dealt with only if the cities are enabled to deal with them.

If the Los Angeles rioting reveals the underlying weaknesses of the current federal approach to segregation, poverty, and housing, and if it stimulates some fresh thinking on these problems, it may compensate at least in part for the terrible havoc it wreaked.

REFERENCES

1. There is no single price reaction to minority infiltrations. Prices may remain constant, fall, or rise and depend on a complex of factors, including the social and economic status of a particular minority at a particular time; its numbers in relation to the numbers in the majority group; the latter's social and cultural level; the minority's capacity for social improvement and assimilation; the size of the city and the physical condition of its neighborhoods; the particular pattern of minority distribution; the nature of the then current minority stereotype; the type of social and educational leadership and maturity in the community; and the relationship between the groups in employment. Shortages may intensify competition for dwellings and increase values. Whether values rise or fall may also depend upon the ability of the newcomers to bid up prices. Nor do values automatically collapse because the minority happens to be of a lower economic status. A minority family may be of lower economic but higher social status, and vice versa. See Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors* (New York, 1955), pp. 285 ff.
2. "If a neighborhood is to retain stability," said the FHA manual, "it is necessary that properties shall be continued to be occupied by the same social and racial classes." (Section 937) Among "adverse influences" was "infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups." Protection against "adverse influences" included "prevention of inharmonious racial groups."

(Section 229) "Presence of incompatible racial elements" (Section 225) and "the social class of the parents of children at the school will in many instances have a vital bearing" on whether the neighborhood is "stable." The neighborhood will be less desirable if there is "a lower level of society or an incompatible racial element . . . in such instance it might well be that for the payment of a fee children of this area could attend another school with pupils of their same social class." (1936 Manual, Section 266; 1938 Manual, Section 951) FHA advocated not only deed restrictions but zoning to bar the wrong kind of people, and it included stables and pig pens in the same categories as sections occupied by the wrong kind of race. (1936, Section 284 (3f)) It advocated the use of hills, ravines, and high-speed traffic arteries to discourage the wrong kinds of parents and children (1936, Section 229; 1938, Section 935), and even prescribed and urged the use of a racial covenant form in which it left the space blank for the group excluded to be inserted.

3. Violation of the rule exposed a member board to expulsion. Supplementing its official code, the association issued a brochure in 1943 entitled "Fundamentals of Real Estate Practice." This classed the Negro seeking an education with strange company:

"The prospective buyer might be a bootlegger who would cause considerable annoyance to his neighbors, a madame who had a number of Call Girls on her string, a gangster, who wants a screen for his activities by living in a better neighborhood, a colored man of means who was giving his children a college education and thought they were entitled to live among whites. . . . No matter what the motive or character of the would-be purchaser, if the deal would instigate a form of blight, then certainly the well-meaning broker must work against its consummation."

EUNICE AND GEORGE GRIER

Equality and Beyond: Housing Segregation in the Great Society

RIOTS, RACIAL protests, and rising waves of crime and violence in Los Angeles and other cities across the nation have focused attention upon a problem unique to America—and one which, if not dealt with decisively and soon, can wreak wholesale destruction upon the objectives of the “Great Society.” The point at issue is the increasing dominance of Negro ghettos, with all their human problems, at the heart of the nation’s metropolitan areas. While racial segregation is by no means new to this country, in recent years it has assumed new dimensions. And the long-smoldering difficulties and disillusionments of a suppressed Negro population have simultaneously taken on new and frightening forms of expression.

The newly emergent pattern of segregation is as simple to describe as it is ominous in its implications. Since the end of World War II, Negroes have rapidly been replacing whites as the dominant population of our greatest cities. Meanwhile, the vast new suburbs growing up around these same urban centers—sharing most of the same problems and feeding upon a common economic base, but separated from the cities politically—have become the residence of an almost exclusively white population. Too many of the suburbanites disavow any concern or responsibility for the cities they have left behind.¹

Yet the ghettos will not be ignored. To the degree that human problems—economic, social, educational, health—are concentrated in the ghetto, they become self-reinforcing. Exploitation flourishes, since “captive” markets can be forced to pay exorbitant prices for inferior merchandise and services, and continuing Negro population growth presses inexorably upon an inadequate and overage supply of housing. Discouragement and bitterness are the natural

expressions. As the Negro ghettos have grown in size, these symptoms of the deeper disease have sometimes reached epidemic proportions.

Unless drastic measures are taken, the ghettos and their problems will continue to grow. They contain within themselves the seeds of their own further expansion. The present urban nonwhite concentrations result only in part from the recent migration of Negroes out of Southern rural areas. They are also the product of natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) among populations already in residence. As a result, even if migration were to cease tomorrow, the ghettos would continue to grow. During the next few years, this trend will be rapid as the postwar "baby boom" reaches maturity and has its own offspring. With this expansion are likely to come greater pressures of people upon available space, and probably more damaging racial explosions.

Today there are very few major cities where Negroes do not constitute a significantly greater proportion than the roughly one-tenth they average across the nation as a whole. In virtually every city they are increasing rapidly. During the 1950's alone, Negro populations increased in New York City by 46 per cent; in Philadelphia by 41 per cent; in Washington, D. C., by 47 per cent; in Los Angeles by 96 per cent.²

One consequence of this growth pattern is that Washington has become the first important city to have a Negro majority. But it almost certainly is not the last. Baltimore and New Orleans are likely to join Washington by 1970 at the latest; Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, and St. Louis before 1980.

Insight into both the nature and the causes of racial change in America's urban areas can be gained from the example of Washington, D. C. Since 1920, the metropolitan population of Washington (encompassing both the central city and its suburbs in neighboring Maryland and Virginia) has grown more than threefold, from less than 600,000 to over two million. Meanwhile, the proportion of Negroes in that population has remained essentially constant at roughly one-fourth of the total. In other words, Negroes have both migrated to and multiplied within *metropolitan* Washington at roughly the same over-all rate as whites.

Yet within the central city of Washington, D. C. (which now contains only about one-third of the total metropolitan population) Negroes have increased from one-fourth of the total to well over one-half, since virtually all the Negro increase has gone to the city.

At the same time, the proportion of Negroes in the suburbs has declined from 25 to only 6 per cent as an almost exclusively white out-flux has overwhelmed long-existing suburban Negro enclaves.³

Rapid Negro increases have been almost universal in cities of large and medium population alike. But in proportional terms, the change has often been greater in the middle-sized cities. Syracuse, Rochester, New Haven, San Diego, and Fort Worth all saw their Negro populations approximately double during the 1950's. Thus these cities can no longer look with smug superiority upon a few urban giants marked by the blight and disorder of Negro ghettos. By the same token, Rochester, New York, and Springfield, Massachusetts recently achieved the headlines through racial disturbances.

Not all the predominantly Negro portions of today's cities are decaying, crime-ridden, potentially explosive slums, however. The movement of white families to the suburbs has recently opened up a number of highly desirable living areas for the small minority of Negroes who can afford them. Some of the finest residential sections of cities like Washington and Philadelphia—once predominantly white—now are interracial or heavily Negro. Their physical character and general flavor have changed little. Imposing stone and brick homes still stand on immaculately maintained lawns. Only the color of the occupants is different.

Yet these too are *Negro* neighborhoods, and—like the sprawling all-white subdivisions surrounding the cities or like the less desirable central districts where most Negroes are allowed to live—they betoken the growing segregation which is splitting our metropolitan areas into two huge enclaves, each the territory of a single race. Their continued social and physical stability, furthermore, is threatened by many of the same pressures of population increase and exploitation which beset the Negro slums. Segregation itself may not be new, but never before has it manifested itself on such a giant and destructive scale.

The Growth of Residential Segregation

How did this change occur so swiftly and so massively? Discrimination and prejudice are certainly among the causes, but they are not the only ones. America cannot escape responsibility for the many decades in which the rights of its Negro citizens were denied. Nonetheless, the present situation cannot be fully understood, nor can

solutions to its perplexing aspects be found, without recognizing that it was produced and is maintained in significant part by forces that are both broader than and different from racial discrimination.

The background to all that has happened lies in certain facts concerning the rapid urbanization of America's people—facts racially neutral in themselves, but having profound racial effects. As the nation has grown more populous, its inhabitants have located increasingly within metropolitan centers. A century ago Americans numbered 31 million, about one-fifth of whom lived in urban areas. By 1920 the total population had risen to 106 million, and the urban proportion had grown to one-half—a ninefold jump in absolute numbers (from about 6 million to 54 million) in only sixty years.

After World War II, population growth accelerated sharply. The largest ten-year increase in the nation's history took place between 1950 and 1960. During that decade 28 million new citizens were added, a total nearly equal to the entire population of a century ago. About 85 per cent of this increase occurred within 212 metropolitan areas, making about two-thirds of the nation's people urban today.

In addition to increase through births and immigration during these fruitful years, the cities gained also from large-scale population movements from the center of the country toward its boundaries (especially to the seacoasts and Great Lakes region) and from the South to the North. These streams of people, most experts agree, were both "pulled" toward the cities by job opportunities and other urban attractions (especially in the coastal areas) and "pushed" out of the rural areas by shrinking labor needs, especially in the depressed portions of the agricultural South. Negroes and whites shared in the migration—Negroes to a somewhat, but not drastically, greater degree in proportion to their share of the total population.

Migration to the cities helps explain why, after World War II, the nation turned to its suburbs in order to satisfy housing needs which had been accumulating during almost two decades of economic depression and world conflict. The previous growth of the cities had used up most of the land suitable for development within their boundaries. Yet the people had to be housed somewhere, and swiftly. The easiest place, requiring no costly and time-consuming demolition of existing buildings, was the suburbs.

How should the suburbs be developed? In answering this ques-

tion certain key public policy decisions—involving racial implications which were probably neither foreseen nor intended—joined with private actions to help produce the present situation. Primary among these was the critical decision to allow the private-enterprise system to meet the housing shortage on its own terms. Most of the government mechanisms mobilized to aid in the task, especially the mortgage guarantee provisions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration, served to support and encourage the efforts of private enterprise.⁴

Such a decision was completely in accord with America's social philosophy and economic structure. And, in light of the inherent dynamism of the private-enterprise system, it is not surprising that the home-building industry was able to provide usable physical shelter. Indeed, this success can be counted as one of the major achievements of a nation which has never been satisfied with small accomplishments. Almost every year following World War II more than one million dwelling units were constructed and occupied, a figure which is double the rate at which new families were formed. And, despite rapid population growth during the fifties, the 1960 Census showed that Americans were far better housed than ever before. Overcrowding and "doubling up" (two or more families in one dwelling) had been considerably reduced. So had dilapidated and otherwise substandard housing. To a greater or lesser degree, the entire population benefited from this widespread improvement—even Negroes, though they continued to be less adequately housed than whites.⁵

Nonetheless, the decision to let private enterprise satisfy the housing need carried with it unfortunate consequences for future residential patterns. It meant that the great majority of the new postwar suburban housing was built for those who could afford to pay the full economic price. Thus the basic mechanisms of the private enterprise system, successful as they were in meeting overall housing needs, selectively operated to reinforce existing trends which concentrated low-income families in the cities. At the same time, they encouraged the centrifugal movement of those who were more wealthy to the outskirts of the cities.

Most Negro families were among those with low incomes, the result of generations of discrimination in employment and education. Quite apart from direct racial discrimination, in which the private housing industry also indulged whenever it felt necessary, economics posed a giant barrier to the free dispersal of the growing

Negro populations. The findings of a market analysis conducted by Chester Rapkin and others at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Urban Studies at the peak of the postwar housing boom in the mid-1950's were quite typical. At that time, only 0.5 per cent of all dwellings costing \$12,000 or more in Philadelphia had been purchased by Negroes—a fact which the authors laid mainly to economic incapacity. This was about the minimum cost of a modest new house in Philadelphia's suburbs.⁶

But this is only part of the story. Federal policies and practices in housing reinforced and increased the separation between the "Negro" cities and the white suburbs. In part, this was intentional. From 1935 to 1950—a period in which about 15 million new dwellings were constructed—the power of the national government was explicitly used to prevent integrated housing. Federal policies were based upon the premise that economic and social stability could best be achieved through keeping neighborhood populations as homogeneous as possible. Thus, the *Underwriting Manual* of the Federal Housing Administration (oldest and largest of the federal housing agencies, established by the Housing Act of 1934) warned that "if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial group." It advised appraisers to lower their valuation of properties in mixed neighborhoods, "often to the point of rejection." FHA actually drove out of business some developers who insisted upon open policies.⁷

More recently, a number of studies by competent real-estate economists have thrown serious doubt upon the thesis that Negro entry lowers property values. Laurenti, in his thorough analysis entitled *Property Values and Race*, found that prices rose in 44 per cent of those areas which Negroes entered, were unchanged in another 41 per cent, and declined in only 15 per cent. These were long-term trends, and they were measured *relative* to trends in carefully-matched neighborhoods which remained all white—thus obviating any possibly misleading effects of generally rising prices.⁸

Surveying the literature, Laurenti noted similar results from other studies in various cities extending back as far as 1930. But erroneous though the allegation of nonwhite destruction of property values may have been, it nonetheless provided "justification" for widespread discriminatory practices, as well as active encouragement of private discrimination, by agencies of the federal government during a

period of critical importance in determining present residential patterns.

However, discrimination *per se* was only a small factor in the impact of federal policies and practices upon racial patterns during this crucial period. Much more important were more basic aspects of the structure and functioning of federal housing programs. Three major programs have dominated the field. The largest and most significant has been the Federal Housing Administration's mortgage insurance program, with its post-World War II counterpart for veterans, the Veterans Administration's loan guarantee program. Both granted their benefits chiefly to the "modal" family recently embarked upon married life, with children already born or on the way, and willing to commit itself to the responsibilities of home ownership with a mortgage. For such families, down-payment requirements were minimal, repayment periods lengthy, and credit restrictions lenient. A certain minimum of present earnings and good prospects for future income were paramount, as well as some evidence of faithful repayment of past obligations. Households which did not fit these criteria—smaller families, older couples, single persons, people with low or precarious earnings, families who sought dwellings for rent rather than for sale, even families dependent upon the wife's employment for an adequate income—all were required to satisfy their needs chiefly through the older housing left vacant by people moving to new homes in the suburbs.

Prominent among those left behind, of course, were Negroes. The federal programs permitted them to "inherit" the cities, along with an assortment of whites who did not meet the conditions for access to the new suburbs: the old, the poor, the physically and mentally handicapped, the single and divorced, together with some persons of wealth and influence who preferred the convenience of living in the central city. The significance of the housing programs for residential patterns, however, lay also in their tendency to pull young and upwardly mobile white families away from the cities and out toward the suburbs.

It may be that a large number of these families, given free choice, would have preferred to remain within the cities, close to work and to older relatives. But the FHA and VA programs generally did not provide nearly so liberal terms on the mortgages of older homes in the cities. Down payments were usually larger; repayment periods shorter; monthly payments higher. For most young

families, therefore, the suburbs were the only practical areas in which to solve their housing needs. In this way, the FHA and VA programs, essentially independent of any direct racial bias in their decisions on applications, enhanced the tendency toward white dominance in the suburbs.

The second of the federal government's major housing programs is subsidized low-income public housing, administered by the Public Housing Administration through local housing authorities. Its criteria for admission are based upon *maximum* rather than minimum income levels. Under these conditions relatively small numbers of whites can qualify because their earnings exceed the required standard. In many areas, even where conscious efforts are made to attract an interracial clientele, the great majority of residents are Negro. In further contrast to the FHA and VA programs, most public housing projects have been constructed in the central cities rather than in the suburbs—since one of their objectives is to reduce the incidence of blighted housing.

The differences between the two programs thus reinforce each other in their effects upon patterns of residence. While the FHA and VA have helped promote white dominance in the suburbs, public housing has helped enhance Negro dominance in the cities.

The third of the major federal housing programs is urban renewal. Established by the Housing Act of 1949, its chief goal is to combat physical decay in the central cities. In a sense, urban renewal has worked against FHA and VA programs, since, among other things, it attempts to draw back to the cities the more prosperous of the families who have left it. Until recently, the renewal program has usually cleared off blighted sections and replaced them with housing units priced in the middle- to upper-income brackets. Most often, as might be expected, the occupants of the site before renewal have been low-income members of a racial minority. They have been displaced by housing which, for economic reasons alone, was available mainly to whites and to very few Negroes. Some civil rights groups therefore have dubbed urban renewal "Negro removal."⁹

Renewal agencies are required by law to relocate displaced families into "decent, safe and sanitary" housing. Relocation procedures have recently received a great deal of criticism throughout the nation. Whether or not all of it is valid, it is an undeniable fact that most relocatees move only a short distance from their former homes. One study found, for example, that two-thirds of them relo-

cated within a radius of twelve city blocks. As a result, displaced low-income minorities ring the renewal site.

Sometimes this movement appears to set off a chain reaction. Whites in the neighborhoods to which the displacees move take up residence elsewhere—as do some of the more secure Negroes. The ultimate effect too often is to touch off spreading waves of racial change, which in the end only produce a broader extension of segregated living patterns. Thus, if the FHA, VA, and public housing programs have helped produce metropolitan areas which increasingly resemble black bullseyes with white outer rings, urban renewal has too often created small white or largely white areas in the center of the bullseyes—simultaneously causing the black ghettos to expand outward even further.

Combined with rapid population growth in the metropolitan areas, the interacting effects of federal policies and practices in the postwar era did much to produce the present segregated patterns. But they were not the only factors. Clear discrimination by private individuals and groups—including the mortgage, real-estate, and home-building industries—has also played its part. The activities of the “blockbuster” provide a good focus for examining the way this works.

The *modus operandi* of the blockbuster is to turn over whole blocks of homes from white to Negro occupancy—the quicker the better for his own profits, if not for neighborhood stability. Once one Negro family has entered a block, the speculator preys on the racial fears and prejudices of the whites in order to purchase their homes at prices as low as possible—often considerably below fair market value. He then plays upon the pent-up housing needs of Negroes and resells the same houses at prices often well *above* their value in a free market situation. Often he makes a profit of several thousand dollars within a period of a few days. Studies have indicated that skillful blockbusters frequently double their investments in a brief interval. They can do this only because tight residential restrictions have “dammed up” the Negro need for housing to such a point that its sudden release can change the racial composition of a neighborhood within a matter of weeks or months. Apart from the damage done to both sellers and buyers and to the structure of the neighborhoods themselves, blockbusters have a far wider negative impact. By funneling Negro housing demand into limited sections of the city (usually around the edges of the Negro slums, since these neighborhoods are easier to throw into panic), the

blockbusters relieve much of the pressure which might otherwise have encouraged the dispersion of Negroes throughout the metropolitan areas.¹⁰

Technically speaking, blockbusters represent an unscrupulous minority of the real estate industry—"outlaws" in a moral if not a legal sense. However, their activities would not prove profitable if racial restrictions on place of residence were not accepted and enforced by the large majority of builders, brokers, and lenders, backed by the supporting opinion of large segments of the white public.

By restraining the Negro market and permitting its housing needs to be satisfied only on a waiting-list basis, "reputable" members of the banking and housing industries have helped perpetuate the conditions under which their less-scrupulous colleagues can flourish. For reasons they consider entirely justifiable, they guard assiduously against the entry of Negroes into white areas. In recent testimony before the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the President of the Mortgage Bankers Association of Metropolitan Washington stated bluntly that "applications from minority groups are not generally considered in areas that are not recognized as being racially mixed." A study by the Chicago Commission on Human Relations found that such a policy was pursued by almost all lending sources in that city. Voluminous evidence from both social research surveys and testimony before legislative and executive bodies indicates that the same is true of most real-estate boards in cities throughout the country.

Supporting this activity is the subjective equivalent of the ostensibly objective economic argument that underlay federal housing policy for years: the belief in neighborhood homogeneity—that is, neighborhood exclusiveness. The general attitude of much of the public (or the most vocal) has been that neighborhoods were better off when the people within them all belonged to the same broad socioeconomic groups and had the same ethnic or racial origins. In practice, of course, this commitment to neighborhood homogeneity has tended to exclude individuals who fell below a certain status level, not those who were above it. The latter, however, usually have "excluded" themselves in neighborhoods restricted to occupants of their own status.

After 1948, when the Supreme Court ruled that racial and religious covenants were unenforceable in the courts, minority groups began to find it somewhat less difficult to obtain access to neighborhoods on the basis of financial status and preference. Still, neigh-

neighborhood exclusiveness remained a commonly accepted value, widely enforced by the real-estate, home-building, and lending industries. It served as the final factor in the constellation which created the nation's new patterns of residential segregation.

The Shape of the Future

The future shape of metropolitan areas, in racial terms, is outlined clearly in population statistics. The growth of segregated patterns has attained a momentum that now tends to be self-sustaining. Most of the young white families who will provide the future increase in white population have moved outside the city limits. In Washington, D. C., for example, half of the remaining white population (children included) are over the age of forty. Even among the young adults, a disproportionate number are single.¹¹

On the other hand, the central cities continue to be the place of residence of Negroes of all ages, including the young couples and teenagers approaching maturity who provide the potential for future population growth. Left to themselves, these population patterns can have no other effect than to swell the ghettos and further exacerbate the color dichotomy between cities and suburbs.

What steps would be necessary to halt or reverse these trends? The magnitude of the effort required is suggested by statistics computed by George Schermer for the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Schermer has estimated that merely to prevent the current areas of Negro concentration from expanding further would require an annual outflux of 6,000 Negro households. To *reverse* the trend and to disperse the Negro population evenly throughout the metropolis by the year 2000 would require the entry of 9,700 Negro households *annually* into currently white districts and the counter-movement of 3,700 white families into areas now Negro. No comparable shift of populations is presently occurring in Philadelphia or in any other metropolis. And, each year that the ghettos continue to expand, these figures grow progressively larger.¹²

The Costs of Segregation

Today's wide-scale patterns of segregation, and the prospect of their further expansion, have several extremely important consequences for the nation as a whole. One of the most dramatic of the current ramifications is the fact that the problems long associ-

ated with the Negro ghetto because of generations of discrimination—educational deficiencies, high rates of illness and social disorders, low employment rates, and predominantly low incomes even among those who are employed—all press with increasing force upon the cities as the ghettos continue to grow. At the same time, the financial and leadership resources of the cities have been severely depleted by the middle-class white movement to the suburbs. As a separate political entity, the city has, with growing force, been deprived by the expanding rings of suburbia of the resources it needs to set its house in order.

The newly emergent residential patterns have thus transformed segregation from a parochial concern largely confined to the South (though posing a moral dilemma for the entire nation) into the hardest kind of practical economic problem affecting all the urban centers of America.¹³

But the problem no longer stops at the city line. Today, segregation increasingly threatens the rational planning and development of entire metropolitan areas—a consequence of profound significance in light of continued population growth and the scarcity of urban land, which make it essential that future generations be housed in a less haphazard fashion.

In recent years choice land on the periphery of the larger cities has been devoured at a ferocious rate. In metropolitan Philadelphia, for example, while the population of the “urbanized” or heavily built up area grew by 24 per cent during the 1950’s, its geographic spread doubled. This reckless consumption of land cannot continue much longer. Municipalities are already grappling in various ways with the challenge of making more efficient use of the land which is still within feasible commuting distance. The aim of their plans is to keep the metropolitan areas fit places in which to live, with a satisfactory balance of the various elements that together constitute an adequate human environment: homes, commercial and cultural centers, adequate transit facilities, industries, parks, and other necessities and amenities.

In metropolitan Washington, regional planning agencies recently devised a “Plan for the Year 2000.” This plan is essentially a general set of principles for meeting the needs of a population that is expected to grow to more than twice its present size before the end of the century. The plan suggests that future growth be channeled along six radial “corridors” extending outward in star fashion from the central city. Highways and transit lines would run along-

side the corridors; centers of commerce and various service areas would be located at appropriate intervals. To preserve as much as possible of the green countryside, parks and open recreation areas would be placed between the corridors.

The plan, however, fails to take into account one vital consideration: the effect of race. If the movement of the city's population continues in its present directions, three of the planned corridors will be heavily Negro. They will have their central origins in neighborhoods which currently are Negro and which already are expanding outward in the directions proposed by the plan. The other three corridors will be almost exclusively white, since they originate in the only white residential areas that remain within the city. Thus segregation will be extended for an indefinite period into the new suburbs. If, on the other hand, Negro expansion is cut off along the three corridors which are presently "open," the future population growth will be forced back into the city, thereby intensifying dangerous pressures which already exist.¹⁴

Still another instance of the way racial segregation thwarts planning can be found in the emerging new towns which, in some parts of the country, at least, may soon begin to offer an alternative to the previous norm of suburban sprawl. These new communities—of which Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland, both already underway, are two important examples—will be planned and built from the outset as complete urban complexes, with a full panoply of shopping, employment, and recreational facilities. The most comprehensive of the new towns will also contain a wide selection of housing, ranging from bachelor apartments to large single houses, so that the residents will be able to satisfy their changing needs without moving from the community. Over-all population densities in these new communities will be considerably higher than in the dormitory suburbs of the recent past. Yet, through imaginative planning, they can offer their residents an even greater sense of spaciousness and privacy.

Already popular in Europe and Great Britain, the new town concept offers important advantages over the formlessness that characterizes America's postwar suburban development—advantages that accrue not merely to the residents of the towns but to the entire nation. The new towns offer a way of comfortably accommodating population growth while conserving irreplaceable green space. The proliferation of multi-million dollar superhighways can be slowed down. Pollution of the air by exhaust fumes will be re-

duced. Speedy, economical mass transit systems, now virtually unfeasible in many areas because of the low density and wide geographic spread of suburban growth, will become practical once more. There will even be substantial savings in taxes for municipal services, as well as in utility and commuting costs.

But the new towns, despite the hopeful prospect they represent, also confront the ever-present specter of race. To be successful in realizing their diversified goals, the towns will require a large number of service workers—including manual laborers, domestics, custodians, and sales people, to mention only a few categories. Today, the only significant reservoir of labor available for many of these occupations is the Negro population. Furthermore, civil rights laws now require equal access by all citizens to employment opportunities. Yet, in most instances, the new towns will be located too far from the central cities for easy and economical commuting. Thus, in all likelihood, the workers will have to be housed in the towns themselves.

But on what basis? Will the new towns contain, from the outset, pre-planned ghettos? If not, how is integration to be accomplished, given the differential income levels of the people involved and the many problems connected with providing low-cost housing under private auspices? Even if this last obstacle is overcome—as might be possible if Congress implements new and imaginative forms of governmental aid and subsidy—will white Americans long conditioned with the encouragement of their own government to rigid spatial separation, not only of races but of economic groups, accept any other arrangement?

If, on the other hand, the new towns do not offer accommodations to families of low income, what will happen as they draw away more and more of the cities' remaining affluent residents, while providing no comparable outlet for their growing low-income populations? Will vast new towns then be planned especially for the low income populations, thus extending patterns of racial segregation upon a scale even now unknown? Or will the cities merely be expected to absorb the population increase indefinitely?

Within some cities, the low income housing needs are already reaching crisis proportions. In Washington, D. C., for example, public attention has recently been focused on the problem through widespread civic protests. With virtually no vacant land remaining, and with a population which has grown since 1960 both in total numbers and in the proportion of low-income Negroes, Washington

now faces a perplexing dilemma indeed. Virtually every improvement of any magnitude in its physical structure, whether publicly or privately sponsored, further reduces an already inadequate low income housing supply.

Development of expressways to relieve traffic congestion has been threatened as a result. Even code enforcement aimed at improving housing conditions is endangered because it often results in evicting poor families with no place else to live. Yet private construction, stimulated by Washington's booming economy and unhampered by considerations that often affect public action, is proceeding apace. Almost all centrally located homes which are privately renewed for occupancy by middle-class families, and many of the sumptuous new apartment houses and office buildings as well, gain their valuable land by removing additional units from the low income housing supply. Some Washington observers are wondering how much longer this process can continue without triggering racial outbreaks similar to those which have already disfigured other major cities.

The complex issues which surround land development, both present and future, constitute only one of the concerns made increasingly problematical by the city-suburban racial split. Paradoxically, it presents obstacles also to current major attempts to aid minority groups in escaping from poverty and deprivation.

A good case in point is the multiple efforts to upgrade Northern public schools in a state of *de facto* segregation. For the most part, these schools are desegregated in principle, but because of surrounding residential patterns have become segregated in practice. A considerable amount of this segregation, it should be realized, occurred during the fifties as a direct result of population shifts. At the time of the Supreme Court decision barring school segregation, Washington, D. C., which is located among the border states, had a completely segregated educational system. Once the decision was announced, the city immediately desegregated. Yet only a decade later, because of intervening population shifts, the school system once again is almost entirely segregated. "Resegregation" is the term some concerned local citizens have coined for this disturbing phenomenon.

De facto segregation tends to create poor, inadequately serviced schools. The concentration of culturally disadvantaged Negro children makes it difficult to provide the intensive programs they need to reach an equal footing with their white contemporaries. In racially

mixed schools, their deficiencies are leavened through contact with children more fortunate in background and home environment. One attempted solution has been to bus Negro children to better schools which are underutilized and for the most part are predominantly white. But this approach has met with strenuous resistance from many of the parents (including some Negroes) whose children attend the better schools. Some officials fear that continued busing in the face of such protests would cause even more middle-class whites to leave the cities and thus make the situation even worse in the long run.¹⁵

The whole problem is exacerbated by the fact that most heavily Negro schools are located in the older and more depressed neighborhoods of the city. Both the schools and their surroundings are often in physical and social decay. Thus, in addition to everything else, it becomes difficult to attract or keep good teachers.

But the nation quite rightly, although belatedly, has committed itself to providing equal educational opportunities for all its citizens. In the face of *de facto* segregation, it is now trying to meet that commitment by a huge complex of experimental programs costing millions of dollars. If the programs are successful, their extension to all those who need them will ultimately mean the spending of many more billions. But aside from the question of money, the nation currently confronts the much more difficult question of whether the programs can in fact work, given the complex of environmental obstacles which exist.

Most of the dilemmas and problems posed by residential segregation in the United States are brought into focus by the current war against poverty. Can poverty among Negroes ever be eliminated while rigid segregation increases within the metropolitan centers? On the other hand, can the metropolitan areas ever be desegregated as long as the majority of Negroes remain poor? As segregation continues to grow and Negroes reach numerical predominance in more and more urban centers, will not the cities which house the majority of the nation's industrial and commercial life find themselves less and less able to cope with their problems, financially and in every other way? What then will be the answer for the metropolitan complexes where two-thirds of America's population currently reside and where as much as 85 per cent of the nation may live by the year 2000?

Aside from these large and basic questions of public policy and social change, residential segregation causes havoc on a more per-

sonal and individual level. And the personal damage is not to Negroes alone. Many of the neighborhoods newly entered by Negroes since World War II have been occupied by middle-aged and retired white families who often look upon their current homes as being their last—and whose emotional attachment to both house and neighborhood is based upon ties of familiarity and friendship built up over many years. These occupants feel deeply threatened by the entrance of a Negro family. The result often is mental stress, misery, and loneliness, as well as a sense of overwhelming personal loss at being “forced” to leave a home and neighborhood one had grown to love.¹⁶

The effects of precipitate change are particularly sad in ethnic neighborhoods where much of the community's life has centered around a house of worship and where neighbors often include kinfolk as well as friends. In such cases, the change is harmful not only to individual families but to institutions and social organizations that can rarely survive transfer to another location. Constant change is normal, of course, and neighborhood institutions should adapt constructively to it and help their members to adjust. Nevertheless, many institutions are unprepared, and the rapidity of racial change often gives them little opportunity to catch up with their responsibilities.

In all these ways, then, residential segregation is or has become central to major domestic problems of the nation. There is no way to determine the ultimate sum of its costs. It ranges into so many areas that it may accurately be designated the key question of our national life in the 1960's.

The Upsurge of Civic Concern

Over the past decade and a half, as the situation has worsened, the significance of residential segregation has steadily been pushing itself into the forefront of the national consciousness. As public comprehension has grown, one response has been a groundswell of concern and action on both public and private levels. This development cannot be overvalued. It is a change of almost revolutionary proportions, a change that has been accomplished not through violence or political disorder but through the constitutional mechanisms of the government and through the exercise of individual freedoms that form the basis of American society. Yet, this counteraction, despite its importance, is in itself presently insufficient for the task

at hand. The best way to indicate both the limitations of the current activity and the general direction in which the country must now move is to outline the various ways in which mounting public concern has expressed itself.

Between 1950 and today, the federal government has completely reversed its racial policy, moving from official sanction of segregation to a Presidential order that prohibits discrimination in any housing receiving federal assistance. The first official impetus for this change came in 1948, when the Supreme Court ruled that restrictive racial covenants were legally unenforceable. At first the Federal Housing Administration declared that the decision was inapplicable to its operation. Finally, late in 1949, it removed the model covenant and all references to neighborhood homogeneity from its manual and declared that after February 1950 it no longer would insure mortgages having restrictive covenants. The Veterans Administration and the Urban Renewal Administration both issued similar statements.

Further changes ensued. By 1960, they included the following: both the FHA and VA had ruled that the insured property they acquired (usually under foreclosure proceedings) would be made available to all buyers or renters, regardless of race, creed, or color; the administrative head of the FHA had instructed local offices to take "active steps to encourage the development of demonstrations in open occupancy projects in suitably located key areas"; both the FHA and VA had signed a series of formal agreements of cooperation with state and local agencies responsible for enforcing laws and ordinances against housing discrimination; the government had dropped a system of racial quotas in housing built for persons displaced by urban renewal; and it also had banned discrimination in a special loan program to assist the elderly in their housing needs.

These regulations and directives clearly represent a large stride forward from the directly discriminatory policies pursued before 1950. Yet their practical effect on the rigid patterns of segregation that had developed over the years was very small. In 1962, federal reports revealed that nearly 80 per cent of all public housing projects receiving a federal subsidy were occupied by only one race. Segregated projects were located as far North as Scranton, Pennsylvania, and Plattsburgh, New York—and, as might be expected, in practically every locality in the South. The vast majority of new suburban housing backed by FHA and VA mortgage guaran-

tees was occupied exclusively by white families. A scattering of developments built on urban renewal sites were made available to both Negroes and whites; but they were limited mainly to the largest cities of the North and West and generally priced at or close to luxury levels. Where integration existed, it was largely the result of state and local laws rather than national directives. Only seldom, however, were these laws adequately enforced.¹⁷

Nonetheless, by 1962, partly because of the ineffectiveness of previous changes, it had become clear that the broad problems of discrimination and segregation were too interwoven to be solved with piecemeal changes in federal policy. The first step toward a more comprehensive approach came on November 20, 1962, when the late President Kennedy issued an Executive Order barring discrimination in all housing receiving federal aid after that date. At the end of April 1964, it was estimated that 932,000 units of housing had come under the directives of the Order. In June 1964, it was estimated that between 12 and 20 per cent of all new residential construction was covered.

But the segregation that had developed in previous years still remained. Charles Abrams summed up both the limitations and the value of the Executive Order shortly after it was issued in the following way:

The Executive Order will . . . touch only a small fraction of the housing market. If any real gains are to be made, its coverage must be widened or more individual state laws laboriously sought. The President's Order is no more than a small first federal step toward breaking the bottleneck in housing discrimination.

Nevertheless, its importance cannot be discounted. First steps in civil rights legislation have often led to second steps when the will to move ahead has been present.¹⁸

The federal government has also made special, though limited, efforts to mitigate the unintended racial effects of its housing programs. Housing legislation gave the FHA, in cooperation with the Federal National Mortgage Association, the right to issue insured loans from government funds at below-market interest rates for housing to be occupied by families with incomes too low to acquire new homes in the private market. This indirect form of subsidy was intended in part to reach a larger number of Negro families. Urban renewal programs have begun to pay more attention to relocation procedures and to stress rehabilitation of existing dwellings rather

than total clearance. In some cities, Community Renewal Programs aided with federal funds are attempting to develop comprehensive plans for housing all groups in the population. In the public housing program, where Negroes predominate, federal action has paradoxically been least decisive. Still, many local authorities have tried to promote racial balance in their projects, and some have been experimenting with various types of nonproject housing scattered throughout the community.

But the fundamental orientations of the federal programs remain today—as do the deeply entrenched consequences of their operation throughout the peak years of the post-World War II housing boom. It will take more than piecemeal efforts to shatter such a solid foundation for the continued growth of segregated living patterns.

While the federal government was moving toward its policy of nondiscrimination in housing, many states and municipalities were moving in the same direction—and, in recent years, at a more rapid pace. Prior to 1954, only a few of the states in the North and Midwest had legislation which barred discrimination in any segment of their housing supply. The laws usually covered only low-rent public housing and, occasionally, units receiving such special forms of assistance as tax exemptions or write-downs on land costs.

As of mid-1965, however, sixteen states and the District of Columbia had barred discrimination in a substantial portion of their private housing supply. At the 1960 census these states together contained about eighty million people, or 44 per cent of the total population. Thus nearly half the citizens of the United States are now living in communities whose public policy is clearly opposed to deliberate segregation on the basis of race—even in housing built under private auspices. President Kennedy's Executive Order of 1962 therefore was basically an extension on the federal level of a principle already gaining widespread acceptance in states and localities across the nation.

However, mere nondiscrimination cannot by itself overcome the problem of segregation. It will take vigorous positive efforts on the part of government and private citizens to halt, let alone reverse, trends now so firmly entrenched.

Contributors to Change

Changes in public policy can usually be attributed to the determined efforts of a small minority of citizens who recognize a need

and work tirelessly to bring it to public attention. In no case has this been more true than with residential segregation. Led by the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing—a small and meagerly financed organization which grew out of the first successful campaigns for housing laws in New York—religious, civic and labor groups in many parts of the country have spearheaded similar campaigns in their own states and cities. The resulting laws have provided a foundation upon which other types of private effort could build.

A second important variety of private effort toward housing desegregation is the intentional development of new housing on an open-occupancy basis. Beginning in 1937 with a small Quaker-sponsored project in southwestern Pennsylvania, the spontaneous development of nondiscriminatory housing by private groups got underway in earnest following World War II. Despite concerted opposition by the federal government, many local governments, and most segments of the real estate industry, a 1956 survey found that some fifty new interracial communities had been produced by private efforts up to that time. Some of them had been inspired by civic and social service organizations to foster racial equality, but a number had been constructed by businessmen for profit. Today, such developments are estimated to number in the high hundreds or even the thousands.¹⁹

In a third approach, “grass-roots” organizations in many cities across the country have sought to stabilize the occupancy of their own neighborhoods following the entry of Negroes. In numerous instances they have accomplished what many once thought impossible—quelling panic, avoiding possible violence, maintaining sound neighborhood conditions, even bringing new white residents into areas where formerly the prognosis had been for complete transition to all-Negro occupancy.²⁰

Finally, in the suburbs of a number of cities, concerned white residents have banded together to help open their own neighborhoods to Negro families able to pay the price. The first of these “fair housing committees,” established in Syracuse, New York, in the mid-1950’s, was sponsored by the local Quaker Meeting. Religious influence of various denominations remains strong in many of the later organizations, now estimated to number more than one thousand.²¹

These private efforts represent one of the most encouraging examples of the inherent strength of American democracy and its

capacity for change. They have helped shatter many racial myths, have opened new housing opportunities for Negroes in areas not previously open to them, and have done much through practical demonstration to alter the attitudes of the white majority toward the prospect of Negro neighbors.

But in the face of population forces, they can have little effect in destroying racial segregation. The point was passed some years ago where either legal bars against discrimination or the best-intentioned of meagerly financed "grass roots" endeavors could accomplish the task. If Americans wish not only to create truly equal opportunity for all, but also to solve the many domestic problems which stem from inequality and the artificial separation of the races, they must now be prepared to move beyond mere nondiscrimination and good will—in a sense, beyond equality—into an area of positive and aggressive efforts to undo the damage already done. It will require a massive national effort, calling upon the full resources of both the public and private sectors.

The Task and the Methods

That the country possesses the fundamental resources it needs to solve the problem is fortunately clear. What is required is less the creation of new mechanisms than the effective harnessing and, where necessary, the reorientation, of those which already exist. Otherwise it will be impossible to meet the goal of rendering segregated housing patterns ineffective as an obstacle to the objectives of the "Great Society."

This aim, it must be stressed, need not be sought through methods which run counter to the basic tenets of American democracy. For example, it need not be attempted through forced redistribution of population. Force is not only intolerable, but unnecessary. The normal mobility of the American people is so great (about half of all households moved during the latter half of the 1950s alone) that redistribution can be achieved through the operation of free choice—if sufficient resources are applied to make socially desirable patterns of residence as attractive to the public as socially undesirable ones have been in the past.

Nor is it necessary to attempt a rigidly planned dispersal of Negro households. The aim, rather, should be to achieve complete freedom of choice in place of residence without respect to racial barriers. Within this framework of unconstrained choice, some sub-

stantial concentrations of Negro families would doubtless persist, just as Jews have remained in certain neighborhoods even after obstacles to their residing elsewhere have largely been eliminated. But the present monolithic character of the Negro ghettos, their inexorable growth, and the social evils they encourage would be broken.

The following are some specific measures which would help achieve the goal. The list is not all-inclusive; doubtless many readers will think of others which would be of value:

A *central federal agency* possessing the competence to plan comprehensively for all phases of urban development and the authority to translate plans into effective action. This agency must have the power to draw together federal operations in such diverse areas as housing, urban renewal, highways, transportation, and community facilities and to guide them toward a set of common objectives. The newly created Department of Housing and Urban Development can be such an instrument—if it can overcome the handicap of its origin in the Housing and Home Finance Agency, a loosely knit combination of essentially independent agencies, and achieve better coordination of individually powerful organizations than has the similarly amalgamated Department of Health, Education and Welfare. This will not be easy.

A *total strategy for desegregation*. The segregation problem is too complex to be solved without a total approach which recognized all the manifold forces which brought it to its present magnitude and threaten to enlarge it further. This approach must take maximum strategic advantage of all available resources and knowledge. It must be adaptable to varying local conditions and flexible enough to permit changes as “feedback” from early applications dictates. But it must be directed always to a clear and unwavering set of goals.

Broadened federal incentives for effective action by local governments and private entrepreneurs. Incentive programs have proved one of the most acceptable means of applying governmental leverage in a democratic system, for they do not involve compulsion and do not infringe upon freedom of choice. In housing, for example, incentives have promoted urban renewal (through grants to local authorities to clear slum land for redevelopment) and the construction of specific types of housing (through liberal mortgage insurance). Incentives must now be used to encourage comprehensive planning and action toward social goals. For example, suitable

incentives can encourage private builders to construct balanced communities serving all population groups, can attract and assist low-income minority families to move to such communities, can stimulate existing neighborhoods to self-renewal and racial stabilization, can encourage local governments to attack segregation in the comprehensive manner it requires by cooperation throughout the metropolitan areas.

Imaginative new forms of subsidy for low-income families. Traditionally, housing subsidies have been available almost exclusively for units built by local nonprofit authorities—chiefly in the form of multi-unit public “projects,” which stood apart from their surroundings and amassed the social ills associated with poverty in much the same fashion as did older and less solidly constructed ghettos. More recently, various localities have experimented with methods for widening the range of choice and location in subsidized housing. The Housing Act of 1965 contains provisions which can make subsidies a much more valuable tool in combatting segregation. But their operation toward this end cannot be left to chance; it will require vigorous and imaginative guidance.

Comprehensive measures to increase minority incomes. Any measure which increases the purchasing power of racial minorities will bring a corresponding reduction in the critically important economic barriers to desegregation. Minimum wage floors must be raised; present ones are actually below the level defined by the federal government as “poverty.” Federal resources must be directed toward expanding the number of jobs available, particularly for those of limited education. The most important need of the minority poor is for decent jobs at decent pay. Economic measures can and should be tied to housing. For example, low-income minority persons should be trained for the specific kinds of jobs which will be made available in the new, comprehensively planned communities on the outskirts of metropolitan areas. Housing should be planned for them close to these new job opportunities. Similarly, relocation from urban renewal areas should be coupled with a range of services, including training and assistance in finding employment, to help assure that displaced families improve not only their housing conditions but their economic situation as well.

Intensive efforts to improve the attractiveness of central cities. To date, urban renewal, in its efforts to draw middle- and upper-income families back to the urban cores, has focused mainly upon the physical aspects of decay. It is increasingly obvious that social

renewal is required also—that many of the economically more capable families, Negro as well as white and especially those with children, will not be persuaded to return to the central areas until they are assured of protection from the social pathology of the ghetto. City schools, for example, must be drastically improved; yet there is growing evidence that this will require not merely replacement of individual buildings and teaching staffs but also comprehensive restructuring of entire school systems. Crime and violence are among the greatest deterrents to affluent families who prefer to live in central areas, and the cities will be at a disadvantage until they prove that they can control both the chronically lawless and those driven to crime by frustration and economic need.

Vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and affirmative measures to promote equal opportunity. As noted earlier, anti-discrimination laws in themselves are unable to solve a problem which stems from much broader causes. But, if vigorously enforced, they can prove a most important weapon in the arsenal of measures against segregation. Further, as many of the more effective law-enforcement agencies already recognize, it is not sufficient merely to remain passive and wait for a minority conditioned by generations of segregation to recognize and claim its newly guaranteed rights. Affirmative measures are necessary to promote awareness of the law both among those it protects and those who offend against it.

Expanded support for “grass-roots” citizen efforts. While the efforts of spontaneous, citizen-led groups have had impressive success in helping change attitudes, practices, and laws across the nation, these groups have been severely handicapped by their meager resources. A few have been fortunate enough to receive substantial support, usually from local foundations. Where funds have permitted hiring full-time staff, the increase in effectiveness has often been dramatic. Compared to the many millions spent annually by philanthropic organizations on problems of comparable or even lesser importance, the few thousands devoted to housing segregation have been infinitesimal. This is still another way in which available resources must be redirected if the problem is to be solved.

A national educational campaign. For the first time in American history, the majority of the white public appears aware that discrimination and segregation defeat the goals of democracy. But it is a long step forward from this recognition to a vigorous and affirmative effort equal to the need. This will require a type and degree of

comprehension and commitment, by majority and minority peoples alike, which are still far from achievement.

National consensus is most readily achieved through full information about the problem and stimulation of public debate on the means of solution. A full-scale campaign to arouse and inform the American people must begin immediately if public understanding and support are to reach the necessary levels before segregation grows so much larger that it appears insoluble to many. The turning point may well come with the 1970 Census. If some tangible progress has not been made—or at least a plan of action proposed—before its statistics appear, discouragement may rule.

The core of organized citizen support necessary to mount such a campaign already exists—in such national organizations as the American Friends Service Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing and in the hundreds of citizen fair housing groups across the country. But their efforts must be focused, coordinated, and, above all, adequately financed. And they must be brought into the context of related activities such as urban planning and the war on poverty.

The task of eliminating segregation rests ultimately with the American people as a whole—led, as in every major struggle in their history, by a small group of devoted citizens. If they do not succeed, the result will almost certainly be the continued spread of Negro ghettos; large-scale physical blight generated by population pressures and exploitation; economic loss to many citizens of both races; persistent social disorder; and spreading racial tensions which strike at the very foundations of a free and democratic society. The choice is not merely between segregation and desegregation, but between wholesale destruction of property and human values and the continued growth and security of American society itself.

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This report can be obtained from the Potomac Institute of Washington, D. C., which participated in its preparation. See also many of the publications of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights dealing with local practices in housing, employment, and so forth. But the extent to which racial considerations now affect local decisions in many subject areas is only scantily documented.

14. The relationship of racial factors to the Washington metropolitan plan is discussed in George B. Nesbitt and Marian P. Yankauer, "The Potential for Equal Housing Opportunity in the Nation's Capital," *Journal of Intergroup Relations*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Winter 1962-1963), pp. 73-97.
15. The problem of *de facto* educational segregation and the civic conflict it often creates has been widely discussed in the public print. The *New York Times Index* is an especially useful source. For more scholarly treatments, see Max Wolff (ed.), "Toward Integration of Northern Schools," special issue of the *Journal of Educational Sociology*, February 1963. Also, "Public School Segregation and Integration in the North," special issue of the *Journal of Intergroup Relations*, November 1963. A provocative view on the feasibility of desegregation will be found in James B. Conant, *Slums and Suburbs* (New York, 1961).
16. The pain caused to long-time residents of ethnic neighborhoods by forced relocation in connection with urban renewal has been documented in Marc Fried, "Grieving for a Lost Home," in Leonard J. Duhl (ed.), *The Urban Condition* (New York, 1963). No doubt much the same kind of agony is caused when long-established white residents feel "forced" to give up their homes in changing neighborhoods.
17. The most complete and reliable source of up-to-date information on the status of housing anti-discrimination laws and ordinances throughout the nation is *Trends in Housing*, published bi-monthly by the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, 323 Lexington Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10016. A comprehensive analysis of action at all governmental levels up to the period just before the Federal Executive Order of 1962 will be found in Margaret Fisher and Frances Levenson, *Federal, State and Local Action Affecting Race and Housing*, National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials, September 1962. The texts of state and local laws as of the end of 1961 are summarized in *State Statutes and Local Ordinances Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing and Urban Renewal Operations*, published by the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington, D. C., December 1961.
18. Charles Abrams, "The Housing Order and its Limits," *Commentary* (January 1963). For another discussion of some of the limitations of the Order, as well as a legal rationale for its extension, see Martin E. Sloane and Monroe H. Freedman, "The Executive Order on Housing: The Constitutional Basis for What it Fails to Do," 9 *Howard Law Journal* (Winter 1963).
19. A nationwide study which examined the experiences of some fifty private housing developments open from the outset to interracial occupancy is

reported in Eunice and George Grier, *Privately Developed Interracial Housing, op. cit.* A more recent but less comprehensive compilation of experience, which leads nonetheless to many of the same conclusions, is found in *Equal Opportunity in Housing—A Series of Case Studies* (Washington, D. C., Housing and Home Finance Agency, June 1964).

20. The experiences of various neighborhoods with efforts to achieve racial stabilization have been discussed in the public print, oftentimes in local newspapers. Among the more valuable studies on this topic is Eleanor Leacock, Martin Deutsch, and Joshua A. Fishman, *Toward Integration in Suburban Housing: The Bridgeview Study* (New York, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1964).
21. An excellent presentation of techniques which have been found useful in efforts to promote open housing opportunities in neighborhoods formerly closed to Negroes is contained in Margaret Fisher and Charlotte Meacham, *Fair Housing Handbook*, published jointly by the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing and the American Friends Service Committee, 1964. See also various issues of *Trends in Housing*.

EUGENE P. FOLEY

The Negro Businessman: In Search of a Tradition

I

FOR YEARS, prominent Negroes have been urging the Negro community to recognize the importance of increasing the number and strength of Negro businessmen. The "Buy Black" movement pointed in this direction and the Black Muslims and various Black African organizations make this a key point in their programs. Yet it is apparent to anyone who has visited a Negro ghetto or is in any way familiar with American business that, irrespective of all the urging and movements, Glazer and Moynihan were all too correct when they pointed out that Negro business has not developed in this country,¹ "... despite the fact that business is in America the most effective form of social mobility for those who meet prejudice."²

Why is this? If Negroes are simply another immigrant group, why have they not developed a Negro Giannini, or Kennedy, or Rosenwald?

The answer is far more complicated than most Negroes tend to believe. The most common explanations Negroes give for the failures of Negro business development are (1) lack of capital because of prejudice on the part of bankers, and (2) unfair competition from Jewish merchants.

Consider the second argument first. The following statement is much milder than some we have heard: "Another thing I am sick and tired of, I am sick and tired of all these Jew business places in Harlem. Why don't more colored business places open? This is our part of town. They don't live here but they got all the businesses and everything."³

In 1947, Fred A. Jones, President of the St. Louis Business League, summed up the situation as follows:

A Negro can hardly rent a store for business in his own neighborhood because the Jew has thought ahead of him. When the Jew sees the drift of

the Negro population he steps in and buys up the strategic corners and spots for the Jew. He rents to the wholesalers, to the retail sales outlets. He supplies every Jew store in the Negro belt from his wholesale houses.

There is no doubt that many Jewish merchants are able and effective business competitors and that they abound in the ghettos. Drake and Cayton reported that in 1936 about three-fourths of the merchants in Bronzeville were Jewish.⁴ In Harlem, more stores are owned by Jews than by any other ethnic group, and the same is true in Philadelphia's Negro areas. There is a reason for this.

During the middle of the nineteenth century, there was a sizeable immigration of German Jews and the 1880's marked the beginning of the enormous Jewish migration from Eastern Europe. These immigrants settled in the large eastern cities and many established independent businesses, inasmuch as many had been small businessmen in Europe and most other fields were closed to them in the United States.

The Jews moved out of the blue-collared class into the middle class at a surprisingly fast rate. As they did, they abandoned the ghettos they had settled in earlier and moved to more desirable residential areas. However, many retained their businesses in the older sections of the city and continued to cater to its new inhabitants, who in many cases were Negroes. So, a pattern of Jewish-owned businesses in predominantly Negro areas developed. As time went on, other Jewish businessmen established businesses in the Negro area because of their familiarity with the area and the Jewish merchants already located there. But Jewish merchants abound in most sections of any city. As an ethnic group, they are three times as heavily represented in American commerce as any other group⁵ and, of course, are located almost entirely in metropolitan areas.

Of all the European immigrant groups, the Jews are the only people with a trading background. The vast majority of immigrants to the United States came from an agrarian society.⁶ In 1880, very few immigrants had a commercial background, 3.3 per cent as opposed to 63.0 per cent who were farmers or laborers. In 1900, the commercial category was changed to that of managers, officials, and proprietors. The numbers of immigrants in this category continued to remain low; for the years 1900, 1910, and 1920, the percentages of immigrants in the preceding category were 2.3, 1.9, and 3.7 respectively. During this period, farmers and laborers continued to

comprise the majority of immigrants; their percentages for 1900, 1910, and 1920 were 63.7, 65.8, and 42.9.⁷

Compare the following figures for the Jewish immigrants with the general pattern. In 1900, the occupational distribution of Jewish immigrants was:⁸

Manufacturing	59.6
Trade	20.6
Domestic & Personal Service	8.0
Clerical	6.7
Professions	2.6
Other	2.5

In their native countries, most Jews were engaged in trading, manufacturing, or mechanical pursuits. For example, the first Russian census of 1897 showed that one-third of the Russian Jews were tradesmen, another third were engaged in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, one-fourth were unskilled laborers, and 5 per cent were professionals.⁹

The Jews, therefore, had an advantage over other immigrants in America's business culture. Despite this advantage and the advantage of native whites, there have been many outstanding business successes from each ethnic group, but very few Negroes, and no Negro business successes to match the accomplishments of the other ethnic groups. Furthermore, the strong feelings about the Jews do not explain either the lack of Negro merchants in non-Negro sections of the city or the failure of Negro merchants to exploit their obvious advantage in the Negro ghettos.

The depth of Negro feeling on this subject can be explained by the proximity of Jews to Negroes which causes the latter to manifest their anti-white feeling in the form of anti-Semitism. Drake and Cayton found that in New Orleans, where Italian merchants predominate in Negro areas, "Dagos" are the target of attack.¹⁰

The other and somewhat more frequent explanation for the lack of significant Negro success in business is the lack of capital available to Negroes because of the prejudice of bankers. The following statement by a fairly successful Philadelphia Negro merchant is quite typical of the Negro businessman's attitude toward banks: "Local bankers have not treated Negro businessmen fairly. Most of the time they are willing to lend money only after you have been able to obtain money from some other source. Most of the time they disregard a good credit experience they have had with you prior

to the attempt to obtain a significant loan to promote or improve your business."

But prejudice is not the sole reason for the scarcity of capital available for Negro businesses. Bankers, of course, share in and manifest American racist patterns, but they also make many loans to Negroes. In Philadelphia, one large bank has had a branch in a predominantly Negro area for many years. About 50 per cent of the branch customers are Negroes, as are 50 per cent of the time-payment customers; the branch manager states their records of payments have been good.

In the matter of consumer loans, the bank noticed a trend toward rejections over the past five years. For instance, in January of 1962, seventy-one applications for consumer loans by Negroes were received; forty-two were put on the books and twenty-nine were rejected. These figures have continued downward until now 50 per cent of the applications for consumer loans by Negroes are rejected. The reason for rejection is that, in the bank's view, the Negro applicants have over-extended themselves by buying on credit. The loans they are requesting are too high for their incomes, and some of them have payments outstanding each month amounting to 70 per cent of their income. At times the bank will consolidate their debts, but experience has shown that they often return to the practice of over-extending themselves.

The important point to note, however, is that this bank has been making consumer loans to Negroes for years, and for a long time Negroes have accounted for at least 50 per cent of its consumer lending activity. Contrast this with the fact that this same branch has only two loans to Negro businessmen on its books today. It is obvious that the bank, located in a Negro area and catering heavily to Negro consumer loans, is not discriminating. In fact, all three banks having branches in Negro areas of Philadelphia report they are seldom approached by Negro businessmen for commercial loans.

The financing of home purchases is further evidence that banks and other financial institutions desire to make loans to Negroes. A comprehensive report financed by the Fund for the Republic covering home purchases by Negroes and whites in Philadelphia in 1955 was made by the Institute for Urban Studies, University of Pennsylvania, at the request of the Commission on Race and Housing.¹¹ Banks financed approximately 10 per cent of the Negro purchases and 18 per cent of the white purchases. (Savings and Loan Associations accounted for the largest share of the financing for each

group.) The report reviewed 1,574 home purchases by Negroes and 443 by whites in that year and these 1,574 purchases accounted for 30 per cent of all purchases by Negroes in Philadelphia that year. The report concluded that "Negroes and whites alike were able to obtain very liberal credit terms, particularly considering the age of the properties on which loans were made. Thus, despite the recency of the transition and the racial mixture of the areas, purchasers appear to have had no unusual difficulties in obtaining the necessary financing for the acquisition of their homes." In fact, the records indicate that Negro purchasers obtained mortgage terms which were somewhat more liberal than those advanced to whites. The reason for this is largely explained by the higher proportion of Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Administration loans made to Negroes.¹²

The reason that Negroes can obtain consumer and mortgage, but not commercial, financing lies in the different types of financing involved. A review of the commercial consumer and mortgage lending practices of banks should make this clear. In earlier days banks were generally unregulated, but, when abuses by bankers resulted in losses to depositors, more state and national regulatory commissions came into being to place certain restrictions upon the banking community. Banks are now limited in the amount they can loan to any one borrower at any one time. There are reserve requirements that limit lending power and there are discount rates that restrict loan activity.

The economic trend of a locality or the country as a whole is a factor in determining a bank's loan and investment policy. Because of the dynamic nature of business conditions, changes in particular industries or areas can enhance or jeopardize the liquidity and the soundness of a bank. "A cautious or conservative policy is generally thought the best insurance against possible swings or fluctuations of the economy."¹³

The banking community recognizes that the making and handling of mortgage and consumer loans differ greatly from the making and servicing of the average commercial loans. Regular commercial loan officers are felt not to be suited to installment loan work because of their generally cautious attitude. "Of primary importance in *consumer* lending is the honesty and ability of the borrower; information in regard to the borrower's assets and indebtedness; the source, amount, adequacy and permanency of his income."¹⁴ (*Italics added.*)

Mortgage loans, of course, are fully secured by real estate. In making commercial loans to very small businesses, the *management ability* of the borrower is of highest concern. The financial factor, while important, is generally the most difficult to analyze properly because of the small firm's chronically inadequate and nonexistent records.

In short, the Negro consumer who has a stable income and is not overextended in his credit can get a consumer loan as easily as any non-Negro with the same characteristics. The same is true of a Negro home owner who can provide a first mortgage on his property, thus fully securing the loan.

But commercial financing, based on the proven management ability of the borrower in a stable industry and a stable locality, is another thing. It is not only Negroes who have difficulty getting such financing. Sixty per cent of *all* businesses in Philadelphia have no borrowing facility from a bank or finance company, *irrespective of race*.¹⁵

The key then to the lack of financing for Negro businesses thus lies in the characteristics of Negro businesses more than in the fact they are Negro-owned. A study has been made of the characteristics of Negro-owned businesses in Philadelphia by the Drexel Institute.¹⁶ And I have made a study of the history of Negro business in that city in an attempt to discover the sociological and economic forces that have brought about these characteristics in Philadelphia.

II

In 1964, the Drexel Institute of Technology of Philadelphia initiated a massive study of little business and the little businessman in Philadelphia. Among other things, the objectives of the study were to review the economic characteristics and behavior of firms with less than four employees and to explore the special problems of businesses owned and operated by members of minority groups. Most of the material in this section has been based upon Drexel's unpublished studies.

There are thirteen manufacturing concerns, all small, operated by Negroes in Philadelphia. The following breakdown, in alphabetical order, indicates the wide degree of diversification:

8 beauty products manufacturing companies
1 casket manufacturing company

- 2 clothing manufacturing companies
- 1 ironworks manufacturing company
- 1 meat products manufacturing company

In addition, fourteen wholesale distribution companies were found. They represent five kinds of products.

- 8 beauty products distribution companies
- 1 candy, notions, and novelties distribution company
- 1 casket distribution company
- 1 clothing distribution company
- 3 food distribution companies

But, the Drexel study revealed that while there were about ten Negro-owned businesses—insurance, publishing, catering, cosmetic supplies, and contracting—which were quite successful, most of the 4,242 Negro businesses of Philadelphia,¹⁷ comprising 9 per cent of the city's total businesses, were marginal in profit-making, stability, and physical condition.

The type of businesses followed the pattern observable in other American cities. Nearly all were retail and service trades, and most were single proprietorships. Personal services were the more numerous, hairdressing and barbering comprising 24 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively, of the total number of Negroes in business. Luncheonettes and restaurants comprised 11.5 per cent of the total.¹⁸ Many of the businesses would be submarginal if free family labor were not available. For example, median sales for a sample of Negro-owned beauty shops were \$2,500, for Negro-owned luncheonettes, \$6,800, and for barber shops, \$4,400.¹⁹

Seventy-seven per cent of Negro businesses are concentrated in three of the city's twenty community business areas. (Drexel used the twenty community business areas originally developed by the Philadelphia City Planning Commission.) The largest Negro community business area, Area 13, comprises nine square miles in the north-central part of the city. Approximately 200,000 Negroes live there, representing 69 per cent of Area 13's total population,²⁰ and about one-third of the city's total Negro population. Approximately 40 per cent (1,615) of all Negro businesses are located here.²¹

Almost all Negro businesses are located in predominantly Negro neighborhoods, but at least half of the businesses in these neighborhoods are white-owned. While the white businessman is free to pass through the walls on either side, the Negro businessman cannot look beyond "his neighborhood."

Community Business Area (CBA) with Significant Negro Population* ²²		
CBA	% Negro Population within CBA	% City Negro-owned Business within CBA
4	7.5	1.1
5	29.7	3.4
8	21.4	3.4
13	69.0	42.4
14	82.9	20.6
15	10.4	2.0
16	27.2	7.7
17	27.5	1.7
18	21.6	2.2
19	25.8	14.5
All others	2.6	1.0
		TOTAL 100.0

* Areas which contained a Negro population of more than 5 per cent were studied by Drexel and described, with the exception of Area 20 which has more than a 5 per cent Negro population but very few businesses because of area redevelopment.

The Drexel survey team took a sample of the various types of businesses in each of the community business areas and rated them by appearance.²³ The meanings of these appearance ratings are as follows:

- A. "General appearance of being neat and clean looking; with a large sign and/or window display of some current nature; goods or products properly arranged; appears to have enough stock on hand; not necessarily a new store."
- B. "General appearance of being neat, but not eye-appealing to the observer; with a sign and/or window display of relatively small size; appearance implies adequacy."
- C. "General appearance of being 'run-down,' untidy and dirty; paint peeling off walls, plaster coming off ceilings, little or no lighting; no displays to speak of; little stock on hand."

A detailed breakdown of the Negro businesses in Area 13 by type of business and appearance of establishment is given in Table 1. Note that, of all the businesses in Area 13, 12.1 per cent fell in Category A (neat and clean), 55.9 per cent in Category B (not eye-appealing), and 32 per cent in Category C (run-down). Of the six largest categories in that area (groceries and delicatessens, luncheonettes and restaurants, candy and variety stores, barber

shops, beauty shops, and other personal services), barber shops had by far the cleanest and neatest appearance. Still, only 17.6 per cent of these were in Category A, 60.6 per cent in Category B, and 21.8 per cent in Category C. The fifteen drug stores classified have the neatest and cleanest appearance of all the businesses surveyed: 60 per cent were in Category A, and 40 per cent in Category B. The results in the other two community business areas with a large number of Negro businesses, Areas 14 and 19, were quite similar to the results in Area 13 and are given in Table 2.

The picture, then, of the Negro in business is that of a small businessman—a very small businessman—who is generally not a very good businessman and, frankly, not a very significant factor in the Negro community.

III

Urban life in nineteenth-century Philadelphia to a large extent revolved around the intense competition between Europe's huddled-masses and the fleeing slaves of America, both yearning to breathe free. The simultaneous influx of freedmen, fugitives, and foreigners within a large city resulted in prejudice, lawlessness, crime, poverty, and race riots.

Before this influx of slaves and immigrants, Negroes participated to a surprising extent in business. Many were already keeping small shops in 1789²⁴ and doing well. A beneficial insurance society was established by Negroes in 1796²⁵ and a Negro life insurance company in 1810.²⁶ An exceptional person during this period was James Forten, a Negro sailmaker who employed approximately forty employees, half whites, half Negroes. (Later, his Negro successors were to fail when the growth of steam vessels made the business less profitable).²⁷ By 1820, the Negro population of Philadelphia was 11,891, and it had about \$250,000 worth of free property.²⁸ An Englishman visiting the city in 1823 reported that a few Negroes in business had amassed fortunes²⁹ and that they were engaged in almost all the branches of business pursued by whites.³⁰

The decade of the 1820's, however, witnessed the first great confrontation of free Negroes and immigrants, a confrontation which continued with rising intensity and without abatement for the next hundred years, until Congress, in the early 1920's, passed the Immigration Exclusion Acts.

A series of riots directed chiefly against Negroes started in 1829, recurred frequently until about 1840, and did not cease until

after the Civil War. The sympathy of the general populace was not with the Negro, and legislation was introduced, but failed to pass, to stop further migration of Southern Negroes into Pennsylvania. However, W. E. B. Du Bois stated that Pennsylvanians who were friends of the Negro advised against sending fugitives to the state since the effects would be detrimental to the colored population.³¹

Du Bois spelled the problem out very clearly. Noting the rapid economic changes which accompanied the growing industrialization of the American economy, he said:

The new industries attracted the Irish, Germans, and other immigrants; Americans too, were fleeing to the city and soon to natural race antipathies was added a determined effort to displace Negro Labor—an effort which had the aroused prejudice of many of the better classes, and the poor quality of the new black immigrants to give it aid and comfort. To all this was soon added a problem of crime and poverty. Numerous complaints of petty thefts, housebreaking, and assaults on peaceful citizens were traced to certain classes of Negroes. In vain did the better class, led by men like Forten, protest by public meeting their condemnation of such crimes. The tide had set against the Negro strongly, and the whole period from 1820 to 1840 became a time of retrogression for the mass of the race, and of discountenance and repression from the whites . . . a mass of poverty-stricken, ignorant fugitives and ill trained freedmen had rushed to the city, swarmed in the vile slums which the rapidly growing city furnished, and met in social and economic competition equally ignorant but more vigorous foreigners. These foreigners outbid them at work, beat them on the streets, and were enabled to do this by the prejudice which Negro crime and the anti-slavery sentiment had aroused in the city.³²

The Negro cause suffered a great legal setback between riots. In 1836, a case came before a state court in Philadelphia involving a Negro who had been denied the right to vote. The court decided that free Negroes were not freemen in the language of the State Constitution and, therefore, that Negroes could not vote. The case was appealed without success. Thus, after forty-six years of full American citizenship the Negro in the City of Brotherly Love was denied the right to vote.³³

The effect on the Negro community was disastrous. The better classes could not escape into the mass of white population and leave the new Negroes to fight their own battles with the immigrants. In terms of the Negro businessman, the impressive developments of the 1790-1820 period fast melted away. In the Register of Trade of Philadelphia in 1838, 344 Negroes—133 women and 211 men—were reported as being in business for themselves.³⁴ (Most of

these operated from stands rather than shops.) A pamphlet issued in 1838 by the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting Abolition of Slavery said, in reference to Negro businessmen, "Here, as in many other particulars, they are met by the prejudice with which they have to contend, which renders it difficult for them to find places for their sons as apprentices, to learn mechanical trades."⁸⁵ From what we have been able to determine, there were probably fewer than twenty-five affluent Negro businessmen in Philadelphia in the entire generation preceding the Civil War.

Following the war, the immigrant rate doubled while the Negro population increase was relatively modest. Immigrants vastly outnumbered the Negroes, and each generation renewed the barefisted competition with each generation of Negroes. In the spring elections of 1870, the Irish incited a race riot so fierce that U.S. Marshals were called on to preserve order.⁸⁶ By the end of the century immigrants made up over one-fifth of Philadelphia's 1,294,000 population while Negroes accounted for about 5 per cent.⁸⁷ In 1896, over one hundred years after Negro enterprise had commenced in that city, there were approximately 300 Negro-owned businesses.⁸⁸ The great majority of these were barbershops, caterers, and restaurants—all developments from the Negro domestic servant. Negro business had scarcely changed despite the revolutionary developments taking place in the rest of American commerce and industry. Du Bois, in fact, flatly stated that the Philadelphia Negro in the 1890's "holds no conspicuous place in the business world" and had generally experienced a retrogression as compared to the pre-Civil War period.⁸⁹

Some significant developments took place in the Philadelphia Negro population from 1890-1915. It had grown slowly during the previous part of the nineteenth century. In 1860, there were 22,185 Negroes in Philadelphia; in the next thirty years, they increased at the rate of approximately 6,000 per decade. But the Great Migration, beginning in the 1890's, caused an increase of 23,242 in Philadelphia's Negro population in that decade and another 21,846 in the first ten years of the present century. The important thing about these rapid increases is that the major portion of them took place within very limited geographical areas of the city. There is a direct correlation between this gradual concentration of the Negro population and the growth of the Negro businesses.

It is more than likely that Negro businessmen, prior to 1890, catered primarily to a Negro trade. However, this is not entirely true, for many served primarily white customers. At least two Negro

undertaking establishments lured white patronage away from white competitors, and first-class Negro barbers would not allow Negroes in their shops because of the color prejudice.⁴⁰ But, as Du Bois pointed out, "The 40,000 Negroes of Philadelphia need food, clothes, shoes, hats and furniture; these by proper thrift they see ought to be in part supplied by themselves, and *the little business ventures we have noticed are attempts in this direction.*"⁴¹

The distribution of Negro business establishments in relation to the Negro population seems to confirm this. In 1896, when Du Bois made his study, about 60 per cent of the Negro-owned businesses were located in a small compact area, Wards 4, 5, 7, and 8,⁴² which included 35 per cent of the total Negro population of the city.* The remaining 40 per cent were scattered throughout the city in small segments somewhat similar to the distribution of the Negro population in the rest of the city. In other words, Negro businesses tended to locate in areas where a fairly sizeable Negro population had concentrated.

By 1913, there were 1,028 Negro businesses in Philadelphia, a remarkable gain of over 700 in just seventeen years. In that year, 67 per cent of all Negro businesses were located in a very concentrated area containing 38.5 per cent of the total Negro population.⁴³ (Wards 7, 26, 30, and 36; note that, as the Negro migration continued into the twentieth century, the population increases took place slightly south and west of the areas previously mentioned in a section which was fast becoming the growing commercial center of the city.)⁴⁴

With the exception of a second Negro population center (Wards 14, 15, 20 and 47) developing between 1899 and 1913 slightly north of downtown Philadelphia and where 9 per cent of all Negro businesses were found in a concentrated area containing almost 17 per cent of the city's Negro population, Negro businesses in all other wards were few and scattered, coinciding with the scattering of the Negro population.⁴⁵

It was only natural for newly arrived Southern Negroes to move into existing Negro population centers, expanding them rather than starting colonies of their own. The rapid development of these areas between 1896 and 1913 provided new opportunities for Negro businessmen. However, whenever the Southern Negroes moved in, the whites—both native and foreign born—moved out. What was worse,

* The percentage of the city's Negro population for 1896 was obtained by taking the mean between the per cent of the total Negro population each ward represented in the 1890 census and that represented in the 1900 census.

as the Negro population soared, not only segregation but bitter racism increased.

Vacant houses in "non-Negro" sections were no longer for rent or sale to Negroes. The sudden increase greatly stimulated the movement, which had already started, to segregate Negro children in the schools. Also, such social activities as eating in restaurants or attending white churches and theaters were almost completely withdrawn. While actual conflicts between the two races were not numerous, a race riot did break out in the summer of 1918 in which two men were killed and sixty injured.⁴⁶

The changing patterns of Negro-white relationships, as well as relationships between the native Negro and the migrant, are described for us by a very astute contemporary observer:

The colored people of every class received harsh treatment at the hands of the white public. This was virtually unknown to the Philadelphia Negro, for the city had long possessed a relatively small population of Negroes of culture, education, and some financial means. They had always enjoyed the same social and educational facilities as the whites and courteous treatment from them. But, with the increase in population by a group of generally uneducated and untrained persons, these privileges were withdrawn—the old colored citizens of Philadelphia resented this, placed the blame at the migrant's door and stood aloof from him.⁴⁷

After World War I, segregation patterns grew worse rather than better. Theaters, restaurants, and lunch counters were either completely off-limits for Negroes or were strictly segregated. The YMCA, YWCA, and hotels all refused accommodations to Negroes in the 1920's.⁴⁸

A sharp rise in the number of Negro businesses took place during World War I. Negro business statistics are not available for Philadelphia during this period, but, nationally, the number of Negro merchants grew from 14,181 in 1910 to 23,794 in 1920, a 68 per cent increase, while Negro undertakers at the same time advanced from 953 to 1,558, a 64 per cent growth.⁴⁹ A sharp decline occurred after the war. "An investigator discovered that from one-half to two-thirds of the small business establishments of Negroes like butcher shops, groceries, cafes, and tailors, listed in 1910, could not be found in 1927."⁵⁰

The stimulus that the war gave to Negro businesses led to a growth in the size of the largest Negro enterprises. The vast majority of Negro-owned establishments were still very small retail or service stores; but, by the end of World War I, a few Negroes had

learned to attract and organize capital.⁵¹ In Philadelphia, the Brown and Stevens Bank, established in 1920, and the Cosmopolitan State Bank, formed in 1923, were both Negro-owned; both fell in 1925.⁵² Falling with the Brown and Stevens Bank were the Gipson Stores, a Negro chain with branches throughout Philadelphia, and the Beresford Gale Corporation, a real-estate and investment broker business which had annual gross receipts up to \$100,000 before its collapse.⁵³ The Citizens and Southern Bank, organized in 1920, is still in existence, although several years ago white owners gained a majority control. (Abram Harris, in *The Negro As A Capitalist*, evaluated the Citizens and Southern as the best managed Negro financial enterprise in existence in 1935.)⁵⁴

Nevertheless Negro business was made up almost exclusively of very small operations all through the 1920's and 30's. While precise statistics are hard to come by, it appears there was a gradual increase in the number of Negro businesses during the 1920's, though not proportionate to the population increase. Table 3 makes a partial comparison of Negro-owned businesses in selected categories between 1913 and 1935.

The depression, of course, took its toll. The number of Negro retail stores decreased by 58 between 1929 and 1935. In terms of percentages the number of Negro stores declined 7.6 per cent in this period, compared with 12.8 per cent for white retail businesses, but in volume of sales, the Negro stores fell 48.2 per cent as opposed to 39.4 per cent for white stores.⁵⁵

During this entire period, the Negro wards of the city continued their population expansion. Table 4 shows that by 1920 86.1 per cent (116,199) of Philadelphia's Negroes resided in three of the eight major city sections. For the first time in history, one ward (Ward 30) contained more Negroes than whites (15,480 Negroes; 13,990 whites).

At the same time segregation incidents were occurring monthly. It was not until the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Civil Rights Act of 1935 that there was even a partial diminution in the number of monthly incidents. But the 1935 Act did not end racial conflict. In the early 1940's, white transit workers caused a crippling strike which cost the city \$10,000,000 because Negro workers were given the same compensation as whites. In 1950, Negro lawyers still could not obtain first-class office space in downtown Philadelphia and were not accepted into white law firms. There were no housing covenants; but builders and sales agents practiced discrimination.⁵⁶

Executives of white-owned companies still feared employee and customer reaction if they hired Negroes for responsible positions.⁵⁷ Since World War I, almost 70 racial incidents, major and minor, have been reported by the *Philadelphia Bulletin*.

While the Negro population continued to grow in all wards, the Negro ghetto, as we see it today, did not really take shape until the 1940's. In the 1940 census, only two wards (30 and 47) held more Negroes than whites. Table 5 shows that in 1950, eight wards had this distinction and in 1960, fourteen wards. It was not until 1960 that one of the eight major city sections, the north, held more Negroes than whites.

In other words, the post-World War II development of residential segregation patterns has transformed Philadelphia into almost all-black or almost all-white sections. Concurrent with this has been a decline in the purchasing power of Negroes. In 1946, the incomes of Philadelphia Negro families almost matched the national urban average; by 1959, they were 25 per cent below the median income of Philadelphia whites.⁵⁸

The closing of the ghetto caused a sharp increase in Negro businesses. By 1964, there were 4,242 Negro-owned businesses of all types; 1,759 retail stores compared to 729 in 1935. As shown in Table 6, 86.4 per cent of these businesses were located in the South, West and North, which contained 90.4 per cent of Philadelphia's Negro population. But, the types and character of Negro businesses have not changed greatly since Du Bois wrote *The Philadelphia Negro* in 1899. (See Table 7.)

IV

What is it that has restrained the business development of the Negro? While there are some modest successes among Negro businessmen, almost all of them depend on a predominantly Negro trade, and in neither numbers, stature, nor prestige do they approach the outstanding successes of other ethnic groups.

For one thing, the long competition with the immigrants was a retarding factor, both because the foreigners were "more vigorous," as Du Bois noted, and because natural race antipathies were exacerbated by the social and economic conflicts arising out of the competition between ignorant fugitive slaves and ignorant European immigrants. Thus, after a promising start in enterprise, the Negro as a businessman suffered when "the whole period from 1820

to 1840 became a time of retrogression for the mass of the race, and of discountenance and repression from the whites.”⁵⁹

The greater vigor of the immigrants cannot be taken lightly, particularly in view of their propensity for entering business on their own. Immigrant groups characteristically engage in individual enterprise in a higher proportion than natives. Two separate studies confirm this, one, a study of 5,368 heads of small businesses in Poughkeepsie, New York, from 1936 to 1955,⁶⁰ and, the other, a study of 110 founders of manufacturing enterprises established in Michigan between 1945 and 1958.⁶¹ In the Poughkeepsie study, it was found that: “The number of foreign born proprietors is out of proportion to the foreign born in the total population. Only 5 percent of the employed native born persons in Poughkeepsie are business proprietors as compared with 15 percent of the employed foreign born.”⁶²

The same study indicates that the percentage of immigrants entering business declines in the second generation. “The number of foreign born in Poughkeepsie is declining, as it is in the country as a whole. A comparison of the businessmen who started their concerns in different periods shows that the foreign born proprietors have declined from 41 percent of the total of those going into business before 1936 to 28 percent for those starting the decade 1936-1945, and to 20 percent for those starting after 1945.”⁶³

The percentage distribution of the foreign-born population as of 1940 and the foreign-born proprietors for the 1936-1955 period in Poughkeepsie are given in Table 8. Note that almost 23 per cent of the presidents of manufacturing establishments were foreign-born.

The Michigan study was a survey of 110 manufacturing firms established between 1945 and 1958, almost all of which had twenty or more employees.⁶⁴ The report notes: “There was a large percentage of foreign-born. Twenty percent of the entrepreneurs . . . were immigrants to this country. In addition, 35 percent were the sons of immigrants. Thus, 55 percent, or more than half of our sample, were either foreign-born or first generation Americans.”⁶⁵

Very likely, immigrant status itself explains the large numbers of Puerto Rican-owned businesses in New York City as compared with Negro businesses.⁶⁶ We are not certain whether this strong tendency of the immigrant to become a businessman is an extension of the rebellion begun with the act of immigration, the euphoria of being “free,” the resistance to domination by unfam-

miliar groups, the lack of familiarity with the social roles expected of his income group, or a combination of these with the economic facts of life, or whether it can be better understood through a more elaborate psychological explanation. The facts are clear, however, and they do show a highly disproportionate number of immigrants in business. There are, then, some differences between the immigrant and the Negro that stimulated the former to overcome the lack of a business tradition common to members of both groups.⁶⁷ And in that very process, the aggressive efforts of immigrants compounded the many other problems Negroes experienced in developing their own business tradition.

The relatively small number of Negroes compared to immigrants also prevented the former from developing two strong economic and social supports which the latter had organized early and well: namely, ethnic institutions and, through them, political unity and strength. The Negroes, of course, had their churches but they were not then the social and political institutions which they have become. As noted previously, the native Philadelphia Negro possessed a considerably different culture than the Negro newly arrived and resented the latter because his migration in growing numbers caused the native whites to withdraw privileges from the former.⁶⁸

The old colored citizens of Philadelphia resented this, placed the blame at the migrant's door and stood aloof from him. Negro preachers invited the new arrivals into the church, but many of the congregations made him know he was not wanted. In some cases the church split over the matter, the migrants and their sympathizers withdrawing and forming a church for themselves.⁶⁹

Other ethnic groups had similar troubles. German Jews, for instance, resented Eastern European Jews. But in this case, the large numbers of each group and the existence of a strong and ancient culture gave even the divided groups a unity and strength which Negroes could never develop.

The unceasing and unbalanced social and economic competition between each influx of Negroes and each wave of immigrants, together with the relatively insignificant ethnic institutions and political strength of the former compared to the latter, as well as the accompanying "discountenance and repression" from all whites, kept the Negroes from developing a business tradition in the American tradition of business throughout the entire nineteenth century.

The Great Migration of the early twentieth century brought about the paradox of a dramatic rise in the number of Negroes in business coupled with an increased isolation from whites, native and foreign-born. As the ghettos grew, Negro businesses grew, but less and less did they deal with whites. The increase in numbers kindled racial friction which in turn emblazed the racism long smoldering in Philadelphia society. Negroes, still lacking political strength and any significant racial unity, became locked more and more into the modern ghetto and into the emotional moods and habits it breeds—apathy, frustration, fear, hatred, and lack of self-esteem—hardly the climate to foster those traditional free-enterprise qualities of persistence, thrift, initiative, and risk-taking.

In the final analysis, the fundamental reason that Negroes have not advanced in business is the lack of business success symbols available to them. The culture has simultaneously unduly emphasized achievement in business as the primary symbol of success and has blindly developed or imposed an all-pervading racism that denied the Negro the necessary opportunities for achieving this success.

One is reminded of George Bernard Shaw's observation in the introduction to *Man and Superman*: "We laugh at the haughty American nation because it makes the Negro clean its boots and then proves the moral and physical inferiority of the Negro by the fact that he is a shoeblack."⁷⁰

Racism has pervaded the white man's society in the United States ever since the country's founding. The United States Constitution provided that a slave would be counted only as three-fifths of a person in determining the number of representatives which a state would have in Congress.⁷¹ While the free Negro in Philadelphia enjoyed the voting franchise for almost forty years, this was taken from him by court action in 1836 and by the Reform Constitution of 1837. While the main stimuli to the many race riots during the pre-Civil War period were the immigrants, the native white Philadelphians were hardly blameless for, as Du Bois pointed out, the better classes of Negroes "could not escape into the mass of white population and leave the new Negroes to fight out their battles with the foreigners."⁷²

Abraham Lincoln himself, at least before he became President, did not believe in the equality of the races. For example, in an 1858 speech, he said:

I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races—that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of Negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forbid the two living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together, *there must be the position of superior and inferior and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race.*⁷³ (Italics added.)

The 100 years of unremitting competition between the Negroes and immigrants merely served to keep the sore of racism open and festering. "With the abolitionists long since gone, and consciences salved by the Civil War and Emancipation, Northern public opinion took a racist turn: the fact that the mass of poor Negroes had not become cultivated gentlemen in two or three decades since Emancipation seemed to justify all the old notions about inherent Negro inferiority."⁷⁴

The United States Supreme Court gave racism official and legal sanction when it established the "separate but equal" doctrine in the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson*. "If one race be inferior to the other socially," Justice Brown declared, "the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."⁷⁵

There followed the gradual denial of privileges at public and commercial centers in downtown Philadelphia as well as the beginning of the Great Migration, both leading to the birth of the ghetto and the gradual physical separation of the races. We have seen that "the Roaring Twenties" were also "the Warring Twenties" as far as race relations were concerned. And, as the ghetto imprisoned the Negro more and more, frustrations increased. "The Warring Twenties" became the Warring Thirties, Forties, Fifties, and Sixties.

The Negro, therefore, is hardly any further advanced in business today than he was in the 1820's. In the American culture the sovereign specific was the art of making money, and thus the more enterprising immigrants were allowed to break through into the Anglo-Saxon world of commerce.

As Warner and Srole note in the Yankee City Series:

The occupational history of the ethnic groups in Yankee City follows a course which is very similar to their residential history. The workers of the newly arrived groups started at the very bottom of the occupational

hierarchy and, through the generations, climbed out of it and moved up to jobs with higher pay and increased prestige. Each new ethnic group tended to repeat the occupational history of the preceding ones. By 1933, most of the ethnic groups had attained positions of the industrial life of the community which approximated that of the original native groups.⁷⁶

But in the American culture the cult of racism was greater than that of money-making since it involved more people and spread to all religious, social, and ethnic groups; and there were no Negro Giannini's, Kennedy's, Rosenwald's, or similar great makers of fortunes from immigrant families. The Negroes, therefore, had no reason to believe or hope that persistence, thrift, or initiative could pay off, nor had they any reason to take unusual risks. Totally limited to a poverty market, the best the Negro could work for was a modest, marginal retail or service operation, hardly an example to cause great dreams or build high hopes, or set fires ablaze in a young Negro's heart.

V

With the passage of the various civil rights acts during the past several years and, even more importantly, with the development of a strong moral climate in the country with respect to equal rights for Negroes, it can be expected that new opportunities will gradually be presented to venturesome Negroes where previously the walls of racism had blocked them off. As in so many other areas of modern life there remains much to be done quickly to enable Negro businessmen to exploit fully the new openings.

Somehow, in the past, enterprising individuals of the various ethnic groups were able to surmount the lack of capital and business experience through unusual determination and superior ability. Because the American culture recognized and encouraged the natural-born money-maker and business-getter, these success stories became well known and encouraged others from their respective ethnic groups. Negroes, as we have seen, could not make such a breakthrough because of an all-pervading racism that permeated white America. Since the progress against racism will probably be gradual, any program of rapid action must confront the traditional capital and management barriers.

In recent years some interesting work has been done in this field. In the fall of 1963 a review was ordered of the loans made to Negroes by the Small Business Administration of the U. S. Government through its Philadelphia office during the ten and one-half

years that it had existed. While the Agency does not keep a record of the race of a loan applicant, the number of approved Negro loans had been so small that it was possible to make an accurate account by interviewing the loan processors who had been in the Philadelphia office during this entire period. The study showed that only seven loans had been made to Negroes during these years, while 425 loans had been made to white businesses.

In an attempt to experiment with a more liberal lending policy for Negro businessmen, SBA launched a "6×6" Pilot Loan and Management Program in Philadelphia on January 28, 1964. With this "6×6" program, a plan involving loans up to \$6,000 for six years plus individual management training and counseling, SBA reached and assisted the very small businessman, especially Negro businessmen since they own and operate a large segment of the very small business sector. Under the Philadelphia program, SBA in 1964 approved 219 loans totaling \$912,547, and, of this number, 98 loans for the amount of \$379,657 were made to Negroes. There were 68 loans to established Negro businesses for \$272,757, and 30 loans to new Negro businesses for \$106,900. Of the 219 approved loans, only 8 were delinquent—6 loans to Negroes and 2 loans to white businesses—and none were liquidated.

SBA overcame traditional bank barriers by considering loan applicants principally on the basis of character, integrity, and ability to repay the loan from earnings, rather than on collateral. Collateral was limited to assets available in the business or acquired from loan proceeds. Prior to SBA's "6×6" Pilot Program, these very small business owners were shut off from the capital needed for improvements because commercial institutions generally do not lend to the very small businessman. Furthermore, prospective businessmen could not get capital to begin a new business. This pilot program was a major breakthrough and was subsequently expanded to five other cities. Its success prompted its inclusion as Title IV in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 on an expanded basis with loans up to \$25,000 for fifteen years.

This liberal financing available from the Small Business Administration under Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act, together with the management training and individual management counseling, should make it possible for enterprising Negroes to begin in business, modernize, and expand. This has to be done if any start is to be made in creating a respectable Negro business tradition because it can be expected that, as the walls of segregation lower

and the incomes of Negroes improve, risk-taking, "profit-smelling" white businessmen will begin to cash in on an untapped market. White businessmen will move in faster than Negro businessmen will be permitted or will feel free to move. In the process, many Negro businesses are bound to fail. In fact, it is estimated that in ten years it is very likely there will be fewer Negro businessmen than there are today. Presumably, those businesses which survive will be stronger, more competitive, and more profitable.

Title IV is a promising beginning; the successes will be more immediate and more visible than those to be achieved under other programs of the anti-poverty campaign. But, it is still not enough. Conditions must be created which will enable the born Negro entrepreneur and risk-taker to feel free to market his services where big money, high stakes, and rich rewards exist. While the ultimate solution is the full and complete implementation of various civil rights acts, it must be taken for granted that this will take some time.

In the interim, a number of actions, in addition to Title IV, could be taken to spur Negro entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, almost all of them are based on the assumption that our cities will continue to have segregated areas. It is hoped that these will soon evolve into the ethnic types of neighborhoods described in *Beyond the Melting Pot*,⁷⁷ where some members of the group prefer to live within the confines of the group but are also free to leave and to reside in other sections of the city.

One of the most promising opportunities for Negro businessmen to move outside the ghetto lies in franchising. Under this system the individual businessman gets the benefit not only of management guidance and some financing from the owner of the franchise system, but also the prestige and stature of the franchise trade name. The businessman remains independent and reaps the full reward of his hard work. Howard Johnson restaurants, A & W root beer stands, and Holiday Inn motels are examples of franchising. The federal government through the Commerce Department and the Small Business Administration has already started such a program. The greater the "visibility" attained by Negro businessmen outside the ghetto, the sooner and easier it will be for the real entrepreneur to make his great break-through.

Within the ghetto, a coordinated economic development plan is badly needed, not just to stimulate Negro entrepreneurship (though this will result), but also to create jobs, increase the purchasing power of ghetto residents, and gradually lift the omnipres-

ent cloud of apathy, frustration, and bitter despair that affects not only the Negro's self-esteem, but also his ability and determination to improve his station in life.

A number of new programs suggest that tremendous potential exists for accomplishing this. They all involve construction projects. Apart from the more direct ends being served by each program, such as the need for low-cost housing, equally important and equally direct economic objectives might be obtained if each project were required to utilize qualified Negro contractors, either as prime- or sub-contractors, in a portion of the units being constructed. For instance, a certain percentage of the units could be "set-aside" for Negro contractors living in the affected area in a manner similar to the way federal procurement agencies "set-aside" certain contracts for bidding exclusively by small businesses. In addition, a certain minimum percentage of Negro labor living in the affected area should be employed by all the contractors working on the project. This would involve delicate problems with the labor unions, but it would surely develop that they would be receptive to a portion of new construction jobs for their union membership rather than none at all.

In the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act, the Small Business Administration is given the authority to guarantee the leases of small businessmen up to ten years. (A small businessman for these purposes is one who grosses less than one million dollars annually.) The great significance in this authority lies in the fact that private mortgage money (insurance companies and pension funds) which heretofore has not been invested in slum areas can be fully protected against any change in the economic or social conditions of these areas or any defaults in rental payments by the small businessman. In other words, modern shopping areas could be built in the Harlems of our nation's cities. Careful planning, of course, is required, but at least the tools now exist.

A valuable program virtually unused in urban areas is the Local Development Company Program of the Small Business Administration. Under this program the SBA lends to a local, non-profit, economic development corporation 80 per cent of the funds needed for land, buildings, and equipment for twenty-five years at 5.5 per cent interest. The maximum allowed is \$350,000 per small business aided. If ten small businesses are assisted, the amount can be \$3,500,000. Under this program factories, industrial parks, parking garages, nursing homes, and a wide variety of job-creating enter-

prises have been financed. For instance, last summer a modern twenty-nine unit shopping center was built in South Chicago. This program has great promise if coordinated with an urban renewal program that broadens its interest to include total land use of a slum area and total community needs.

Various construction programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs provide similar opportunities for Negro contractors and Negro employees, and for economic development of the ghettos. These include: (1) F.H.A.'s 3 per cent insured loans for the construction or rehabilitation of housing projects designed for low and moderate income families;⁷⁸ (2) the new grant program (2/3) for small public facilities, such as community centers and health centers which are related to the community action programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity;⁷⁹ and (3) the construction as well as the new leasing program of public housing units.⁸⁰

An important aspect of the ghetto's economic development, as well as the ultimate liberation of the Negro entrepreneur, is the full involvement of normal commercial financial institutions and services in the ghetto. The trade contacts, business opportunities, and local financial assistance they can offer are far greater than anything the federal government can devise. Important among these are the following: (1) Development of high-risk casualty and theft insurance policies by the major insurance companies similar to high-risk automobile collision insurance policies. Most casualty and theft insurance companies do not insure in Negro areas; this applies to white businessmen as well as Negroes. A progressive, risk-taking businessman cannot operate boldly without such insurance; this is true any place, but especially in the ghetto. (2) The banks must be brought into the commercial financing of the very small businesses they historically have not financed. The Small Business Administration has proved that the risk is not so great as feared. And now banks have been offered a further incentive because under Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act they can obtain 100 per cent guarantees by the Small Business Administration. (3) A retail installment credit institution needs to be created for ghetto businessmen. At the present time both Negro and white stores have difficulty getting credit from banks using a Negro consumer's installment purchase as security. (This is typical bank discount financing.) They are thus forced into the hands of disreputable high-interest installment operators.

The Negro Businessman

Finally, Negro businessmen must organize their own business associations until such time as they are freely admitted into the local chambers of commerce and other trade associations. Such associations will help give the Negro businessman a sense of identity and a channel of communication for success stories. In addition, they provide a vehicle for representing the individual Negro merchant's views and complaints on rent-gouging, licensing, traffic-routing, and zoning, as well as his interests in the anti-poverty program, city hall, and civil rights.

The growing interest in the Negro market should naturally lead to an increased awareness of the Negro as a businessman. A strong Negro business community is one reality which the white power structure will truly respect simply because it will have to.

TABLE 1. Negro Businesses in Area 13 by Type of Business and Appearance of Establishment^a

Business Type	A			B			C		
	Total in Business Type	Per Cent of Businesses By Type	Number of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses	Number of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses	Number of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses
Total	1,615	100.0	188*	12.0*	871*	55.9*	500*	32.1*	
Retail Trade Establishments									
Groceries, Delicatessens, etc.	211	13.2	20	9.5	132	62.5	59	28.0	
Luncheonettes & restaurants	194	12.2	20	10.3	107	55.4	67	34.3	
Taverns	18	0.8		not classified					
General merchandise	27	1.7	9	33.3	11	40.7	7	26.0	
Apparel stores	52	3.3	9	17.4	18	34.5	25	48.1	
Furniture, furnishings, etc.	38	2.4	—	—	5	13.2	33	86.8	
Automotive stores	2	0.1	1	50.0	—	—	1	50.0	
Gasoline service stations	20	1.3	9	45.0	6	30.0	5	25.0	
Lumber, bldg., hardware	3	0.2	—	—	2	66.7	1	33.0	
Drug stores	15	0.9	9	60.0	6	40.0	—	—	
Candy & variety stores	147	9.2	11	7.5	90	61.2	46	31.3	
Other retail stores	17	1.1	6	35.2	4	23.5	7	41.3	
Service Establishments									
Hotels & other lodging places	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Real estate	12	0.8	—	not classified	—	—	—	—	
Funeral directors	26	1.6	—	not classified	—	—	—	—	
Barber shops	216	13.5	38	17.6	131	60.6	47	21.8	
Beauty shops	271	16.9	28	10.3	181	66.8	62	22.9	
Other personal services	240	14.9	18	7.5	126	52.5	96	40.0	
Radio & TV repair	33	2.1	5	15.2	17	51.5	11	33.3	
Reupholstering & decorating	10	0.6	—	—	6	60.0	4	40.0	
Other repair services	9	0.6	1	11.2	4	44.4	4	44.4	
Auto repair services garages	39	2.4	3	7.8	16	40.9	20	51.3	
Motion pictures & recreation	3	0.2	—	—	2	66.7	1	33.3	
Janitorial services & maint.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Other business services	12	0.8	1	8.3	7	58.4	4	33.3	

* Excluding not classified

TABLE 2. Negro Business in Areas 14 and 19 by Appearance of Establishments*⁸²

Area	Total in Business Type	Per Cent of Business by Type	A		B		C	
			Number of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses	Number of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses	Number of Businesses	Per Cent of Businesses
14	784	100.0	118	15.7	390	52.0	241	32.3
19	554	100.0	48	8.9	260	48.5	228	42.6

* The above table is a condensed version of the two original tables of Areas 14 and 19. The totals exclude businesses unclassified by Drexel.

TABLE 3. Comparison of Negro-Owned Businesses in Selected Categories Between 1913 and 1935*⁸³

Category	1913	1935
Food stores, including bakeries and caterers.....	174	258
Automotive, including accessories, filling stations and garages.....	0	36
General merchandise.....	3	3
Apparel.....	8	15
Furniture-household, including radios.....	21	3
Lumber—building, hardware.....	0	1
Eating and drinking places.....	190	161
Drug stores.....	3	27
Other retail stores, including cigar stores and stands, fuel and ice, beer and liquor stores.....	102	159
Second-hand stores.....	6	66
TOTAL	507	729

* We omitted about one-half of the businesses in 1913 because they did not coincide with the categories in the 1935 count.

TABLE 4. Distribution of the Population of the North, South, and West Sections of Philadelphia, 1920⁸⁴

Section or Ward	Negro Population	% of Total Negro Population	White Native Population	% of Total White Native Population	White Foreign Population	% of Total White Foreign Population	Total Population
North							
Ward 13	2,095	1.6	9,257	.7	7,607	1.9	18,959
14	4,946	3.7	9,874	.7	3,498	.8	18,318
15	3,766	2.8	31,717	2.4	9,342	2.3	44,825
20	8,269	6.2	25,798	1.9	12,940	3.3	47,007
28	1,813	1.4	41,023	3.1	10,862	2.7	53,698
29	1,716	1.3	23,793	1.8	6,710	1.6	32,219
32	3,926	2.9	34,467	2.7	9,147	2.2	47,540
37	1,126	.8	18,943	1.5	3,167	.7	23,236
38	2,031	1.5	55,268	4.3	15,048	3.8	72,347
47	9,211	6.9	19,625	1.5	4,219	1.1	33,055
Section Total	38,899	29.1	269,765	20.6	82,540	20.4	391,204
South							
Ward 7*	12,241	9.1	10,585	.8	3,471	.8	26,297
1	257	.2	25,847	2.0	19,726	4.9	45,830
2	1,962	1.4	18,120	1.4	15,133	3.8	35,215
3	1,695	1.3	10,863	.8	8,806	2.2	21,364
4	2,619	1.9	7,793	.6	6,419	1.6	16,831
26	5,715	4.2	39,169	3.0	17,577	4.4	62,461
30**	15,481	11.5	10,700	1.3	3,290	.8	29,471
36	13,291	9.9	32,315	2.5	9,619	2.4	55,225
39	799	.6	52,854	4.0	29,056	7.3	82,709
48	23	—	21,747	1.7	4,573	1.1	26,343

TABLE 4. (Continued)

Section or Ward	Negro Population	% of Total Negro Population	White Native Population	% of Total White Native Population	White Foreign Population	% of Total White Foreign Population	Total Population
Section Total	54,083	40.1	229,993	18.1	117,670	29.3	401,746
West Ward 24	8,152	6.1	40,901	3.2	11,355	2.8	60,408
27	2,927	2.2	17,358	1.3	4,005	1.0	24,290
34	3,557	2.6	57,555	4.5	11,214	2.8	72,326
40	3,946	2.7	64,147	4.9	10,807	2.7	78,900
44	3,595	2.7	34,124	2.6	7,748	1.9	45,467
46	1,040	.7	66,354	5.1	10,816	2.7	78,210
51			(This ward was not in existence in 1920.)				
52			"				
60			"				
Section Total	23,217	17.0	280,439	21.6	55,945	13.9	359,601
Grand Total	116,199	86.2	780,197	58.8	256,155	63.6	1,152,551

* For these figures, Ward 7 is being included in the South, although it is shown as part of the Center City section on the map.

** Only ward in 1920 where Negroes outnumber the white population.

TABLE 5. Wards in 1950 and 1960 in Which the Negro Population Outnumbered the White Population^{as}

<i>Section or Wards</i>	<i>Negro Population</i>	<i>1950</i>		<i>Total Population</i>
		<i>White Native Population</i>	<i>White Foreign Population</i>	
North				
Ward 13	7,859	3,776	1,671	13,306
14	9,604	3,743	828	14,175
20	25,559	13,532	4,753	43,844
32	44,872	12,175	3,813	60,860
47	27,690	8,032	972	36,694
South				
Ward 30	23,789	3,096	323	27,208
West				
Ward 24	36,741	21,908	4,742	63,391
44	23,398	15,569	2,585	41,552
Total	199,512	81,831	19,687	301,030

<i>Section or Wards</i>	<i>Negro Population</i>	<i>1960</i>		<i>Total Population</i>
		<i>Native*</i> <i>Population</i>	<i>Foreign*</i> <i>Population</i>	
North				
Ward 13	5,070	1,631	518	7,219
14	8,560	1,469	314	10,343
20	24,110	6,018	2,257	32,385
28	46,230	3,122	1,264	50,616
29	23,095	4,178	977	28,250
32	52,191	1,567	739	54,497
37	11,284	6,632	822	18,738
47	28,713	2,231	289	31,233
South				
Ward 4	4,055	2,207	709	6,971
30	21,587	1,701	239	23,527
36	23,542	19,477	2,287	45,306
West				
Ward 24	45,666	9,927	2,394	57,987
44	28,598	6,482	1,379	36,459
52	27,975	18,820	5,451	52,246
Total	350,676	101,643	19,639	455,777

* In 1960, the category for natives and for foreign born included all races.

TABLE 6. Distribution of Negro-owned Businesses in Philadelphia by Wards and Sections With Heavy Negro Population, 1964**

<i>Section and Ward</i>	<i>Negro Population, 1960</i>	<i>% of Negro Total Population</i>	<i># of Negro-owned Businesses, 1964</i>	<i>% of Total Negro-owned Businesses, 1964</i>
South				
Ward 7	6,308	1.2	98	2.3
1	522	.1	5	.1
2	3,006	.6	15	.4
3	3,032	.6	9	.2
4**	4,055	.8	19	.5
26	6,918	1.3	47	1.1
30**	21,587	4.0	248	5.9
36**	23,542	4.4	167	4.0
39	2,917	.6	4	.1
48	1,035	.2	6	.1
Section Total	72,929	13.7	618	14.7
West				
Ward 24**	45,666	8.6	339	8.0
27	4,074	.8	22	.5
34	11,692	2.2	110	2.6
40	4,880	.9	14	.3
44**	28,598	5.4	253	6.0
46	40,171	7.6	293	7.0
51	6,044	1.1	41	1.0
52**	27,975	5.6	255	6.0
60	(Part of Ward 46 in 1960)			
Section Total	169,100	31.9	1327	31.4
North				
Ward 13**	5,070	.9	16	.4
14**	8,560	1.6	50	1.2
15	10,888	2.1	69	1.6
20**	24,110	4.6	106	2.5
28**	46,230	8.7	349	8.3
29**	23,095	4.4	177	4.2
32**	52,191	9.9	337	8.0
37**	11,284	2.1	71	1.7
38	24,505	4.6	160	4.0
47**	28,713	5.4	354	8.4
Section Total	342,857	44.8	1689	40.3
Grand Total	584,886	90.4	3634	86.4

(There were also 2 wards, 22 and 59 in the Northwest, Far North Section, which had, respectively, Negro populations totaling to 19,531 and 8,454 and contained 76 and 60 Negro-owned businesses. The total section had a small Negro population, but Wards 22 and 59 were contiguous to the North.)

* 305 businesses could not be placed in their proper wards because the addresses were not complete. As a result, the distribution and total numbers of the businesses may be slightly conservative.

** Indicates wards where the Negro population outnumbers the white population.

TABLE 7. Numbers of Negro-owned Businesses in Philadelphia in 1964 in Selected Categories*⁸⁷

<i>Category</i>	<i>1964</i>
Food stores.....	446
Automotive, including accessories, filling stations and garages.....	195
General merchandise.....	67
Apparel.....	122
Furniture.....	57
Lumber—building, hardware.....	10
Eating and drinking places.....	489
Drug stores.....	29
Other retail stores.....	344
TOTAL	1,759

* Several categories, in the services especially, were omitted so as to make this count comparable to the 1935 survey taken by the United States Bureau of the Census.
(See Table 3 for comparison with 1913 and 1935.)

TABLE 8. Foreign Born Proprietors and Total Foreign Born Population in Poughkeepsie*⁸⁸

	<i>Percentage Distribution</i>						<i>Total</i>
				<i>Other</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Non</i>	
	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>East</i>	<i>Euro-</i>	
	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Hungary</i>		<i>Euro-</i>	<i>Euro-</i>	<i>pean</i>	
Poughkeepsie							
Population	3.8	2.4	.4	2.2	2.8	0.6	12.2
All proprietors	8.5	5.4	4.5	1.7	6.5	2.4	29.1
Retail	7.7	5.1	4.1	1.6	8.0	3.3	29.8
Service	12.4	6.5	6.3	1.8	2.4	0.9	30.2
Wholesale	2.1	5.7	2.9	—	9.3	0.7	20.7
Manufacture	3.5	2.1	.7	3.5	9.9	2.9	22.7
Included in retail:							
Grocery	16.2	7.9	1.1	1.9	12.1	5.7	44.9
Clothing	3.4	4.1	—	2.1	17.2	—	26.9
Restaurant	9.2	5.2	20.4	0.7	3.3	4.6	43.5
Service station	—	1.5	—	1.5	0.8	0.8	4.6
Included in service:							
Shoe repair	72.5	—	2.5	—	2.5	—	77.5
Barber	35.9	—	2.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	41.8
Beauty shop	3.8	—	3.8	3.8	—	—	11.3
Garage	3.0	7.5	—	1.5	3.0	—	14.9
Trucking	2.2	—	—	—	—	—	2.2
Number of cases	217	137	115	43	167	62	741

* Poughkeepsie population is as of 1940; proprietors are for 20 years, 1936–1955.

TABLE 9. Comparison of Nativity of Entrepreneurs and Business Leaders With Nativity of U.S.A. White Population in 1960

Nativity	Percentage of Entrepreneurs	Percentage of Business Leaders*	Percentage of U.S.A. White Population in 1960**
Foreign born	19.8***	5.3	5.9
U. S.-born with foreign-born fathers	35.0****	19.7	15.0
Total	54.8	25.0	20.9

* Business leader data adapted from Table 34 in Warner and Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry*, *op. cit.*, p. 90. Number of business leaders was approximately 7,500.

** Computed from data appearing in U. S. Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population: 1960*.

*** Number of entrepreneurs reporting nativity, 86.

**** Number of entrepreneurs reporting father's nativity, 40.
(This table refers to the information given in footnote 65.)

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1. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 36.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York, 1965), p. 29.
4. St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis, A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City*, Vol. II (New York, 1945; 2nd ed., 1962), p. 432.
5. Nathan Reich, "The Economic Structure of Modern Jewry," *The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion*, Vol. II (New York, 1949), p. 1246.
6. W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*, Yankee City Series, Vol. III (New Haven, Conn., 1945), p. 54.
7. Department of Immigration, *Immigrants by Major Occupation Groups: 1820 to 1957*, Series C, pp. 115-132. The percentages are of totals that exclude the No-occupation category which contained mostly dependents as well as persons who declined to state their occupations.
8. Reich, *op. cit.*, p. 1245.
9. Warner and Srole, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
10. Drake and Cayton, *op. cit.*, p. 432.
11. See Chester R. Rapkin and William Grissby, *The Demand for Housing in Racially Mixed Areas* (Berkeley, Calif., 1960).
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-86.

13. American Institute of Banking, *The Fundamentals of Banking* (New York, 1947), pp. 378-399.
14. Carlisle R. Davis, *Credit Administration* (New York, 1949 and 1964), p. 308.
15. Drexel Institute of Technology, *An Analysis of the Little Businessman in Philadelphia*, Vol. I (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 92.
16. Drexel Institute of Technology, *The Census of Negro-owned Businesses* (Philadelphia, 1964), p. ii. This figure was obtained by a team of Drexel Institute researchers who canvassed the entire City and recorded every Negro business no matter how marginal.

The Bureau of the Census reported in 1960 there were 1,840 (1,370 males, 470 females) self-employed Negroes in Philadelphia. (*United States Census of Population, 1960, Pennsylvania, Detailed Characteristics*, pp. 40-749, male; pp. 40-751, female.) This self-employed figure is only a part of the total number of Negro businessmen, since many appear to have a business, in addition to a full-time job, but reported only the latter. Also, some may not have reported their businesses for tax reasons.
17. Drexel Institute of Technology, *The Census of Negro-owned Businesses*, *op. cit.*, p. ii.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. iii.
20. Philadelphia City Planning Commission, *Population of Philadelphia Sections and Wards: 1860-1960* (Philadelphia, 1963), Table 4, pp. 4-2. Source: individual returns to the United States Bureau of the Census (In all cases, we calculated the native white population by subtracting the Negro and foreign-born from the total population.)
21. Drexel Institute of Technology, *An Analysis of the Little Businessman in Philadelphia*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 83, as taken from The Delaware Valley Market, prepared by The Philadelphia Inquirer Research Department, 1963.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
24. Edward Turner, *The Negro in Pennsylvania, Slavery—Servitude—Freedom, 1639-1861* (Washington, D. C., 1911), p. 123, as taken from Brissot de Warville, *Memoire*, pp. 28, 29.
25. W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro, A Social Study* (Philadelphia, 1899), p. 23.
26. Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 17.
28. Du Bois, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

29. Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 125, in which the quote from the following publication is cited. "In New York and Philadelphia there are many sensible blacks. Some few have amassed fortunes; several conduct their businesses with considerable ability and integrity." I. Holmes, *An Account of the United States of America, Derived from Actual Observation, during a Residence of Four Years, 1823*, p. 334.
30. Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, *The Present State and Condition of the Free People of Color of Philadelphia and Adjoining Districts* (Philadelphia, 1838), p. 10.
31. Du Bois, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 31.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
34. Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, *Register of Trades of Colored People in the City of Philadelphia and Districts* (Philadelphia, 1838). The information was taken from Census statistics.

Du Bois, *op. cit.*, p. 143. Du Bois notes that during this period, ". . . though the diversity of employment [for Negroes] at this time was considerable, . . . under such heads as 'shopkeepers and traders' street stands more often than stores were meant." (The majority of the women were engaged in dressmaking and/or tailoring.)
35. Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, *The Present State and Condition of the Free People of Color of the City of Philadelphia and Adjoining Districts* (Philadelphia, 1838), p. 10.
36. Du Bois, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
37. Philadelphia City Planning Commission, *op. cit.*, Table 4, pp. 4-1,-2,-3, Table 5, pp. 5-1,-2,-3.
38. Du Bois, *op. cit.* Du Bois uses two sets of figures. On page 100, he indicated the results of a questionnaire showing 207 Negro men in business in the 7th ward, and on page 103, 63 Negro women in business in that ward. On the other hand, on page 122, he shows the results of an actual nose count of Negro-owned establishments in that ward which comes to 104. The discrepancy can be explained by the fact that, in the latter case, he does not include caterers because, as he says on page 119, "strictly a large part of them are waiters rather than caterers in the Ward who had annual receipts of \$3,000-\$5,000 and we have included them in the totals." Neither does he include every barber because of their numbers. In addition, Du Bois' footnotes on page 99, referring to the responses to the questionnaires, indicate the probability of bias in some cases. For instance, "a carpenter who gets little work and makes his living largely as a laborer is sometimes returned as a carpenter." On pages 124 and 125, he lists 144 business establishments in other parts of the City. Again, he includes no caterers and only some barbers. He also omits businesses that seem transient. Therefore, we have used the number of Negro-owned establishments rather than the number of Negro businessmen.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 116.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-126.
43. R. R. Wright, Jr., Chairman, John W. Harris, A. C. Taylor, J. H. Williams, and A. C. Nicholson, *The Philadelphia Colored Business Directory, 1913, A Handbook of Information Concerning Professional and Business Activities of the Negroes of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1913), pp. 25-76. (We omitted some business categories which this directory included, the most notable being 72 caterers, in order to make this 1913 count more comparable to the one taken by Du Bois in 1896.); and Philadelphia City Registration Commission, *Board and Division Book of City and County of Philadelphia*, as of July 1964. (For approximately the last hundred years, the Ward boundaries have remained constant.)
44. Philadelphia City Planning Commission, *Population of Philadelphia Sections and Wards: 1860-1960*, *op. cit.*, Table 4, p. 4-1.
45. *Ibid.*, Table 4, p. 4-2; R. R. Wright, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 25-76; and Philadelphia City Registration Commission, *op. cit.*
46. Sadie Tanner Mossell, *The Standard of Living Among One Hundred Negro Migrant Families* (Philadelphia, 1920), p. 9.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Raymond Pace Alexander, "The Struggle Against Racism in Philadelphia from 1923 to 1948," a speech delivered before the Business and Professional Group of the American Jewish Congress (Philadelphia, 1950), pp. 2-3.
49. Carter G. Woodson, J. H. Harmon, Jr., and Arnett G. Lindsay, *The Negro as a Businessman* (Washington, D. C., 1929), p. 26.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
51. Monroe N. Work (ed.), *Negro Year Book, 1921-22* (Tuskegee, Alabama, 1922), p. 14.
52. Abram Lincoln Harris, *The Negro as a Capitalist* (Washington, D. C., 1936), pp. 125-143.
53. *Crisis*, January 1923, p. 124. Information about the Gipsen Stores was obtained from William Kelly, President of the National Business League, Philadelphia Chapter.
54. Harris, *loc. cit.*
55. Florence Murray (ed.), *The Negro Handbook* (New York, 1942), p. 24.
56. Alexander, "The Struggle Against Racism in Philadelphia from 1923 to 1948," *loc. cit.*, pp. 15, 17, 18.
57. William A. Reinke, *The Employment of Negro White Collar Workers in the New York-Philadelphia Area* (Philadelphia, 1950), p. 3.
58. In 1946, the income of Philadelphia Negro families as compared to the average for city families in the United States was as follows:

The Negro Businessman

	<i>Philadelphia Negro Families</i>	<i>U. S. Average City Families</i>
\$2,000-\$3,000	32%	30%
Over \$3,000	21%	27%
Under \$2,000	47%	43%

Source: Research Company of America and Harry Hayden Company, *The New Philadelphia Story* (Baltimore, 1946) p. 10.

In 1959, the median income for Philadelphia's nonwhite families was \$4,794 and for all city families it was \$6,433. Source: United States Bureau of the Census, *1960 Pennsylvania General Social and Economic Characteristics*, PC (1) 40 C Pa., Table 78, pp. 40-43; *1960 U. S. Summary, General Social and Economic Characteristics*, PC (1) 1C, Table 148, pp. 1-310. (The figures were taken in 1959.)

59. Du Bois, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
60. Mabel Newcomer, "The Little Businessman: A Study of Business Proprietors in Poughkeepsie, New York," *Business History Review*, Vol. 35 (Winter 1961), pp. 477-531.
61. Orvis L. Collins and David G. Moore, *The Enterprising Man* (East Lansing, Mich., 1964).
62. Newcomer, *op. cit.*, p. 480.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 481.
64. Collins and Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 232-233. The comparison of the nativity of the businessmen included in the Michigan sample of Collins and Moore and the business leaders found in W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1955) is shown in Table 9.

The authors of the Michigan study comment in regard to this Table that: "Only about five percent of the big business leaders were foreign born and an additional twenty percent were U. S. born sons of foreign born fathers. Our figures of twenty and thirty-five percent are disproportionately large. There are almost three times as many foreign born as would be expected from the general population figures and twice as many sons of foreign born." (p. 233)

Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York, 1944, 1962) p. 310. "The foreign-born are 'under-represented' among industrial entrepreneurs, business managers, officials, and white collar workers, but they constitute a larger proportion of the retail dealers than corresponds to their proportion in the population. In fact, one out of every three wholesale and retail dealers in the United States in 1930 was a foreign-born person." (Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Negroes in the United States: 1920-1932*, p. 53.)

66. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

67. This inclination of the immigrant to engage in individual enterprise may explain the unusually large number of Southern Negro migrants who entered business in Pennsylvania during the 1920's. Between 1924 and 1927, 62 per cent of Negro businessmen in Pennsylvania were born in the South. In 1930, 264,804 (61 per cent) of Pennsylvania's Negro population were Southern born. While the percentage of Southern Negroes in business was approximately even to their ratio within the total Negro population, the fact that there was that high a percentage, in light of the state of Negro business at the time, as well as of Negroes generally, is surprising. Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Welfare, *Negro Survey of Pennsylvania*, (Harrisburg, Penn., 1927), p. 28.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
69. Mossell, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
70. George Bernard Shaw, *Man and Superman* (Baltimore, Md., 1952), p. 19.
71. Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section II, paragraph 3.
72. Du Bois, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.
73. Charles E. Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White* (New York, 1964), pp. 92-93.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
75. 163 U.S. 537, 552.
76. Warner and Srole, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
77. Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*
78. Public Law 89-117, Title I, section 106.
79. *Ibid.*, Title VII, section 703.
80. *Ibid.*, Title I, section 103.
81. Drexel Institute of Technology, *An Analysis of the Little Businessman in Philadelphia*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 79.
83. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 24; Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-76.
84. Philadelphia City Planning Commission, *op. cit.*, Table 3, 3-1,-2, Table 4, 4-1,-2, Table 5, 5-1,-2.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Drexel Institute of Technology, *The Census of Negro-owned Businesses*, *op. cit.*; Philadelphia City Registration Commission, *op. cit.*
87. Drexel Institute of Technology, *An Analysis of the Little Businessman in Philadelphia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-82.
88. Newcomer, *op. cit.*, p. 515. It should be pointed out that 94 per cent of all business concerns had less than twenty employees and two-thirds had less than four.

ERIK H. ERIKSON

The Concept of Identity in Race Relations: Notes and Queries

Introductory Remark

THE FOLLOWING notes represent an expansion of the remarks on the concept of identity which I was asked to make in November 1964 at the meeting of the committee gathered to plan the current issues of *Dædalus* on the Negro American. Shortly after that meeting, I undertook a trip abroad in order to interview the surviving witnesses and to study the remaining documents of what seemed, when the study was first planned, a long-past episode in a faraway country, namely, one of Gandhi's nonviolent campaigns. I am now returning to my fragmentary contribution to this symposium for the very reason that the concept or at least the term identity seems not only to have pervaded the literature on the Negro revolution in this country, but also to have come to represent in India (and in other countries) something in the psychological core of the revolution of the colored races and nations who seek inner as well as outer emancipation from colonial rule and from the remnants of colonial patterns of thought. When, for example, Nehru said (as I have been told) that "Gandhi gave India an identity," he obviously put the term into the center of that development of a nonviolent technique, both religious and political, by which Gandhi strove to enhance a unique unity among Indians while insisting on their complete autonomy within the British Empire. But what did Nehru mean?

R. P. Warren, in his *Who Speaks for the Negro?* reacts to the first (but by no means last) mention of the word by one of his informants with the exclamation:

I seize the word *identity*. It is a key word. You hear it over and over again. On this word will focus, around this word will coagulate, a dozen issues, shifting, shading into each other. Alienated from the world to which he is born and from the country of which he is a citizen, yet

surrounded by the successful values of that world, and country, how can the Negro define himself?¹

Usually, the term is used without explanation as if it were obvious what it means; and, indeed, faddish as the word has become, it has also come to mean to many something both profound and unfathomable.

Social scientists sometimes attempt to make it more concrete. However, if they do not quickly equate it with the strangely pat question "Who am I?" they make such words as "identity crisis," "self-identity," or "sexual identity" fit whatever they are investigating. For the sake of logical or experimental maneuverability (and in order to keep in good academic company) they try to treat these terms as matters of social roles, personal traits, or conscious self-images, shunning the less manageable and the less obscure (and often more sinister) implications of the concept. Its use has, in fact, become so indiscriminate that the other day a German reviewer (of a new edition of my first book in which I first used the term in the context of psychoanalytic ego theory) called the concept the pet subject of the *amerikanische Popularpsychologie*. As we might say in American popular psychology: that does it. I return to the subject because (in spite of slogan-like misuse and lip service) it does seem to speak to the condition of many serious observers at this juncture of history. I will try to explain some of its dimensions and relate them to what can only be approximate illustrations from race-relations. I will claim no further status for this effort than "notes and queries"² within a symposium, that is, in a context in which what will be referred to here as a *revolution of awareness* can be seen against the background of what Gandhi called the "four-fold ruin" wrought by political and economic as well as cultural and spiritual degradation; for surely, power, or at least the power to choose, is vitally related to identity. In this context, I shall emphasize rather than minimize the alternatives and controversies, the ambiguities and ambivalences concerning various aspects of the identity issue.

I. *Individual and Communal*

At a time when the term identity refers, more often than not, to a more or less desperate quest, or even (as in the case of the Negro American) to something mostly negative or absent ("invisible,"

"inaudible," "unnamed"), it may be well to introduce the subject with quotations from two men who asserted strongly what identity feels like when you become aware of it. My two witnesses are the bearded and patriarchal founding fathers of the kind of psychology on which this writer's thinking on identity is based. As a *subjective sense* of an *invigorating sameness* and *continuity*, what I would call a sense of identity seems to me best described by William James in a letter to his wife. "A man's character," he wrote, "is discernible in the mental or moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: '*This is the real me!*'" Such experience always includes

"an element of active tension, of holding my own, as it were, and trusting outward things to perform their part so as to make it a full harmony, but without any *guaranty* that they will. Make it a guaranty—and the attitude immediately becomes to my consciousness stagnant and stingless. Take away the guaranty, and I feel (provided I am *uberhaupt* in vigorous condition) a sort of deep enthusiastic bliss, of bitter willingness to do and suffer anything . . . and which, although it is a mere mood or emotion to which I can give no form in words, authenticates itself to me as the deepest principle of all active and theoretic determination which I possess. . . ."⁸

James uses the word "character," but I am taking the liberty of claiming that he describes what today we would call a sense of identity, and that he does so in a way which can in principle be experienced by any man. To him it is both mental and moral (the last a word also often swallowed up by ours); and he experiences it as something that "comes upon you" as a re-cognition, almost as a surprise rather than as something strenuously "quested" after. It is an active tension (rather than a paralyzing question)—a tension which, furthermore, must create a challenge "without guaranty" rather than one dissipated in a clamor for certainty. But let us remember in passing that James was in his thirties when he wrote this, that he had faced and articulated an "identity crisis" of honest and desperate depth, and that he became *the* Psychologist-Philosopher of American Pragmatism only after having attempted to integrate other cultural, philosophic, and professional identity elements.⁴

One can study in James' life history the emergence of a "self-made" identity in a new and expansive civilization. But for a statement of that unity of *personal and cultural* identity which is rooted

in an ancient people's fate we turn to Sigmund Freud. In an address to the Society of B'nai B'rith in Vienna in 1926 he said:

What bound me to Jewry was (I am ashamed to admit) neither faith nor national pride, for I have always been an unbeliever and was brought up without any religion though not without a respect for what are called the "ethical" standards of human civilization.

Whenever I felt an inclination to national enthusiasm I strove to suppress it as being harmful and wrong, alarmed by the warning examples of the peoples among whom we Jews live. But plenty of other things remained over to make the attraction of Jewry and Jews irresistible—many obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction. And beyond this there was a perception that it was to my Jewish nature alone that I owed two characteristics that had become indispensable to me in the difficult course of my life. Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew I was prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the "compact majority."⁵

No translation ever does justice to the grandiose choice of words in Freud's German original. "Obscure emotional forces" are "*dunkle Gefuehlsmaechte*"; the "safe privacy of a common mental construction" is "*die Heimlichkeit der inneren Konstruktion*"—not just "mental," then, and certainly not "private," but a deep communality known only to those who share in it.

This quotation takes on new meaning in the context for which this is written, for *this* "consciousness of inner identity" includes a sense of bitter pride preserved by a dispersed and often despised people throughout a long history of alternating persecution and re-establishment. It is anchored in a particular (here intellectual) gift which had victoriously emerged from the suppression of other opportunities. At the same time, it should not be overlooked (for we will need to refer back to it later) that this *positive identity* is seen against the background of a *negative* counterpart in all "the peoples among whom we Jews live," namely, "prejudices which restrict others in the use of their intellect." Identity here is one aspect of the struggle for ethnic survival: one person's or group's identity may be relative to another's; and identity awareness may have to do with matters of an *inner emancipation* from a more dominant identity, such as the "compact majority." An exquisite triumph is suggested in the claim that the same historical development which restricted the prejudiced in the free use of their intellect made

those discriminated against freer and sturdier in intellectual matters.

These two statements (and the life-histories behind them) serve to establish a first dimension of identity which immediately helps to explain why it is so tenacious and yet so hard to grasp: for here we deal with something which can be experienced as "identical" *in the core of the individual* and yet also identical *in the core of a communal culture*, and which is, in fact, the identity of those two identities.

But we can also see that this is a matter of *growth*, both personal and communal. For a mature psychosocial identity presupposes a community of people whose traditional values become significant to the growing person even as his growth and his gifts assume relevance for them. Mere "roles" which can be "played" interchangeably are not sufficient; only an integration of roles which foster individual vitality within a vital trend in the existing or developing social order can support identities. (We may speak, then, of a *complementarity* of an *inner synthesis* in the individual and of *role integration* in his group.)

In all their poetic spontaneity these two statements prove to be the product of trained minds and therefore exemplify the main dimensions of a positive sense of identity almost systematically: from here one could proceed in a number of directions. But since these utterances are taken not from theoretical works, but from special communications (a letter to his wife from a man who married late; an address to his "brothers" by an observer long isolated in his field), it would seem most fitting now to quote corresponding voices among Negroes. But the mere contemplation of the task reveals two difficulties. The corresponding statements of Negro authors are couched in terms so negative that they at first suggest an absence of identity or the prevalence of what we will call *negative* identity elements. From Du Bois' famous passage (quoted in Myrdal's introduction to *Dark Ghetto*)⁶ on the *inaudible* Negro, we would be led to Baldwin's and Ellison's very titles suggesting *invisibility*, *namelessness*, *facelessness*. But I would not approach these themes as a mere plaintive expression of the Negro American's sense of "nobody-ness," a social role which, God knows, was his heritage. Rather, I would tend to interpret the desperate and yet determined pre-occupation with invisibility on the part of these creative men as a demand to be heard and seen, recognized and faced as *individuals with a choice* rather than as men marked by what is all too

superficially visible, namely, their color (and by the stereotypes which go with it). In a haunting way they defend an existing but in some ways voiceless identity against the stereotypes which hide it. They are involved in a battle to reconquer for their people, but first of all (as writers must) for themselves, what Vann Woodward calls a "surrendered identity." I like this term because it does not assume total absence as many contemporary writings do, something to be searched for and found, to be granted or given, to be created or fabricated, but something to be liberated. This will be emphasized in this paper because I consider it to be an actuality, and thus the only bridge from past to future.

I almost quoted Ellison as saying that his writing was indeed an attempt to transcend "as the blues transcended the painful conditions with which they deal." But I stopped myself; and now I have quoted him to show up a second difficulty. Except for extraordinary moments of lucidity, all self-images and images of otherness (and, yes, even the blues) change their connotation kaleidoscopically before our eyes and in our discussions; and no writer of today can escape this. To have something to hold on to, we all use stereotypes temporarily endowed with ideological connotations which are a measure of Negro or white distance from the thoughtless accommodation to the postslavery period from which we are all emerging. What before was a more unconscious mixture of guilt and fear on the white side, and a mixture of hate and fear on the other, is now being replaced by the more conscious and yet not always more practical sentiments of remorse and mistrust. We have, at the moment, no choice but to live with those stereotypes and these affects: confrontation will disprove some of them, history dissolve others. In the meantime, it may be helpful to bring some concepts to bear on this problem so that the kaleidoscope may reveal patterns as well as bewildering changes.

II. *Conscious and Unconscious*

A "sense of identity" obviously has conscious aspects, such as the experience of an increased unity of the physical and mental, moral and sensual selves, and of a oneness in the way one experiences oneself and the way others seem to experience us. But this process *can* also be visible to others, for he who "knows where he is going and who is going with him" demonstrates an unmistakable, if not always easily definable, unity and radiance of appearance, physiog-

monic as well as postural. And yet, just when a person, to all appearances, seems to "find himself," he can also be said to be "losing himself" in new tasks and affiliations. He transcends identity-consciousness; and this is surely so in the early days of any revolution and was so in the case of the young of the Negro revolution who found themselves and, in fact, found their generation in the very decision to lose themselves (as well as all guaranty) in the intensity of the struggle. Here identity-consciousness is absorbed in actuality. There are vivid and moving descriptions of this state (none more so than in Howard Zinn's account of the early days of SNCC).⁷ Afterwards, no doubt, these at first anonymous heroes faced redoubled self-consciousness, a kind of double-take on the stage of history. Conversely, Negroes who must now prove themselves in the sober light of a more integrated day cannot escape a self-consciousness which is apt to interfere with the happiness of finding or losing oneself: there are and there will be the martyrs of self-chosen or accidentally aggravated identity-consciousness, who must sacrifice the innocent unity of living to a revolutionary awareness.

But the core of that inner unification called identity is at best (as we psychoanalysts would say) *pre-conscious*, that is, accessible only to musings at moments of special awareness or to the revelatory experiences of intuitive writers. Mostly it is *unconscious* and even repressed, and hereby related to all those unconscious conflicts to which only psychoanalysis has found a methodical access. Thus the concept not only is difficult to work with; it also arouses deep-seated "resistances," which must be pointed out not in the hope of doing away with them (for they are an intricate and insurmountable part of the problem of human awareness), but in order to get acquainted with a shadow which will always follow us.

"Resistance" is a term from psychoanalytic treatment proper. There it indicates a "technical" problem met with in the therapeutic attempt to induce an individual to recognize the nature (or sometimes the very fact) of his illness, to describe his thoughts freely, and to accept the interpretations given to him. But the term has also been used in a wider sense in order to characterize a general resistance to psychoanalytic insights or, indeed, to "psychic reality" itself. However, the widespread acceptance of psychoanalysis (or of what Freud is understood to have said or is reported to have said) and the freer commission of sexual and verbal acts, the omission of which is now considered to be a symptom of repression,

have not done away with a more fundamental aspect of "resistance," for it concerns the relation of man's awareness to his need for a free will, and thus something in the core of man's identity. This resistance can come to awareness in vague discomfort, often the more gnawing as it contradicts our professed interest in enlightenment:

1. If unconscious determinants should, indeed, prove operative in our very sense of self and in the very pathos of our values, does this not carry the matter of determination to a point where free will and moral choice would seem to be illusory?

2. If a man's individual identity is said to be linked to communal identities, are we not faced with another crypto-Marxism which makes man's very sense of destiny a blind function of the dialectics of history?

3. And if such unconscious determinants could, indeed, be demonstrated, is such awareness good for us?

Philosophers, no doubt, have answers to these questions, which recur in the reactions of the best-trained students when faced somewhat more systematically with insights which they otherwise devour eagerly in a non-systematic mixture of paperbacks.⁸ But it must be clear that nobody can escape these questions which are really only part of a wider trend in the scrutiny of human motivation ranging from Darwin's discovery of our evolutionary animal ancestry and Marx's uncovering of class-bound behavior, to Freud's systematic exploration of the unconscious. The preoccupation with identity, therefore, may be seen not only as a symptom of "alienation," but also as a corrective trend in psychosocial evolution. It may be for this reason that revolutionary writers and writers from national and ethnic minority groups (like the Irish expatriots or our Negro and Jewish writers) have become the artistic spokesmen and prophets of identity confusion. Artistic creation, as pointed out, goes beyond complaint and exposure; it includes the moral decision that a certain painful identity-consciousness may have to be tolerated in order to provide the conscience of man with a critique of conditions, with the insight and with the conceptions necessary to heal himself of what most deeply divides and threatens him, namely, his division into what we will call *pseudo-species*.

In this new literature, pre-conscious processes are faced and unconscious ones symbolized in a way which often resembles the process of psycho-analysis; but the "case" is transcended by human revolt, the inner realignment by intense contact with historical actuality. And, in the end, are these writers not proclaiming also an

essential superiority of identity-in-torment over those identities which feel as safe and remote as a suburban home?

What is at stake here is nothing less than the realization of the fact and the obligation of man's specieshood. Great religious leaders have attempted to break through the resistances against this awareness, but their churches have tended to join rather than shun the development which we have in mind here, namely, man's deep-seated conviction that some providence has made his tribe and race or class, caste, or religion "naturally" superior to others. This seems to be part of a psychosocial evolution by which he has developed into *pseudo-species*. This fact is, of course, rooted in tribal psychology and based on all the evolutionary changes which brought about man. Among these is his prolonged childhood during which the newborn, "naturally" born to be the most "generalist" animal of all and adaptable to widely differing environments, becomes specialized as a member of a human group with its complex interplay of an "inner world" and an ethological environment. He becomes indoctrinated, then, with the conviction that his "species" alone was planned by an all-wise deity, created in a special cosmic event, and appointed by history to guard the only genuine version of humanity under the leadership of elect élites and leaders. "Pseudo" suggests pseudologia, a form of lying with at least transitory conviction; and, indeed, man's very progress has swept him along in a combination of developments in which it seems hard to bring to bear what rationality and humanity he can muster against illusions and prejudices no longer deserving of the name mythology. I mean, of course, that dangerous combination of technological specialization (including weaponry), moral righteousness, and what we may call the *territoriality of identity*, all of which make *hominem hominis lupum* far exceeding anything typical for wolves among wolves. For man is not only apt to lose all sense of species, but also to turn on another subgroup with a ferocity generally alien to the "social" animal world and, of course, with an increasing sophistication in all three—lethal weaponry, moral hypocrisy, and identity-panic. Sophistication, in fact, seems to escalate the problem just at the time when (and this would seem to be no coincidence) a more universal, a more inclusive human identity seems forcefully suggested by the very need for survival. National-socialist Germany is the most flagrant and all too recent manifestation of the murderous mass-pseudologia which can befall a modern nation.

While we all carry with us trends and tendencies which anchor

our identities in some pseudo-species, we also feel in our bones that the Second World War has robbed such self-indulgence of all innocence, and that any threat of a third one would lead man's adaptative genius to its own defeat. But those who see what the "compact majority" continues to deny and to dissimulate must also attempt to understand that for man to realize his specieshood and to exchange a wider identity for his pseudo-species, means not only the creation of a new and shared technological universe, but also the out-growing of prejudices which have been essential to all (or almost all) identities in the past. For each *positive identity* is also defined by *negative* images (as we saw even in Freud's reference to the intellectual components of his identity), and we must now discuss the unpleasant fact that our god-given identities often live off the degradation of others.

III. *Positive and Negative*

As I restudied Freud's address, I remember a remark made recently by a warm-hearted and influential American Jew: "Some instinctive sense tells every Jewish mother that she must make her child study, that his intelligence is his pass to the future. Why does a Negro mother not care? Why does she not have the same instinctive sense?" This was a rhetorical question, of course; he wanted to know which of many possible answers I would give first. I suggested that, given American Negro history, the equivalent "instinctive sense" may have told the majority of Negro mothers to keep their children, and especially the gifted and the questioning ones, away from futile and dangerous competition, that is, for survival's sake to keep them in their place even if that place is defined by an indifferent and hateful "compact majority."

That the man said "mothers" immediately marks one of the problems we face in approaching Negro identity. The Jewish mothers he had in mind would expect to be backed up by their husbands or, in fact, to act in their behalf; the Negro mothers would not. Negro mothers are apt to cultivate the "surrendered identity" forced on Negro men for generations. This, so the literature would suggest, has reduced the Negro to a reflection of the "negative" recognition which surrounded him like an endless recess of distorting mirrors. How his positive identity has been undermined systematically—first under the unspeakable system of slavery in North America and then by the system of enslavement

perpetuated in the rural South and the urban North—has been extensively, carefully, and devastatingly documented.

Here the concept of a negative identity may help to clarify three related complications:

1. Every person's psychosocial identity contains a hierarchy of positive *and* negative elements, the latter resulting from the fact that the growing human being, throughout his childhood, is presented with evil prototypes as well as with ideal ones (by reward and punishment, by parental example, and by the community's typology as revealed in wit and gossip, in tale and story). These are, of course, culturally related: in the background which gives prominence to intellectual achievement, some such negative roles as the Schlemihl will not be wanting. The human being, in fact, is warned *not* to become what he often had no intention of becoming so that he can learn to anticipate what he must avoid. Thus, the positive identity (far from being a static constellation of traits or roles) is always in conflict with that past which is to be lived down and by that potential future which is to be prevented.

2. The individual belonging to an oppressed and exploited minority, which is aware of the dominant cultural ideals but prevented from emulating them, is apt to fuse the negative images held up to him by the dominant majority with his own negative identity. The reasons for this exploitability (and temptation to exploit) lie in man's very evolution and development as pseudo-species. There is ample evidence of "inferiority" feelings and of morbid self-hate in all minority groups; and, no doubt, the righteously and fiendishly efficient way in which the Negro slave in America was forced into and kept in conditions preventing in most the incentive for independent ambition now continues to exert itself as a widespread and deep-seated inhibition to utilize equality even where it is "granted." Again, the literature abounds in descriptions of how the Negro, instead, found escape into musical or spiritual worlds or expressed his rebellion in compromises of behavior now viewed as mocking caricatures, such as obstinate meekness, exaggerated childlikeness, or superficial submissiveness. And yet, is "the Negro" not often all too summarily and all too exclusively discussed in such a way that his negative identity is defined *only* in terms of his defensive adjustments to the dominant white majority? Do we (and can we) know enough about the relationship of positive and negative elements *within* the Negro personality and *within* the Negro community? This alone would reveal how negative is negative and how positive, positive.

3. As yet least understood, however, is the fact that the oppressor has a vested interest in the negative identity of the oppressed because that negative identity is a projection of his own unconscious negative identity—a projection which, up to a point, makes him feel superior but also, in a brittle way, whole. The discussion of the pseudo-species may have clarified some of this. But a number of questions remain. One comes to wonder, for example, about the ways in which a majority, suddenly aware of a vital split in itself over the fact that it has caused a near-fatal split in a minority, may, in its sudden zeal to regain its moral position and to face the facts squarely, inadvertently tend to *confirm* the minority's negative image of itself and this in the very act of dwelling exclusively and even self-indulgently upon the majority's sins. A clinician may be forgiven for questioning the curative values of an excessive dose of moral zeal. I find, for example, even the designation "culturally deprived" somewhat ironic (although I admire much of the work done under this banner) because I am especially aware of the fact that the middle-class culture, of which the slum children are deprived, deprives some of the white children of experiences which might prevent much neurotic maladjustment. There is, in fact, an exquisite poetic justice in the historical fact that many white young people who feel deeply deprived *because* of their family's "culture" find an identity and a solidarity in living and working with those who are said to be deprived for lack of such culture. Such confrontation may lead to new mutual insights; and I have not, in my lifetime, heard anything approaching the immediacy of common human experience revealed in stories from today's South (and from yesterday's India).

In this connection we may also ask a question concerning the measurements used in diagnosing the Negro American's condition; and diagnosis, it must be remembered, defines the prognosis, and this not least because it contributes to the patient's self-awareness and attitude toward his suffering.

Our fellow panelist Thomas Pettigrew, in his admirable compilation *A Profile of the Negro American*, employs identity terms only in passing. He offers a wealth of solid and all the more shocking evidence of the disuse of the Negro American's intelligence and of the disorganization of his family life. If I choose from the examples reported by Pettigrew one of the most questionable and even amusing, it is in order to clarify the place of single testable *traits* in the whole *configuration* of an individual's development and of his people's history.

Pettigrew, following Burton and Whiting, discusses the problem that

[Boys] from fatherless homes must painfully achieve a *masculine self-image* late in their childhood after having established an original self-image on the basis of the only parental model they have had—their mother. Several studies point to the applicability of this *sex-identity problem* to lower-class Negro males.

He reports that

Two objective test assessments of widely different groups—Alabama jail prisoners and Wisconsin working-class veterans with tuberculosis—found that Negro males scored higher than white males on a *measure of femininity*. . . . This measure is a part of the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory (MMPI), a well-known psychological instrument that requires the respondent to judge the applicability to himself of over five hundred simple statements. Thus, Negroes in these samples generally agreed more often with such “feminine” choices as, “*I would like to be a singer*” and “*I think that I feel more intensely than most people do.*”⁹

Pettigrew wisely puts “feminine” in quotation marks. We will assume that the M.M.P.I. is an “objective test assessment for widely different groups” including Alabama jail prisoners and patients on a tubercular ward, and that incidental test blemishes in the end all come-out-in-the-wash of statistics so that the over-all conclusions may point to significant differences between Negroes and whites and between indices of femininity and of masculinity. That such assessment singles out as “feminine” the wish to be a singer and “feeling more intensely than most people do,” may be a negligible detail. And yet, this detail suggests that the choice of test items and the generalizations drawn from them may say at least as much about the test and the testers as about the subjects tested. To “want to be a singer” or “to feel intensely” seems to be something only a man with feminine traits would acknowledge in that majority of respondents on whom the test was first developed and standardized. But why, one wonders, should a lower-class Negro locked up in jail or in a tuberculosis ward not admit to a wish to be a man like Paul Robeson or Harry Belafonte, and also that he feels more intensely (if, indeed, he knows what this means) than the chilly business-like whites around him? To be a singer and to feel intensely may be facets of a masculine ideal gladly admitted if you grew up in Alabama (or, for that matter, in Napoli), whereas it would be a blemish to be denied in a majority having adjusted to other masculine ideals. In fact, in Alabama and in Naples an em-

phasis on artistic self-expression and intense feeling may be close to the core of your positive identity—so close that the loss or devaluation of such emphasis by way of “integration” may make you a drifter on the murky sea of adjustable “roles.” In the case of the compact white majority, the denial of “intense feelings” may, in turn, be part of a white identity problem which contributes to the prejudiced rejection of the Negro’s potential or periodical intensity. Tests harboring similar distinctions may be offering “objective” evidence of racial differences, but may also be symptomatic of them. If this is totally overlooked, and this is my main point, the test will only emphasize, and the tester will only report, and the reader of the report (white or Negro) will only perceive the distance between the Negro’s “disintegrated” self-imagery and what is assumed to be the white’s “integrated” one.

As Pettigrew (in another connection) says starkly, putting himself in the shoes of a Negro child to be tested:

... After all, an intelligence test is a middle-class white man’s instrument; it is a device whites use to prove their capacities and get ahead in the white world. Achieving a high test score does not have the same meaning for a lower-status Negro child, and it may even carry a definite connotation of personal threat. In this sense, scoring low on intelligence measures may for some talented Negro children be a rational response to perceived danger¹⁰

The whole *test-event* thus itself underlies a certain historical and social relativity to be clarified in each case in terms of the actual identity configuration. By the same token, it is by no means certain that the individual undergoing such a procedure will be the same person when he escapes the predicament of the test procedure and joins, say, his peers on the playground or on a street corner. Thus, a “profile” of the Negro American made up of different methods under different conditions may offer decisively different configurations of “traits.” This does not make one procedure wrong and the other right, but it makes both (and more) essential in the establishment of criteria for an existing identity configuration. On the other hand, it is all too often taken for granted that the *investigator* (and his identity conflicts) invisibly blends into his method even when he is a representative of a highly (and maybe defensively) verbal subgroup of whites and is perceived as such by subjects who are near-illiterate or come from an illiterate background.

In this connection, I would like to refer to Kenneth Clark’s moving characterization of the sexual life of the “marginal young peo-

ple in the ghetto." As a responsible father-figure, he knows he must not condone what he nevertheless must also defend against deadly stereotypes.

Illegitimacy in the ghetto cannot be understood or dealt with in terms of punitive hostility, as in the suggestion that unwed mothers be denied welfare if illegitimacy is repeated. Such approaches obscure, with empty and at times hypocritical moralizing, the desperate yearning of the young for acceptance and identity, the need to be meaningful to someone else even for a moment without implication of a pledge of undying fealty and foreverness. . . .To expose oneself further to the chances of failure in a sustained and faithful relationship is too large to risk. The *intrinsic value* of the relationship is the only value because there can be no other.¹¹

This places a legal or moral item into its "actual" context—a context which always also reveals something about those who would judge and stereotype rather than understand: for is not the *intrinsic value of the relationship* exactly that item (hard to define, hard to test, and legally irrelevant) which may be lost in some more fortunate youths who suffer under a bewildering and driving pluralism of values?¹²

IV. Past and Future

Turning now to the new young Negroes: "My God," a Negro woman student exclaimed the other day in a small meeting, "what am I supposed to be integrated *out of*? I laugh like my grandmother—and I would rather die than not laugh like that." There was a silence in which you could hear the stereotypes click; for even laughter had now joined those aspects of Negro culture and Negro personality which have become suspect as the marks of submission and fatalism, delusion and escape. But the young girl did not give in with some such mechanical apology as "by which I do not mean, of course . . ." and the silence was pregnant with that immediacy of joint experience which characterizes moments when an identity conflict becomes palpable. It was followed by laughter—embarrassed, amused, defiant.

To me, the young woman had expressed one of the anxieties attending a rapid reconstitution of identity elements: "supposed to" reflects a sense of losing the active, the choosing role which is of the essence in a sense of identity as a continuity of the living past and the anticipated future. I have indicated that single items of behavior or imagery can change their quality within new identity con-

figurations; and yet these same indices once represented an integration as well as an integrity of Negro life—"such as it was," to be sure, but the only existing inner integration for which the Negro is now "supposed to" exchange an unsure outer integration. Desegregation, compensation, balance, re-conciliation—do they all sometimes seem to save the Negro at the cost of an absorption which he is not sure will leave much of himself left? Thus the "revolution" poses an "identity crisis" in more than one way; the Negro writer's "complicated assertions and denials of identity" (to use Ellison's words) have simpler antecedents, not less tragic for their simplicity.

For identity development has its time, or rather two kinds of time: a *developmental stage* in the life of the individual, and a *period* in history. There is, then, also a complementarity of life-history and history. Unless provoked prematurely and disastrously (and the biographies of sensitive Negro writers as well as direct observations of Negro children attest to such tragic prematurity) psychosocial identity is not feasible before the beginning, even as it is not dispensable after the end of *adolescence*, when the body, now fully grown, grows together into an individual appearance; when sexuality, matured, seeks partners in sensual play and, sooner or later, in parenthood; when the mind, fully developed, can begin to envisage a career for the individual within a historical perspective—all idiosyncratic developments which must fuse with each other in a new sense of sameness and continuity. But the increasing irreversibility of all choices (whether all too open or foreclosed) leads to what we call the *identity crisis* which here does not mean a *fatal turn* but rather (as in drama and in medicine) an *inescapable turning point* for better or for worse. "Better" here means a confluence of the constructive energies of individual and society, which contributed to physical grace, sexual spontaneity, mental alertness, emotional directness, and social "actualness." "Worse" means prolonged *identity confusion* in the young individual. Here it must be emphasized—for this is the point at which the psychosexual theories of psychoanalysis fuse with the psychosocial ones—that identity formation is decisive for the integration of sexuality (whether the cultural trend is toward repression or expression) and for the constructive use of aggression. But the crisis of youth is also the crisis of a generation and of the ideological soundness of its society. (There is also a complementarity of identity and ideology). The crisis is least marked and least "noisy" in that segment of youth

which in a given era is able to invest its fidelity¹³ in an ideological trend associated with a new technical and economic expansion, (such as mercantilism, colonialism, industrialization). For here new types and roles of competence emerge. Today this includes the young people in all countries and in all classes who can fit into and take active charge of technical and scientific development, learning thereby to identify with a lifestyle of testing, inventing, and producing. Youth which is eager for such experience but unable to find access to it will feel estranged from society, upset in its sexuality, and unable to apply its aggression constructively. It may be that today much of Negro Youth as well as an artistic-humanistic section of White Youth feel disadvantaged and, therefore, come to develop a certain solidarity in regard to "the crisis" or "the revolution": for young people in privileged middle-class homes as well as in under-privileged Negro homes may miss that sameness and continuity throughout development which makes a grandmother's warmth and a fervent aspiration part of an identical world. One may go further and say that this whole segment of American youth is attempting to develop its own ideology and its own rites of confirmation by following the official call to the external frontiers of the American way of life (Peace Corps), by going to the internal ones (deep South), or by attempting in colleges (California) to fill an obvious void in the traditional balance of the American way of life—a void caused by a dearth of that realism, solidarity, and ideology which welds together a functioning radical opposition.

We will come back to this point. Here we may suggest that identity also contains a complementarity of past and future both in the individual and in society: it links the actuality of a living past with that of a promising future. This formulation excludes, I hope, any romanticizing of the past or any salesmanship in the creation of future "postures."

In regard to "the revolution" and its gains, one can only postulate that the unblinking realism and ruthless de-masking of much of the present literature supports a new sense of toughness in the "face of reality." It fits this spirit that Pettigrew's "Profile," for example, fails to list such at any rate untestable items as (in alphabetical order) companionability, humor, motherhood, music, sensuality, spirituality, sports, and so forth. They all are suspect, I know, as traits of an accommodation romanticized by whites. But this makes presently available "profiles" really the correction of caricatures, rather than attempts at even a sketch of a portrait. But can a new or

renewed identity emerge from corrected caricatures? One thinks of all those who are unable to derive identity gains from the "acceptance of reality" at its worst (as the writers do and the researchers) and to whom a debunking of all older configurations *may* become a further *confirmation* of worthlessness and helplessness.

It is in this context also that I must question the fact that in many an index the Negro father appears *only* under the heading of "absence." Again, the relationship between family disintegration, father-absence, and all kinds of social and psychiatric pathology is overwhelming. "Father absence" does belong in every index and in the agenda of national concern. But as the *only* item related to fatherhood *or* motherhood does it not do grave injustice to the presence of many, many mothers, and at least of some fathers? Whatever the historical, sociological, or legal interpretation of the Negro mother's (and grandmother's) saving presence in the whole half-circle of plantation culture from Venezuela through the Caribbean into our South, is it an item to be omitted from the agenda of the traditional Negro identity? Can Negro culture afford to have the "strong mother" stereotyped as a liability? For a person's (and a people's) identity begins in the rituals of infancy, when mothers make it clear with many pre-literate means that to be born is good and that a child (let the bad world call it colored or list it as illegitimate) is deserving of warmth. As I pointed out in another *Dædalus* publication,¹⁴ these mothers have put an indelible mark on "Negro Culture" and what they accomplished should be one of the proudest chapters in cultural history.

The systematic exploitation of the Negro male as a domestic animal and the denial to him of the status of responsible fatherhood are, on the other hand, two of the most shameful chapters in the history of this Christian nation. For an imbalance of mother-and-father presence is never good, and becomes increasingly bad as the child grows older; for then the trust in the world established in infancy may be all the more disappointed. Under urban and industrial conditions it may, indeed, become the gravest factor in personality disorganization. But, again, the "disorganization" of the Negro family must not be measured solely by its distance from the white or Negro middle-class family with its one-family housing and legal and religious legitimizations. Disintegration must be measured and understood also as a distortion of the *traditional* if often unofficial *Negro family pattern*. The traditional wisdom of the mothers will be needed as will the help of the Negro men who (in spite

of such circumstances) actually did become fathers in the full sense.

In the meantime, the problem of the function of both parents, each strong in his or her way, and both benignly present in the home when needed most is a problem facing the family in any industrial society on a universal scale. The whole great society must develop ways to provide equality of opportunity in employment and yet also differential ways of permitting mothers and fathers to attend to their duties toward their children. The maternal-paternal dimension may well also serve to clarify the fact that each stage of development needs its own optimum environment, and that to find a balance between maternal and paternal strength means to assign to each a period of dominance in the children's life. The mother's period is the earliest and, therefore, the most basic. There is a deep relation between the first "identity" experienced in the early sensual and sensory exchanges with the mother(s)—the first re-cognition—and that final integration in adolescence when all earlier identifications are assembled and the young person meets his society and his historical era.

V. Total and Whole

In his book *Who Speaks for the Negro?* R. P. Warren records another exclamation by a young woman student:

...The auditorium had been packed—mostly Negroes, but with a scattering of white people. A young girl with pale skin, dressed like any coed anywhere, in the clothes for a public occasion, is on the rostrum. She is leaning forward a little on her high heels, speaking with a peculiar vibrance in a strange irregular rhythm, out of some inner excitement, some furious, taut élan, saying: "—and I tell you I have discovered a great truth. I have discovered a great joy. I have discovered that I am black. I am black! You out there—oh, yes, you may have black faces, but your hearts are white, your minds are white, you have been white-washed!"

Warren reports a white woman's reaction to this outburst and surmises that if this woman

at that moment heard any words in her head, they were most likely the echo of the words of Malcolm X: "White devils!" And if she saw any face, it must have been the long face of Malcolm X grinning with sardonic certitude.

I think we understand this fear. She has witnessed what I will call a "totalistic" re-arrangement of images which is, indeed, basic to

some of the ideological movements of modern history. By totalitarianism I mean an inner regrouping of imagery, almost a *negative conversion*, by which erstwhile negative identity elements become totally dominant, making out of erstwhile positive elements a combination to be excluded totally.¹⁵ This, however, can happen in a transitory way in many young people of all colors and classes who rebel and join, wander off or isolate themselves; it can subside with the developmental storm or lead to an unexpected commitment. Depending on historical and social conditions, the process has its malignant potentials, as exemplified in "confirmed" pervert-delinquent or bizarre-extremist states of mind and forms of behavior.

The chill which this process can give us in its political implications refers back to our sense of historical shock when post-Versailles German youth, once so sensitive to foreign critique, but then on the rebound from a love of Kultur which promised no realistic identity, fell for the Nazi transvaluation of civilized values. The transitory Nazi identity, based on a *totalism* marked by the radical *exclusion* of foreign otherness, failed to integrate historically given identity elements, reaching instead for a pseudologic perversion of history. Obviously both radical segregationism, in its recourse to an adjusted Bible, and Black Muslimism are the counterparts of such a phenomenon in this country. In the person of Malcolm X the *specific rage* which is aroused wherever identity development loses the promise of a traditionally assured wholeness, was demonstrated theatrically. Such latent rage (by no means always unjustified) is easily exploited by fanatic and psychopathic leaders: it can explode in the arbitrary destructiveness of mobs; and it can in a more repressed form serve the efficient violence of organized machines of destruction. Yet, the Black Muslims, too, were able to call on some of the best potentials of the individuals who felt "included."

This country as a whole, however, is not hospitable to such totalitarian turns, and the inability or, indeed, unwillingness of youth in revolt to come to systematic ideological conclusions is in itself an important historical fact. The temporary degeneration of the Free Speech Movement in California into a revolt of dirty words was probably representative of the intrusion of an impotent totalitarianism into a promising radicalism. This reluctance to be regimented in the service of a political ideology, however, can make the latent violence in our disadvantaged youth that much more destructive to personal unity and, sporadically, to "law and order." But note also, that the rate of crime and of delinquency in some Southern counties was re-

ported to have dropped sharply when the Negro population became involved in social protest.

The alternative to an exclusive totalism is the wholeness of a *more inclusive identity*. This leads to another question: If the Negro American wants to "find" that wider identity which will permit him to be self-certain as a Negro (or a descendant of Negroes) and integrated as an American, what joint *historical actuality* can he count on? For we must know that when all the *objective realities* are classified and investigated, and all the studies assessed, the question remains: what are the *historical actualities* with which we can work?

Returning once more to the individual, I can now register a certain impatience with the faddish equation of the term identity with the question "Who am I?" This question nobody would ask himself except in a more or less transient morbid state, in a creative self-confrontation, or in an adolescent state sometimes combining both; wherefore on occasion I find myself asking a student who claims that he is in an "identity-crisis," whether he is complaining or boasting. For most, the pertinent question really is "What do I want to make of myself—and—what do I have to work with?" Here, the awareness of inner motivations is, at best, useful in keeping the future from being swamped by infantile wishes and adolescent defenses. Beyond that, only a restored or better trained sense of historical actuality can lead to a deployment of those energies which both activate and are activated by potential developments. How potential developments become historical fact is demonstrated by the way in which "culturally deprived" Negro children meet a sudden historical demand with surprising dignity and fortitude. In an unpublished manuscript, Robert Coles, who has made significant contributions to this problem, presents psychiatric data which (according to our theories) would have predicted for a lone Negro boy an inevitable and excusable failure in his task of personifying (with one other child) the desegregation of a whole school. But he did stand up to it unforgettably—and he is on his way.

In all parts of the world the struggle now is for anticipatory and *more inclusive identities*: what has been a driving force in revolutions and reformations, in the founding of churches and in the building of empires has become a contemporaneous world-wide competition. Revolutionary doctrines promise the new identity of peasant-and-worker to the youth of countries which must overcome their tribal, feudal, or colonial past; new nations attempt to absorb

regions; new markets, nations; and world space is extended to include outer space as the proper locale for a universal technological identity.

At this point, we are beyond the question (and Gandhi did much to teach this to the British) of how a remorseful or scared colonialist may dispense corrective welfare in order to appease the need for a wider identity. The problem is rather how he includes himself in the wider pattern. For a more inclusive identity is a development by which two groups who previously had come to depend on each other's negative identities (by living in a traditional situation of mutual enmity or in a symbiotic accommodation to one-sided exploitation) join their identities in such a way that new potentials are activated in both.

VI. *Exclusive and Inclusive*

What wider identities are competing for the Negro American's commitment? Some, it seems, are too wide to be "actual," some too narrow. As too wide I would characterize the identity of a "human being" bestowed, according to a strange modern habit of a latter-day humanistic narcissism, by humans to humans (patients, women, Negroes, and so on). While this at times represents genuine transcendence of the pseudo-species mentality, it often also implies that the speaker, having undergone some revelatory hardships, is in a position to grant membership in humanity to others. But it also tends to take all specificity out of "human" relations; for man meets man always in categories (be they adult and child, man and woman, employer and employee, leader and follower, majority and minority) and "human inter-relations" can truly be only the expression of divided function and the concrete overcoming of the specific ambivalence inherent in them. I would not be surprised to find that our Negro colleagues and friends often sense such a residue of species-wide colonialism in the "best" of us. In contrast, the concrete work on the achievement of minimum rights for the *Negro American citizen* has created moments of the most intense sharing of the human condition.

Probably the most inclusive and the most absorbing identity potential in the world today is that of *technical skill*. This is what Lenin meant when he advocated that first of all the mushik be put on a tractor. True, he meant: as a preparation for the identity of a class-conscious proletarian. But it has come to mean more today, namely, the participation in an area of activity and experience

which (for better or for worse) verifies modern man as a worker and planner. It is one thing to exclude oneself from such verification because one has proven oneself gifted in other respects and able to draw on the traditional verification provided by Humanism or the Enlightenment—at least sufficiently so that alienation from the present, too, adds up to some reasonably comfortable “human identity.” It is quite another to be excluded from it by literacy requirements which prevent the proof that one is mechanically gifted or the use of the gift after such proof is given. Israel, a small country with a genius for renewing identities, has shown (for example, in the use of its army as an educational institution) that illiteracy can be corrected in the process of putting people where they feel they are needed and are needed.

The “*African identity*” is a strong contender for a wider identity, as Harold Isaacs has shown. It offers a highly actual setting for the solidarity of black skin color, and probably also provides the American Negro with an equivalent of what all other Americans could boast about or disavow: an (if ever so remote) homeland. However, the American Negro’s mode of separation from Africa robbed him of the identity element “*immigrant*.” There seems to be a question also whether to Africans a Negro American is more black or more American, and whether the Negro American, in actual contacts with Africans, wants to be more American or more Negro. The Black Muslims, at any rate, seem to have called themselves at first Asiatics, to emphasize the wider mystical unity of Muslimism.

The great *middle class* as the provider of an identity of consumers (for whom, indeed, Pettigrew’s prescription of “dollars and dignity” seems to be most fitting) has been discussed in its limitations by many, but by none more eloquently than by the President in his Howard University speech. The middle-class identity (a class pre-occupied with matters of real estate and of consumption, of status and of posture) will include more and more of the highly gifted and the fortunate, but, if it does not yield to the wider identity of the Negro American, it obviously creates new barriers between these few and the mass of Negroes, whose distance from white competition is thereby only increased. “Work and dignity” may be a more apt slogan, provided that work dignifies by providing a “living” dollar as well as a challenge to competence, for without both “opportunity” is slavery perpetuated.

But here as everywhere the question of the Negro American’s identity imperceptibly shades into the question of what *the Ameri-*

can wants to make of himself in the technology of the future. In this sense, the greatest gain all around (and one now to be consolidated) may be what the doctors at Howard University have discussed as *pro-social action* on the part of Negroes. I mean the fact that their protest, pervaded by nonviolent spirit and yet clearly defying local law and custom, has been accepted by much of the nation as American, and that the President himself would echo the slogan "we shall overcome," thus helping to align "pro-social" action with American action. The judiciary and legislative levels, too, have attempted to absorb "the revolution" on a grand scale. But absorption can be defensive and merely adjustive, or it can be adaptive and creative; this must as yet be seen.

In the meantime, the success of pro-social action should not altogether obscure an *anti-social* identity element relevantly recounted in the autobiographies of Negro Americans. I mean the tragic sacrifice of youth designated as delinquent and criminal. They, no doubt, often defended whatever identity elements were available to them by revolting in the only way open to them—a way of vicious danger, and yet often of self-respect and solidarity. Like the outcast heroes of the American frontier, some anti-social types among the Negroes are not expendable from the history of their people—not yet.

Our genuinely humanist youth, however, will continue to extend a *religious identity element* into race-relations: for future over-all issues of identity will include the balance within man of technological strivings and ethical and ultimate concerns. I believe (but you must not tell them for they suspect such words) that the emergence of those youths who stepped from utter anonymity right into our national affairs does contain a new and *wider religious element* embracing nothing less than the promise of a mankind freer of the attitudes of a pseudo-species: that utopia of universality proclaimed as the most worthy goal by all world religions and yet always entombed in new empires of dogma which turned into or allied themselves with new pseudo-species. The churches, too, have come to the insight that earthly prejudices—fanatical or outspoken, hiding in indifference, or latent and repressed—feed into that deadly combination which now makes man "the lethal factor" in the universe, for as pointed out it ties limitless technical ambition (including the supremacy of weapons of annihilation) and the hypocrisy of outworn moralistic dogma to the territoriality of mutually exclusive identities. The counter force, *nonviolence*, may always be a compelling

and creative actuality only at critical moments, and only for "the salt of the earth." But Gandhi took the first steps toward a world-wide application to politics of principles once purely religious.

As far as the world-wide frontier of *post-colonial* and *colored identities* is concerned, it is hard to predict their fate in the clash of new national interests in Africa and Asia. As of now, however, one cannot ignore the possible implications of American action in Vietnam for a world-wide identification of colored people with the naked heroism of the Vietcong revolutionaries. The very demand that North Vietnam give in (and even if it were nearly on her own terms) to a super-organized assault by a superfluity of lethal weapons may simply be too reminiscent of the function of firepower in colonial expansion in general; of police power in particular; and of a certain (implicitly contemptuous) attitude which assumes that "natives" will give in to pressures to which the master-races would consider themselves impervious (*vide* the British in the Blitz). It must be obvious that differences of opinion in this country in regard to American military involvement in Asia are not merely a matter of the faulty reading of facts or of lack of moral stamina on one side or the other, but also of a massive identity conflict. Intrinsic to the dominant political-technological nucleus of an American identity is the expectation that such power as can now be unleashed can be used to advantage in limited employment, and has built-in safeguards against an unthinkable conflagration. But there will be urgent voices abroad and sincere protest at home expressing the perplexity of those who perceive only one active moral frontier of equality and of peace extending from the center of the daily life of America to the peripheries of its foreign concerns. Here the Negro American shares the fate of a new and wider American dilemma.

I have now listed a few of the emerging "wider" identity elements in order to introduce queries which other members of the symposium are better equipped to answer. Such listing can only lead to one tentative impression, namely, that none of these alternatives offers to the American Negro a nucleus for a total realignment, and that all of them must find their place in a new constellation, the nucleus of which is already clearly suggested by the two words Negro and American.

Concluding Remark

As used in the foregoing, the term identity has betrayed its clin-

ical origin in the study of individual disturbances and of social ills. But even where applied to the assessment of a social problem it remains clinical in methodology, that is, it can be used only to focus the thinking of a "staff." For the consideration of identity problems calls for the "taking of history," the localization and the diagnostic assessment of disintegration, the testing of intact resources, the approximate prognosis, and the weighing of possible action—each based on specialties of approach and often of temperament. In addition to all this, a certain intuitive insight based on experience and on conviction is indispensable in the assessment of *verifiable reality* and of *modifiable actuality*. On the way some theory may help; but a concept should be retained only as long as it brings some preliminary order into otherwise baffling phenomena.¹⁶

REFERENCES

1. Robert Penn Warren, *Who Speaks for the Negro?* (New York, 1965), p. 17.
2. These notes are a counterpart to the "Memorandum on Identity and Negro Youth," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 1964).
3. Henry James (ed.), *The Letters of William James*, Vol. I (Boston, 1920), p. 199.
4. See my introduction to G. B. Blaine and C. C. McArthur (eds.), *Emotional Problems of the Student* (New York, 1961).
5. Sigmund Freud, "Address to the Society of B'nai B'rith," in *The Standard Edition* (London, 1959), p. 273.
6. Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York, 1965).
7. Howard Zinn, *SNCC, The New Abolitionists* (Boston, 1964).
8. Not all doubt or discomfort regarding the conception of identity is to be seen as "resistance" by any means. Powerful methodological quandaries are inescapable. I would also share the reluctance to accept psychosocial identity as "all there is" to human identity. Psychosocial phenomena, however, are part of that engagement in a period of the life cycle and in a given historical era without which an unfolding of human potentials (including an eventual transcendence) seems unthinkable.
9. Thomas F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the Negro American* (Princeton, N. J., 1964), p. 19. (Italics added.)
10. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
11. Kenneth B. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 73. (Italics added.)

The Concept of Identity

12. Under the tense conditions of a sudden awareness of facts long suppressed and distorted, new stereotypes are apt to enter the imagery of the most thoughtful. In *Crisis in Black and White*, C. E. Silberman discusses S. M. Elkin's basic book *Slavery* and, half-quoting and half-editorializing, uses the stereotype "childlike" as a common denominator of Negro personality and the transient regressions of inmates in concentration camps. Along with truly childish qualities, such as silliness, we find fawning, servile, dishonest, mendacious, egotistic, and thievish activities all summed up under "this childlike behavior." (p. 76). Here childlike replaces childish or regressed, as feminine often replaces effeminate, which is both misleading and destructive of the image of the genuine article.
13. See Erik H. Erikson, "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," *Youth: Change and Challenge* (New York, 1963), pp. 1-23.
14. *Ibid.*
15. See Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York, 1961).
16. Attempts at transverting clinical concepts into quantifiable items subject to experimental verification are always undertaken at the risk of the experimenter.

LEE RAINWATER

Crucible of Identity: The Negro Lower-Class Family

But can a people . . . live and develop for over three hundred years by simply reacting? Are American Negroes simply the creation of white men, or have they at least helped create themselves out of what they found around them? Men have made a way of life in caves and upon cliffs, why can not Negroes have made a life upon the horns of the white man's dilemma? . . . American Negro life is, for the Negro who must live it, not only a burden (and not always that) but also a discipline just as any human life which has endured so long is a discipline teaching its own insights into the human conditions, its own strategies of survival. . . .

For even as his life toughens the Negro, even as it brutalizes him, sensitizes him, dulls him, goads him to anger, moves him to irony, sometimes fracturing and sometimes affirming his hopes; even as it shapes his attitude towards family, sex, love, religion; even as it modulates his humor, tempers his joy—it conditions him to deal with his life and with himself. Because it is his life and no mere abstraction in someone's head. He must live it and try consciously to grasp its complexity until he can change it; must live it as he changes it. He is no mere product of his socio-political predicament. He is a product of interaction between his racial predicament, his individual will and the broader American cultural freedom in which he finds his ambiguous existence. Thus he, too, in a limited way, is his own creation.

—Ralph Ellison

As LONG as Negroes have been in America, their marital and family patterns have been subjects of curiosity and amusement, moral indignation and self-congratulation, puzzlement and frustration, concern and guilt, on the part of white Americans.¹ As some Negroes have moved into middle-class status, or acquired standards of American common-man respectability, they too have shared these

attitudes toward the private behavior of their fellows, sometimes with a moral punitiveness to rival that of whites, but at other times with a hard-headed interest in causes and remedies rather than moral evaluation. Moralism permeated the subject of Negro sexual, marital, and family behavior in the polemics of slavery apologists and abolitionists as much as in the Northern and Southern civil rights controversies of today. Yet, as long as the dialectic of good or bad, guilty or innocent, overshadows a concern with who, why, and what can be, it is unlikely that realistic and effective social planning to correct the clearly desperate situation of poor Negro families can begin.

This paper is concerned with a description and analysis of slum Negro family patterns as these reflect and sustain Negroes' adaptations to the economic, social, and personal situation into which they are born and in which they must live. As such it deals with facts of lower-class life that are usually forgotten or ignored in polite discussion. We have chosen not to ignore these facts in the belief that to do so can lead only to assumptions which would frustrate efforts at social reconstruction, to strategies that are unrealistic in the light of the actual day-to-day reality of slum Negro life. Further, this analysis will deal with family patterns which interfere with the efforts slum Negroes make to attain a stable way of life as working- or middle-class individuals and with the effects such failure in turn has on family life. To be sure, many Negro families live *in* the slum ghetto, but are not *of* its culture (though even they, and particularly their children, can be deeply affected by what happens there). However, it is the individuals who succumb to the distinctive family life style of the slum who experience the greatest weight of deprivation and who have the greatest difficulty responding to the few self-improvement resources that make their way into the ghetto. In short, we propose to explore in depth the family's role in the "tangle of pathology" which characterizes the ghetto.

The social reality in which Negroes have had to make their lives during the 450 years of their existence in the western hemisphere has been one of victimization "in the sense that a system of social relations operates in such a way as to deprive them of a chance to share in the more desirable material and non-material products of a society which is dependent, in part, upon their labor and loyalty." In making this observation, St. Clair Drake goes on to note that Negroes are victimized also because "they do not have the same degree of access which others have to the attributes needed for

rising in the general class system—money, education, ‘contacts,’ and ‘know-how.’”² The victimization process started with slavery; for 350 years thereafter Negroes worked out as best they could adaptations to the slave status. After emancipation, the cultural mechanisms which Negroes had developed for living the life of victim continued to be serviceable as the victimization process was maintained first under the myths of white supremacy and black inferiority, later by the doctrines of gradualism which covered the fact of no improvement in position, and finally by the modern Northern system of ghettoization and indifference.

When lower-class Negroes use the expression, “Tell it like it is,” they signal their intention to strip away pretense, to describe a situation or its participants as they really are, rather than in a polite or euphemistic way. “Telling it like it is” can be used as a harsh, aggressive device, or it can be a healthy attempt to face reality rather than retreat into fantasy. In any case, as he goes about his field work, the participant observer studying a ghetto community learns to listen carefully to any exchange preceded by such an announcement because he knows the speaker is about to express his understanding of how his world operates, of what motivates its members, of how they actually behave.

The first responsibility of the social scientist can be phrased in much the same way: “Tell it like it is.” His second responsibility is to try to understand why “it” is that way, and to explore the implications of what and why for more constructive solutions to human problems. Social research on the situation of the Negro American has been informed by four main goals: (1) to describe the disadvantaged position of Negroes, (2) to disprove the racist ideology which sustains the caste system, (3) to demonstrate that responsibility for the disadvantages Negroes suffer lies squarely upon the white caste which derives economic, prestige, and psychic benefits from the operation of the system, and (4) to suggest that in reality whites would be better rather than worse off if the whole jerry-built caste structure were to be dismantled. The successful accomplishment of these *intellectual* goals has been a towering achievement, in which the social scientists of the 1920’s, ’30’s, and ’40’s can take great pride; that white society has proved so recalcitrant to utilizing this intellectual accomplishment is one of the great tragedies of our time, and provides the stimulus for further social research on “the white problem.”

Yet the implicit paradigm of much of the research on Negro

Americans has been an overly simplistic one concentrating on two terms of an argument:

White cupidity————→Negro suffering.

As an intellectual shorthand, and even more as a civil rights slogan, this simple model is both justified and essential. But, as a guide to greater understanding of the Negro situation as human adaptation to human situations, the paradigm is totally inadequate because it fails to specify fully enough the *process* by which Negroes adapt to their situations as they do, and the limitations one kind of adaptation places on possibilities for subsequent adaptations. A reassessment of previous social research, combined with examination of current social research on Negro ghetto communities, suggests a more complex, but hopefully more vertical, model:

White cupidity
creates
Structural Conditions Highly Inimical to Basic Social Adaptation (low-income availability, poor education, poor services, stigmatization)
to which Negroes adapt
by
Social and Personal Responses which serve to sustain the individual in his punishing world but also generate aggressiveness toward the self and others
which results in
Suffering directly inflicted by Negroes on themselves and on others.

In short, whites, by their greater power, create situations in which Negroes do the dirty work of caste victimization for them.

The white caste maintains a cadre of whites whose special responsibility is to enforce the system in brutal or refined ways (the Klan, the rural sheriff, the metropolitan police, the businessman who specializes in a Negro clientele, the Board of Education). Increasingly, whites recruit to this cadre middle-class Negroes who can soften awareness of victimization by their protective coloration. These special cadres, white and/or Negro, serve the very important function of enforcing caste standards by whatever means seems required, while at the same time concealing from an increasingly "unprejudiced" public the unpleasant facts they would prefer to ignore. The system is quite homologous to the Gestapo and concentration camps of Nazi Germany, though less fatal to its victims.

For their part, Negroes creatively adapt to the system in ways that keep them alive and extract what gratification they can find, but in the process of adaptation they are constrained to behave in ways that inflict a great deal of suffering on those with whom they make their lives, and on themselves. The ghetto Negro is constantly confronted by the immediate necessity to suffer in order to get what he wants of those few things he can have, or to make others suffer, or both—for example, he suffers as exploited student and employee, as drug user, as loser in the competitive game of his peer-group society; he inflicts suffering as disloyal spouse, petty thief, knife- or gun-wielder, petty con man.

It is the central thesis of this paper that the caste-facilitated infliction of suffering by Negroes on other Negroes and on themselves appears most poignantly within the confines of the family, and that the victimization process as it operates in families prepares and toughens its members to function in the ghetto world, at the same time that it seriously interferes with their ability to operate in any other world. This, however, is very different from arguing that "the family is to blame" for the deprived situation ghetto Negroes suffer; rather we are looking at the logical outcome of the operation of the widely ramified and interconnecting caste system. In the end we will argue that only palliative results can be expected from attempts to treat directly the disordered family patterns to be described. Only a change in the original "inputs" of the caste system, the structural conditions inimical to basic social adaptation, can change family forms.

Almost thirty years ago, E. Franklin Frazier foresaw that the fate of the Negro family in the city would be a highly destructive one. His readers would have little reason to be surprised at observations of slum ghetto life today:

. . . As long as the bankrupt system of southern agriculture exists, Negro families will continue to seek a living in the towns and cities. . . . They will crowd the slum areas of southern cities or make their way to northern cities where their families will become disrupted and their poverty will force them to depend upon charity.³

The Autonomy of the Slum Ghetto

Just as the deprivations and depredations practiced by white society have had their effect on the personalities and social life of Negroes, so also has the separation from the ongoing social life of

the white community had its effect. In a curious way, Negroes have had considerable freedom to fashion their own adaptations within their separate world. The larger society provides them with few resources but also with minimal interference in the Negro community on matters which did not seem to affect white interests. Because Negroes learned early that there were a great many things they could not depend upon whites to provide they developed their own solutions to recurrent human issues. These solutions can often be seen to combine, along with the predominance of elements from white culture, elements that are distinctive to the Negro group. Even more distinctive is the *configuration* which emerges from those elements Negroes share with whites and those which are different.

It is in this sense that we may speak of a Negro subculture, a distinctive *patterning* of existential perspectives, techniques for coping with the problems of social life, views about what is desirable and undesirable in particular situations. This subculture, and particularly that of the lower-class, the slum, Negro, can be seen as his own creation out of the elements available to him in response to (1) the conditions of life set by white society and (2) the selective freedom which that society allows (or must put up with given the pattern of separateness on which it insists).

Out of this kind of "freedom" slum Negroes have built a culture which has some elements of intrinsic value and many more elements that are highly destructive to the people who must live in it. The elements that whites can value they constantly borrow. Negro arts and language have proved so popular that such commentators on American culture as Norman Mailer and Leslie Fiedler have noted processes of Negro-ization of white Americans as a minor theme of the past thirty years.⁴ A fairly large proportion of Negroes with national reputations are engaged in the occupation of diffusing to the larger culture these elements of intrinsic value.

On the negative side, this freedom has meant, as social scientists who have studied Negro communities have long commented, that many of the protections offered by white institutions stop at the edge of the Negro ghetto: there are poor police protection and enforcement of civil equities, inadequate schooling and medical service, and more informal indulgences which whites allow Negroes as a small price for feeling superior.

For our purposes, however, the most important thing about the freedom which whites have allowed Negroes within their own

world is that it has required them to work out their own ways of making it from day to day, from birth to death. The subculture that Negroes have created may be imperfect but it has been viable for centuries; it behooves both white and Negro leaders and intellectuals to seek to understand it even as they hope to change it.⁵

Negroes have created, again particularly within the lower-class slum group, a range of institutions to structure the tasks of living a victimized life and to minimize the pain it inevitably produces. In the slum ghetto these institutions include prominently those of the social network—the extended kinship system and the “street system” of buddies and broads which tie (although tenuously and unpredictably) the “members” to each other—and the institutions of entertainment (music, dance, folk tales) by which they instruct, explain, and accept themselves. Other institutions function to provide escape from the society of the victimized: the church (Here-after!) and the civil rights movement (Now!).

The Functional Autonomy of the Negro Family

At the center of the matrix of Negro institutional life lies the family. It is in the family that individuals are trained for participation in the culture and find personal and group identity and continuity. The “freedom” allowed by white society is greatest here, and this freedom has been used to create an institutional variant more distinctive perhaps to the Negro subculture than any other. (Much of the content of Negro art and entertainment derives exactly from the distinctive characteristics of Negro family life.) At each stage in the Negro’s experience of American life—slavery, segregation, *de facto* ghettoization—whites have found it less necessary to interfere in the relations between the sexes and between parents and children than in other areas of the Negro’s existence. His adaptations in this area, therefore, have been less constrained by whites than in many other areas.

Now that the larger society is becoming increasingly committed to integrating Negroes into the main stream of American life, however, we can expect increasing constraint (benevolent as it may be) to be placed on the autonomy of the Negro family system.⁶ These constraints will be designed to pull Negroes into meaningful integration with the larger society, to give up ways which are inimical to successful performance in the larger society, and to adopt new ways that are functional in that society. The strategic

questions of the civil rights movement and of the war on poverty are ones that have to do with how one provides functional equivalents for the existing subculture before the capacity to make a life within its confines is destroyed.

The history of the Negro family has been ably documented by historians and sociologists.⁷ In slavery, conjugal and family ties were reluctantly and ambivalently recognized by the slave holders, were often violated by them, but proved necessary to the slave system. This necessity stemmed both from the profitable offspring of slave sexual unions and the necessity for their nurture, and from the fact that the slaves' efforts to sustain patterns of sexual and parental relations mollified the men and women whose labor could not simply be commanded. From nature's promptings, the thinning memories of African heritage, and the example and guilt-ridden permission of the slave holders, slaves constructed a partial family system and sets of relations that generated conjugal and familial sentiments. The slave holder's recognition in advertisements for runaway slaves of marital and family sentiments as motivations for absconding provides one indication that strong family ties were possible, though perhaps not common, in the slave quarter. The mother-centered family with its emphasis on the primacy of the mother-child relation and only tenuous ties to a man, then, is the legacy of adaptations worked out by Negroes during slavery.

After emancipation this family design often also served well to cope with the social disorganization of Negro life in the late nineteenth century. Matrifocal families, ambivalence about the desirability of marriage, ready acceptance of illegitimacy, all sustained some kind of family life in situations which often made it difficult to maintain a full nuclear family. Yet in the hundred years since emancipation, Negroes in rural areas have been able to maintain full nuclear families almost as well as similarly situated whites. As we will see, it is the move to the city that results in the very high proportion of mother-headed households. In the rural system the man continues to have important functions; it is difficult for a woman to make a crop by herself, or even with the help of other women. In the city, however, the woman can earn wages just as a man can, and she can receive welfare payments more easily than he can. In rural areas, although there may be high illegitimacy rates and high rates of marital disruption, men and women have an interest in getting together; families are headed by a husband-wife pair much more often than in the city. That pair may be much less

stable than in the more prosperous segments of Negro and white communities but it is more likely to exist among rural Negroes than among urban ones.

The matrifocal character of the Negro lower-class family in the United States has much in common with Caribbean Negro family patterns; research in both areas has done a great deal to increase our understanding of the Negro situation. However, there are important differences in the family forms of the two areas.⁸ The impact of white European family models has been much greater in the United States than in the Caribbean both because of the relative population proportions of white and colored peoples and because equalitarian values in the United States have had a great impact on Negroes even when they have not on whites. The typical Caribbean mating pattern is that women go through several visiting and common-law unions but eventually marry; that is, they marry legally only relatively late in their sexual lives. The Caribbean marriage is the crowning of a sexual and procreative career; it is considered a serious and difficult step.

In the United States, in contrast, Negroes marry at only a slightly lower rate and slightly higher age than whites.⁹ Most Negro women marry relatively early in their careers; marriage is not regarded as the same kind of crowning choice and achievement that it is in the Caribbean. For lower-class Negroes in the United States marriage ceremonies are rather informal affairs. In the Caribbean, marriage is regarded as quite costly because of the feasting which goes along with it; ideally it is performed in church.

In the United States, unlike the Caribbean, early marriage confers a kind of permanent respectable status upon a woman which she can use to deny any subsequent accusations of immorality or promiscuity once the marriage is broken and she becomes sexually involved in visiting or common-law relations. The relevant effective status for many Negro women is that of "having been married" rather than "being married"; having the right to be called "Mrs." rather than currently being Mrs. Someone-in-Particular.

For Negro lower-class women, then, first marriage has the same kind of importance as having a first child. Both indicate that the girl has become a woman but neither one that this is the last such activity in which she will engage. It seems very likely that only a minority of Negro women in the urban slum go through their child-rearing years with only one man around the house.

Among the Negro urban poor, then, a great many women have

the experience of heading a family for part of their mature lives, and a great many children spend some part of their formative years in a household without a father-mother pair. From Table 1 we see

TABLE 1
Proportion of Female Heads for Families with Children
by Race, Income, and Urban-Rural Categories

	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Negroes</i>			
under \$3000	18%	47%	36%
\$3000 and over	5%	8%	7%
Total	14%	23%	21%
<i>Whites</i>			
under \$3000	12%	38%	22%
\$3000 and over	2%	4%	3%
Total	4%	7%	6%

Source: U. S. Census: 1960, PC (1) D. U. S. Volume, Table 225; State Volume, Table 140.

that in 1960, forty-seven per cent of the Negro poor urban families with children had a female head. Unfortunately cumulative statistics are hard to come by; but, given this very high level for a cross-sectional sample (and taking into account the fact that the median age of the children in these families is about six years), it seems very likely that as many as two-thirds of Negro urban poor children will not live in families headed by a man and a woman throughout the first eighteen years of their lives.

One of the other distinctive characteristics of Negro families, both poor and not so poor, is the fact that Negro households have a much higher proportion of relatives outside the mother-father-children triangle than is the case with whites. For example, in St. Louis Negro families average 0.8 other relatives per household compared to only 0.4 for white families. In the case of the more prosperous Negro families this is likely to mean that an older relative lives in the home providing baby-sitting services while both the husband and wife work and thus further their climb toward stable working- or middle-class status. In the poor Negro families it is much more likely that the household is headed by an older relative who brings under her wings a daughter and that daughter's children. It is important to note that the three-generation household with the grandmother at the head exists only when there is no husband

present. Thus, despite the high proportion of female-headed households in this group and despite the high proportion of households that contain other relatives, we find that almost all married couples in the St. Louis Negro slum community have their own household. In other words, when a couple marries it establishes its own household; when that couple breaks up the mother either maintains that household or moves back to her parents or grandparents.

Finally we should note that Negro slum families have more children than do either white slum families or stable working- and middle-class Negro families. Mobile Negro families limit their fertility sharply in the interest of bringing the advantages of mobility more fully to the few children that they do have. Since the Negro slum family is both more likely to have the father absent and more likely to have more children in the family, the mother has a more demanding task with fewer resources at her disposal. When we examine the patterns of life of the stem family we shall see that even the presence of several mothers does not necessarily lighten the work load for the principal mother in charge.

The Formation and Maintenance of Families

We will outline below the several stages and forms of Negro lower-class family life. At many points these family forms and the interpersonal relations that exist within them will be seen to have characteristics in common with the life styles of white lower-class families.¹⁰ At other points there are differences, or the Negro pattern will be seen to be more sharply divergent from the family life of stable working- and middle-class couples.

It is important to recognize that lower-class Negroes know that their particular family forms are different from those of the rest of the society and that, though they often see these forms as representing the only ways of behaving given their circumstances, they also think of the more stable family forms of the working class as more desirable. That is, lower-class Negroes know what the "normal American family" is supposed to be like, and they consider a stable family-centered way of life superior to the conjugal and familial situations in which they often find themselves. Their conceptions of the good American life include the notion of a father-husband who functions as an adequate provider and interested member of the family, a hard working home-bound mother who is concerned about her children's welfare and her husband's needs, and children who look up to their parents and perform well in school and other out-

side places to reflect credit on their families. This image of what family life can be like is very real from time to time as lower-class men and women grow up and move through adulthood. Many of them make efforts to establish such families but find it impossible to do so either because of the direct impact of economic disabilities or because they are not able to sustain in their day-to-day lives the ideals which they hold.¹¹ While these ideals do serve as a meaningful guide to lower-class couples who are mobile out of the group, for a great many others the existence of such ideas about normal family life represents a recurrent source of stress within families as individuals become aware that they are failing to measure up to the ideals, or as others within the family and outside it use the ideals as an aggressive weapon for criticizing each other's performance. It is not at all uncommon for husbands or wives or children to try to hold others in the family to the norms of stable family life while they themselves engage in behaviors which violate these norms. The effect of such criticism in the end is to deepen commitment to the deviant sexual and parental norms of a slum subculture. Unless they are careful, social workers and other professionals exacerbate the tendency to use the norms of "American family life" as weapons by supporting these norms in situations where they are in reality unsupportable, thus aggravating the sense of failing and being failed by others which is chronic for lower-class people.

Going together. The initial steps toward mating and family formation in the Negro slum take place in a context of highly developed boys' and girls' peer groups. Adolescents tend to become deeply involved in their peer-group societies beginning as early as the age of twelve or thirteen and continue to be involved after first pregnancies and first marriages. Boys and girls are heavily committed both to their same sex peer groups and to the activities that those groups carry out. While classical gang activity does not necessarily characterize Negro slum communities everywhere, loosely-knit peer groups do.

The world of the Negro slum is wide open to exploration by adolescent boys and girls: "Negro communities provide a flow of common experience in which young people and their elders share, and out of which delinquent behavior emerges almost imperceptibly."¹² More than is possible in white slum communities, Negro adolescents have an opportunity to interact with adults in various "high life" activities; their behavior more often represents an identification with the behavior of adults than an attempt to set up

group standards and activities that differ from those of adults.

Boys and young men participating in the street system of peer-group activity are much caught up in games of furthering and enhancing their status as significant persons. These games are played out in small and large gatherings through various kinds of verbal contests that go under the names of "sounding," "signifying," and "working game." Very much a part of a boy's or man's status in this group is his ability to win women. The man who has several women "up tight," who is successful in "pimping off" women for sexual favors and material benefits, is much admired. In sharp contrast to white lower-class groups, there is little tendency for males to separate girls into "good" and "bad" categories.¹³ Observations of groups of Negro youths suggest that girls and women are much more readily referred to as "that bitch" or "that whore" than they are by their names, and this seems to be a universal tendency carrying no connotation that "that bitch" is morally inferior to or different from other women. Thus, all women are essentially the same, all women are legitimate targets, and no girl or woman is expected to be virginal except for reason of lack of opportunity or immaturity. From their participation in the peer group and according to standards legitimated by the total Negro slum culture, Negro boys and young men are propelled in the direction of girls to test their "strength" as seducers. They are mercilessly rated by both their peers and the opposite sex in their ability to "talk" to girls; a young man will go to great lengths to avoid the reputation of having a "weak" line.¹⁴

The girls share these definitions of the nature of heterosexual relations; they take for granted that almost any male they deal with will try to seduce them and that given sufficient inducement (social not monetary) they may wish to go along with his line. Although girls have a great deal of ambivalence about participating in sexual relations, this ambivalence is minimally moral and has much more to do with a desire not to be taken advantage of or get in trouble. Girls develop defenses against the exploitative orientations of men by devaluing the significance of sexual relations ("he really didn't do anything bad to me"), and as time goes on by developing their own appreciation of the intrinsic rewards of sexual intercourse.

The informal social relations of slum Negroes begin in adolescence to be highly sexualized. Although parents have many qualms about boys and, particularly, girls entering into this system, they seldom feel there is much they can do to prevent their children's

sexual involvement. They usually confine themselves to counseling somewhat hopelessly against girls becoming pregnant or boys being forced into situations where they might have to marry a girl they do not want to marry.

Girls are propelled toward boys and men in order to demonstrate their maturity and attractiveness; in the process they are constantly exposed to pressures for seduction, to boys "rapping" to them. An active girl will "go with" quite a number of boys, but she will generally try to restrict the number with whom she has intercourse to the few to whom she is attracted or (as happens not infrequently) to those whose threats of physical violence she cannot avoid. For their part, the boys move rapidly from girl to girl seeking to have intercourse with as many as they can and thus build up their "reps." The activity of seduction is itself highly cathected; there is gratification in simply "talking to" a girl as long as the boy can feel that he has acquitted himself well.

At sixteen Joan Bemias enjoys spending time with three or four very close girl friends. She tells us they follow this routine when the girls want to go out and none of the boys they have been seeing lately is available: "Every time we get ready to go someplace we look through all the telephone numbers of boys we'd have and we call them and talk so sweet to them that they'd come on around. All of them had cars you see. (I: What do you do to keep all these fellows interested?) Well nothing. We don't have to make love with all of them. Let's see, Joe, J. B., Albert, and Paul, out of all of them I've been going out with I've only had sex with four boys, that's all." She goes on to say that she and her girl friends resist boys by being unresponsive to their lines and by breaking off relations with them on the ground that they're going out with other girls. It is also clear from her comments that the girl friends support each other in resisting the boys when they are out together in groups.

Joan has had a relationship with a boy which has lasted six months, but she has managed to hold the frequency of intercourse down to four times. Initially she managed to hold this particular boy off for a month but eventually gave in.

Becoming pregnant. It is clear that the contest elements in relationships between men and women continue even in relationships that become quite steady. Despite the girls' ambivalence about sexual relations and their manifold efforts to reduce its frequency, the operation of chance often eventuates in their becoming pregnant.¹⁵ This was the case with Joan. With this we reach the second stage in the formation of families, that of premarital pregnancy. (We are outlining an ideal-typical sequence and not, of course, implying

that all girls in the Negro slum culture become pregnant before they marry but only that a great many of them do.)

Joan was caught despite the fact that she was considerably more sophisticated about contraception than most girls or young women in the group (her mother had both instructed her in contraceptive techniques and constantly warned her to take precautions). No one was particularly surprised at her pregnancy although she, her boy friend, her mother, and others regarded it as unfortunate. For girls in the Negro slum, pregnancy before marriage is expected in much the same way that parents expect their children to catch mumps or chicken pox; if they are lucky it will not happen but if it happens people are not too surprised and everyone knows what to do about it. It was quickly decided that Joan and the baby would stay at home. It seems clear from the preparations that Joan's mother is making that she expects to have the main responsibility for caring for the infant. Joan seems quite indifferent to the baby; she shows little interest in mothering the child although she is not particularly adverse to the idea so long as the baby does not interfere too much with her continued participation in her peer group.

Establishing who the father is under these circumstances seems to be important and confers a kind of legitimacy on the birth; not to know who one's father is, on the other hand, seems the ultimate in illegitimacy. Actually Joan had a choice in the imputation of fatherhood; she chose J.B. because he is older than she, and because she may marry him if he can get a divorce from his wife. She could have chosen Paul (with whom she had also had intercourse at about the time she became pregnant), but she would have done this reluctantly since Paul is a year younger than she and somehow this does not seem fitting.

In general, when a girl becomes pregnant while still living at home it seems taken for granted that she will continue to live there and that her parents will take a major responsibility for rearing the children. Since there are usually siblings who can help out and even siblings who will be playmates for the child, the addition of a third generation to the household does not seem to place a great stress on relationships within the family. It seems common for the first pregnancy to have a liberating influence on the mother once the child is born in that she becomes socially and sexually more active than she was before. She no longer has to be concerned with preserving her status as a single girl. Since her mother is usually willing to take care of the child for a few years, the unwed mother has an oppor-

tunity to go out with girl friends and with men and thus become more deeply involved in the peer-group society of her culture. As she has more children and perhaps marries she will find it necessary to settle down and spend more time around the house fulfilling the functions of a mother herself.

It would seem that for girls pregnancy is the real measure of maturity, the dividing line between adolescence and womanhood. Perhaps because of this, as well as because of the ready resources for child care, girls in the Negro slum community show much less concern about pregnancy than do girls in the white lower-class community and are less motivated to marry the fathers of their children. When a girl becomes pregnant the question of marriage certainly arises and is considered, but the girl often decides that she would rather not marry the man either because she does not want to settle down yet or because she does not think he would make a good husband.

It is in the easy attitudes toward premarital pregnancy that the matrifocal character of the Negro lower-class family appears most clearly. In order to have and raise a family it is simply not necessary, though it may be desirable, to have a man around the house. While the AFDC program may make it easier to maintain such attitudes in the urban situation, this pattern existed long before the program was initiated and continues in families where support comes from other sources.

Finally it should be noted that fathering a child similarly confers maturity on boys and young men although perhaps it is less salient for them. If the boy has any interest in the girl he will tend to feel that the fact that he has impregnated her gives him an additional claim on her. He will be stricter in seeking to enforce his exclusive rights over her (though not exclusive loyalty to her). This exclusive right does not mean that he expects to marry her but only that there is a new and special bond between them. If the girl is not willing to accept such claims she may find it necessary to break off the relationship rather than tolerate the man's jealousy. Since others in the peer group have a vested interest in not allowing a couple to be too loyal to each other they go out of their way to question and challenge each partner about the loyalty of the other, thus contributing to the deterioration of the relationship. This same kind of questioning and challenging continues if the couple marries and represents one source of the instability of the marital relationship.

Getting married. As noted earlier, despite the high degree of

premarital sexual activity and the rather high proportion of premarital pregnancies, most lower-class Negro men and women eventually do marry and stay together for a shorter or longer period of time. Marriage is an intimidating prospect and is approached ambivalently by both parties. For the girl it means giving up a familiar and comfortable home that, unlike some other lower-class subcultures, places few real restrictions on her behavior. (While marriage can appear to be an escape from interpersonal difficulties at home, these difficulties seldom seem to revolve around effective restrictions placed on her behavior by her parents.) The girl also has good reason to be suspicious of the likelihood that men will be able to perform stably in the role of husband and provider; she is reluctant to be tied down by a man who will not prove to be worth it.

From the man's point of view the fickleness of women makes marriage problematic. It is one thing to have a girl friend step out on you, but it is quite another to have a wife do so. Whereas premarital sexual relations and fatherhood carry almost no connotation of responsibility for the welfare of the partner, marriage is supposed to mean that a man behaves more responsibly, becoming a provider for his wife and children even though he may not be expected to give up all the gratifications of participation in the street system.

For all of these reasons both boys and girls tend to have rather negative views of marriage as well as a low expectation that marriage will prove a stable and gratifying existence. When marriage does take place it tends to represent a tentative commitment on the part of both parties with a strong tendency to seek greater commitment on the part of the partner than on one's own part. Marriage is regarded as a fragile arrangement held together primarily by affectional ties rather than instrumental concerns.

In general, as in white lower-class groups, the decision to marry seems to be taken rather impulsively.¹⁶ Since everyone knows that sooner or later he will get married, in spite of the fact that he may not be sanguine about the prospect, Negro lower-class men and women are alert for clues that the time has arrived. The time may arrive because of a pregnancy in a steady relationship that seems gratifying to both partners, or as a way of getting out of what seems to be an awkward situation, or as a self-indulgence during periods when a boy and a girl are feeling very sorry for themselves. Thus, one girl tells us that when she marries her husband will cook all of her meals for her and she will not have any housework; another girl says that when she marries it will be to a man who has plenty of

money and will have to take her out often and really show her a good time.

Boys see in marriage the possibility of regular sexual intercourse without having to fight for it, or a girl safe from venereal disease, or a relationship to a nurturant figure who will fulfill the functions of a mother. For boys, marriage can also be a way of asserting their independence from the peer group if its demands become burdensome. In this case the young man seeks to have the best of both worlds.¹⁷

Marriage as a way out of an unpleasant situation can be seen in the case of one of our informants, Janet Cowan:

Janet has been going with two men, one of them married and the other single. The married man's wife took exception to their relationship and killed her husband. Within a week Janet and her single boy friend, Howard, were married. One way out of the turmoil the murder of her married boy friend stimulated (they lived in the same building) was to choose marriage as a way of "settling down." However, after marrying the new couple seemed to have little idea how to set themselves up as a family. Janet was reluctant to leave her parents' home because her parents cared for her two illegitimate children. Howard was unemployed and therefore unacceptable in his parent-in-law's home, nor were his own parents willing to have his wife move in with them. Howard was also reluctant to give up another girl friend in another part of town. Although both he and his wife maintained that it was all right for a couple to step out on each other so long as the other partner did not know about it, they were both jealous if they suspected anything of this kind. In the end they gave up on the idea of marriage and went their separate ways.

In general, then, the movement toward marriage is an uncertain and tentative one. Once the couple does settle down together in a household of their own, they have the problem of working out a mutually acceptable organization of rights and duties, expectations and performances, that will meet their needs.

Husband-wife relations. Characteristic of both the Negro and white lower class is a high degree of conjugal role segregation.¹⁸ That is, husbands and wives tend to think of themselves as having very separate kinds of functioning in the instrumental organization of family life, and also as pursuing recreational and outside interests separately. The husband is expected to be a provider; he resists assuming functions around the home so long as he feels he is doing his proper job of bringing home a pay check. He feels he has the right to indulge himself in little ways if he is successful at this task. The wife is expected to care for the home and children and make her husband feel welcome and comfortable. Much that is distinctive

to Negro family life stems from the fact that husbands often are not stable providers. Even when a particular man is, his wife's conception of men in general is such that she is pessimistic about the likelihood that he will continue to do well in this area. A great many Negro wives work to supplement the family income. When this is so the separate incomes earned by husband and wife tend to be treated not as "family" income but as the individual property of the two persons involved. If their wives work, husbands are likely to feel that they are entitled to retain a larger share of the income they provide; the wives, in turn, feel that the husbands have no right to benefit from the purchases they make out of their own money. There is, then, "my money" and "your money." In this situation the husband may come to feel that the wife should support the children out of her income and that he can retain all of his income for himself.

While white lower-class wives often are very much intimidated by their husbands, Negro lower-class wives come to feel that they have a right to give as good as they get. If the husband indulges himself, they have the right to indulge themselves. If the husband steps out on his wife, she has the right to step out on him. The commitment of husbands and wives to each other seems often a highly instrumental one after the "honeymoon" period. Many wives feel they owe the husband nothing once he fails to perform his provider role. If the husband is unemployed the wife increasingly refuses to perform her usual duties for him. For example one woman, after mentioning that her husband had cooked four eggs for himself, commented, "I cook for him when he's working but right now he's unemployed; he can cook for himself." It is important, however, to understand that the man's status in the home depends not so much on whether he is working as on whether he brings money into the home. Thus, in several of the families we have studied in which the husband receives disability payments his status is as well-recognized as in families in which the husband is working.¹⁹

Because of the high degree of conjugal role segregation, both white and Negro lower-class families tend to be matrifocal in comparison to middle-class families. They are matrifocal in the sense that the wife makes most of the decisions that keep the family going and has the greatest sense of responsibility to the family. In white as well as in Negro lower-class families women tend to look to their female relatives for support and counsel, and to treat their husbands as essentially uninterested in the day-to-day problems of family living.²⁰ In the Negro lower-class family these tendencies are all con-

siderably exaggerated so that the matrifocality is much clearer than in white lower-class families.

The fact that both sexes in the Negro slum culture have equal right to the various satisfactions of life (earning an income, sex, drinking, and peer-group activity which conflicts with family responsibilities) means that there is less pretense to patriarchal authority in the Negro than in the white lower class. Since men find the overt debasement of their status very threatening, the Negro family is much more vulnerable to disruption when men are temporarily unable to perform their provider roles. Also, when men are unemployed the temptations for them to engage in street adventures which repercuss on the marital relationship are much greater. This fact is well-recognized by Negro lower-class wives; they often seem as concerned about what their unemployed husbands will do instead of working as they are about the fact that the husband is no longer bringing money into the home.

It is tempting to cope with the likelihood of disloyalty by denying the usual norms of fidelity, by maintaining instead that extra-marital affairs are acceptable as long as they do not interfere with family functioning. Quite a few informants tell us this, but we have yet to observe a situation in which a couple maintains a stable relationship under these circumstances without a great deal of conflict. Thus one woman in her forties who has been married for many years and has four children first outlined this deviant norm and then illustrated how it did not work out:

My husband and I, we go out alone and sometimes stay all night. But when I get back my husband doesn't ask me a thing and I don't ask him anything. . . . A couple of years ago I suspected he was going out on me. One day I came home and my daughter was here. I told her to tell me when he left the house. I went into the bedroom and got into bed and then I heard him come in. He left in about ten minutes and my daughter came in and told me he was gone. I got out of bed and put on my clothes and started following him. Soon I saw him walking with a young girl and I began walking after them. They were just laughing and joking right out loud right on the sidewalk. He was carrying a large package of hers. I walked up behind them until I was about a yard from them. I had a large dirk which I opened and had decided to take one long slash across the both of them. Just when I decided to swing at them I lost my balance—I have a bad hip. Anyway, I didn't cut them because I lost my balance. Then I called his name and he turned around and stared at me. He didn't move at all. He was shaking all over. That girl just ran away from us. He still had her package so the next day she called on the telephone and said she wanted to come pick it up. My husband washed his face, brushed his teeth, took out his false

tooth and started scrubbing it and put on a clean shirt and everything, just for her. We went downstairs together and gave her the package and she left.

So you see my husband does run around on me and it seems like he does it a lot. The thing about it is he's just getting too old to be pulling that kind of stuff. If a young man does it then that's not so bad—but an old man, he just looks foolish. One of these days he'll catch me but I'll just tell him, "Buddy you owe me one," and that'll be all there is to it. He hasn't caught me yet though.

In this case, as in others, the wife is not able to leave well enough alone; her jealousy forces her to a confrontation. Actually seeing her husband with another woman stimulates her to violence.

With couples who have managed to stay married for a good many years, these peccadillos are tolerable although they generate a great deal of conflict in the marital relationship. At earlier ages the partners are likely to be both prouder and less innured to the hopelessness of maintaining stable relationships; outside involvements are therefore much more likely to be disruptive of the marriage.

Marital breakup. The precipitating causes of marital disruption seem to fall mainly into economic or sexual categories. As noted, the husband has little credit with his wife to tide him over periods of unemployment. Wives seem very willing to withdraw commitment from husbands who are not bringing money into the house. They take the point of view that he has no right to take up space around the house, to use its facilities, or to demand loyalty from her. Even where the wife is not inclined to press these claims, the husband tends to be touchy because he knows that such definitions are usual in his group, and he may, therefore, prove difficult for even a well-meaning wife to deal with. As noted above, if husbands do not work they tend to play around. Since they continue to maintain some contact with their peer groups, whenever they have time on their hands they move back into the world of the street system and are likely to get involved in activities which pose a threat to their family relationships.

Drink is a great enemy of the lower-class housewife, both white and Negro. Lower-class wives fear their husband's drinking because it costs money, because the husband may become violent and take out his frustrations on his wife, and because drinking may lead to sexual involvements with other women.²¹

The combination of economic problems and sexual difficulties can be seen in the case of the following couple in their early twenties:

Crucible of Identity

When the field worker first came to know them, the Wilsons seemed to be working hard to establish a stable family life. The couple had been married about three years and had a two-year-old son. Their apartment was very sparsely furnished but also very clean. Within six weeks the couple had acquired several rooms of inexpensive furniture and obviously had gone to a great deal of effort to make a liveable home. Husband and wife worked on different shifts so that the husband could take care of the child while the wife worked. They looked forward to saving enough money to move out of the housing project into a more desirable neighborhood. Six weeks later, however, the husband had lost his job. He and his wife were in great conflict. She made him feel unwelcome at home and he strongly suspected her of going out with other men. A short time later they had separated. It is impossible to disentangle the various factors involved in this separation into a sequence of cause and effect, but we can see something of the impact of the total complex.

First Mr. Wilson loses his job: "I went to work one day and the man told me that I would have to work until 1:00. I asked him if there would be any extra pay for working overtime and he said no. I asked him why and he said, 'If you don't like it you can kiss my ass.' He said that to me. I said, 'Why do I have to do all that?' He said, 'Because I said so.' I wanted to jam (fight) him but I said to myself I don't want to be that ignorant, I don't want to be as ignorant as he is, so I just cut out and left. Later his father called me (it was a family firm) and asked why I left and I told him. He said, 'If you don't want to go along with my son then you're fired.' I said O.K. They had another Negro man come in to help me part time before they fired me. I think they were trying to have him work full time because he worked for them before. He has seven kids and he takes their shit."

The field worker observed that things were not as hard as they could be because his wife had a job, to which he replied, "Yeah, I know, that's just where the trouble is. My wife has become independent since she began working. If I don't get a job pretty soon I'll go crazy. We have a lot of little arguments about nothing since she got so independent." He went on to say that his wife had become a completely different person recently; she was hard to talk to because she felt that now that she was working and he was not there was nothing that he could tell her. On her last pay day his wife did not return home for three days; when she did she had only seven cents left from her pay check. He said that he loved his wife very much and had begged her to quit fooling around. He is pretty sure that she is having an affair with the man with whom she rides to work. To make matters worse his wife's sister counsels her that she does not have to stay home with him as long as he is out of work. Finally the wife moved most of their furniture out of the apartment so that he came home to find an empty apartment. He moved back to his parents' home (also in the housing project).

One interesting effect of this experience was the radical change in the husband's attitudes toward race relations. When he and his wife were

doing well together and had hopes of moving up in the world he was quite critical of Negroes; "Our people are not ready for integration in many cases because they really don't know how to act. You figure if our people don't want to be bothered with whites then why in hell should the white man want to be bothered with them. There are some of us who are ready; there are others who aren't quite ready yet so I don't see why they're doing all of this hollering." A scarce eight months later he addressed white people as he spoke for two hours into a tape recorder, "If we're willing to be with you, why aren't you willing to be with us? Do our color make us look dirty and low down and cheap? Or do you know the real meaning of 'nigger'? Anyone can be a nigger, white, colored, orange or any other color. It's something that you labeled us with. You put us away like you put a can away on the shelf with a label on it. The can is marked 'Poison: stay away from it.' You want us to help build your country but you don't want us to live in it. . . . You give me respect; I'll give you respect. If you threaten to take my life, I'll take yours and believe me I know how to take a life. We do believe that man was put here to live together as human beings; not one that's superior and the one that's a dog, but as human beings. And if you don't want to live this way then you become the dog and we'll become the human beings. There's too much corruption, too much hate, too much one individual trying to step on another. If we don't get together in a hurry we will destroy each other." It was clear from what the respondent said that he had been much influenced by Black Muslim philosophy, yet again and again in his comments one can see the displacement into a public, race relations dialogue of the sense of rage, frustration and victimization that he had experienced in his ill-fated marriage.²²

Finally, it should be noted that migration plays a part in marital disruption. Sometimes marriages do not break up in the dramatic way described above but rather simply become increasingly unsatisfactory to one or both partners. In such a situation the temptation to move to another city, from South to North, or North to West, is great. Several wives told us that their first marriages were broken when they moved with their children to the North and their husbands stayed behind.

"After we couldn't get along I left the farm and came here and stayed away three or four days. I didn't come here to stay. I came to visit but I liked it and so I said, 'I'm gonna leave!' He said, 'I'll be glad if you do.' Well, maybe he didn't mean it but I thought he did. . . . I miss him sometimes, you know. I think about him I guess. But just in a small way. That's what I can't understand about life sometimes; you know—how people can go on like that and still break up and meet somebody else. Why couldn't—oh, I don't know!"

The gains and losses in marriage and in the post-marital state

often seem quite comparable. Once they have had the experience of marriage, many women in the Negro slum culture see little to recommend it in the future, important as the first marriage may have been in establishing their maturity and respectability.

The house of mothers. As we have seen, perhaps a majority of mothers in the Negro slum community spend at least part of their mature life as mothers heading a family. The Negro mother may be a working mother or she may be an AFDC mother, but in either case she has the problems of maintaining a household, socializing her children, and achieving for herself some sense of membership in relations with other women and with men. As is apparent from the earlier discussion, she often receives her training in how to run such a household by observing her own mother manage without a husband. Similarly she often learns how to run a three-generation household because she herself brought a third generation into her home with her first, premarital, pregnancy.

Because men are not expected to be much help around the house, having to be head of the household is not particularly intimidating to the Negro mother if she can feel some security about income. She knows it is a hard, hopeless, and often thankless task, but she also knows that it is possible. The maternal household in the slum is generally run with a minimum of organization. The children quickly learn to fend for themselves, to go to the store, to make small purchases, to bring change home, to watch after themselves when the mother has to be out of the home, to amuse themselves, to set their own schedules of sleeping, eating, and going to school. Housekeeping practices may be poor, furniture takes a terrific beating from the children, and emergencies constantly arise. The Negro mother in this situation copes by not setting too high standards for herself, by letting things take their course. Life is most difficult when there are babies and preschool children around because then the mother is confined to the home. If she is a grandmother and the children are her daughter's, she is often confined since it is taken as a matter of course that the mother has the right to continue her outside activities and that the grandmother has the duty to be responsible for the child.

In this culture there is little of the sense of the awesome responsibility of caring for children that is characteristic of the working and middle class. There is not the deep psychological involvement with babies which has been observed with the working-class mother.²³ The baby's needs are cared for on a catch-as-catch-can

basis. If there are other children around and they happen to like babies, the baby can be over-stimulated; if this is not the case, the baby is left alone a good deal of the time. As quickly as he can move around he learns to fend for himself.

The three-generation maternal household is a busy place. In contrast to working- and middle-class homes it tends to be open to the world, with many non-family members coming in and out at all times as the children are visited by friends, the teenagers by their boy friends and girl friends, the mother by her friends and perhaps an occasional boy friend, and the grandmother by fewer friends but still by an occasional boy friend.

The openness of the household is, among other things, a reflection of the mother's sense of impotence in the face of the street system. Negro lower-class mothers often indicate that they try very hard to keep their young children at home and away from the streets; they often seem to make the children virtual prisoners in the home. As the children grow and go to school they inevitably do become involved in peer-group activities. The mother gradually gives up, feeling that once the child is lost to this pernicious outside world there is little she can do to continue to control him and direct his development. She will try to limit the types of activities that go on in the home and to restrict the kinds of friends that her children can bring into the home, but even this she must give up as time goes on, as the children become older and less attentive to her direction.

The grandmothers in their late forties, fifties, and sixties tend increasingly to stay at home. The home becomes a kind of court at which other family members gather and to which they bring their friends for sociability, and as a by-product provide amusement and entertainment for the mother. A grandmother may provide a home for her daughters, their children, and sometimes their children's children, and yet receive very little in a material way from them; but one of the things she does receive is a sense of human involvement, a sense that although life may have passed her by she is not completely isolated from it.

The lack of control that mothers have over much that goes on in their households is most dramatically apparent in the fact that their older children seem to have the right to come home at any time once they have moved and to stay in the home without contributing to its maintenance. Though the mother may be resentful about being taken advantage of, she does not feel she can turn her children

away. For example, sixty-five-year-old Mrs. Washington plays hostess for weeks or months at a time to her forty-year-old daughter and her small children, and to her twenty-three-year-old granddaughter and her children. When these daughters come home with their families the grandmother is expected to take care of the young children and must argue with her daughter and granddaughter to receive contributions to the daily household ration of food and liquor. Or, a twenty-year-old son comes home from the Air Force and feels he has the right to live at home without working and to run up an eighty-dollar long-distance telephone bill.

Even aged parents living alone in small apartments sometimes acknowledge such obligations to their children or grandchildren. Again, the only clear return they receive for their hospitality is the reduction of isolation that comes from having people around and interesting activity going on. When in the Washington home the daughter and granddaughter and their children move in with the grandmother, or when they come to visit for shorter periods of time, the occasion has a party atmosphere. The women sit around talking and reminiscing. Though boy friends may be present, they take little part; instead they sit passively, enjoying the stories and drinking along with the women. It would seem that in this kind of party activity the women are defined as the stars. Grandmother, daughter, and granddaughter in turn take the center of the stage telling a story from the family's past, talking about a particularly interesting night out on the town or just making some general observation about life. In the course of these events a good deal of liquor is consumed. In such a household as this little attention is paid to the children since the competition by adults for attention is stiff.

Boy friends, not husbands. It is with an understanding of the problems of isolation which older mothers have that we can obtain the best insight into the role and function of boy friends in the maternal household. The older mothers, surrounded by their own children and grandchildren, are not able to move freely in the outside world, to participate in the high life which they enjoyed when younger and more foot-loose. They are disillusioned with marriage as providing any more secure economic base than they can achieve on their own. They see marriage as involving just another responsibility without a concomitant reward—"It's the greatest thing in the world to come home in the afternoon and not have some curly headed twot in the house yellin' at me and askin' me where supper is, where I've been, what I've been doin', and who I've been

seein'." In this situation the woman is tempted to form relationships with men that are not so demanding as marriage but still provide companionship and an opportunity for occasional sexual gratification.

There seem to be two kinds of boy friends. Some boy friends "pimp" off mothers; they extract payment in food or money for their companionship. This leads to the custom sometimes called "Mother's Day," the tenth of the month when the AFDC checks come.²⁴ On this day one can observe an influx of men into the neighborhood, and much partying. But there is another kind of boy friend, perhaps more numerous than the first, who instead of being paid for his services pays for the right to be a pseudo family member. He may be the father of one of the woman's children and for this reason makes a steady contribution to the family's support, or he may simply be a man whose company the mother enjoys and who makes reasonable gifts to the family for the time he spends with them (and perhaps implicitly for the sexual favors he receives). While the boy friend does not assume fatherly authority within the family, he often is known and liked by the children. The older children appreciate the meaningfulness of their mother's relationship with him—one girl said of her mother's boy friend:

"We don't none of us (the children) want her to marry again. It's all right if she wants to live by herself and have a boy friend. It's not because we're afraid we're going to have some more sisters and brothers, which it wouldn't make us much difference, but I think she be too old."

Even when the boy friend contributes ten or twenty dollars a month to the family he is in a certain sense getting a bargain. If he is a well-accepted boy friend he spends considerable time around the house, has a chance to relax in an atmosphere less competitive than that of his peer group, is fed and cared for by the woman, yet has no responsibilities which he cannot renounce when he wishes. When women have stable relationships of this kind with boy friends they often consider marrying them but are reluctant to take such a step. Even the well-liked boy friend has some shortcomings—one woman said of her boy friend:

"Well he works; I know that. He seems to be a nice person, kind hearted. He believes in survival for me and my family. He don't much mind sharing with my youngsters. If I ask him for a helping hand he don't seem to mind that. The only part I dislike is his drinking."

The woman in this situation has worked out a reasonably stable adaptation to the problems of her life; she is fearful of upsetting

this adaptation by marrying again. It seems easier to take the "sweet" part of the relationship with a man without the complexities that marriage might involve.

It is in the light of this pattern of women living in families and men living by themselves in rooming houses, odd rooms, here and there, that we can understand Daniel Patrick Moynihan's observation that during their mature years men simply disappear; that is, that census data show a very high sex ratio of women to men.²⁵ In St. Louis, starting at the age range twenty to twenty-four there are only seventy-two men for every one hundred women. This ratio does not climb to ninety until the age range fifty to fifty-four. Men often do not have real homes; they move about from one household where they have kinship or sexual ties to another; they live in flop houses and rooming houses; they spend time in institutions. They are not household members in the only "homes" that they have—the homes of their mothers and of their girl friends.

It is in this kind of world that boys and girls in the Negro slum community learn their sex roles. It is not just, or even mainly, that fathers are often absent but that the male role models around boys are ones which emphasize expressive, affectional techniques for making one's way in the world. The female role models available to girls emphasize an exaggerated self-sufficiency (from the point of view of the middle class) and the danger of allowing oneself to be dependent on men for anything that is crucial. By the time she is mature, the woman learns that she is most secure when she herself manages the family affairs and when she dominates her men. The man learns that he exposes himself to the least risk of failure when he does not assume a husband's and father's responsibilities but instead counts on his ability to court women and to ingratiate himself with them.

Identity Processes in the Family

Up to this point we have been examining the sequential development of family stages in the Negro slum community, paying only incidental attention to the psychological responses family members make to these social forms and not concerning ourselves with the effect the family forms have on the psychosocial development of the children who grow up in them. Now we want to examine the effect that growing up in this kind of a system has in terms of socialization and personality development.

Household groups function for cultures in carrying out the initial phases of socialization and personality formation. It is in the family that the child learns the most primitive categories of existence and experience, and that he develops his most deeply held beliefs about the world and about himself.²⁶ From the child's point of view, the household *is* the world; his experiences as he moves out of it into the larger world are always interpreted in terms of his particular experience within the home. The painful experiences which a child in the Negro slum culture has are, therefore, interpreted as in some sense a reflection of this family world. The impact of the system of victimization is transmitted through the family; the child cannot be expected to have the sophistication an outside observer has for seeing exactly where the villains are. From the child's point of view, if he is hungry it is his parents' fault; if he experiences frustrations in the streets or in the school it is his parents' fault; if that world seems incomprehensible to him it is his parents' fault; if people are aggressive or destructive toward each other it is his parents' fault, not that of a system of race relations. In another culture this might not be the case; if a subculture could exist which provided comfort and security within its limited world and the individual experienced frustration only when he moved out into the larger society, the family might not be thought so much to blame. The effect of the caste system, however, is to bring home through a chain of cause and effect all of the victimization processes, and to bring them home in such a way that it is often very difficult even for adults in the system to see the connection between the pain they feel at the moment and the structured patterns of the caste system.

Let us take as a central question that of identity formation within the Negro slum family. We are concerned with the question of who the individual believes himself to be and to be becoming. For Erikson, identity means a sense of continuity and social sameness which bridges what the individual "*was as a child and what he is about to become*" and also reconciles his *conception of himself* and his community's recognition of him." Thus identity is a "self-realization coupled with a mutual recognition."²⁷ In the early childhood years identity is family-bound since the child's identity is his identity *vis-à-vis* other members of the family. Later he incorporates into his sense of who he is and is becoming his experiences outside the family, but always influenced by the interpretations and evaluations of those experiences that the family gives. As the child tries on identities, *announces* them, the family sits as judge of his preten-

sions. Family members are both the most important judges and the most critical ones, since who he is allowed to become affects them in their own identity strivings more crucially than it affects anyone else. The child seeks a sense of valid identity, a sense of being a particular person with a satisfactory degree of congruence between who he feels he is, who he announces himself to be, and where he feels his society places him.²⁸ He is uncomfortable when he experiences disjunction between his own needs and the kinds of needs legitimated by those around him, or when he feels a disjunction between his sense of himself and the image of himself that others play back to him.²⁹

"Tell it like it is." When families become involved in important quarrels the psychosocial underpinnings of family life are laid bare. One such quarrel in a family we have been studying brings together in one place many of the themes that seem to dominate identity problems in Negro slum culture. The incident illustrates in a particularly forceful and dramatic way family processes which our field work, and some other contemporary studies of slum family life, suggests unfold more subtly in a great many families at the lower-class level. The family involved, the Johnsons, is certainly not the most disorganized one we have studied; in some respects their way of life represents a realistic adaptation to the hard living of a family nineteen years on AFDC with a monthly income of \$202 for nine people. The two oldest daughters, Mary Jane (eighteen years old) and Esther (sixteen) are pregnant; Mary Jane has one illegitimate child. The adolescent sons, Bob and Richard, are much involved in the social and sexual activities of their peer group. The three other children, ranging in age from twelve to fourteen, are apparently also moving into this kind of peer-group society.

When the argument started Bob and Esther were alone in the apartment with Mary Jane's baby. Esther took exception to Bob's playing with the baby because she had been left in charge; the argument quickly progressed to a fight in which Bob cuffed Esther around, and she tried to cut him with a knife. The police were called and subdued Bob with their nightsticks. At this point the rest of the family and the field worker arrived. As the argument continued, these themes relevant to the analysis which follows appeared:

- 1) The sisters said that Bob was not their brother (he is a half-brother to Esther, and Mary Jane's full brother). Indeed, they said their mother "didn't have no husband. These kids don't even know who their daddies are." The mother defended herself by saying that she had one legal husband, and one common-law husband, no more.
- 2) The sisters said that their fathers had never done anything for

them, nor had their mother. She retorted that she had raised them "to the age of womanhood" and now would care for their babies.

- 3) Esther continued to threaten to cut Bob if she got a chance (a month later they fought again, and she did cut Bob, who required twenty-one stitches).
- 4) The sisters accused their mother of favoring their lazy brothers and asked her to put them out of the house. She retorted that the girls were as lazy, that they made no contribution to maintaining the household, could not get their boy friends to marry them or support their children, that all the support came from her AFDC check. Mary Jane retorted that "the baby has a check of her own."
- 5) The girls threatened to leave the house if their mother refused to put their brothers out. They said they could force their boy friends to support them by taking them to court, and Esther threatened to cut her boy friend's throat if he did not co-operate.
- 6) Mrs. Johnson said the girls could leave if they wished but that she would keep their babies; "I'll not have it, not knowing who's taking care of them."
- 7) When her thirteen-year-old sister laughed at all of this, Esther told her not to laugh because she, too, would be pregnant within a year.
- 8) When Bob laughed, Esther attacked him and his brother by saying that both were not man enough to make babies, as she and her sister had been able to do.
- 9) As the field worker left, Mrs. Johnson sought his sympathy. "You see, Joe, how hard it is for me to bring up a family. . . . They sit around and talk to me like I'm some kind of a dog and not their mother."
- 10) Finally, it is important to note for the analysis which follows that the following labels—"black-assed," "black bastard," "bitch," and other profane terms—were liberally used by Esther and Mary Jane, and rather less liberally by their mother, to refer to each other, to the girls' boy friends, to Bob, and to the thirteen-year-old daughter.

Several of the themes outlined previously appear forcefully in the course of this argument. In the last year and a half the mother has become a grandmother and expects shortly to add two more grandchildren to her household. She takes it for granted that it is her responsibility to care for the grandchildren and that she has the right to decide what will be done with the children since her own daughters are not fully responsible. She makes this very clear to them when they threaten to move out, a threat which they do not really wish to make good nor could they if they wished to.

However, only as an act of will is Mrs. Johnson able to make this a family. She must constantly cope with the tendency of her adolescent children to disrupt the family group and to deny that they are in fact a family—"He ain't no brother of mine"; "The baby has a check of her own." Though we do not know exactly what processes

communicate these facts to the children it is clear that in growing up they have learned to regard themselves as not fully part of a solidary collectivity. During the quarrel this message was reinforced for the twelve-, thirteen-, and fourteen-year-old daughters by the four-way argument among their older sisters, older brother, and their mother.

The argument represents vicious unmasking of the individual members' pretenses to being competent individuals.³⁰ The efforts of the two girls to present themselves as masters of their own fate are unmasked by the mother. The girls in turn unmask the pretensions of the mother and of their two brothers. When the thirteen-year-old daughter expresses some amusement they turn on her, telling her that it won't be long before she too becomes pregnant. Each member of the family in turn is told that he can expect to be no more than a victim of his world, but that this is somehow inevitably his own fault.

In this argument masculinity is consistently demeaned. Bob has no right to play with his niece, the boys are not really masculine because at fifteen and sixteen years they have yet to father children, their own fathers were no goods who failed to do anything for their family. These notions probably come originally from the mother, who enjoys recounting the story of having her common-law husband imprisoned for nonsupport, but this comes back to haunt her as her daughters accuse her of being no better than they in ability to force support and nurturance from a man. In contrast, the girls came off somewhat better than the boys, although they must accept the label of stupid girls because they have similarly failed and inconveniently become pregnant in the first place. At least they can and have had children and therefore have some meaningful connection with the ongoing substance of life. There is something important and dramatic in which they participate, while the boys, despite their sexual activity, "can't get no babies."

In most societies, as children grow and are formed by their elders into suitable members of the society they gain increasingly a sense of competence and ability to master the behavioral environment their particular world presents. But in Negro slum culture growing up involves an ever-increasing appreciation of one's shortcomings, of the impossibility of finding a self-sufficient and gratifying way of living.³¹ It is in the family first and most devastatingly that one learns these lessons. As the child's sense of frustration builds he too can strike out and unmask the pretensions of others. The

result is a peculiar strength and a pervasive weakness. The strength involves the ability to tolerate and defend against degrading verbal and physical aggressions from others and not to give up completely. The weakness involves the inability to embark hopefully on any course of action that might make things better, particularly action which involves cooperating and trusting attitudes toward others. Family members become potential enemies to each other, as the frequency of observing the police being called in to settle family quarrels brings home all too dramatically.

The conceptions parents have of their children are such that they are constantly alert as the child matures to evidence that he is as bad as everyone else. That is, in lower-class culture human nature is conceived of as essentially bad, destructive, immoral.³² This is the nature of things. Therefore any one child must be inherently bad unless his parents are very lucky indeed. If the mother can keep the child insulated from the outside world, she feels she may be able to prevent his inherent badness from coming out. She feels that once he is let out into the larger world the badness will come to the fore since that is his nature. This means that in the identity development of the child he is constantly exposed to identity labeling by his parents as a bad person. Since as he grows up he does not experience his world as particularly gratifying, it is very easy for him to conclude that this lack of gratification is due to the fact that something is wrong with him. This, in turn, can readily be assimilated to the definitions of being a bad person offered him by those with whom he lives.³³ In this way the Negro slum child learns his culture's conception of being-in-the-world, a conception that emphasizes inherent evil in a chaotic, hostile, destructive world.

Blackness. To a certain extent these same processes operate in white lower-class groups, but added for the Negro is the reality of blackness. "Black-assed" is not an empty pejorative adjective. In the Negro slum culture several distinctive appellations are used to refer to oneself and others. One involves the terms, "black" or "nigger." Black is generally a negative way of naming, but nigger can be either negative or positive, depending upon the context. It is important to note that, at least in the urban North, the initial development of racial identity in these terms has very little directly to do with relations with whites. A child experiences these identity placements in the context of the family and in the neighborhood peer group; he probably very seldom hears the same terms used by whites (unlike the situation in the South). In this way, one of the effects of

ghettoization is to mask the ultimate enemy so that the understanding of the fact of victimization by a caste system comes as a late acquisition laid over conceptions of self and of other Negroes derived from intimate, and to the child often traumatic, experience within the ghetto community. If, in addition, the child attends a ghetto school where his Negro teachers either overtly or by implication reinforce his community's negative conceptions of what it means to be black, then the child has little opportunity to develop a more realistic image of himself and other Negroes as being damaged by whites and not by themselves. In such a situation, an intelligent man like Mr. Wilson (quoted on pages 193-194) can say with all sincerity that he does not feel most Negroes are ready for integration—only under the experience of certain kinds of intense personal threat coupled with exposure to an ideology that places the responsibility on whites did he begin to see through the direct evidence of his daily experience.

To those living in the heart of a ghetto, black comes to mean not just "stay back," but also membership in a community of persons who think poorly of each other, who attack and manipulate each other, who give each other small comfort in a desperate world. Black comes to stand for a sense of identity as no better than these destructive others. The individual feels that he must embrace an unattractive self in order to function at all.

We can hypothesize that in those families that manage to avoid the destructive identity imputations of "black" and that manage to maintain solidarity against such assaults from the world around, it is possible for children to grow up with a sense of both Negro and personal identity that allows them to socialize themselves in an anticipatory way for participation in the larger society.³⁴ This broader sense of identity, however, will remain a brittle one as long as the individual is vulnerable to attack from within the Negro community as "nothing but a nigger like everybody else" or from the white community as "just a nigger." We can hypothesize further that the vicious unmasking of essential identity as black described above is least likely to occur within families where the parents have some stable sense of security, and where they therefore have less need to protect themselves by disavowing responsibility for their children's behavior and denying the children their patrimony as products of a particular family rather than of an immoral nature and an evil community.

In sum, we are suggesting that Negro slum children as they

grow up in their families and in their neighborhoods are exposed to a set of experiences—and a rhetoric which conceptualizes them—that brings home to the child an understanding of his essence as a weak and debased person who can expect only partial gratification of his needs, and who must seek even this level of gratification by less than straight-forward means.

Strategies for living. In every society complex processes of socialization inculcate in their members strategies for gratifying the needs with which they are born and those which the society itself generates. Inextricably linked to these strategies, both cause and effect of them, are the existential propositions which members of a culture entertain about the nature of their world and of effective action within the world as it is defined for them. In most of American society two grand strategies seem to attract the allegiance of its members and guide their day-to-day actions. I have called these strategies those of *the good life* and of *career success*.³⁵ A good life strategy involves efforts to get along with others and not to rock the boat, a comfortable familism grounded on a stable work career for husbands in which they perform adequately at the modest jobs that enable them to be good providers. The strategy of career success is the choice of ambitious men and women who see life as providing opportunities to move from a lower to a higher status, to “accomplish something,” to achieve greater than ordinary material well-being, prestige, and social recognition. Both of these strategies are predicated on the assumption that the world is inherently rewarding if one behaves properly and does his part. The rewards of the world may come easily or only at the cost of great effort, but at least they are there.

In the white and particularly in the Negro slum worlds little in the experience that individuals have as they grow up sustains a belief in a rewarding world. The strategies that seem appropriate are not those of a good, family-based life or of a career, but rather *strategies for survival*.

Much of what has been said above can be summarized as encouraging three kinds of survival strategies. One is the strategy of the *expressive life style* which I have described elsewhere as an effort to make yourself interesting and attractive to others so that you are better able to manipulate their behavior along lines that will provide some immediate gratification.³⁶ Negro slum culture provides many examples of techniques for seduction, of persuading others to give you what you want in situations where you have

very little that is tangible to offer in return. In order to get what you want you learn to "work game," a strategy which requires a high development of a certain kind of verbal facility, a sophisticated manipulation of promise and interim reward. When the expressive strategy fails or when it is unavailable there is, of course, the great temptation to adopt a *violent strategy* in which you force others to give you what you need once you fail to win it by verbal and other symbolic means.³⁷ Finally, and increasingly as members of the Negro slum culture grow older, there is the *depressive strategy* in which goals are increasingly constricted to the bare necessities for survival (not as a social being but simply as an organism).³⁸ This is the strategy of "I don't bother anybody and I hope nobody's gonna bother me; I'm simply going through the motions to keep body (but not soul) together." Most lower-class people follow mixed strategies, as Walter Miller has observed, alternating among the excitement of the expressive style, the desperation of the violent style, and the deadness of the depressed style.³⁹ Some members of the Negro slum world experiment from time to time with mixed strategies that also incorporate the stable working-class model of the good American life, but this latter strategy is exceedingly vulnerable to the threats of unemployment or a less than adequate pay check, on the one hand, and the seduction and violence of the slum world around them, on the other.

Remedies. Finally, it is clear that we, no less than the inhabitants of the ghetto, are not masters of their fate because we are not masters of our own total society. Despite the battles with poverty on many fronts we can find little evidence to sustain our hope of winning the war given current programs and strategies.

The question of strategy is particularly crucial when one moves from an examination of destructive cultural and interaction patterns in Negro families to the question of how these families might achieve a more stable and gratifying life. It is tempting to see the family as the main villain of the piece, and to seek to develop programs which attack directly this family pathology. Should we not have extensive programs of family therapy, family counseling, family-life education, and the like? Is this not the prerequisite to enabling slum Negro families to take advantage of other opportunities? Yet, how pale such efforts seem compared to the deep-seated problems of self-image and family process described above. Can an army of social workers undo the damage of three hundred years by talking and listening without massive changes in the social

and economic situations of the families with whom they are to deal? And, if such changes take place, will the social-worker army be needed?

If we are right that present Negro family patterns have been created as adaptations to a particular socioeconomic situation, it would make more sense to change that socioeconomic situation and then depend upon the people involved to make new adaptations as time goes on. If Negro providers have steady jobs and decent incomes, if Negro children have some realistic expectation of moving toward such a goal, if slum Negroes come to feel that they have the chance to affect their own futures and to receive respect from those around them, then (and only then) the destructive patterns described are likely to change. The change, though slow and uneven from individual to individual, will in a certain sense be automatic because it will represent an adaptation to changed socioeconomic circumstances which have direct and highly valued implications for the person.

It is possible to think of three kinds of extra-family change that are required if family patterns are to change; these are outlined below as pairs of current deprivations and needed remedies:

<i>Deprivation effect of caste victimization</i>	<i>Needed remedy</i>
I. Poverty	Employment income for men; income maintenance for mothers
II. Trained incapacity to function in a bureaucratized and industrialized world	Meaningful education of the next generation
III. Powerlessness and stigmatization	Organizational participation for aggressive pursuit of Negroes' self-interest
	Strong sanctions against callous or indifferent service to slum Negroes
	Pride in group identity, Negro and American

Unless the major effort is to provide these kinds of remedies, there is a very real danger that programs to "better the structure of the Negro family" by direct intervention will serve the unintended functions of distracting the country from the pressing needs for socioeconomic reform and providing an alibi for the failure to embark

on the basic institutional changes that are needed to do anything about abolishing both white and Negro poverty. It would be sad, indeed, if, after the Negro revolt brought to national prominence the continuing problem of poverty, our expertise about Negro slum culture served to deflect the national impulse into symptom-treatment rather than basic reform. If that happens, social scientists will have served those they study poorly indeed.

Let us consider each of the needed remedies in terms of its probable impact on the family. First, the problem of poverty: employed men are less likely to leave their families than are unemployed men, and when they do stay they are more likely to have the respect of their wives and children. A program whose sole effect would be to employ at reasonable wages slum men for work using the skills they now have would do more than any other possible program to stabilize slum family life. But the wages must be high enough to enable the man to maintain his self-respect as a provider, and stable enough to make it worthwhile to change the nature of his adaptation to his world (no one-year emergency programs will do). Once men learn that work pays off it would be possible to recruit men for part-time retraining for more highly skilled jobs, but the initial emphasis must be on the provision of full-time, permanent unskilled jobs. Obviously it will be easier to do this in the context of full employment and a tight labor market.⁴⁰

For at least a generation, however, there will continue to be a large number of female-headed households. Given the demands of socializing a new generation for non-slum living, it is probably uneconomical to encourage mothers to work. Rather, income maintenance programs must be increased to realistic levels, and mothers must be recognized as doing socially useful work for which they are paid rather than as "feeding at the public trough." The bureaucratic morass which currently hampers flexible strategies of combining employment income and welfare payments to make ends meet must also be modified if young workers are not to be pushed prematurely out of the home.

Education has the second priority. (It is second only because without stable family income arrangements the school system must work against the tremendous resistance of competing life-style adaptations to poverty and economic insecurity.) As Kenneth Clark has argued so effectively, slum schools now function more to stultify and discourage slum children than to stimulate and train them. The capacity of educators to alibi their lack of commitment to their

charges is protean. The making of a different kind of generation must be taken by educators as a stimulating and worthwhile challenge. Once the goal has been accepted they must be given the resources with which to achieve it and the flexibility necessary to experiment with different approaches to accomplish the goal. Education must be broadly conceived to include much more than classroom work, and probably more than a nine-months schedule.⁴¹

If slum children can come to see the schools as representing a really likely avenue of escape from their difficult situation (even before adolescence they know it is the only *possible* escape) then their commitment to school activities will feed back into their families in a positive way. The parents will feel proud rather than ashamed, and they will feel less need to damn the child as a way to avoid blaming themselves for his failure. The sense of positive family identity will be enriched as the child becomes an attractive object, an ego resource, to his parents. Because he himself feels more competent, he will see them as less depriving and weak. If children's greater commitment to school begins to reduce their involvement in destructive or aimless peer-group activities this too will repercuss positively on the family situation since parents will worry less about their children's involvement in an immoral outside world, and be less inclined to deal with them in harsh, rejecting, or indifferent ways.

Cross-cutting the deprivations of poverty and trained incapacity is the fact of powerlessness and stigmatization. Slum people know that they have little ability to protect themselves and to force recognition of their abstract rights. They know that they are looked down on and scape-goated. They are always vulnerable to the slights, insults, and indifference of the white and Negro functionaries with whom they deal—policemen, social workers, school teachers, landlords, employers, retailers, janitors. To come into contact with others carries the constant danger of moral attack and insult.⁴² If processes of status degradation within families are to be interrupted, then they must be interrupted on the outside first.

One way out of the situation of impotence and dammed-up in-group aggression is the organization of meaningful protest against the larger society. Such protest can and will take many forms, not always so neat and rational as the outsider might hope. But, coupled with, and supporting, current programs of economic and educational change, involvement of slum Negroes in organizational activity can do a great deal to build a sense of pride and

potency. While only a very small minority of slum Negroes can be expected to participate personally in such movements, the vicarious involvement of the majority can have important effects on their sense of self-respect and worth.

Some of the needed changes probably can be made from the top, by decision in Washington, with minimal effective organization within the slum; but others can come only in response to aggressive pressure on the part of the victims themselves. This is probably particularly true of the entrenched tendency of service personnel to enhance their own sense of self and to indulge their middle-class *ressentiment* by stigmatizing and exploiting those they serve. Only effective protest can change endemic patterns of police harassment and brutality, or teachers' indifference and insults, or butchers' heavy thumbs, or indifferent street cleaning and garbage disposal. And the goal of the protest must be to make this kind of insult to the humanity of the slum-dweller too expensive for the perpetrator to afford; it must cost him election defeats, suspensions without pay, job dismissals, license revocations, fines, and the like.

To the extent that the slum dweller avoids stigmatization in the outside world, he will feel more fully a person within the family and better able to function constructively within it since he will not be tempted to make up deficits in self-esteem in ways that are destructive of family solidarity. The "me" of personal identity and the multiple "we" of family, Negro, and American identity are all inextricably linked; a healthier experience of identity in any one sector will repercuss on all the others.

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1. This paper is based in part on research supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Mental Health, Grant No. MH-09189, "Social and Community Problems in Public Housing Areas." Many of the ideas presented stem from discussion with the senior members of the Pruitt-Igoe research staff—Alvin W. Gouldner, David J. Pittman, and Jules Henry—and with the research associates and assistants on the project. I have made particular use of ideas developed in discussions with Boone Hammond, Joyce Ladner, Robert Simpson, David Schulz, and William Yancey. I also wish to acknowledge helpful suggestions and criticisms by Catherine Chilman, Gerald Handel, and Marc J. Swartz. Although this paper is not a formal report of the Pruitt-Igoe research, all of the illustrations of family behavior given in the text are drawn from interviews and observations that are part of that study. The study deals with the residents of the Pruitt-Igoe housing projects in St. Louis. Some 10,000 people live in these

projects which comprise forty-three eleven-story buildings near the downtown area of St. Louis. Over half of the households have female heads, and for over half of the households the principal income comes from public assistance of one kind or another. The research has been in the field for a little over two years. It is a broad community study which thus far has relied principally on methods of participant observation and open-ended interviewing. Data on families come from repeated interviews and observations with a small group of families. The field workers are identified as graduate students at Washington University who have no connection with the housing authority or other officials, but are simply interested in learning about how families in the project live. This very intensive study of families yields a wealth of information (over 10,000 pages of interview and observation reports) which obviously cannot be analyzed within the limits of one article. In this article I have limited myself to outlining a typical family stage sequence and discussing some of the psychosocial implications of growing up in families characterized by this sequence. In addition, I have tried to limit myself to findings which other literature on Negro family life suggests are not limited to the residents of the housing projects we are studying.

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PAUL B. SHEATSLEY

White Attitudes Toward the Negro

ANY ATTEMPT to describe white attitudes toward Negroes in the 1870's or the 1890's, or immediately before or after World War I, must necessarily rely on impressionistic or anecdotal evidence, or on secondary studies of contemporary newspapers, letters, diaries, and similar materials. Only since the advent of public opinion research in the mid-nineteen thirties has it been possible to address a series of standard questions to representative samples of the general population by means of personal interviews, and to cross-tabulate the results by such factors as age, sex, race, and geographical region.

It tells much about white attitudes toward the Negro that, during the seven years from 1935 to 1942, only four questions bearing even indirectly on the subject seem to have been asked by the national public opinion polls of that time.¹ Three of these questions, dealing with opinions about the "lynching bill" then before Congress in 1937, are practically irrelevant because the results simply show that most Americans thought people should not be lynched and the question itself said nothing about race. The fourth question was asked in 1939 and reveals that two-thirds of the American public approved of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt's resignation from the Daughters of the American Revolution in protest against the refusal of that organization to permit a "well-known Negro singer" to give a concert in a D.A.R. hall. The polls, for obvious reasons, tend to ask their questions about the issues that are hot, and it is clear that, during the decade preceding World War II, race relations did not qualify on this basis. Negroes had their place, and it was a rare American white who became exercised over this fact of life.

Today, of course, the situation is entirely different. Since mid-summer 1963, the question of race relations has been consistently

cited by Americans as "the most important problem facing the United States," except when it has been temporarily displaced by some international crisis such as Vietnam.² As in 1935-42, public opinion polls have responded to the times, but today they are doing so by asking every question they can think of which will reveal more clearly the white American's response to the Negro protest movement. The results of these polls are widely publicized, but quite often are contradictory and confusing. A recent Gallup report, for example, tells us that "Today, white Americans seem more sympathetic to Negro rights than they have ever been";³ a recent Harris report, on the other hand, warns that "At least for now, the dominant mood of white America is to put a brake on the pace of civil rights progress."⁴ Actually, surveys such as these tell us much more than the quotations suggest, and one poll does not differ from others so much as it differs from itself, depending upon the questions asked. Hardly any white Americans have attitudes toward Negroes which are clearly thought out and rigidly maintained; and even those who do may have sudden qualms when they read about racial murders in the South or Negro violence on Northern streets. The problem is one of interpreting what the polls and surveys tell us so we can understand what it all means.


Proper interpretation of survey data requires some baseline or norm against which a particular finding can be evaluated. While it is of interest to know, for instance, that "eight in ten white Americans said they would not move" if a Negro family moved next door, or that 41 per cent feel that the pace of civil rights progress is too fast,⁵ the numbers have little meaning unless we can anchor them somehow. One means of anchoring is to compare findings over the course of time. The figures take on added significance if we can determine whether they are increasing or decreasing in response to events. A second means is to compare subgroup differences (for example, North *vs.* South, the well-educated *vs.* those with little formal education) against the national norm. We propose to examine past and current survey findings with a view to clarifying and interpreting their meaning. In the course of this examination we shall rely mainly, though not exclusively, on data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The NORC data are particularly suitable for two reasons. First, the earliest national survey of white attitudes toward Negroes was conducted by NORC on behalf of the Office of War Information in 1942, and a number of the same questions have been periodically repeated in subsequent

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surveys. Second, in December 1963, NORC devoted an entire interview schedule to questions on race relations, administered to a national sample of white Americans. The possibilities of fruitful analysis of such a study are more promising than the examination of scattered poll results from a great number of separate surveys.

Twenty-Year Trends on School Integration⁶

Chart I shows for each of three years—1942, 1956, and 1963—



(This is an adaptation of a chart which appeared in an article by H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, Vol. 211, July 1964).

the proportion of American whites who expressed approval of integration when asked the question, "Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?"⁷ The most striking message of the chart is the revolutionary change in white attitudes, both North and South,⁸ which has taken place on this explosive issue in less than a generation. In 1942, not one American white in three approved of integrated schools. Even in the North, majority sentiment was strongly opposed, while in the South only two whites in one hundred could be found to support the proposition. By 1956, two years after the historic Supreme Court decision which abolished the "separate but equal" doctrine, white attitudes had shifted markedly. Nationwide, support for inte-

gration was now characteristic of about half the white population, while in the North it had clearly become the majority view. In the South, where only one white person in fifty had favored integration fourteen years earlier, the proportion by 1956 had risen to approximately one in seven.

The continuation of the trend from 1956 to 1963 is especially noteworthy, since the years between were marked by agitation and occasional violence which might easily have led one to suspect a reversal of attitudes and a white revulsion against integration. Desegregation of Southern schools in accordance with the Supreme Court decision had sparked physical conflict not only in Little Rock in 1957 but in dozens of smaller communities during these years. The start of the "sit-in" movement in 1960, the freedom rides of 1961, the Oxford riots of 1962 might well have hardened white attitudes and halted the trend toward acceptance of integration. But repetition of the same question to three different national samples in 1963 showed that this massive trend was still intact. By that year, almost two-thirds of all American whites expressed approval of integrated schools; among white persons in the North, the proportion was close to three in four. And in the South, which was then bearing the brunt of the Negro protest movement, sentiment for integration had climbed even faster, so that almost a third of all white Southerners agreed that white students and Negro students should attend the same schools.

The strength of the long-term trend was further attested by its immunity to short-run events. In both 1956 and 1963, it was possible to ask the question on three separate surveys at different times of the year, and it is evident that all three surveys in each year produced essentially identical results.⁹ One would not necessarily have expected such short-term stability. Though largely forgotten now, there appeared between the June and September 1956 surveys the first banner headlines of racial conflict as the long slow task of Southern school desegregation began in Clay, Kentucky, Clinton, Tennessee, and other small towns in border states across the country. Between June and November 1963, there occurred the march on Washington and the September school openings, while between the November and December surveys there intervened the shocking assassination of President Kennedy in a Southern metropolis. But even so dramatic an event, with all its implications for the civil rights movement, failed to disturb, in either North or South, the attitudes which had been expressed a month earlier.

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The figures shown on the chart for the South represent, of course, a geographical composite of Deep South states like Mississippi and Alabama, border states such as West Virginia and Kentucky, and southwestern states such as Arkansas and Oklahoma. We shall indicate certain regional differences later. It is possible, however, to sort the Southern respondents to the 1963 surveys into three groups, according to the amount of school integration in their communities. When this is done, it is found that a solid majority of Southern whites (58 per cent), in those few places where there had been (as of 1963) considerable integration of schools, declared that they approved of school integration. In Southern communities which had accepted only some token desegregation, 38 per cent approved; while in the hard-core segregationist communities, only 28 per cent were in favor of integration. Though the sample sizes are small, particularly in the desegregated areas, the correlation is clear: Where integration exists in the South, more whites support it.¹⁰

It is dangerous to try to unravel cause and effect from mere statistical correlation, yet a close analysis of the data indicates that official action to desegregate Southern schools did not wait for majority opinion to demand it, but rather preceded a change in community attitudes. In the 1956 surveys, only 31 per cent of Southern whites in those few areas which had begun at least token desegregation expressed approval of integrated schools. Clearly there was no public demand for integration in those areas then. Furthermore, by 1963 the integrated areas included not only those communities which had pioneered in integration in 1956, but also many additional communities where anti-integration sentiment had in 1956 been even stronger. Yet by 1963 the majority of Southern whites in such communities had accepted the integration of their schools. It may be noted that even in the most segregationist parts of the South, approval of integration has continued to climb. In 1956, only 4 per cent of Southern whites residing in segregated school areas approved of integration, but by 1963 the proportion in communities which had not by then introduced even token integration—the essential “hard-core” areas—had nevertheless risen to 28 per cent.

Trends on Other Racial Issues

School integration is one of the most basic and explosive of the civil rights issues, and it has provided perhaps the most apt illustration of the dramatic shift in white attitudes over the past two

decades. Additional evidence from the same surveys is available, however, to show that the increasing accommodation of whites to equal rights has not been restricted to the schools, but extends to other spheres as well. Table 1 shows the trends in attitudes with re-

TABLE 1. Per Cent Who Approve Residential and Public Transportation Integration in 1942, 1956, June and December, 1963

<i>Approval of ...</i>	<i>Surveys in</i>			
	<i>1942</i>	<i>1956</i>	<i>June 1963</i>	<i>Dec. 1963</i>
<i>Residential Integration</i>				
National white total	35	51	61	64
Northern whites only	42	58	68	70
Southern whites only	12	38	44	51
<i>Public Transportation Integration</i>				
National white total	44	60	79	78
Northern whites only	57	73	89	88
Southern whites only	4	27	52	51

spect to residential integration and the integration of public transportation. The three later surveys used exactly the same questions that were employed in 1942. These were: "If a Negro with the same income and education as you have moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?"¹¹ and "Generally speaking, do you think there should be separate sections for Negroes on streetcars and buses?" Nationwide, in 1942 only 35 per cent of American whites would not have objected to a Negro neighbor of their own social class; by 1963 almost two out of three would accept such a neighbor. Nationwide, in 1942 fewer than half of all American whites approved of integrated transportation facilities; by 1963 almost four out of five had adopted this view. The changes are especially dramatic among Southern whites, for in 1942 only one out of eight of them would have accepted a Negro neighbor and but one in twenty-five the idea of sharing transportation facilities on an integrated basis. By the end of 1963, both forms of integration had achieved majority approval.

Though not shown in the data thus far presented, it should be noted that throughout this twenty-one-year period the proportion of persons having "No opinion" on any of these questions rarely exceeded 3 or 4 per cent. This finding is in sharp contrast to the

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public's answers on most other national issues, where it is common to find upwards of 10 per cent expressing ignorance or indecision. The fact that almost everybody has been aware of the civil rights issue and has had an opinion on it during all this time has implications for the significance of the trends we have observed. There have been no masses of apathetic or undecided people, swayed this way and that by events, and drifting from segregationist to doubtful, from doubtful to integrationist, and perhaps back again. Rather, support for civil rights today comes from a younger generation that, during the last two decades, has come of age and has replaced an older, more segregationist generation in our population; and from former segregationists whose senses and consciences have been touched by the Negro protest, or who have simply changed their opinions as segregation appears increasingly to be a lost cause.

On four occasions, starting in July 1957, the Gallup Poll has asked the question: "Do you think the day will ever come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools, eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations?" In 1957 and 1958, only a small majority of white people answered "Yes" to that question; in 1961, the proportion had grown to three-fourths, and by 1963, to five-sixths. Conversely, the proportion who answered "No" (or "Never") had dropped by 1963 to 13 per cent. As the Civil Rights Act of 1964 hastens the day when whites and Negroes actually are sharing the same restaurants and public accommodations and as the pace of Southern school desegregation quickens, it is difficult to foresee any reversal in the massive trends we have shown.

An important shift in white beliefs on one further issue helps explain the trends we have observed and underlines the solid base on which they rest. In 1942, a national sample of whites was asked, "In general, do you think that Negroes are as intelligent as white people—that is, can they learn things just as well if they are given the same education and training?" At that time only about half the Northern whites and one Southern white in five answered "Yes." Today, four-fifths of the white population in the North and a substantial majority in the South (57 per cent) believe that Negroes are as intelligent as white people. The implications of this revolutionary change in attitudes toward Negro educability are far-reaching. It has undermined one of the most stubborn arguments formerly offered by whites for segregated schools and has made the case for segregation much more difficult to defend.

Subgroup Differences in White Attitudes Toward the Negro

THE NORC survey of December 1963 asked a national sample of white persons a broad range of questions designed to measure their attitudes toward Negroes and toward the civil rights movement. From this range of questions it was possible to form a Guttman scale of pro-integration attitudes based upon the eight items shown in Table 2.¹² The properties of a Guttman scale are such that if a

TABLE 2. Guttman Scale of Pro-Integration Sentiments

<i>Item</i>	<i>Per Cent Giving Pro-Integration Response (December 1963)</i>
1. "Do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?" ("As good a chance.")	82
2. "Generally speaking, do you think there should be separate sections for Negroes in street cars and buses?" ("No.")	77
3. "Do you think Negroes should have the right to use the same parks, restaurants and hotels as white people?" ("Yes.")	71
4. "Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools, or to separate schools?" ("Same schools.")	63
5. "How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner?" ("Not at all.")	49
6. "White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes should respect that right." ("Disagree slightly" or "Disagree strongly.")	44
7. "Do you think there should be laws against marriages between Negroes and whites?" ("No.")	36
8. "Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted." ("Disagree slightly" or "Disagree strongly.")	27

person rejects one item on the scale, the chances are at least nine in ten that he will also reject all items below it. Thus, those who reject the top item—equal job rights for Negroes—are highly unlikely to endorse any of the other items on the scale and may be considered extreme segregationists. At the other end of the scale, the 27 per cent

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who disagree with the proposition that "Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted" are extremely likely to take a pro-integrationist position on all seven of the other items.

It may be seen that each of the top four items—equal job rights and integration of transportation facilities, public accommodations, and schools—has the support of at least 63 per cent of the white population. (It helps in interpreting the magnitude of public opinion poll percentages to remember that Lyndon Johnson polled only 62 per cent of the popular vote in his "landslide" election over Barry Goldwater. Americans are seldom unanimous about anything, and majorities as high as 80 per cent on any serious issue are extremely rare.) Opinions are more evenly divided on social mixing and residential integration (Items 5 and 6), while the great majority of whites take a firm stand against racial intermarriage and aggressive integrationist activity (Items 7 and 8).¹³

The Pro-Integration Scale provides a convenient measure of integrationist sentiment, since it is possible to assign each individual in the survey a score ranging from 0 to 8, depending upon the number of pro-integration responses he gave. From there it is a small step to compute mean (average) scores for various population groups to determine the locus of pro- and anti-civil rights attitudes. A simple calculation reveals that the mean score for all white Americans is 4.29, which indicates that the average white person accepts the first four propositions and would dislike but would not totally reject the idea of a family member bringing a Negro friend home to dinner. Table 3 shows the distribution of the mean scores among the more relevant subgroups of the white population.

Not surprisingly, the greatest differences are regional. The differences between Northern whites and Southern whites, even when such factors as age, sex, and educational level are controlled, are almost always greater than the differences between various population groups within the same region. Northern whites *in toto*, for example, have a scale score of 4.97. (The average white Northerner endorses integrated schools and would scarcely object if a Negro guest were brought home to dinner.) Southern whites, in contrast, show a scale score of 2.54. (The average white Southerner accepts equal job opportunities and integrated transportation facilities, but he is doubtful about parks, restaurants, and hotels, and he still draws the line at school integration.) But within the two broad geographical regions, interesting differences are nevertheless observable. (See Table 3-A.) In the North, pro-

TABLE 3. Mean Scores on Pro-Integration Scale
(White Population, U.S.A., December 1963)

	North	South		North	South
TOTAL.....	4.97	2.54			
A. <i>By Region:</i>			F. <i>By Age Group:</i>		
New England.....	5.03	—	Under 25.....	5.70	2.76
Middle Atlantic.....	5.47	—	25-44.....	5.34	2.86
East North Central..	4.61	—	45-64.....	4.71	2.33
West North Central..	4.37	—	65-up.....	4.07	2.10
South Atlantic.....	—	2.53			
East South Central..	—	1.89	G. <i>By Religion:</i>		
West South Central..	—	2.70	Protestant.....	4.75	2.38
Mountain.....	4.33	—	Catholic.....	5.18	3.41
Pacific.....	5.43	—	Jewish.....	6.44	a
B. <i>By Population Size:</i>			H. <i>By Strength</i>		
10 largest M.A.'s....	5.33	a	<i>of Religious Belief:</i>		
All other M.A.'s....	4.97	2.65	Very strong.....	5.00	2.34
Urban counties.....	5.04	1.36	Strong.....	5.15	2.86
Rural counties.....	4.23	2.70	Moderate.....	4.87	2.53
C. <i>By Number of Negroes</i>			Not strong.....	4.30	2.37
<i>in Public Schools:</i>					
No Negroes.....	4.62	2.29	I. <i>By Educational Level:</i>		
A few Negroes.....	5.01	2.80	8 years or less.....	3.88	1.70
Considerable number.	5.49	a	9-12 years (H.S.):....	5.01	2.71
D. <i>By Prior Residence:</i>			Attended college.....	5.96	3.54
Formerly lived in			J. <i>By Family Income:</i>		
South.....	4.80	—	Under \$5,000.....	4.36	2.20
Never lived in			\$5,000-7,499.....	5.24	2.75
South.....	5.05	—	\$7,500-9,999.....	5.26	2.78
Formerly lived in			\$10,000 or over.....	5.56	3.41
North.....	—	3.22			
Never lived in			K. <i>By Occupation:</i>		
North.....	—	1.97	Professional.....	6.08	4.32
E. <i>By Sex:</i>			Proprietors, managers..	5.09	2.79
Male.....	4.91	2.57	Clerical, sales.....	4.96	2.98
Female.....	5.03	2.51	Skilled.....	4.90	2.04
			Semi-skilled.....	4.77	1.63
			Unskilled.....	4.73	1.82
			Farm.....	3.86	2.87

* Insufficient cases to justify reliable answers.

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integration sentiment is strongest on the East and West coasts, weakest in the Midwest. Specifically, the highest scores are found in the Middle Atlantic region (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) and in the three Pacific states. New England is somewhat lower, but still higher than the East North Central area (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin), which in turn is higher than the less urbanized states of the plains area comprising the West North Central region, and the Mountain region. Geographical variation appears also in the South, where Southwestern states (Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma) have the highest pro-integration score, closely followed by the South Atlantic region (stretching from Delaware and Maryland through Virginia and the Carolinas to Georgia and Florida). Lowest of all is the East South Central region, which includes Kentucky and Tennessee, but also Mississippi and Alabama. Yet even in the latter region (where many whites score "0" on the scale), the average white person has just about accepted two of the eight pro-integration statements.

As of December 1963, the highest scale scores were found in the ten largest metropolitan areas, all but one of which (Washington, D. C.) are in the North (3-B). However, the date of the survey preceded the summer riots in some of these Northern cities in 1964 and the increased protests against job discrimination and *de facto* school segregation that have occurred in New York, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, and other Northern metropolises during the last year or two. Whether and to what extent these more recent events may have increased or reduced pro-integrationist attitudes in the large Northern cities is not known. It will be noted that, in both North and South, the more Negroes are integrated into the public schools, the higher the scores on the Pro-Integration Scale (3-C). There are too few Southern respondents living in areas where the schools are "considerably" integrated to justify presentation of the figure, but it is still higher than that for areas in which only a "few Negroes" attend the schools. The general finding confirms our earlier analysis of the trend data.

Turning from community variables, such as region, population size, and degree of school integration, to individual characteristics, perhaps one of the most significant findings is that shown in Part D of the table. Northerners who formerly lived in the South (and these may be either Southern migrants or Northerners who spent some time in the South) are only slightly less pro-integrationist than their neighbors who have never been exposed to Southern life. In

contrast, Southerners who have previously resided in the North differ greatly from their co-regionalists who have known nothing but Southern life. The net effect of migration from one of the regions to the other seems to be a strengthening of the cause of integration. Ex-Southerners who move to the North appear generally to conform to Northern attitudes, while ex-Northerners who move to the South (and Southerners who have been temporarily exposed to Northern living) tend to reject the more extreme segregationist views of the life-long Southerner.

Men and women differ little in their scores on this Pro-Integration Scale, but age differences are more marked and are of considerable interest (3-E,F). In both North and South, the older age groups are clearly the more segregationist. The forty-five to sixty-four group has lower scores than the twenty-five to forty-four, while those sixty-five or older have the lowest scores of all. The same finding was observed in the 1956 NORC studies, and suggests that part of the long-term trend in white attitudes is due to the passing of an elderly less tolerant generation and their replacement in the population by younger adults who are more likely to accept racial integration. But we note a singular inversion of the relationship between age and pro-integration sentiment among the two youngest age groups in the South. Unexpectedly, the very youngest Southern adults (aged twenty-one to twenty-four) have lower Pro-Integration Scale scores than the twenty-five to forty-four year old group. The same result occurred in the June 1963 survey but not in the 1956 studies. We have suggested elsewhere¹⁴ that the current group of young white adults in the South have grown up and received their schooling and formed their attitudes during the stormy years which followed the 1954 Supreme Court decision outlawing segregated schools. It is they who have been most immediately exposed to the crises and dislocations brought to the South by the Negro protest movement. Perhaps the surprise is that these Southern white youths today are nonetheless more pro-integrationist than are their parents and grandparents who are over the age of forty-five.

Among Northern whites, Catholics are slightly more integrationist than Protestants, and Jews much more so (3-G). In the South, Catholics are among the most liberal of all the groups shown in the table, scoring well above the Southern norm. All persons interviewed were asked not only their religious preference, but also "How strongly do you feel about your religious beliefs?" The respective scale scores are shown in Part H of Table 3. The pattern,

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clearly in the South and to some extent in the North, is for the middle groups ("strongly" and "moderately") to have the higher Pro-Integration scores, while both extreme groups are lower. One might speculate that persons who feel strongly or even moderately about their religious beliefs are more likely to see all men as equal in the sight of God and to regard segregation (or at least some aspects of segregation) as immoral, while those who hold only nominal religious beliefs or none at all might lack this moral imperative. The fact that those who are "very strongly" religious score lower than expected on the scale, and especially low in the South, suggests that such persons may derive support for their segregationist views from certain passages of the Bible often quoted by fundamentalist preachers.

Occupation, educational level, and family income are highly intercorrelated and are often combined to provide a single measure of socioeconomic status. Presented independently, as they are in Table 3 (I,J,K), they all point in the same direction, with quite remarkable consistency. The inescapable conclusion is that the higher a person's socioeconomic status, as measured by these three characteristics, the higher his score on the Pro-Integration Scale. The differences by educational level are remarkably strong and have been duplicated in all earlier NORC studies. Education is correlated with age, of course, so that much of the differences by age which we noted earlier simply reflects the higher educational level attained by younger adults, as compared with their parents and grandparents. This is not to say that education, or any other single factor, is all-important. It may be observed that the Southern white who attended college nevertheless has a lower scale score than the Northern white with eight years of schooling or less. Yet, as higher proportions of the nation's youth go on to college, as higher proportions enter white-collar and professional rather than farm or production employment, and as (and if) family income levels continue to rise, we may reasonably expect the long-term trend in white attitudes toward acceptance of racial integration not only to continue but even to accelerate.

Views of the Civil Rights Movement

We have described the changing attitudes of white Americans over a twenty-year period and have examined what might be called the epidemiology of anti-Negro prejudice as it existed at the end

of 1963. We have seen which subgroups of white persons manifest the greatest support for and the greatest resistance to integration. We have also indicated, by means of the Pro-Integration Scale, some of the components of these attitudes—the forms of Negro equality which are acceptable to various groups of whites and the kinds at which they draw the line. As stated earlier, however, the Pro-Integration Scale utilized only eight of a much larger number of questions about Negro-white relations. It will be instructive now to observe how Northern whites and Southern whites and persons of varying degrees of prejudice regard the Negro protest movement in general as well as in some of its ramifications. The first two columns of Table 4 compare the opinions of Northern whites and Southern whites, without regard to their Pro-Integration Scale scores. The next four columns compare the opinions of four groups, ranging in scale scores from High Segregationist to High Integrationist, without regard to their place of residence.

We see first (Table 4-A) that the main goals of the civil rights movement are similarly perceived by all white Americans—North and South, integrationist and segregationist. Three-quarters or more of all of these groups believe that most Negroes feel strongly about equal job opportunities and the right to vote. It is probably no coincidence that job equality and the vote are the very things which a representative sample of Negroes themselves have said are “most important to work for,” and are also the Negro demands which white Americans are most willing to accept.¹⁵ Almost as many whites, in December 1963, perceived that Negroes feel strongly about equal access to parks, hotels, restaurants, and other public accommodations. The right to send their children to white schools was believed to be very important to Negroes by the majority of Northern whites, but by only about a third of the Southerners. Similarly, more Northern than Southern whites believe Negroes feel strongly about residential integration. These differences probably reflect the actualities of the civil rights struggle in the two regions. In many cities throughout the North, Negroes have made plain their demands for better housing and an end to *de facto* school segregation, while demonstrations in the South have focused more often on voting rights, employment, and public accommodations. Recognition of what it is that the Negro wants is distorted remarkably little by the white person's own attitudes toward integration. The overwhelming majority of even the most highly segregationist group do not deny that the Negro feels strongly about job

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TABLE 4. White Attitudes Toward Negro Protest Movement in North and South, and by Scores on Pro-Integration Scale, December 1963

		Pro-Integration Scale Scores					
		North	South	0-2 (High Seg.)	3-4 (Mod. Seg.)	5-6 (Mod. Int.)	7-8 (High Int.)
Per Cent Who Say:							
A. Most Negroes feel strongly about							
The right to vote.....	80%	77%	79%	76%	84%	79%	
Right to hold same jobs as white people.....	84	81	76	84	85	89	
Right to use same parks, hotels, restaurants.....	84	80	67	82	83	90	
Right to send children to same schools as whites.....	63	35	45	51	59	66	
Right to live in white neighborhoods.....	45	33	42	39	42	44	
Right to marry white people.	10	8	13	9	7	10	
Having a separate area of U. S. set aside for Negroes.....	5	3	7	6	4	2	
B. The Negro protest movement has been generally violent rather than peaceful.....							
	47%	63%	78%	50%	47%	30%	
C. Demonstrations have hurt rather than helped the Negro cause....							
	43%	60%	71%	52%	45%	24%	
D. Generally disapprove of actions Negroes have taken to obtain civil rights.....							
	59%	78%	89%	73%	62%	33%	
E. Negro groups are asking for too much.....							
	37%	55%	74%	45%	31%	16%	
F. "Others" are really behind the Negro protest movement.....							
	39%	52%	56%	46%	43%	24%	
Communists are behind it.....							
	21	27	30	26	22	12	
G. Problem of Negro rights should be left to states rather than federal government.....							
	34%	59%	57%	45%	36%	24%	
H. Negro-white relations will always be a problem for U. S.....							
	42%	49%	61%	52%	36%	26%	
*I. Self or family have been affected favorably by integration.....							
	4%	1%	—%	2%	4%	7%	
Have been affected unfavorably							
	9	11	16	14	4	3	
Have not been affected.....							
	87	83	82	83	91	87	
J. Are around Negroes:							
Almost every day.....	29%	39%	33%	28%	31%	35%	
Less often than that.....	45	52	45	47	46	51	
Never around Negroes.....	26	9	22	25	23	14	

* Percentages do not always add to 100 per cent. Omitted are a small group who answered vaguely or irrelevantly.

equality and the right to vote; nor, as the percentage figures indicate, do they delude themselves that Negroes feel strongly about their right to marry white people or that they really want to have their own separate state.

The items shown on Lines B-F of Table 4, on the other hand, all refer to Negro actions in the civil rights struggle, rather than to Negro goals, and here we find sharp cleavages between North and South and between persons with low and high Pro-Integration scores. The majority of Southern whites, and even larger proportions of the highly segregationist group, perceive the Negro protest movement as having been generally violent rather than generally peaceful; they think that demonstrations and other direct action by Negroes have hurt their cause rather than helped it; they themselves disapprove of "the actions Negroes have taken to get the things they want"; they say Negroes are asking for "too much," rather than "too little" or "just about what they should"; and they believe that, not the Negro people, but "some other person or group" is "really behind the recent Negro actions." A substantial majority of Northern whites also say they generally disapprove of Negro actions in the struggle, but on none of the other of these items (B-F) can a majority be mustered in the North. Persons who score high on the Pro-Integration Scale are even more sympathetic to the Negro protest movement and overwhelmingly reject all of these opinions. Differences are also found on Lines G-H, which reflect a larger view of Negro-white relations. Segregationists, for example, tend to believe that "the question of Negro rights is more a problem that individual states should solve," and Southerners, whatever their attitudes toward integration, are even more likely to hold this view. The great majority of integrationists and of Northerners, on the other hand, see Negro rights as "a problem that the federal government should solve." Similarly, segregationists are much more pessimistic about the future, the majority of them believing that "Negro-white relations will always be a problem for the United States"; but the great majority of integrationists believe that "a solution will eventually be worked out."

Part I of Table 4 is of considerable interest and importance. The percentages are based on replies to the open-ended question, "In what ways have you or any members of your family been affected by integration?" The question came toward the end of the interview, after extended discussion of the civil rights movement, and interviewers were instructed to probe for any ways at all in which the

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respondent or any members of his family had been personally affected. Somewhat surprisingly, 86 per cent of American whites said they had not been affected at all, and the proportion differed very little from North to South, or according to attitudes toward integration. As shown on Line J, large numbers of American whites have had little or no exposure to the opposite race; one-fourth of Northern whites say they are "never around Negroes" and only 29 per cent are around them almost every day. On the other hand, it was clear from the verbatim replies that a substantial proportion of the unaffected had actually experienced integration and accepted it quite casually: "No, I just go my way and they don't bother me." "Not at all. My boy goes to school with them but he never mentions any problems." "None, my husband works with some colored fellows and they get along fine." About one white person in ten said he had been affected unfavorably by integration. The behavior of Negro children in school, an influx of Negroes into the neighborhood, or unpleasant contacts with Negroes in public places were each mentioned by 2 or 3 per cent of the white public. Only 1 per cent referred to unfavorable effects of job integration. Three per cent of all whites reported favorable effects of integration, explaining that the Negroes had not turned out to be so bad after all or that they enjoyed excellent relations. The ratio of unfavorable to favorable effects was 11-to-1 in the South, but only 2.5-to-1 in the North. Among those with pro-integrationist attitudes, favorable effects were mentioned more often than unfavorable

Since December 1963

We are aware that many readers will question the relevance of public opinion poll findings from December 1963 to the situation today. After all, the year 1964 alone saw the nomination of Barry Goldwater, the Presidential election campaign, general elections in every state, Congressional passage of a comprehensive Civil Rights Act, Negro rioting in several Northern cities, the murder of three civil rights workers in Mississippi—to mention only some of the most striking events which might have affected the attitudes we have described. And the pace of the civil rights movement in 1965 has shown no signs of slackening. We urge such readers, however, to regain their perspective by looking again at the twenty-year trend shown in Chart 1, and especially at the absence of short-run change over the three separate surveys conducted in 1956 and

1963, when racial tensions were also high. It cannot be doubted that people do respond to short-run events and often have very strong opinions about them. But all the evidence we know of indicates that attitudes toward the basic issues included in the Pro-Integration Scale—such as school and residential integration, social mixing, the use by Negroes of public accommodations—are not subject to sudden and dramatic shifts. If all the events in the months and years preceding December 1963 did not halt the rising trend toward acceptance of integration, it may be doubted that more recent events have produced any major change in the attitudes we have examined.

Indeed, the 1964 Presidential election itself provided a very important test of civil rights sentiment in the United States, for there, “in the privacy of the voting booth,” the widely heralded “white backlash” failed to materialize in the North, while President Johnson carried the South in spite of his forthright stand on civil rights for Negroes. The result could hardly be construed as other than a rejection by the American people of the views of those who would try to stem the progress of the Negro protest movement. Yet, both the Gallup Poll and the Harris Survey, during 1964 and 1965, reported seeming inconsistencies in the attitudes of the white public. Each has found, just as we saw in the 1963 NORC study, that whites generally disapprove of direct action by Negroes and would welcome relief from racial tensions. Thus, Harris reported (August 17, 1964) that “Fully 87 per cent of the American people feel that the recent riots in New York, Rochester and Jersey City have hurt the Negro cause,” and (May 17, 1965) that there existed an “. . . apparent uneasiness of the American people over the current pace of civil rights progress. Six months ago, the public tended to feel that steady and sound progress was being registered. After recent events, the number who feel things are moving ‘too fast’ has risen rather sharply.” (The increase was from 32 per cent in November to 41 per cent in May, shortly after the events in Selma, Alabama.) Only six days earlier (May 11, 1965) Gallup had also warned that “Criticism of integration speed has grown among Northern whites. . . . The number who believe the Johnson Administration is pushing integration ‘too fast’ has grown considerably over the last few weeks.” Gallup had also been reporting such results as (June 7, 1964) “Eight in ten say demonstrations more likely to hurt than to help Negro. . . . Opposition among both races has grown,” and (November 12, 1964) “Six in ten favor a gradual approach” to

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enforcement of the new Civil Rights Law rather than "strict enforcement right from the beginning." In that same release, Gallup reported that 73 per cent of his sample "think Negroes should stop demonstrating, now that they have made their point."

But both of these polling agencies have also reported a steady support for civil rights measures. Harris found a large and increasing majority for the 1964 Civil Rights bill between November 1963 and April 1964, with 70 per cent of the public favoring it by the latter date. Both polls reported public approval of the 1965 voting rights bill, though their figures differed considerably. Gallup (April 14, 1965) found 76 per cent in favor, Harris (May 10, 1965) only 53 per cent, the difference apparently tracing to a reference in the Harris question that "opponents feel this is an invasion of the rights of states to control their own elections." The Gallup question made no mention of states' rights. Gallup also found (March 19, 1965) that 56 per cent of the public believe that people who cannot read or write should nevertheless have the right to vote and that 63 per cent disagree with the proposition that only persons who have had at least five years of schooling should be allowed to vote.

Opportunity to apply a more rigorous test of the hypothesis that the long-term trends are still intact finally occurred in June 1965, when NORC was able to append a few of the 1942-1963 questions to a current national survey. It was not possible to ask all of the items included in the December 1963 survey, but the measures which were obtained strongly confirmed the inexorability of the trend. The proportion of white Americans who favor school integration rose from 62 per cent to 67 per cent during this eighteen-month period, and the proportion who would not object to a Negro neighbor of the same social class rose from 64 per cent to 68 per cent. Perhaps the most striking finding was that the increases were accounted for entirely by the South. While the figures for the North held steady or showed small and insignificant fluctuations, Southern attitudes were undergoing revolutionary change. The proportion of Southern whites who favor integrated schools almost doubled within this eighteen-month period, moving from 30 per cent at the end of 1963 to 55 per cent—a clear majority—in mid-1965. The proportion of Southern whites who would not object to a Negro neighbor rose from 51 per cent to 66 per cent during this same period. Again it was found that exposure to integration fosters pro-integrationist attitudes. Of Southern whites whose children had attended school with Negroes, 74 per cent said Negroes and whites

should attend the same schools; of Southern whites whose children had not attended school with Negroes, only 48 per cent held that view.

There will, of course, be those who now ask, "But what about Los Angeles? Surely that violence must have produced a white revulsion against civil rights"—but if the past is any guide, the answer can be predicted with considerable assurance. Certainly large majorities of American whites, and especially the dwindling ranks of segregationists, will say that the Los Angeles rioting has "hurt the Negro's cause," that "they have made their point," and that nothing is settled by violence, but not even Los Angeles will halt the massive attitudinal changes we have demonstrated over the last generation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the rioting in Watts took scarcely anyone by surprise. The June 1965 NORC survey asked, "As you probably recall, there were race riots in several Northern cities last summer. The way it looks now, do you expect that this summer there will be many race riots around the country, some, hardly any, or none at all?" Only 2 per cent said they expected no Negro rioting during the summer, and almost a quarter of the white population expected many riots. Thus, the unprecedentedly high level of support expressed for integration in this survey actually seems to have discounted Los Angeles in advance. With the full expectation of at least some riots in Northern cities, American whites nevertheless (or perhaps for that reason?) actually increased their support of integration.

A recent (but pre-Los Angeles) Gallup Poll release confirms the remarkable change in white Southern attitudes between 1963 and 1965. In May 1963, Gallup asked a representative sample of white parents, "Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are colored?" and 61 per cent of those in the South said, "Yes, I would object." When he repeated the same question two years later, the proportion of Southern parents who would object had dropped abruptly to 37 per cent. Similar, though less dramatic, changes were found in the attitudes of Northern parents. The millennium has scarcely arrived. Gallup went on to ask whether the parents would object to sending their children to a school where half, and then where more than half, of the children were colored. A majority of white parents in the North and almost four out of five of those in the South said they would object to the latter situation.

Certainly there is no evidence that the majority of American

White Attitudes Toward the Negro

whites eagerly look forward to integration. Most are more comfortable in a segregated society, and they would prefer that the demonstrators slow down or go away while things are worked out more gradually. But most of them know also that racial discrimination is morally wrong and recognize the legitimacy of the Negro protest. Our survey data persuasively argue that where there is little or no protest against segregation and discrimination, or where these have the sanction of law, racial attitudes conform to the existing situation. But when attention is kept focused on racial injustice and when acts of discrimination become contrary to the law of the land, racial attitudes change. Conversely, there is no persuasive evidence thus far that either demonstrations and other forms of direct action, or legal sanctions applied by government, create a backlash effect and foster segregationist sentiment. On the contrary, they may simply demonstrate, ever more conclusively, that it is more costly to oppose integration than to bring it about. The mass of white Americans have shown in many ways that they do not want a racist government and that they will not follow racist leaders. Rather, they are engaged in the painful task of adjusting to an integrated society. It will not be easy for most, but one cannot at this late date doubt the basic commitment. In their hearts they know that the American Negro is right.

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2. Gallup Poll releases, July 21, 1963, October 2, 1963, *et passim*. The question, "What do you regard as the most vital issue before the American people today?" was first asked in September 1935 (the answer was "Unemployment") and has been repeated by the Gallup Poll at regular intervals, with slight changes of wording, since that time. "Racial problems" was not mentioned frequently enough to receive a separate code until 1944-1945.
3. "America's Mood Today," *Look*, June 29, 1965.
4. Harris Survey news release, May 17, 1965.
5. *Look* and Harris survey, *op. cit.*

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7. The question was asked also in 1944 and 1946. Results for those years, while consistent with the trend, are not shown for reasons of space. Absence of financial support precluded asking the question on any other occasions, so we cannot conclude that the trend lines are uniformly smooth.
8. "South" refers to the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central regions, as defined by the Bureau of the Census. "North" refers to the rest of the country, except Alaska and Hawaii, where no interviews were conducted.
9. Sample sizes ranged from 1,250 to 1,500. The minor changes from one 1956 or 1963 survey to another are well within the range of normal sampling error.
10. The same holds true for the North. Northern whites living in segregated school areas were 65 per cent for integration, but in areas where there had been considerable integration, 83 per cent favored the policy.
11. In the 1956 and 1963 surveys, a special category was added for the response, "Yes, I would welcome it," and persons giving this reply were combined with the "No Difference" group.
12. We are indebted to Donald J. Treiman of the NORC staff for construction of this scale.
13. The latter item is admittedly loaded, since it is perfectly reasonable to take the position that nobody—white or Negro—should push himself where he isn't wanted. The item does have the advantage, however, of defining a minimum estimate of pro-integrationist sentiment in the country, since anyone who disagrees with it is hardly likely to be unsympathetic to any aspect of the civil rights movement.
14. *Scientific American*, *op. cit.*
15. Negro data from unpublished NORC survey, May 1963. In the survey under discussion, 79 per cent of the white public agreed that "It should be made easier than it is now for Negroes to vote in the South."

KENNETH B. CLARK

The Civil Rights Movement: Momentum and Organization

The History of the Civil Rights Movement

THE AMERICAN civil rights movement in its most important sense is as old as the introduction of human slavery in the New World. From the beginning, the essential conflict of the civil rights movement was inherent in the contradiction between the practical economic and status advantages associated with slavery and racial oppression, and the Judao-Christian ideals of love and brotherhood and their translation into the democratic ideology of equality and justice. The presence of African slaves visibly different in culture and color of skin intensified this conflict which demanded resolution.

One could read the early history of America as an attempt to resolve this conflict by combining both, that is, by continuing slavery while making grudging concessions to religious and democratic ideology. The decision to convert some of the African slaves to Christianity and to teach some to read could be interpreted as the first "victory" of the civil rights movement, but at the same time it paradoxically intensified the conflict. It would have been more consistent logically to leave the African slave heathen and ignorant if he were to be kept in slavery. Yet the economic demands of slavery required that the slaves be skilled, adaptable, and efficient. The fact that such skill could be developed was evidence of the humanity of the African and the beginning of the end of human slavery in a society committed to social and political democracy. The dynamics of the contemporary civil rights movement continues to reflect this same struggle between the desire to deny the Negro full and unqualified status as a human being and the unquestioned evidence that such denial cannot be based upon fact.

Signs of a civil rights renaissance in the North emerged in the

1940's when Negro resentment mounted against segregation in the armed services and discrimination in employment. A new period of overt and sustained protest had begun. In 1941, A. Philip Randolph threatened a march on Washington to force President Roosevelt to issue the first executive order compelling fair employment of Negroes. Testimony to the depth of the ambivalence of the American nation on civil rights was the fact that Roosevelt, himself generally considered one of the most liberal and far-seeing Presidents in American history, only reluctantly issued this order. His noted charm was brought into play in an attempt to persuade Randolph to compromise his demands. He appealed to Randolph's patriotism and his unwillingness to embarrass the nation at a time of dire emergency; only when all of these appeals failed did he accede to Randolph's demand. This conflict between Roosevelt and Randolph marked the beginning of a new militance and assertiveness on the part of the Northern Negro. It has been sustained ever since.

Since World War II, the Negro had succeeded in eliminating segregation in the armed forces, and, unsatisfied with less in peace than he had won in war, he gained a series of victories in the federal courts, culminating in the historic May 17, 1954 *Brown vs. Board of Education* decision of the United States Supreme Court. He developed and refined techniques for nonviolent direct-action boycotts in the South, resulting in the elimination of the more flagrant forms and symbols of racial segregation. The massive legislative commitment to racial reform, codified by the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts, had begun. The American press justified and validated the claims of its freedom and responsibility in its generally objective recording of racial injustices, while television brought into American living rooms the stark mob faces of primitive race hatred. The importance of television must eventually be evaluated by historians, but to this observer it appears to have played a most crucial role in intensifying the commitment of both Negroes and whites and increasing the momentum of the civil rights movement.

International politics also played a strong role in the struggle for justice. With the overthrow of colonial domination in the postwar decade, white Europeans and Americans could no longer sustain their political dominance over the nonwhite peoples of Asia and Africa. The increasing dignity associated with the independence of these colored peoples provided a new source of strength for the American Negro. And one should not underestimate the role of the

Communist ideology as an aggressive world adversary of the American and Western concept of democracy. American Communists had never been successful in exploiting the grievances of the American Negro and attracting any significant numbers of Negroes to the Communist cause—probably because their dogmatic inability to understand the subtle but important psychological aspects of the Negro's aspirations and struggles had led them to advocate *segregation* under the guise of self-determination in the Black Belt. Nevertheless, the competitive struggle between world Communism and the American concept of democracy demanded an American response to this embarrassing and easily exploited violation of democratic ideals. America risked standing before the world as a hypocrite or resting its claims for leadership on might alone, subordinating any democratic ideological basis of appeal. The international struggle for the first time clearly placed racists on the defensive, in grave danger of being classed as subversives in their threat to America's ideological power.

One could define the civil rights movement in terms of organized and sustained activity directed toward the attainment of specific racial goals or the alleviation or elimination of certain racial problems. Such a definition, with its emphasis upon organization as the basis for changes in the status of Negroes in America, would suggest that the civil rights movement was synonymous with civil rights organizations. But this definition would obscure the important fact that the civil rights movement had its own historic and impersonal momentum, responsive to deep and powerful economic and international events and political and ideological forces beyond the control of individuals, agencies, or perhaps even individual governments. In fact, the uncontrollable power and momentum of the civil rights movement impelled it to create the necessary machinery, organizations, and leaders.¹

The History and Character of the Civil Rights Organizations

There is an understandable tendency to think of the civil rights movement, organizations, and leaders as if they were interchangeable or as if they were only parts of the same historic and social phenomenon. But, while there are similarities and overlaps among them, they are not identical, and their important historical and contemporary dynamic differences need clarification if one is to understand the present nature and force of the civil rights movement, or

if one is to assess accurately the role and power of the various civil rights organizations and the actual extent of personal decision-making power held by their recognized leaders. Confusion on these questions can lead only to dangerous miscalculations. Specifically, political and governmental leaders may make demands upon civil rights leaders, demands which they genuinely believe can be fulfilled in the normal course of social bargaining and negotiation. The parties to these discussions may enter into such agreements in good faith only to find themselves unable to fulfill them. Those who view the civil rights movement in terms of the model of the American labor movement, with elected labor leaders holding responsibility for negotiating and bargaining for a disciplined rank and file, misjudge the nature of the movement. One obvious difference is that civil rights leaders have not been elected by any substantial number of Negroes. Either they are essentially hired executives, holding their office at the pleasure of a board of directors, or else they emerge as leaders by charismatic power, later creating an organization which, in effect, they control. Whitney Young is an example of the one, Martin Luther King of the other. So far, no machinery exists to enable the masses of Negroes to select a leader, but, if an individual strikes a responsive chord in the masses of Negroes, they will identify with him and "choose" him. So, too, an organizational leader may be accepted as spokesman by default, by the mere fact that he has been able to avoid overt repudiation.

One cannot understand the nature and the problems of contemporary civil rights organizations without understanding some of their individual histories. The *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* and the *Urban League*, the two oldest, were founded in the first decade of this century in 1909 and 1910 respectively.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

The NAACP emerged from the Niagara Movement of W. E. B. Du Bois and other Negro and white liberals during that period when Negroes were moving North.

A meeting of some of the members of the Niagara Movement was held in 1908, and it was agreed that a call should be issued by whites and Negroes for a conference on the centennial of the birth of Abraham Lincoln to discuss the status of the Negro in the United

States. Oswald Garrison Villard wrote the Call for the Conference which was held in New York City on February 12 and 13, 1909. It read in part:

In many states today Lincoln would find justice enforced, if at all, by judges elected by one element in a community to pass upon the liberties and lives of another. He would see the black men and women, for whose freedom a hundred thousand of soldiers gave their lives, set apart in trains, in which they pay first-class fares for third class service, and segregated in railway stations and in places of entertainment; he would observe that State after State declines to do its elementary duty in preparing the Negro through education for the best exercise of citizenship. . . . Added to this, the spread of lawless attacks upon the Negro, North, South, and West—even in Springfield made famous by Lincoln—often accompanied by revolting brutalities, sparing neither sex nor age nor youth, could but shock the author of the sentiment that “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” . . . Silence under these conditions means tacit approval. The indifference of the North is already responsible for more than one assault upon democracy, and every such attack reacts as unfavorably upon the whites as upon the blacks. Discrimination once permitted cannot be bridled; recent history in the South shows that in forging chains for the Negroes the white voters are forging chains for themselves. “A house divided against itself cannot stand;” this government cannot exist half-slave and half-free any better today than it could in 1861. . . . Hence we call upon all the believers in democracy to join in a national conference for the discussion of present evils, the voicing of protests, and the renewal of the struggle for civil and political liberty.²

The Call clearly indicates that, at its founding, the NAACP sensed that the status of the Negro in the North would not be significantly better than his status in the South. The founding of the NAACP anticipated the race riots of 1917, following the clues of the New York City riot of 1900. It was an attempt by the more perceptive and sensitive Negroes and whites to recapture the fervor, the purpose, and the concern of the pre-Civil War abolitionists.

The NAACP, from its beginning, took a more direct and militant stance, in spite of the fact that its founders and its Board of Directors were always interracial. The top staff tended to address itself to legislation and litigation. It pioneered in the use of direct action demonstrations. The more militant approach of the NAACP reflected, among other things, the role of W. E. B. Du Bois, paradoxically both a detached scholar and poet and an intense actionist. The direction and approach of the NAACP, to the extent that they can be attributed to a single person, were determined by his power and personality. In the tradition of a nineteenth-century New England

aristocratic poet-actionist-crusader, Du Bois was a dignified intellectual, Harvard-educated, detached, aloof, and cold, but also intensely concerned and committed to the attainment of unqualified justice and equality for Negroes. He may well have been the most important figure in the American civil rights movement in the twentieth century. His importance lies not only in his role in setting the direction and the methods of the NAACP, but in his capacity to understand and predict the larger dimensions of the American racial problem. Like Frederick Douglass, he was a prophet and leader of the movement, but, unlike Douglass, he was a founder and leader of an organization within the movement, capable of articulating the purposes of that organization. Du Bois the scholar gave Du Bois the leader of the NAACP a deeper human understanding, and to the NAACP he gave a significance which a mere organization could not have had without him. Yet his temperament, facing the contradictions and the turmoil necessary to organizational struggle, determined that his role in the organization itself would be limited. One could speculate that the ardor, the intensity, the militance of Du Bois, his inability to tolerate anything other than acceptance of his complete humanity were viewed as a handicap to those willing to make the "necessary" compromises for the survival of the institution. He was a proud and uncompromising man.

The essence of the controversy between Du Bois and Booker T. Washington was that Washington could accommodate and adjust, while Du Bois could not. If the NAACP had been run by Washington, it would have been pragmatic and practical, but not militant or crusading. The clash between Washington and Du Bois was a clash of temperament and principle. Washington was willing to accept qualifications of his humanity; Du Bois was not. Du Bois' dignity and his inability to settle for anything less than total human acceptance set the tone for the approach, methods, and early militant stance of the NAACP.

The Du Bois-Washington controversy could be illustrated by their conflicting views on education for Negroes. Washington's support for a special kind of education "appropriate" to the caste status of the Negro—vocational education, the acceptance of separation (in a sense the acceptance of segregation itself)—was consistent with his pragmatic accommodation. Du Bois' insistence on academic education, his belief that, if the Negro were to progress in America, he would need to assume the same stance as whites, his belief that one could not make judgments about a person's role in

terms of his color, his slogan of the "talented tenth," all were consistent with his refusal to allow color to qualify the rights of persons. He took seriously the American ideology. Washington was the realist, the moderate, yet he never founded a civil rights organization, but operated from the institutional base of Tuskegee Institute. He had gained acceptance from the white power controllers without an "organization." It is indeed doubtful that he could have mobilized a civil rights agency. It may be that his power and his usefulness to the equally pragmatic white political and economic structure would have been curtailed by even the semblance of a functioning civil rights organization. That Washington was not a particularly significant influence in the movement during its earliest stages may be due to the fact that his domain by this time was clearly the Southern Negro. The civil rights movement was then becoming Northern-oriented. One could speculate that the doctrine of accommodation preached by Washington and reinforced by white power effectively curtailed the growth of a Negro civil rights movement in the South until the mid-twentieth century.

The National Urban League

The Urban League was founded a year later than the NAACP, in 1910, for the specific purpose of easing the transition of the Southern rural Negro into an urban way of life. It stated clearly that its role was to help these people, who were essentially rural agrarian serf-peasants, adjust to Northern city life. Until the termination of Lester Granger's tenure as director in September 1961, the League announced in its fund-raising appeals and to both business and government that it was essentially a social service agency with a staff of social workers. Its implicit assumption was that the problems of the Negro were primarily those of adjustment and that their need was for training and help. The League summoned whites to demonstrate their good will, relying upon negotiation and persuasion to show white business leaders that it was in their "enlightened self interest," to use Lester Granger's term, to ease the movement of Negroes into middle-class status. The Urban League played down the more primitive and irrational components of racial hostility, depending on the conviction that white leadership, particularly in the North, could be dealt with in terms of rational economic appeals. The League courted the white community through its national and local boards, considering itself an effective bridge be-

tween the Negro community and the white decision-makers; to this end, it recruited a staff skilled not only in social work but also in negotiation procedure and style. During the early 1950's, one member of the top national staff of the Urban League described the role of the League as "the State Department of race relations," in contrast to the NAACP, which was characterized as "the War Department." This was more than an analogy; the style of speech and dress and manner of the League tended to be a stereotype of the style of the staff of the American State Department.

NAACP and Urban League: Democratic, Nonpartisan, Conservative

These two civil rights organizations, the NAACP and the Urban League, had in common their Northern base and their interracial character. They also shared a basic assumption that major changes in the status of the Negro could be obtained within the framework of the American democratic system. They sought to manipulate the machinery of government and to influence other institutions. The Urban League's primary emphasis was placed upon the economic, industrial, and social-service clusters of power, while the NAACP's primary interest was in political and legal power, with a major emphasis upon propaganda which sought to reach the conscience of the American people, both white and Negro. The League's appeal was to self-interest—employ Negroes, or you will spawn large numbers of dependent people. The NAACP's appeal was to public and judicial conscience; their argument was that America is intended to be a democratic nation with justice for all.

From the very beginning, both organizations were politically nonpartisan and therefore in some measure effective in flexibility of appeal and action. They could not afford identification with a particular political group, for they faced an always imminent prospect of political changes in government and the possibility of retaliation. Their decision, on its face, seemed quite wise; but it limited the extent to which the civil rights organizations could, in any meaningful sense, be politically or socially revolutionary. They could not or did not identify with labor, and their sense of alienation was stimulated by the political immaturity of the American labor movement itself. The rank-and-file members of organized labor, if not its leaders, were contaminated by racism; thus, the civil rights organizations and American labor could not form a political coalition or develop a

significant labor party. It would, however, be inaccurate to say these civil rights groups ever "sought" an alliance with a political labor movement. The mere fact that civil rights organizations were necessary made a civil rights-labor coalition impossible since one of the major sources of racial exclusion has been and remains the organized American labor movement.

The civil rights organizations were never revolutionary. Their assumptions and strategy and tactics were essentially conservative, in that they did not seek to change and certainly made no attempt to overthrow the basic political and economic structure. The social changes they sought were limited to the inclusion of the Negro in the existing society; the Negro wanted his own status raised to that of other American citizens. The NAACP and Urban League staked their strategies on a belief in the resilience, flexibility, and eventual inclusiveness of the American democratic system—in an ultimate sense, perhaps in a pathetic sense, upon acceptance and identification with the articulated American concept of democracy. They took literally the ideology and promises of the system and shared unquestioningly American democratic optimism. They believed in the words of Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights and asked only that these rights—and nothing less—be extended to Negroes. This was their main source of power. They could be considered revolutionary only if one tortures the meaning of the term to imply a demand to include other human beings in a system which promises fulfillment to others.

To call such modest requests disruptive or radical or extremist is to misunderstand and misjudge the logic of the original American revolution, and reflects the sickness of racism. In effect, a Marxist could justifiably accuse the civil rights movement from its beginning to the present, as well as the American labor movement, of being unrealistic and superficial in its belief that fundamental change for oppressed peoples was possible under a system within which the oppression occurred and was sustained.

The purpose of the civil rights movement has always been to counteract and destroy the lie that the Negro is subhuman, a lie that no one ever really believed, yet one that was reinforced by those with power. The fact that the Negro *is* human made him susceptible to and influenced by the same forces that influence other human beings in his society. Although the Negro's indoctrination in democracy was contaminated by the obvious reality of his

rejection and exclusion by that democracy, he did not, astonishingly, respond by rejection of democracy itself. He seemed to show a sophisticated wisdom in understanding that the ideal of democracy itself was not to blame merely because democracy, as practiced, had not, for the Negro, advanced beyond verbal commitments. He sought a continuation of a revolution that had already begun. He desired only to join it and share its benefits.

Probably even more important is the compelling reality that the civil rights organizations could not have afforded to behave in a revolutionary manner. Even if a racial revolution were psychologically possible, it was not statistically possible. Negro slaves in the United States, unlike Negro slaves in the Caribbean or South America, remained a numerical minority. Attempts at rebellion during and after the period of slavery were ruthlessly suppressed and tended to introduce not the alleviation of oppression but a new period of intensified cruelty. The stark fact is that the Negro in the United States was never in a position to entertain seriously any notions of major disruption or changes in the existing economic or political system. If his condition were to improve, it would have to improve within the framework of the existing realities, realities which he could not modify in a fundamental way because he lacked the necessary power.

It may be that the strategies and techniques of the civil rights organizations could have been only more systematic and organizational forms of the very kinds of accommodations that individual Negroes were required to make in the face of the superior power of the white system. As the material economic, political, and military power of the United States increased during the twentieth century, the validity of this strategy of assertive accommodation on the part of the civil rights organizations became even more justifiable, practical, and realistic. It is important, however, to understand that these accommodations were never acquiescence in or acceptance of injustice, but rather tactical maneuvers, strategic retreats, or temporary delays, and the effective timing of demands for specific changes.

NAACP and Urban League: Leadership and Strategy

What were the effects of this strategy? There is no question that the rationale and techniques of the NAACP led to notable successes in the field of legislation and litigation. Civil rights victories in the

federal courts, including equalization of salaries for teachers, the Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin cases, the restrictive covenant cases, and, finally, the *Brown vs. Board of Education* school-desegregation decision of 1954, are examples of the extent to which the NAACP has removed almost every legal support for racial segregation in all aspects of American life. Probably the only exception to this is the remaining laws dealing with intermarriage, and these laws may soon be declared unconstitutional.

The techniques, methods, and organizational structure of the NAACP in 1965 are essentially the same as they were in the 1920's. If one were to examine the NAACP today and compare it with the NAACP twenty or thirty years ago, the only significant difference one would find is an increase in the number of staff, particularly in the Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., staff.

This important legal arm of the NAACP has been officially separated as an independent corporation from the rest of the NAACP since 1939. But by the early 1950's this technical separation had increased in fact. The Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., has its own offices, budget, fund-raising program, and Board of Directors and staff. While there has remained a close working relationship with the NAACP itself, this increasing independence of the Legal Defense and Education Fund has made it possible for it to work closely and provide legal services to the newer more activist civil rights organizations such as CORE and SNCC.

The NAACP itself has added some staff for specialized work in such problem areas as labor and housing. The newer and more direct-actionist civil rights groups have forced the NAACP to initiate more concrete measures, but there is reason to believe that this advance was reluctant and that, left to its own devices, the NAACP would have continued to put its major emphasis on its traditional concerns. Ironically, ten, fifteen, or twenty years ago, such concerns seemed to be extreme militance. Today, in the view of the development of more activist civil rights groups, such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the NAACP is seen as a rather moderate, even conservative, organization.

As leaders of the NAACP, Walter White and, later, Roy Wilkins continued the tradition of Du Bois, but they stopped short where he had only begun. There is every reason to believe that Du Bois would have taken the NAACP to the front lines where CORE,

SCLC, and SNCC are now. Walter White developed the method of personal contact and friendship with top public officials, and during his administration an effective NAACP lobby was begun and the legal staff strengthened. Nevertheless this program and his predilection for a "first name" approach to power figures necessarily supplanted direct-action confrontation. It approached the methods of the Urban League and transformed the Du Bois style of militance into one of personal diplomacy. On the death of Walter White in 1955, Roy Wilkins became executive director of the NAACP, after serving as editor of *The Crisis*, the NAACP's official journal. His approach differs little from Walter White's, in spite of the counter pressure of the more militant groups and more activist and impatient forces within the Board and staff of the NAACP. His style, manner, background, and personality are not consistent with a mass appeal. He seems more comfortable in rational discussions with key decision-makers in economic and governmental centers of power than before a mass meeting of his "followers." Wilkins is the personification of responsible, statesmanlike leadership. He jealously guards his belief in the rational and intellectual approach to significant social change and refuses to be pushed even temporarily into the stance of the fiery leader. The value of this approach is clear; its dangers are more obscure but nonetheless real. Its chief danger is that a primary and understandable concern of civil rights leaders for a posture of respectability might make them more vulnerable to the shrewd, psychological exploitation of skillful political leaders. The power of civil rights leaders could probably be more effectively controlled by affability than by racial brutality.

The NAACP either was not able or did not desire to modify its program in response to new demands. It believed it should continue its important work by using those techniques it had already perfected. It may, of course, have been impossible for an old-line organization to alter its course dramatically, and thus it may have been inevitable that new programs would have to stem from the apparently more militant, assertive, and aggressive civil rights organizations.

The Urban League, contrary to popular opinion, has by no means been so visibly successful as the NAACP in attaining its stated goals. Certainly its desire and efforts to aid the smooth adjustment of the Southern Negro who moved to Northern cities, while quite laudable, have not prevented the massive pathology which dominates the expanding ghettos of such cities as New York,

Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Cleveland. The fascinating paradox is that the very areas in which the Urban League program has been most active—the blight of segregated housing, segregated and inferior education, and persistent and pernicious discrimination in employment—have been those areas in which the virulence of racism has increased in the North. Obviously, one cannot blame the program and activities of the Urban League for this blight. It remains a fact, however, that the approach used by the Urban League has not effectively stemmed the tide nor obscured the symptoms of Northern racism. The goals of the NAACP, resting on the vision and courage of the federal courts, were far more concrete and limited and hence more easily achieved. The ghettos of Northern cities and the forces which perpetuate such ghettos are clearly beyond the scope of an agency such as the Urban League or indeed any private agency. In response to this, there are indications that the League's present leadership is moving closer to direct involvement with governmental power.

It is clear also that the victories of the NAACP in the federal courts, the victories of all the combined forces of the civil rights organizations, leading to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the voting rights act of 1965 do not appear to be relevant to the peculiar cancerous growth of racism in American ghettos now spreading from the North back to more "liberal" Southern cities like Atlanta and New Orleans. The difficult truth civil rights agencies must eventually face is that so far no technique has been developed which seems relevant to this problem which now has emerged as the key civil rights issue. Protest demonstrations, litigation, and legislation do not seem to be specific remedies for this pattern of social pathology.

Within recent years, under the guidance of its new executive director, Whitney Young, the Urban League has indicated its awareness of the complexities of the present civil rights problem. The Urban League has joined with more "militant" civil rights groups, associating itself with mass protest movements, acknowledging that a social-service approach is not adequate to deal with the more flagrant predicaments of Negroes in the North and South. It has joined in demands for effective legislation. Whitney Young, probably by force of his personality, his background as an academician and administrative social worker, and his diplomatic skill, has managed to combine the traditional approach with a more dramatic and seemingly more militant stance without major disruption to the Ur-

ban League. He has not alienated white supporters; indeed, he has convinced them to increase their contributions. He has demonstrated beyond question that a more assertive insistence upon the inclusion of Negroes in the main stream of American life (his "fair share" hiring plan) and the willingness of the Urban League to identify itself with more "militant" direct-action dramatization of the plight of the Negro have not been at a financial sacrifice. Whitney Young demonstrated in the Urban League a degree of flexibility not yet so clearly apparent in the NAACP.

The Congress of Racial Equality

The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), like the Urban League and NAACP, began in the North. It was founded in Chicago in 1942 and became a national organization in 1943. From its inception it emphasized direct action and the dramatization of special forms of racial segregation. The founders of CORE were associated in some of their activities with a pacifist-oriented group, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the organization was interracial. In the initial stages of CORE, the evolution of a civil rights organization with a larger political commitment seemed possible. The pacifist aura and direct-action orientation of early CORE founders and members suggested a significant divergence from the politically nonpartisan policies and programs of the NAACP and the Urban League. In fact, one of the rationales for the founding of CORE was that it felt that legalism alone could not win the war against segregation.³

It is significant that CORE did not become a major civil rights organization until the civil rights movement reached a crescendo after the Brown decision of 1954. Before that, CORE seemed to be a rather constricted, dedicated, almost cult-like group of racial protesters who addressed themselves to fairly specific forms of racial abuse which could be dramatized by their particular method of direct action and personal protest. In 1943, they sat-in at a segregated Chicago restaurant, successfully desegregating it; in 1947 they co-sponsored with the Fellowship of Reconciliation a two-week freedom-ride to test discrimination in buses engaged in interstate travel; and through nonviolent stand-ins, they successfully desegregated the Palisades Amusement Park's pool in 1947-48.⁴ These techniques could be viewed as the harbingers of the more extensive use of direct action, nonviolent techniques, which, since the Montgom-

ery bus boycott, have become almost the symbol of the civil rights protest movement. Whether or not Martin Luther King, Jr., was aware of his debt to the CORE precedent, CORE set the pattern for Montgomery. The sit-in technique was initially CORE's, and CORE was also the first civil rights organization to rely upon nonviolent political pacifism.

James Farmer, executive director of CORE, was formerly a Methodist minister. He combines the appearance of personal calm and tolerant objectivity with a surprising forthrightness and fervent commitment. He makes no diplomatic accommodation to power figures, but demands uncompromising equality. In CORE's loose confederation of militant and seemingly undisciplined local chapters under a permissive national board, Farmer is a stabilizing influence, a convergence point; he holds power by virtue of his personal example of commitment. But while he is a symbol of the integrity of CORE and is generally accepted as such by the public and by CORE members, so far he does not seem able to control the activities of some of the more zealous and activist CORE chapters.

When local CORE groups in Brooklyn threatened to use a dramatic, but seemingly ineffective tactic—the abortive stall-in to keep people from getting to the New York World's Fair in April of 1964—Farmer was forced to intervene in an unaccustomed show of discipline to save the national organization. He allowed himself to be arrested at the Fair partly to demonstrate his own commitment to the cause but also to divert the spotlight from his unruly locals. Yet, whatever the anarchism of these locals and the inadvisability of demonstrations not directly related to concrete grievances, there is something to be said for the observation that, when multitudes are inconvenienced or threatened with discomfort, the very random quality of the action reflects the desperation of the demonstrators and has some impact, even if only irritation, upon the white majority. To the Negro, white irritation and anger is at least a *response*. And where chaos threatens, more responsible leaders of society intervene. The danger of disruptive demonstration, of course, is that the intervention may be repressive and the repressiveness may seem justifiable in the name of public order. But thus far CORE has not demonstrated that its tactics and methods are relevant to the problems and the pervasive pathology of the Negro in urban ghettos.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which Martin Luther King, Jr., heads, has the distinction of being the first civil rights organization to start in the South. It began in Atlanta in 1957, primarily as an expression of the commitment of nearly one hundred men throughout the South to the idea of a Southern movement to implement through nonviolent means the Supreme Court's decision against bus segregation. This commitment was made concrete by formation of a permanent organization, the SCLC, and Martin Luther King, Jr., was elected its president.

In order to understand SCLC and King, one must understand that this movement would probably not have existed at all were it not for the 1954 Supreme Court school-desegregation decision which provided a tremendous boost to the morale of Negroes by its clear affirmation that color is irrelevant to the rights of American citizens. Until this time, the Southern Negro generally had accommodated himself to the separation of the black from the white society. In spite of the fact that Southern rural Negroes in Clarendon County, South Carolina, were the original plaintiffs in the school-desegregation cases, one could speculate that if the United States Supreme Court had ruled against them, the Southern Negro would probably have retreated into stagnation or inner rebellion or protest by indirection. The leadership of King came immediately, however, as a consequence of a Negro woman's refusal, in 1955, to make the kinds of adjustments to racial humiliation that Negro women had been making in the South throughout the twentieth century. Rosa Parks' defiance was publicized in *The Montgomery Advertiser*, which also revealed the fact that Negroes were organizing. Ironically, the chief boost to the boycott came from the white press. Scores of Negroes, who would not have known about the boycott, learned of it in the Montgomery newspaper and offered help to King and other ministers.

The bus boycott catapulted King first into local leadership as head of the Montgomery Improvement Association, formed for the purpose of coordinating the bus boycott, and then by virtue of the drama and success of that boycott into national leadership. He had responded to forces beyond his control, forces let loose by the early work of the NAACP in clearing away the legal support for segregation, by the urbanization and industrialization of society, and by the pressures of America's role in a predominantly nonwhite world.

Here was a man who, by virtue of his personality and his role as minister, did not excite an overt competitive reaction from others. He could and did provide the symbol of unified protest and defiance. As a minister trained not only in theology, but in philosophy and history as well, sensitive and jealous of his understanding of world events and world history, King could develop and articulate a philosophical rationale for the movement, an ideology to support his strategy. Associating his role in Montgomery with the Gandhian philosophy of passive resistance and nonviolence, he emphasized another dimension of the civil rights movement in America, systematically articulating and developing the form of racial protest first used by CORE more than ten years before. The question has been raised whether or not this philosophy and the commitment to love one's oppressor is relevant to the effectiveness of the method itself. What happened in Montgomery was not a consequence of King's philosophy. The Montgomery affair demonstrated rather the ability of King and others to exploit the errors of the whites and to unify the Negroes for an effective boycott. There is no evidence that whites react to philosophy, but they do react to what happens. King's philosophy did not exist before the fact; rather, it was adopted after it was found to be working.

The development of philosophical and religious support for the method did, however, help to gather support for future action by focusing and refining a tactic and by an appeal to the conscience of Negro and white. King effectively turned the main weakness of the Negro, his numerical, economic, and political impotence, into a working strategy. Practically speaking, he could not seek redress by violence, but he did have available resources of nonviolence. Nietzsche said that Christ developed a philosophy of love because the Jews were weak; and that only when Christianity becomes strong can love become powerful. King's philosophy is actually a response to the behavior of others, effective directly in terms of the ferocity of the resistance it meets. It is not only nonviolent; it is also assertive. It depends on the reactions of others for its own strength. King and SCLC sometimes appear, indeed, to be satisfied, as in the case of Birmingham, with negotiations leading to minimal concessions. King does not insist upon total change in the status of Negroes in a community but considers partial change temporarily satisfactory. What he settles for can be questioned in terms of the energy expended and the risks taken.

One cannot understand SCLC solely in terms of its organization,

which is amorphous and more symbolic than functional, even though the national headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, has sixty-five affiliates throughout the South. To understand this organization, one has to understand King, because SCLC is Martin Luther King, Jr. King is a national hero, a charismatic leader, portrayed in America and through the world as a man of quiet dignity, a personification of courage in the face of racial danger. He has the ability to articulate a philosophy and ideology of race relations clearly acceptable to the larger society. As far as the general public is concerned, the civil rights movement has converged in his personality. His ability to portray selflessness and to understand other civil rights leaders has made him a suitable person for his role. In the complexities, tensions, and frustrations of the civil rights movement, King fills an important function of simplification through personalization.

The presence of King and SCLC indicates something about the inadequacy or the inappropriateness of the methods and techniques used by the NAACP and the Urban League in the South today. If either the NAACP or the Urban League had been sufficient, King could not have been so successful as he is. King moved into a vacuum that existing civil rights groups did not fill. He mobilized people not in protest against the entire system but against specific injustices. Concrete successes, in turn, raised Negro morale. But SCLC's program, as a means to transform society, is more apparently than actually successful. The dramatization of the direct-action, SCLC-King technique over the mass media leads to the impression that the civil rights movement in the South is in fact a mass movement. In those situations in which white police and political officers do not exacerbate the resentment of Negroes by acts of cruelty and hostility, even King's appeal does not actively involve more than a fraction of the Negro population. It can, of course, be said of any "mass" movement that it rarely involves more than a small minority in direct action, at least in its initial stages.

King himself seems to realize the limitations of his method as shown by his unsuccessful attempt to encourage a less concrete strategy, a general boycott of the state of Alabama. In his plans to extend his program into Northern cities he seems likely to be less successful. In the future phase of the civil rights movement where Negroes confront not direct tyranny but pervasive oppression, King's strategy and charisma may be less effective. Furthermore, it would probably be all too easy to abort and to make impotent the whole King-SCLC approach, if white society could control the flagrant idiocy of some

of its own leaders, suppress the more vulgar, atavistic tyrants like Sheriff Jim Clark, and create instead a quiet, if not genteel, intransigence. Such intransigence presents a quite different problem to the civil rights movement. A philosophy of love or techniques which seem compatible with such a philosophy would seem effective only in a situation of flagrant hate or cruelty. When love meets either indifference or passive refusal to change, it does not seem to have the power to mobilize the reactions of potential allies. Nor does it seem to affect the enemy—it appears irrelevant to fundamental social change.

Gandhi, of course, whose philosophy was one of nonviolent resistance, was the leader of a *majority* in the fight for Indian independence, King of a *minority*; this fact, important in an analysis of power, may be the decisive one in determining whether King can achieve a transformation of American society as deep and real as the Gandhian victory in India. The willingness of an oppressed people to protest and suffer, passively or assertively, without bitterness or with “love for the oppressors” seems to have influence only where the conscience of the majority of the society can be reached. In Hitler’s Germany the Jews suffered nonviolently without stirring Nazi repentance; the early Christians who were eaten by lions seem to have stimulated not guilt but greed in the watching multitudes. King’s strategy depends therefore for its success not only upon the presence of flagrant cruelty in a society but also upon the inherent good will, the latent conscience of the majority of the American people, as Gandhi’s did upon the British commitment to justice.

In a situation of benign intransigence—like New York City—or a society of gentlemen—North Carolina, for example—a philosophy of love for the oppressor may be less effective than in Alabama. There Negroes do not face overt cruelty but rather the refusal to alter their status. What do you do in a situation in which you have laws on your side, where whites smile and say to you that they are your friends, but where your white “friends” move to the suburbs leaving you confronted with segregation and inferior education in schools, ghetto housing, and a quiet and tacit discrimination in jobs? How can you demonstrate a philosophy of love in response to this? What is the appropriate form of protest? One can “sit-in” in the Board of Education building, and not a single child will come back from the suburbs or from the private and parochial schools. One can link arms with the Mayor of Boston and march on the Com-

mons, but it will not affect the housing conditions of Negroes in Roxbury. One can be hailed justifiably as a Nobel Prize hero by the Mayor of New York City, but this will not in itself change a single aspect of the total pattern of pathology which dominates the lives of the prisoners of the ghettos of New York.

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

The rise of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee intensified and sharpened the dramatic confrontation begun by CORE in the 1940's and developed by Martin Luther King, Jr., in the late 1950's. The restless young students who originally led the movement used direct assertive defiance and resistance, nonviolent in tactic and yet militant in spirit. They had gone beyond the quiet, stubborn, passive resistance of the bus boycott in Montgomery to a new stage of challenge—no less stubborn but considerably less passive. The first demonstrations in Greensboro, North Carolina, and Nashville, Tennessee, were appropriately in college towns. It was as a result of these that the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee was formed.⁵ SNCC was organized in April 1960 at a meeting at Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina. It took as its original function the coordination of the protest work of the many student groups conducting sit-ins.⁶

This program, representing the impatience of a younger generation, came at a time when more established civil rights groups seemed ready to settle for post-Little Rock tokenism and moderation. During the years since 1954 and up to that time, the letter and spirit of the Brown decision had been effectively eroded. "All deliberate speed" had been translated into "any perceptible movement," or mere verbalization of movement. The presence of a single Negro child in a previously white school was considered a famous victory. But the SNCC "kids" in their worn denims brought new verve, drive, daring, and enthusiasm—as well as the brashness and chaos of youth—to sustain the dynamism of direct-action civil rights tactics. They propelled more orderly and stable groups like the NAACP and Urban League toward increasing acceptance of direct-action methods not only because some of the older leaders found the ardor of youth contagious but also because, after the manner of experienced leaders, they sensed that bolder programs would be necessary if their own role were not to be undermined. The intervention of youth revitalized CORE and sustained the intensity

of the direct involvement of King and SCLC. It has helped make possible—indeed it may have played a vital part in—the continuation of King's role as charismatic leader by arousing weary and apathetic Negroes to the imminence of justice, thereby stimulating an atmosphere sympathetic to crusade and sacrifice.

The SNCC uniform of blue denims and the manner of defiance were far removed from the neat white shirt and tie and Ivy League jacket of Urban League workers and the courteous, Biblical eloquence of King. After SNCC's initial stage of urban protest, it decided to move into the deep South and consciously attempted to express through dress, manner, and method a direct identification with working-class Southern Negroes. Nonetheless, many of the SNCC leaders were actually even closer than the SCLC, NAACP, and Urban League leadership to sophisticated Northern campuses where militance previously had been less action-oriented than intellectual.

SNCC seems restless with long-term negotiation and the methods of persuasion of the Urban League, and it assumes that the legislative and litigation approach of the NAACP has practically attained its goals. SNCC has not overtly repudiated King's philosophy of nonviolence, but it does not root its own acceptance of this strategy in love of the enemy. Rather SNCC leaders seem almost nationalistic in spirit, in the sense of pride that they hold, not so much in *being* black (an appreciable number of SNCC workers are white) as in their conviction that justice and the future are on their side. SNCC welcomes dedicated whites and others who presumably share its concern for total justice. The style and manner of the SNCC leaders and workers are not consistent with any overt display of gratitude even to those whites who share their dangers and daily risks. The underlying assumption of the SNCC approach appears to be that the struggle for political and social democracy in the South is the responsibility of all Americans. They approach their programs and tasks with pride, courage, and flexibility and with an absence of sentimentality which those seeking gratitude or deference might view as disdain. They do not seem to be so concerned with the careful political screening of co-workers and exclusion of "radicals" as are the more experienced and "respectable" civil rights organizations. But it would be a mistake to interpret the SNCC style and method of challenge to the racial hypocrisies of the South as evidence of "left-wing" or Communist domination. SNCC is flexible and inclusive—not doctrinaire and dogmatic. Being loosely or-

ganized, SNCC has practically no hierarchy or clear lines of authority. The discipline of its workers seems to be determined by each individual's identification with the "cause" and the direct confrontation approach rather than by external controls or organizational structure.

Instead of a single leader, SNCC has many "leaders." Nominally, John Lewis is president of the Board of Directors and James Forman is executive director of SNCC. Actually "policy" and "operational" leadership is not only shared by Lewis and Forman but must be shared with others. Robert Moses, who plays a key role in the SNCC leadership team, directed the activities of the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) in Mississippi during the summer of 1964. The individuals who coordinate SNCC activities for such Southern states as Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina also insist upon being heard in the leadership councils of SNCC. So far no single personality has emerged to speak for SNCC. John Lewis and Bob Moses seem deceptively retiring and soft-spoken in manner, but each is doggedly determined, assertive, and courageous in pursuit of the goals of unqualified equality. James Forman and Donald Harris, formerly SNCC coordinator in Georgia, are more overtly assertive and articulate but are no less likely to assume personal risks. The essence of SNCC leadership appears to be this willingness to assume personal risks, to expose oneself to imprisonment and brutality, and thereby to dramatize the nature of American racism before the nation and the world. Its members play the important role of commando raiders on the more dangerous and exposed fronts of the present racial struggle. This is not to be understood as mere adolescent bravado or defiance. It must be understood as an insistence upon total honesty, unwillingness to settle for anything less than uncompromised equality. It is an impatience with the verbalizations and euphemisms of "the accommodations" of more "realistic" or "strategic" leaders and organizations. This stance could be and has been described as "unrealistic" and "radical."

A Variety of Methods, the Same General Goals, and Contemporary Relevance

There are obvious and subtle problems in any social movement when a variety of organizations with different philosophies, strategies, tactics, organizational structure, and leadership all seek the same broad goals. All civil rights organizations are committed to

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full inclusion of the Negro in the economic and political life of America, without restrictions based on race or color. But each differs from the other in its conception of how this commitment can best be fulfilled.

There is general agreement that the successes of the civil rights movement and organizations have catapulted the civil rights struggle into a new stage with more complex and difficult problems and goals. Martin Luther King, Jr., in an interview with this observer which included other civil rights leaders, sought to verbalize this growing awareness of the fact that the civil rights movement must now address itself to the problem of bringing about observable changes in the actual living conditions of the masses of Negroes. He said:

Well, aren't we saying, gentlemen, that a program has not yet been worked out to grapple with the magnitude of this problem in the United States, both North and South? Isn't there a need now, because of the urgency and the seriousness of the situation, to develop a sort of crash program to lift the standards of the Negro and to get rid of the underlying conditions that produce so many social evils and develop so many social problems?

I think this is what we face at this time, and I know it leads to the whole question of discrimination in reverse, and all of that. But I think we've got to face the fact in this country, that because of the legacy of slavery and segregation, and the seeds of injustice planted in the past, we have this harvest of confusion now, and we're going to continue to have it until we get to the root of the problem.⁷

The disturbing question which must be faced is whether or not the present civil rights organizations are equipped in terms of perspective, staff, and organizational structure to deal effectively with the present level of civil rights problems. And, if not, whether they are flexible enough to make the necessary changes in order to be relevant.

An examination of some of the concrete deficiencies in the organizations themselves shows that the NAACP and Urban League are under the handicap of experience. Committed to a method and a goal, they have not altered either in major ways since their founding. The sweep of the civil rights movement in the past two decades has not significantly affected these two elders of the movement. They still appear to function primarily in terms of personal leadership rather than staff competence. An exception is the expansion of the NAACP's legal and educational fund staff, which still remains

largely legal and pays little attention to education. A serious analysis of the way in which the NAACP has attempted to modify its structure to meet the current civil rights struggle would force one to conclude that it has done so to a minimal degree. For example, the staff concerned with the problems of housing is, practically speaking, nonexistent. As of June 1965, and for the previous two years, the position of housing secretary was unfilled. The NAACP staff concerned with labor consists of a director and a secretary. This is true also for education. The staff responsible for public relations, promotion, and propaganda has increased from five to seven persons within the past crucial decade of civil rights activity. These facts suggest that the NAACP has made virtually no organizational response to meet the present increased civil rights demands. The local branches are archaic and generally ineffective, with barely adequate communication and coordination of policy and procedures between the national organization and the local branches. Probably the NAACP's most glaring inadequacy in light of the present and future demands of the civil rights revolution is the lack of a fact-gathering and research staff.

The Urban League seems more modern and efficient in its fund raising, promotion, and public relations and in its relationship with its local groups. It also, however, seems weak in research.

One could speculate that this weakness—which is shared by the newer organizations as well—reflects the difficulty of moving from reliance on personal leadership to the more demanding, less dramatic, less ego-satisfying but imperative staff approach. Now that the maximum gains have been obtained through legislation, litigation, and appeals to conscience, the difficult problem of implementation, of translating these gains into actual changes in the lives of Negroes, remains. This cannot be achieved by charisma alone. It requires adequate and efficient staffs, working, of course, under inspired and creative leadership.

In spite of these objective limitations, the NAACP and the Urban League are flourishing. In 1962, the NAACP was said to have a membership of 370,000 in 1,200 local branches in forty-four states and the District of Columbia.⁸ By the end of 1964, its membership was given as 455,839 in 1,845 branches in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia. An unaudited budget indicates that income for 1964 was \$1,116,565.68.

The picture for the Urban League is even more dramatic. Until Whitney Young became executive director of the organization in

1961, the largest fund-raising total in any one year was \$325,000. In 1962, contributions were \$700,000; in 1963, \$1,441,000; and in 1964, \$1,650,000. Of particular note is the fact that, prior to 1962, no corporate body had made a contribution of more than \$5,000 to the Urban League. In 1964, several donations of \$50,000 were received from corporations, and foundations have given as much as \$150,000. These impressive accretions are, no doubt, a testament not only to the skill and eloquence of Young but also, as in the case of the NAACP's growth, to the dynamic momentum and strength of the entire civil rights movement. The success of both might be a reflection, at least in part, also of their relative respectability.

CORE's chief deficiencies are its weak organizational structure, the fact that its executive does not have sufficient power, and the problem that it has seemed at various times to be endangered by lack of discipline. However weak in discipline, it is nevertheless strong in enthusiasm and dedication among its members and its locals. It appears to be weak also in its fiscal arrangements, its fund-raising and systematic promotion. CORE is in serious financial difficulties. There is a serious question whether CORE's lack of organizational discipline and structure is an asset or liability in terms of the flexibility necessary for it to be relevant to the present civil rights problems.

Behind SCLC's inspiring reality lie some very real difficulties, many of them quite human. Financially, however, it seems strong; it seems relatively easy for SCLC, through King, to attract a majority of the nonselective contributions to the civil rights movement, despite the minimal organization of SCLC itself. It is reasonable to conclude that if King were not its leader there would be no SCLC. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the role of SCLC's Board of Directors. It and the organization seem to be dominated by the magnetic appeal of King, by the personal loyalty and reverence of his top aides and of the masses who respond to his leadership. It is reasonable to assume that most of those who respond most enthusiastically to King's and SCLC's leadership are not members of his organization. The burdens of this special type of personal leadership are great if not intolerable. Probably the most desperate need of King and SCLC is for an effective supporting working staff to provide King with the type of background information and program planning which are necessary if this organization is to be relevant and if the type of leadership held by King is to continue to be effective.

SNCC is probably the least organized of all the civil rights organizations, suggesting that the degree of organization is not necessarily related to effectiveness or to the appearance of effectiveness.

As movements become more structured, they fall prey to the problems that plague most organizations, namely, red tape, bureaucracy, hierarchical discipline restricting spontaneous and imaginative experimentation, fear of change and, therefore, of growth. In large industrial, economic, financial, and governmental bureaucracies, and in political parties, major decisions are not personal, in spite of the existence of a charismatic leader. Similarly in the civil rights movement, major decisions must now reflect painstaking, difficult staff work based on fact-finding, intelligence, continuing critical analyses of data and strategies. Institutions tend to repress the rebel and to elevate the businessman-diplomat, yet the civil rights movement is full of rebels and its goal is independence. It is possible that the vitality of all of the civil rights organizations will depend on sustaining certain respectable organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League while stimulating them to pursue new programs and encouraging the fluid realignment of younger, more restless forces from whom the momentum for change must certainly come.

Who Speaks for the Negro?

It would be understandable to succumb to the temptation to rank the civil rights organizations in terms of their degree of militance and effectiveness. And it has been argued persuasively that for maximum effectiveness the civil rights organizations should develop an efficient and disciplined machinery for coordination and genuine cooperation. This tendency and these suggestions, while understandable, would reduce the complexities of the present civil rights movement and the role of the organizations and leaders to a convenient oversimplification. The civil rights problems—the American racial problem—are historically and currently complex and multidimensional. Each approach has some validity and no one now knows which is more valid than others. The ultimate test of a given approach or pattern of approaches will be in the demonstration of observable and sustained changes in the status of Negroes—the evidence that the Negroes are included in all aspects of American life with the equal protection of laws and governmental power.

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This goal is not likely to be obtained by a single agency, method, or leader. Certain approaches will be more compatible with the temperament of some individuals, Negro and white, than with others.

The civil rights groups vary in organizational efficiency as well as in philosophy, approach, and methods. The rank and file of liberal or religious whites might be more responsive to the seemingly non-threatening, Christian approach of Martin Luther King, Jr. More tough-minded and pragmatic business and governmental leaders might find a greater point of contact with the appeals and approaches of the NAACP and the Urban League. The more passionate Negroes and whites who seek immediate and concrete forms of justice will probably gravitate toward CORE and SNCC. Obviously one would not offer financial or other support to an organization whose philosophy and methods made one uncomfortable or threatened one's status. Therefore, while the extent of financial support for a given organization may be seen as an index of the degree of the general acceptability of that organization's approach, it is not necessarily an index of the relevance or effectiveness of its program. One is tempted to hypothesize from these data that the financial success of an organization engaged in the civil rights confrontation is directly related to the *perceived* respectability of the organization and its nominal head. Correlative to this would be the hypothesis that the relative financial success of a civil rights group is inversely related to the *perceived* degree of radicalism of the organization and its nominal head.

The question "Who speaks for the Negro?" is real; perhaps no one group can speak for all Negroes just as no one political party can speak for all citizens of a democracy or no one religion can satisfy the needs of all individuals. The variety of organizations and "leaders" among Negroes may be viewed as a sign of democracy, health, and the present strength of the movement rather than as a symptom of weakness. This variety and loose coordination can help revitalize each through dynamic competition. Each organization influences the momentum and pace of the others. The inevitable interaction among them demands from each a level of effectiveness and relevance above the minimum possible for any single organization.

As Roy Wilkins said in response to a question from this observer:

We cannot promise you . . . that there will be a co-ordinated, organized, structural, formalized attack on these matters and that each will be ap-

portioned a part of this task. But we will say this: like Martin (Luther King, Jr.) said, there is more unity than there ever has been before, there's more division of work, and there's more co-ordination and backing up of each other than there has been before. Maybe in 1975, or some other time, there will come an over-all organization, but no other group has managed that, and why should we?⁹

Direct observation and analysis of relevant data and events lead to the conclusion that the stresses and strains within the civil rights movement and within and among the various organizations are real and cannot be denied; and a great deal of energy is expended in preventing these difficulties from becoming overt and thus destroying the public image of unity. But these problems can be seen as symptoms of the irresistible strength of the civil rights movement rather than as signs of inherent flaws or fatal weaknesses of the organizations and their leaders. Furthermore, the power and the momentum of the movement itself seem able to compensate for the present deficiencies in the organizations and leadership. Probably, and paradoxically, the clearest indication of the solidity and rapidity of movement toward the goal of unqualified rights for America's Negro citizens is the fact that civil rights agencies not only have mobilized and organized some of the latent power of committed whites and Negroes necessary for social change, but, in so doing, have now achieved sufficient strength to risk the beginnings of public debate over philosophy, strategy, and tactics. The lie which supports racism is being supplanted by more forthright dialogue and honest confrontation between whites and Negroes, among various classes of Negroes, between Negro "leaders" and their white and Negro co-workers, and within the civil rights movement itself.

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OSCAR HANDLIN

The Goals of Integration

SINCE 1954, and even more so since 1960, Americans concerned with resolving the dilemma posed by the Negro's plight in a society committed to equal rights have lived in a state of crisis. The destruction of the concept of "separate but equal" in the Brown Case was the *culmination of a quarter-century of re-examination of the premise that the colored men of the United States could be held permanently in a position that was actually separate but unequal.* The implications of that decision were not immediately clear; nor have they been clarified in the intervening eleven years.¹

Had the decision been immediately acceded to, it might have been possible to begin at once to explore its consequences. Instead, the necessity for fighting a succession of guerrilla actions behind the lines has delayed any consideration of long-range problems. Attention has been so narrowly focused on tactical issues that there has been no time to consider ultimate goals. The civil rights movement, which is actually a congeries of quite disparate efforts, maintains the pretense of unity only by a resolute determination not to think of long-term objectives.

However, we know all too well, from an earlier conflict a century ago, that battles and even wars can be won and yet the fruits of victory lost through men's haziness about what they are fighting for. In the present situation, the inability to define the ultimate goals of the civil rights struggle is an unacknowledged threat that complicates immediate tactics and that may deprive this momentous upheaval of its meaning.

In the absence of defined goals, it is difficult to estimate the character or pace of change or even to judge its direction. Under these circumstances, organizational controls and leadership weaken. There is confusion about which objectives are salient, and issues tend to crop up of their own accord. Action is sporadic, local, and

discontinuous and is not related to any general standard of importance. Explosive activists, always ready to precipitate conflict, find tactical opportunities to determine the questions to be fought over while the established leadership has to tag along to maintain its influence. At the same time, the atmosphere of continuous crisis generates the obligation of solidarity. Those who dissent must be silent or be counted as sympathizers of the antagonists. No one wishes to be known as an Uncle Tom or a white liberal.²

Recent demonstrations of solidarity on behalf of civil rights have been impressive. The march on Washington in 1963 and from Selma in 1965 showed the extent to which diverse elements in American society coalesced in support of a common cause. These occasions have ceremonial significance; they manifest the extent to which a variety of people affirm their dislike of brutality and their faith in the orderly methods of democracy. There is no difficulty in eliciting unanimity of support for the slogan of equal rights as man and citizen as long as the terms remain vague and undefined.

But it is erroneous to regard these events or professions of sentiment as expressions of unity with reference to a program of action. The calls for brotherly love sounded on the platforms do not reduce the intensity of the hatreds in Harlem. White resentment at black demands is also stiffening. It is a mistake to judge the extent of backlash by the refusal to commit suicide in 1964; the California vote on Proposition Fourteen that year was more revealing than the national vote against Goldwater. Popular sentiment is still for tolerance and against prejudice; but the time is approaching for a test of the meaning of that preference.³

Insofar as the civil rights movement has proceeded beyond the call for brotherly love or for equality, it has ventured upon unsure ground. Civil rights demands in Alabama and Mississippi are comprehensible; the promises of personal security, the ballot, and decent schools are familiar and long overdue. But the issues blur in the newer context of New York or Chicago or Atlanta where these minimal gains are well on the way to attainment. There the failure to define appropriate goals has created future difficulties, the shape of which is already apparent. The new problems are important not only because an increasing percentage of American Negroes live in an urban environment, but also because the range of decisions involved will confront the nation long after the difficulties of the rural South are resolved.

In the earlier stages of the struggle for equality, it was enough to ask that the government be color-blind. The barriers that confined the Negro were the products of law, and it was necessary to demand only the equal treatment that the Constitution guaranteed. Desegregation was the response to segregation; and it was a response that attracted the support not only of other underprivileged minorities but also of many Americans who found it in accord with their own creed of individual dignity and equality of opportunity.

In the past decade, emphasis has gradually and imperceptibly shifted from desegregation to integration, but without adequate awareness of the consequences and often with a profound ambiguity about the nature of the desirable goal.

The term integration sometimes refers to the openness of society, to a condition in which every individual can make the maximum number of voluntary contacts with others without regard to qualifications of ancestry. In that sense, the objective is a leveling of all barriers to association other than those based on ability, taste, and personal preference.

But integration sometimes also refers to a condition in which individuals of each racial or ethnic group are randomly distributed through the society so that every realm of activity contains a representative cross section of the population. In that sense, the object is the attainment, in every occupational, educational, and residential distribution, of a balance among the constituent elements in the society.

In crucial matters of public policy, antithetical consequences follow from the two positions. The one calls for improvements in the Negroes' opportunities for jobs, housing, and schooling even though the group may remain as separate as before; the other puts a primary emphasis upon racial balance.

The civil rights movement has never made a clear choice between these alternatives, nor has any spokesman fully articulated the implications of the two points of view. But increasingly in the past five years, the thrust has been in the latter direction, toward an organization in which every sector of society is racially balanced; and it is in that sense that the term integration will be used in the discussion which follows.

In part the change of recent years was due to the very intensity of the struggle against an intransigent opposition. More important, however, was the perception that the leveling of governmental bar-

riers was in itself inadequate to remove the handicaps under which colored people labored. The vicious cycle of slum housing, poor schools, lack of skills, and low income trapped the urban Negro and widened rather than closed the gap between him and others in the society. Deprivation became a pattern of life that hopelessly handicapped him in the competition for desirable places. The simple neutrality of government would not relieve him of these shackles; positive action to compensate was essential. The state was to intervene to assure the disadvantaged a due proportion of well-paying jobs and to balance the population of neighborhoods and schools in a thoroughly integrated pattern. That assurance was deemed necessary to restore equality to the disadvantaged. Hence the campaigns to destroy *de facto* segregation in the public schools, to secure preferential hiring and job quotas for Negroes in industry, and to manage housing in the interest of mixed residential neighborhoods.

This profound shift in the tactics of the civil rights movement during the past decade has come without any clear estimation of the consequences. To clarify those consequences, it is necessary to resolve the ambiguities in the goals of the civil rights movement. Is the ultimate objective to eliminate the differences that actually divide the population of the United States and thus dissolve its people into a single homogeneous and undifferentiated mass? Or will it be possible to reach toward equality while retaining the social subgroupings produced by a heritage of diversity and by the problems of managing a free population of almost 200 million? The answer, upon which the welfare of all Americans rests, should, to a greater degree than in the past, influence the tactics of the civil rights struggle.

The view of integration as racial balance rests on two fallacious assumptions—that the position of the Negro is absolutely unique in the American experience and that racist prejudice is so thoroughly ingrained in the people of the United States that only positive exertions by the government will assure the colored man his rights. Neither proposition conforms to the evidence.

The Negro is unique, it is argued, because his color sets him off from the majority more decisively than the traits of other ethnic groups did and because slavery crippled him so seriously that he cannot compete on equal terms and needs a crutch to help him along.

Certainly slavery was a more traumatic experience than the centuries of persecution, the hardships of migration, and the generations of depressed proletarian existence from which the Irish peasants suffered. But the argument slights the Negro's powers of recuperation and exaggerates the extent to which the damage caused more than a century ago remains a permanent part of his character. There has been a tendency to underestimate the extent of his achievements even in the fifty years immediately after emancipation, under conditions immensely more difficult than those of the present. When one considers the backwardness of the Southern economy after 1865, the exclusion from political power, the racist prejudices, and the bitterness left by a great war, it was a respectable accomplishment to have formed stable family units, to have developed productive skills, and to have created an array of churches, lodges, and media for cultural expression, with the limited resources the group possessed. Few people released from bondage in any society have performed as creditably.⁴

The disadvantages from which the Negro suffers in 1965 are less the products of the plantation than of the great migration to the city in the past fifty years; and that experience he shares with the other ethnic groups who have participated in American urbanization. Of course the Negroes are different from the Poles or Italians or Jews, just as those peoples differ among, and from, each other. The differences, however, are not of kind but of degree, and they are largely explained by the recency of arrival of the colored men, by their greater numbers, and by their dense concentration in a few cities. The problems of prejudice and acculturation from which the most recent newcomers suffer had their counterparts among the earlier arrivals.⁵

Nor is color the sole and unique sign of ethnic visibility. It is no doubt the most prominent mode of social recognition; but much depends upon the social assessment of this as of other physical traits. The Japanese-Americans are far less visible in 1965 than they were in 1940 although their color has not changed. And the Kennedys are still identified as Irish after five generations in the New World, and despite their wealth, prominence, and whiteness.

The assumption that color has a unique differentiating quality rests upon the argument that American society is inherently racist, its promise of equality reserved only for the white man. It has become fashionable in the past few years to sneer at Myrdal's statement of the American creed of equality and to urge that only

forceful measures will restrain the propensity to prejudice.

There was a racist period in American history in the sixty years after the end of the Civil War; but the hatreds of that period were peculiar to the time and place. Much more significant is the deeper tradition of equality before and since that interlude. The agony with which slaveholders like Thomas Jefferson and George Mason considered their own situation, the tortured efforts of early scientists to understand color differences, and the torment the abolitionists caused in the North and the South were the results of the inability to square the existing labor system with the belief in the brotherhood of man and the commitment to equality. And the changes since 1945 have been the result not of fear either of the Negroes or of Africans but of the awareness that equality is a necessary ideal of the Republic.

Furthermore, the Negro, while the most prominent, was not the sole target even in the racist period. Prejudice was not limited by race, creed, national origin, or previous condition of servitude. The majority of the victims of lynchings in those years were Negroes; but there were 1,293 white victims of the rope and faggot as against 3,436 black. Italians in New Orleans, a Jew in Georgia, and Greeks in Omaha also met the fury of mob violence. The Ku Klux Klan of 1924 was more concerned with Catholics and Jews than with colored men.⁶

Above all, the response of Americans to the crisis of the past decade reveals the effectiveness of the appeal to the creed of equality. Even Bogalusa is not South Africa; and the inability of the open advocates of racism to attract support is the best evidence of the extent of commitment to that creed.

In estimating the meanings of integration, therefore, it is entirely appropriate to examine the analogous if not identical experience of other ethnic groups. Their process of acculturation will throw light on the need for defining the goals and the strategy of the civil rights movement.

Barring a major overturn of the American social system, which at the moment appears neither probable nor desirable, change will come within definable limits and will involve choices among alternatives. And decisions on this matter will be more effective if they come within an informed context that makes it possible to envision their results.

The inequities which survive from the past cannot be understood or remedied without a comprehension of the social order that

produced them. They are the pathological manifestations of a mechanism of adjustment which permitted that order to function. Their successful removal requires a consideration of the function they serve; otherwise, the alternatives are grim. Either the order will collapse to the injury of everyone, white as well as black, or else uncontrolled alternative modes of adjustment will recreate and perpetuate the diseased condition.

This was the error of most of the abolitionists, who thought they could extirpate slavery without considering the effects upon Southern society. The result by 1900 was the restoration of the Negro's subordination in other forms than slavery.⁷

Hence, the importance, in any effort to foresee future developments, of an understanding of segregation, of its relationship to equality, and of the probable effects of integration.

Popularly speaking, segregation was a response to the dissolution of earlier forms of stratification. In a slave regime, the physical separation of the dominant and subordinate populations was superfluous and inconvenient. In other relatively static societies, where places were rigidly defined and the symbols of status clearly fixed by law or custom, groups could mingle with considerable promiscuity because there were no problems of recognition and no dangers to the established hierarchy of persons and groups.⁸

In the South, segregation was a response to the abolition of slavery and to the threat to white superiority posed by Reconstruction. The pattern that emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century used the law to fix the identity of the Negroes and to confine them to inferior social places. To those ends it established a rigid etiquette of behavior and separate institutions that restricted the opportunities of the former slaves for education and employment. Within the limits thus established, residential separateness was unnecessary. The measures that implemented segregation were deliberate on the part of the whites; the purposes were clearly understood at the time. As for the Negroes, their wishes were of no consequence; once they were excluded from political power, violence induced their acquiescence. The result was a kind of order, the price of which was inequality of rights.⁹

In the freer, more fluid, and more mobile sections of the country, segregation was achieved by withdrawal rather than by restraint and was voluntary rather than compulsory. As the Northern cities expanded with the influx of waves of heterogeneous newcomers, the old residents moved away, and the new arrivals sorted themselves

out in neighborhoods that reflected their own sense of community. Education, employment, religious affiliation, and associational life fell within lines that were not imposed by law or by violence but were shaped by informal and largely spontaneous connections of kinship or community.

Although the Northern Negro suffered from prejudice as did the Southern, society was not polarized but fragmented; and he found himself but one of many groups comparably situated, some of which suffered from disabilities similar to his own. Negroes did not confront a homogeneous white community with a single chain of command leading up to a unified leadership. They found a place among numerous communities, each with its own power structure and its own leaders.¹⁰

The function of separateness in this context was not to establish or to perpetuate the inferiority of one group, but rather to accommodate diverse patterns of life that were the products of differences in ethnic and sectional heritage, or in economic and social background. By reducing contacts at the points of potential tension, this adjustment permitted each group to organize its own institutions without the oversight or interference of others, and yet was flexible enough to preserve some degree of order in a highly complex society. Furthermore, the expanding cities possessed enough free space and their organization was so loosely articulated that individuals who preferred not to affiliate could refrain from doing so and could get along in whatever degree of detachment they wished. The ghetto arrangement was therefore totally different in intention as well as in form from the segregation of the South.

Indeed the fact that the pluralistic order took account of actual differences within the population made it possible to preserve the *concept* of equality. Not every man was equally qualified in terms of inherited capital, cultural traits, personality, and intelligence to pursue equally the goals of success in American life. But the pursuit of happiness was not a single, unified scramble in which every individual sought the same prizes and in which only a few could be winners while the rest were doomed to frustration. In the stated beliefs of the society, every boy could grow up to be President—of the United States or at least a railroad. Americans could cling to faith in that useful proposition because they never subjected it to the test of practice. In reality the disparity of aspirations and career lines drew only a few persons into the competition for those lofty places while relatively independent subsystems, with their own

values and rewards, provided satisfying alternatives to many more. The children of Irish or Italian parents did not count themselves failures if their lives did not follow a course identical with that of the children of the Yankees. They had their own criteria of achievement and their own sources of gratification.

The result was to take the edge off the harshly competitive psychological and social conditions of an open society. Pluralism permitted the deployment of the population in an intricate network of relationships and associations that facilitated cooperation at some points, but that left large areas free for the withdrawal of individuals and groups and that therefore minimized conflict-provoking contacts. There were manifestations of prejudice, discrimination, and occasional violence among many of the ethnic and occupational groups. Measured against the potential explosiveness of the situation, however, those were relatively minor. Until the migrations of the past half-century, Negro life in Northern cities was not essentially different from that of other ethnic groups. It had some distinctive problems as every other group did; but relatively small numbers and generally favorable conditions permitted an accommodation on essentially the same terms.

Neither in the North nor in the South is integration in the sense of racial balance a meaningful guide to proximate future action. Desegregation is likely soon to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination inherited from the Jim Crow era; and it may open the way to full participation by Negroes in the political and economic life of the nation, but it will do so within the terms of some approximation of the group life already developed. Integration, defined as the elimination of differences, on the other hand, demands of both Negroes and whites an impossible surrender of identity. The deletion of all memory of antecedents, the severance of all ties to the past, and the liquidation of all particularistic associations is not only unfeasible but undesirable. It would curtail the capacity of this society to deal with its problems under the conditions of freedom; and significantly some of its advocates are either altogether nihilistic or else do not flinch from the totalitarian methods and consequences that would be involved in achieving this version of integration.¹¹

Only a small minority of Negroes, however, think in these terms. The vast majority understand that they are a group and will remain so; they seek an expansion of their rights and opportunities, but

show neither a desire to merge with the whites nor any expectation that that will soon happen. Desegregation is a genuine issue; racial balance is a vague and confusing abstraction that turns their attention away from the genuine political, economic, and social problems they and other Americans confront.

The issue is perhaps clearest in the field of political action. No right is more basic than that to full and equal participation in the governmental process; and Negroes were quick to exercise the privileges of citizenship once they secured access to the ballot either through migration to the North or through the leveling of barriers in the South. Apathy was no more widespread among them than among other voters new to the suffrage. The colored people promptly assimilated the techniques of machine organization, and their power has increased steadily as their numbers have. With the appearance of a second generation, native to the city, they have begun to move into elective office at about the same pace as their predecessors did.

Three related factors continue to limit the effectiveness of their use of political power. The lack of competent leadership has enabled self-serving hacks and demagogues to push to the fore and has wasted on the quest for petty privilege the effort and energy that might have gone into improving the status of the whole group. The modes of collaboration with other blocs of voters have been slow to develop; and since the Negroes remain a minority, the ability to use their strength depends on alliances with others. Finally, Negroes have had difficulty in perceiving where their true interests lay when it came to such complex questions as education, urban renewal, and economic policy. In all three respects, they are repeating the experiences of earlier groups drawn into the processes of American democracy.

Nor is it to be expected that these people will be more enlightened in the use of power than their predecessors. Politics is not the cure-all that some naive observers consider it to be.¹² Post-Civil War Negroes in the South did not use their strength any more effectively than did the Irish of Boston in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The same sentimental temptation to idealize the underdog that once built up exaggerated expectations of the proletariat now sometimes leads to hopes for a panacea in the activities of the Negro citizen. There is no more reason to expect political wisdom from the black than from the white resident of a slum or from either than from the suburban commuter. The vote is not an

abstract exercise in either intelligence or benevolence but a means of exercising influence on the processes that shape governmental decisions. For some time yet, Negroes will use it to serve narrowly defined group interests.

The removal of surviving restraints on the right to vote is obviously important; but integration is an irrelevant distraction which disperses energy and inhibits the development of responsible leadership which can take a full and active role in politics at every level. Political effectiveness will grow not through the weakening of the sense of identity but through the development of institutions that can clarify the group's interests, provide organized means of ascent to leadership, and retain the loyalties of the growing middle-class and professional elements in the colored population.

Integration in the sense of the elimination of distinctiveness is no more relevant to the economic plight than to the political plight of the mass of Negroes. The demands for preferential hiring, for assigned quotas of desirable jobs, and for a Black Man's Marshall Plan are sometimes presented as if they were the means of attaining racial balance and therefore of furthering integration. Actually, they are calls for the recognition of the special character of the group; and to the extent that they are heeded, they strengthen identification with it.

Measurement of the rate of Negro progress is difficult because of the recency of this migration to the cities and because gross comparisons of whites and nonwhites distort the actual situation. A large proportion of urban Negroes have been where they are less than twenty years, almost all of them, less than fifty years. The analogous migration from Eastern and Southern Europe began in the 1890's and reached its peak between 1900 and 1910. The mass of Poles, Italians, and Russian Jews even in the prosperous 1920's, much less in the depression 1930's, had not made more rapid progress. Furthermore, the limitations of the census categories which recognize only whites and nonwhites obscure the genuine differences in occupation and income among the former and make comparisons invidious. Unfortunately, more refined data are difficult to come by.

It is undeniable, however, that a large percentage of American Negroes are confined to unskilled and poorly paid occupations at a time when technological changes reduce the demand for their labor. They therefore suffer more than do other sectors of the

population from unemployment, low incomes, and the consequent social deprivations. Furthermore, the same economic forces that contract the demand for their services and their position as late arrivals prevent them from developing the protected trades through which other groups maintained quasi-monopolistic control of some employment opportunities.

The difficulty is that no occupation in the United States—hod-carrier, teamster, machinist, shopkeeper, physician, or banker—ever represented a cross-section of the whole population. The social and cultural conditions that influenced recruitment to these callings did not prevail identically in all ethnic and sectional groups. Entirely apart from prejudice or discrimination, therefore, the chances that a given individual would follow one career line rather than another were likely to depend on an environment and on connections shaped by family influences.

Conceivably this pattern of recruitment could change. Since Jefferson's day, various utopians have dreamed of a mandarin system within which all infants start on equal terms and are directed by successive competitive tests of ability to their appropriate niches in life. This is the ultimate model of integration; and it would certainly put Negroes on terms of parity with all others. But, desirable or not, this solution is visionary. It is hardly necessary to attempt to estimate the social and psychological costs of such a system or even to speculate about the difficulty of defining ability (intelligence?) in that context. The dominant tendencies in American life have consistently broken down any effort to create the rigid controls upon which development in that direction depends. The likelihood is slim that those tendencies will change enough in the near future to offer any promise of relief to the Negroes' problems.

A general assault on the problems of poverty may, in time, mitigate the difficulties from which Negroes suffer along with the other unskilled and therefore superfluous elements in American society. But some Negroes at least are not content to wait for that happy outcome and are struggling now for better chances as a group. Pressure on employers to assign a quota of desirable places to colored people may result in a kind of tokenism, advantageous to a few without easing the hardships of the many. But such adjustments do help the few; and both the tactic and its outcome sustain and strengthen the sense of group solidarity. There are already contexts—in some levels of government employment, for instance—

in which there is an advantage to being black, a condition which puts a premium on affiliation with the group.

In the last analysis, the welfare of the Negroes depends upon the health of the whole economy and its capacity to produce and distribute goods according to an acceptable pattern. But the last analysis is remote indeed. In the interim, the Negroes will use what power they can muster as a group for their own advantage. Preferential treatment in some high-prestige forms of employment will be justified not because it will improve the lot of the great mass of the unskilled, but because it is a means of opening some avenues of escape for the most qualified. At relatively little cost in efficiency, this device can create a pool of potential leaders with a stake in social order and at the same time break the identification of the race with poverty.

Hence the importance of education upon which, increasingly, access to the more desirable places depends. The Negroes started with the initial disadvantage of dependence on the weakest schools in the country—those of the South. Migration compounded their difficulties, and the environment of poverty adds to their handicaps. The need for improvement is unarguable.

The methods of effecting that improvement are by no means clear, however. The pressure for integration has called attention to the problem; but it has also confused the solution. For some elements in the civil rights movement, integration in the form of racial balance has become an end in itself more important than the quality of the schools. Martin Luther King's hit-and-run involvement in this issue in Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland shows the danger of the thoughtless transference of the tactics of one kind of struggle to another.

Partly this outcome is the result of the historic development of the school issue in the South, where segregation was a means of perpetuating educational inequality and Negro inferiority. There desegregation was an essential step toward equality. However, the slogans of that effort were uncritically applied to the separateness of the Northern schools which had an altogether different function. The imbalance of the Northern schools was not designed to create or maintain Negro inferiority; and its result was not always to lower the quality of the education available to colored people.¹³ Yet there was no forethought about the consequences of the attempt to end what came to be termed *de facto* segregation.

Furthermore, in this matter, there is a striking division of opinion

among Negroes, covered up by the appearance of unity on such occasions as the school strikes. The most vocal persons in the civil rights movement are the most mobile, those whose aspirations reach furthest, those most irked by the identification of their color. Integration expresses their not fully understood desire to sever their ties with the past; and racial balance is a means toward that end.

This desire does not reach very far among the mass of Negroes. In such cities as New York and Boston, where open-enrollment plans offered parents an opportunity to send their children outside the districts of their residence, only a very small minority chose to do so. However the lack of response may be explained away, it reveals the limited scope of the appeal of racial balance.

Yet this issue in many places has overshadowed the far more important factors that enter into the Negroes' educational deprivation. And it is likely that time and energy will continue to be dissipated on the question of racial balance that might more usefully be expended on the quality of the schools and on the orientation of the educational process to the needs of the colored students.

The demand for racial balance has sometimes had a blackmail effect; it has forced concessions on municipal authorities willing to spend more heavily on slum schools than they might otherwise have in order to stave off the drive for bussing. But this tactic has also had the adverse effect of exaggerating the deficiencies of schools in Negro neighborhoods and thus of frightening away experienced teachers, of hastening the flight to the suburbs and increasing the rate of withdrawal to private and parochial schools. The insistence upon integration is thus self-frustrating, as the experience of Washington, D. C., shows. Further pressure toward racial balance will certainly weaken the public schools and leave the Negroes the greatest sufferers.

The dilemma is unnecessary. There is no evidence that racial balance itself improves the capacity of the underprivileged to learn; nor that the *enforced* contact of dissimilar children has significant educational advantages. There is abundant evidence that deprived children have distinctive needs that require the special attention of the school. Yet the drive for integration has obscured, and sometimes actually impeded, the task of providing for those needs. Indeed the argument is now often being made that racial balance is desirable to meet the needs of white children.

Here, too, an awareness of the groups' identity and a determination to deal with its problems is the most promising path to equality.

The Negro deserves preferential treatment in education because his needs are great. But to receive it calls for the recognition of the special character of his situation, not for costly efforts artificially to commingle his children with others in the interest of the ideal of balance.¹⁴

Since the desegregated, but unintegrated, school is a neighborhood school, there is a relationship between the range of residential choices and the conditions of education. The Negroes suffer from poverty, from their recency of arrival, and—in housing, more than in any other sphere—from prejudice. It remains unfortunately true that some whites willing to work side by side with the Negro or even to vote for him in an election will boggle at accepting him as a neighbor. That hesitation is connected with the fact that the residential district, especially in the middle-class areas of the city, is also the setting of a distinctive communal life, with group-derived values and activities of its own. The presence of any outsider is a potential threat, exaggerated in the case of the Negro by fears of a mass inundation.

Something has been done—by law and persuasion—to quiet these fears; a good deal more can be done by these methods. But it would help if the fearful were aware that there is no widespread desire among Negroes for residential intermixture as such. Colored people are primarily concerned with the quality of housing; they do not value highly propinquity to whites. Talk about racial balance not only distorts the actuality of Negro intentions, but it heightens the very fears that may limit the freedom of the occasional black family that wishes to move to a mixed neighborhood. A recent study of middle-income Negro families, for instance, expressed surprise at the preference for ghetto residence and suggested that whites be moved in to encourage integration, as if that were a necessary and desirable end in itself. A state legislative committee on low-income housing uncritically adopted the same goal. These proposals repeat the errors of New York City's experiment with benign quotas which deprived Negroes of the quarters they needed in order to save room for whites, all out of the concern with balance.¹⁵

Integration is a false issue. The problem is housing—how can adequate space up to present-day standards of decency be made available to the poor? How can all other colored families get fair value up to the level of their incomes, without being penalized for their race? For most Negroes these are the primary issues. They are

difficult enough without the complications of racial balance. The control of the urban renewal process, the role of government as entrepreneur, and problems of design and form will set the framework within which the character of the Negroes' future housing will be determined. And group cohesiveness will be of great importance in influencing decisions in these matters.

The development and strengthening of Negro communal institutions may also help normalize the situation of the colored family. The disorderly features of that position are well known—the absence of a male head, frequent illegitimacy and dependence—as well as their relationship to juvenile delinquency, crime, and narcotic addiction. But these characteristics have been too readily associated with the effects of the slave heritage. The servitude of the plantation may have left elements of weakness in the families of the freedmen; but the extent to which sound family life developed among the Negroes between 1865 and 1915 is impressive, as is the extent to which it still prevails in the rural South closest to the slave setting.

A more plausible source of disorder is the effect of rural-urban migration with low income and slum housing at its destination. That correlation conforms to what is known about the changes in family life in other societies in which slavery has not been a factor.¹⁶ It conforms also to the experience of earlier groups of migrants to American cities. Less than a half-century ago, the foreign-born residents of Irish, Jewish, or Polish slums faced comparable problems of matriarchal households and delinquency.

It was not alone the tradition of solidarity and discipline that contained the damage among these peoples, but also the fact that their families were encased in social and cultural institutions which imposed restraints upon recalcitrant individuals, established norms of behavior, and disposed of weighty sanctions for conformity. Negroes have been slower to develop similar institutions, partly because this migration came at a moment when government absorbed some of these functions, but also because in their experience separation meant segregation and bore the imputation of inferiority. Yet those men who, in the name of integration, deny that there is a significant role for the Negro press, or for Negro churches, or for Negro associations are also denying the group of its media for understanding, for expression, and for action. They would thereby weaken the capacity of the people who need those media to act on their own behalf.¹⁷

It is the ultimate illogic of integration to deny the separateness of the Negro and therefore to inhibit him from creating the communal institutions which can help cope with his problems. Delinquency, poverty, slums, and inadequate housing of course concern all Americans; and the attempt to eradicate them calls for common efforts from every part of the nation. But history has given the Negroes a special involvement in these matters; and to deny the actualities of the group's existence is to diminish its ability to deal with them. To confuse segregation, the function of which is to establish Negro inferiority, with the awareness of separate identity, the function of which is to generate the power for voluntary action, hopelessly confuses the struggle for equality.

Clarification of the goals of the civil rights movement has immediate tactical implications. Desegregation is not the same as integration; Selma is not Harlem, Bogalusa, not Chicago.

Where violence, exclusion from the ballot, or state power has deprived the Negro of his equal rights as a man and a citizen, it is his obligation and that of all other Americans to demand an immediate end to the discriminatory measures that aim at his subordination.

Desegregation will not solve any of the other important economic, social, and political problems of American life; it will only offer a starting point from which to confront them. The inadequacies of the political system, unemployment, inferior education, poor housing, and delinquency will still call for attention. In some of these matters the peculiarities of the Negroes' situation call for special treatment. But with reference to none of them is integration a meaningful mode of action; and the call for it which echoes from a different struggle on a different battleground only produces confusion.

Whatever may happen in the more distant future, Negroes will not merge into the rest of the population in the next few decades. Those who desire to eliminate every difference so that all Americans will more nearly resemble each other, those who imagine that there is a main stream into which every element in the society will be swept, are deceived about the character of the country in which they live. As long as common memories, experience, and interests make the Negroes a group, they will find it advantageous to organize and act as such. And the society will better be able to accommodate them as equals on those terms than it could under the pretense that integration could wipe out the past.

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1. I have treated the background of this problem in greater detail in *The American People in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); *Race and Nationality in American Life* (Boston, 1957); and *Fire-Bell in the Night* (Boston, 1964).
2. The civil rights movement is neither unified nor represented by a single spokesman. The attitudes here discussed reflect a trend expressed in statements of individuals. There are helpful collections of these views in Harold R. Isaacs, *The New World of Negro Americans* (New York, 1963); and Robert Penn Warren, *Who Speaks for the Negro?* (New York, 1965). For the background, see Richard Bardolph, *The Negro Vanguard* (New York, 1959); August Meier, *Negro Thought in America 1880-1915* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1963). On the extremists, see Irving Howe, "New Styles in 'Leftism,'" *Dissent*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1965), pp. 312, 314, 318 ff.
3. See, for example, *New York Times*' survey of whites' attitudes, September 21, 1964; Dean Harper, "Aftermath of a Long, Hot Summer," *Transaction*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (July-August 1965), pp. 9, 10.
4. Reconstruction literature generally focuses on the failures and the missed opportunities rather than on the achievements. See E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (New York, 1957), pp. 135, 142; W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America* (New York, 1935).
5. Oscar Handlin, *The Newcomers. Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis* (New York, 1959).
6. Walter White, *Rope & Faggot* (New York, 1929), pp. 20, 227, 230 ff.; James E. Cutler, *Lynch-Law* (New York, 1905), pp. 170 ff.; J. E. Cox, "New Orleans Mafia Incident," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 1937), pp. 1067 ff.; Theodore Saloutos, *Greeks in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 62-69.
7. See Dwight L. Dumond, *Anti-Slavery* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961); Martin Duberman, *The Antislavery Vanguard* (Princeton, N. J., 1965), pp. 137 ff.; James M. McPherson, *The Struggle for Equality* (Princeton, N. J., 1964); Willie Lee Rose, *Rehearsal for Reconstruction* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1964).
8. See Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen* (New York, 1946); Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery* (Chicago, 1959).
9. C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York, 1957) describes the process.
10. See T. J. Woofter, *Negro Problem in Cities* (New York, 1928), pp. 177 ff.; Howard Brotz, *The Black Jews of Harlem* (New York, 1964); John Daniels, *In Freedom's Birthplace* (Boston, 1914), pp. 133 ff.; W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro* (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 197 ff., 389 ff.; St. Clair Drake, *Churches and Voluntary Associations in the Chicago*

Negro Community (Chicago, 1940); St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York, 1962), Vol. I, pp. 174 ff.

11. See, for example, Howard Zinn, *SNCC, The New Abolitionists* (Boston, 1964), pp. 216-241.
12. For example, Charles E. Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White* (New York, 1964).
13. A misleading impression is often the result of gross comparisons of selected Negro schools or school districts with a general white average. It is necessary to take account also of variables other than race that affect performance. An analysis of achievement in Boston district high schools, for instance, shows that schools in certain white neighborhoods are as deficient as those in Negro neighborhoods (reported in *Boston Globe*, December 14, 1964, pp. 1, 13).
14. There is abundant evidence that significant improvement can come in the performance of Negroes in desegregated but racially unbalanced schools. The Banneker experiment in St. Louis, the experience of Washington, D. C., and the results in Louisville, Kentucky, point to the same conclusion. Of course, improvement can also come in balanced schools. However, the essential element is not balance, but the allocation of adequate educational resources to compensate for the disadvantaged situation of the Negro. See also Frank G. Dickey, "A Frontal Attack on Cultural Deprivation," *Phi Delta Kappan*, Vol. 45, No. 8 (May 1964), p. 398; *New York Times*, May 17, 1965. A good deal of the literature is summarized in T. F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the Negro American* (Princeton, N. J., 1964), although the conclusions drawn are different.
15. Lewis G. Watts, et al., *The Middle-Income Negro Family Faces Urban Renewal* (Boston, 1964); Massachusetts Special Commission on Low-Income Housing, *Summary Report* (Boston, 1965), and *Final Report* (Boston, 1965), House Document 4040, p. 10.
16. See, for example, B. A. Pauw, *The Second Generation: A Study of the Family among the Urbanized Bantu in East London* (Cape Town, Union of South Africa, 1963); Raymond T. Smith, *The Negro Family in British Guiana* (London, 1956).
17. See, for example, Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York, 1962), pp. 204, 205.

NOTES FROM THE ACADEMY

Transcript of the American Academy Conference on the
Negro American—May 14-15, 1965

SESSION I

GRAUBARD: Let me say, on behalf of the Academy, how enormously pleased we are to have you with us on this occasion. We regard this as the most important conference we have held in this house in five years. Five years ago, we convened to discuss the problem of arms control. Out of that conference, three months later, came an issue of *Dædalus* about 400 pages long that sold at that time the greatest number of copies we had ever dared print, 20,000, and that eventually became, as a book, a special selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club, which had the particular advantage of making it available to some 50,000 additional people.

Our hope is that we can do something of the same sort this time. As many of you know, *Dædalus* is now a much more widely circulated journal. We now print some 40,000 copies, and our expectation is that in this instance we will produce many more copies than that. It is also our intention that this should be a book in the *Dædalus* Library, which Houghton Mifflin Company is publishing, and that the book should appear early in 1966.

It occurs to me that we might properly begin with three of the papers which are among the most provocative we have, those of Mr. Fein, Mr. Hauser, and Mr. Moynihan. Each in its own way suggests that whatever the gains made by the Negro in the last decade in respect to civil rights, justice, and political rights, the *economic* gains for most Negroes have been, at best, negligible. Mr. Fein argues that in vital matters the gap between the Negro and white citizen has been widening rather than narrowing, that the Negro is today further behind than he once was. This is a theme which, in one way or another, both Mr. Moynihan and Mr. Hauser also agree on and develop.

These papers pay particular heed to the grave problems created by high unemployment and unstable family structure. The poverty of the Negro family, Mr. Hauser says, must rank as the single most important factor preventing the Negro from achieving his potential so that he is able to assume the rights and obligations proper to a first-class American citizen. This point is reiterated eloquently by Mr. Moynihan, who argues that the problem is particularly serious because the gap between Negro income and white income is not closing, but widening. The gains that the Negro

communities were able to make in World War II and perhaps up through the Korean War have not continued. In fact, they have ceased.

The point made by Mr. Moynihan (and supported by Mr. Turner) is that it is imperative that we give immediate attention to the problems of Negro youth and of the Negro male worker. While we have been satisfied, for various reasons, with certain of the changes that have occurred within the last decade, we must admit that in many critical areas the changes are not such as to encourage us. Time, as Mr. Moynihan puts it, is our enemy and not our friend.

I would like to begin our discussion with the facts brought out in these papers, not simply in order that the facts may be discussed, but so that we may reflect upon their implications. What are the kinds of things that we ought to be concerned with first in devising a strategy for coping with the range of problems suggested? What do we as a group think are the most critical matters that ought to command our attention now? And, finally, how can the things to which we are going to give attention be accomplished?

UNIDENTIFIED: Does not Mr. Tobin's paper. . .?

GRAUBARD: Mr. Tobin's paper is also relevant.

UNIDENTIFIED: Are we not therefore considering the four papers?

GRAUBARD: We could. Mr. Tobin is not here this morning, but will be here later in the day. He is saying three things which are absolutely essential. First, that unemployment is the key problem. Second, that the federal government is capable of doing a great deal more about unemployment than is presently being done, if only it will admit that the fear of inflation ought not so to dominate its thinking. Third, that we ought to reconsider our welfare programs. These welfare policies, so largely constructed, I suspect, out of the ideas and experience of the 1930's, are simply not, in the context of the 1960's, producing the social order that we want to see. I agree that Mr. Tobin's paper should also figure in our discussions this morning.

HUGHES: May I ask all these gentlemen a question? Are they or are they not saying that any reduction in the number and proportion of the very poor among the Negro will be accomplished not by addressing ourselves so much to the Negro but by addressing ourselves to the whole state of the economy in our society, to the nature of poverty in general?

MOYNIHAN: I will answer the question by saying that in order to do anything about Negro Americans on the scale that our data would indicate, we have to declare that we are doing it for *everybody*. I think, however, that the problem of the Negro American *is* now a special one, and is not just an intense case of the problem of all poor people.

REDDING: Why do we have to announce that we are doing this for everyone?

MOYNIHAN: Congressmen vote for everyone more readily than they vote

for any one. Because the poverty program is a color-blind program, we can do what we could not have done otherwise. We could not have done it for West Virginia or for Harlem—either one of those opposite extremes—but we can do it in generalized terms—for people.

REDDING: Do you think, then, that the idea of compensatory or preferential treatment for the Negro specifically is a bad idea?

MOYNIHAN: I do not know about "good" or "bad." I would say that in terms of the working of the system we are trying to influence by our thinking here, it will be done for "everybody," whatever may be in the back of the minds of the people who do it.

HAUSER: May I introduce a word here? I think it probably ought to be said "for everybody" for no other reason than to include the Appalachian white, the hillbilly, on whom we do not have adequate data, but who, apart from some differences in historical background, is probably not too different in many respects from the Negro and who probably needs compensatory education as much as the Negro. The Appalachian white in some respects is worse off than the Negro, because he has not even discovered he has a problem yet.

BERRY: He is not organized.

WILSON: What struck me in the papers of Mr. Fein, Mr. Moynihan, and the others was not simply that the gap is widening, but that one of the crucial aspects of the gap is the very great importance we must attach to the nature of the family, and the relationship between family structure and employment. This I take to be the reason that Mr. Moynihan suggests pessimistically—and I think with good reason—that poverty may be feeding on itself; in some sense it may be a cultural, as well as economic, phenomenon and a cultural phenomenon that can be inherited to a very depressing degree.

Is there any evidence that this problem is the same as the white hillbilly or Appalachian problem? Or is the cultural aspect of poverty among the white poor different from that among the Negro? I do not know and would very much like to be enlightened.

HAUSER: May I speak to that very briefly? The evidence on the white Appalachian is not too good because it is obscured in the census. It is beginning to be discernible but we do not have very much in the way of a time series. However, I would like to introduce as evidence the Oscar Lewis thesis that cultural poverty is essentially the same everywhere. I think there is considerable evidence that poverty in India, in Brazil, in the Appalachian Mountains, and in the Mississippi Delta has many attributes and essentials that are the same from a cultural standpoint.

BERRY: There are a couple of different items involved here, though. It seems to me that there is a dual problem with the black poor in the cities (I just happened to know more about the black poor in the cities than in the country, having been one of them for a long time), one because he is black and the other because he is poor. There are certain

features of poverty that are quite the same no matter what color you are, and this is bad enough; but when you add the racial situation to this, it is almost intolerable.

It seems to me that what Mr. Moynihan has said about sugar-coating the problem of race in order to get something done is quite an important thing at this point in history. However, I think that we are not going to get anything real and substantial done until we recognize and are willing to approach the problem of race without sugar-coating it, because the basic attitude with which we approach a problem is going to determine pretty much the outcome. Until we have the attitude that we have one hell of a problem, which we have caused and which has to be solved on the basis of the recognition of that problem, we are not going to get the job done.

Mr. Hauser touched in his paper on the distorted image of the Negro. The basic problem, underlying all others, is the basic attitude of white Americans toward black Americans. The big job is figuring out how to correct the image. This is the biggest thing that we can do. How do we correct the distorted image that white Americans have of Negro Americans and that has become a part of the decision-making process of every power structure in our society?

COLES: Without denying the fact that there is a culture of poverty, I am not so sure that we cannot have all kinds of subdivisions within the structure. I have just spent a couple of years with migrant farmers and sharecroppers, and I found a great deal of difference in the way white sharecroppers and white migrants live and the way Negroes do. I am not at all sure that the Negro migrant has not had an easier time of it than the white, because of the Negro's historical and cultural tradition, because of the ways that he has learned to live and develop, and because of strengths within the Negro family that many white Appalachian families do not have. I think we should try to trace, both historically and culturally, the different roots of the end result of poverty and not try to lump this all together.

I also wonder whether we could get through the Congress a kind of Black Belt Program similar to the Appalachian Program.

HAUSER: I agree that we have subcultures of poverty.

BREEDEN: Would it also be fair to say that there are subcultures in terms of *regarding* poverty? I think that the white American decision-making process *vis-à-vis* the Negro American may also reflect another kind of inquiry, the decision-making process *vis-à-vis* the poor. There may be stereotypes and standards in terms of the larger culture that confound dealing directly with the problem of poor people.

HUGHES: I would like to ask my question again. Mr. Moynihan answered it by saying that on the political front you have to offer a plan that appeals to everybody in order to achieve a program. I think, however, that the other side is still there. It comes out clearly in all these papers.

Although Mr. Moynihan shows the difference between the Negro labor

force and the white labor force of the 1940's and the 1950's, he shows a comparison between the urban Negro labor force now and the Italian labor force of the 1900's. *That* was a different economy. There is certainly no demand now for unskilled illiterate labor; and the Negroes happen to be unskilled, illiterate, and urban, when that part of the labor force no longer exists. I think that is what Mr. Moynihan is saying in part. And he is saying that the Negro family and social structure is not as well developed, not as well equipped to overcome this handicap by itself. In the 1900's there *was* demand for unskilled labor. Furthermore, the Italians had very strong paternal families. The whole situation was different. Are you not saying, Mr. Moynihan, in part at least, that whatever we do has to be directed toward the present state and the projection of the economy?

MOYNIHAN: I would like to say that if we can decide, at this meeting or any meeting like it, what should be done, there are plenty of people whose business it is to figure out how to do it. That sort of strategy will take care of itself. I think our problem is to decide what is the situation and what should be done about it. We can leave it to others to decide how it should be done.

BERRY: Speaking of the family and the importance of the family in our way of life, I would say categorically that there is no way to strengthen family life among Negroes in the American community until we find a way to give the father his rightful role as breadwinner and protector of his family. There is no other way to do it. We have, in our society, denied the Negro male an opportunity to earn his living properly, to be the head of his family; and then we have engaged in a process of what I refer to as cultural castration by society's unwillingness to let that man protect his family. We have a very strong matriarchal situation in the Negro community.

Furthermore, when you go down the main drags in any big city during working hours, anybody—and especially the kids of the community—will be struck by the fact of the large number of Negro males who stand on the street. One has to come to the conclusion that Negro males do not work—which comes right back to the whole basic problem of the incentive of Negro youth. We have them corralled. We build fences around the kids, so they cannot get out of their compounds, the big ghettos. And again, one of the attributes of cultural poverty is that the kids never get far from home. They do not have any money or any way to ride.

FLEMING: I think we ought to linger a moment on the issue that has been raised about blanketing the problem of Negro poverty under general poverty. One of the questions is: Do these differences call for a difference in legislative approach? I think Mr. Moynihan was saying that any legislative approach is likely to be an over-all approach that does not specifically distinguish color. The second question is: Should these differences be allowed for in the implementation of a general program? This happens to be my own view. I think the legislative provision can be general, but I

think in implementing it the people who are running the program have to be very aware of these differences.

The third question, which I do not think is really dealt with in the papers I read, and which would logically follow the other two questions, is: What can be said thus far, in terms of these differences, about the concept and approach of legislation to combat poverty? To what extent is this approach realistically designed to get at the problems of Negro poverty? And to what extent, as far as we can tell as yet, is it being implemented in a way to allow meaningfully for these differences? I think some analysis of this, even though it is early in the game for the anti-poverty program, would add importantly to the implications of these papers.

FEIN: I would offer the comment that, obviously, among the things necessary are much more than federal programs. Continuing with that observation, I would point out that private programs at one time or another have played favorites. Harvard looked for the football player, or it looked for the young man who did not quite have the grades but came from Arizona, so it could get its geographic mix. If it needed a clarinet player, it discriminated in favor of him. It might well consider—as indeed Harvard undoubtedly has, but other schools have not—discriminating in favor of the Negro.

I would estimate that perhaps one-third to one-half of the poverty of the Negro today is a function of discrimination *today*, that is, not the historical discrimination in education, but the fact that Negroes *with* education are placed in occupations lower than whites with the same education and receive wages lower than whites in those occupations with the same education.

A good deal of the discrimination is not the kind that takes massive compensatory programs, but the kind that takes rather massive change in behavior—change that can come at virtually no cost, except the painful psychological cost to the white community, no economic cost as it were. In business, the president of the firm has usually made sure that his nephew got a job, even if his nephew was not quite up to snuff. All that I would suggest is that he might today make sure that his brother gets a job.

COHEN: I do not think the papers have faced squarely the issue of compensatory treatment, and I do not think we should let this issue evade us. There must be a posture here which we either support or do not support. I do not think we should deal with it peripherally as we do in the papers. I think the case has already been made for compensatory treatment within the framework of a larger program designed to eliminate poverty.

Another question I would like to raise is whether or not, within our present social and economic framework, we can eliminate poverty. I think we can. Mr. Tobin suggests some ways, particularly a tight labor market. I would suggest that a tight labor market is not enough, but rather the techniques must be developed that will provide in one way or another jobs for everyone who is capable of working. Some democratic societies in the world are already well on their way toward this.

I would suggest that as a first matter for discussion we consider compensatory treatment and our attitude toward it.

HAUSER: There are one or two points I want to make that I think are relevant to our present discussion and may perhaps help point up the discussion. I hope that before the morning is over those of us whose papers are under consideration will have the benefit of specific criticisms that suggest modification. For example, I would like to make a suggestion to Mr. Moynihan right now, because it is relevant to the discussion under way.

In his paper, Mr. Moynihan says: "Anyone with eyes to see can observe the emergence of a Negro middle class that is on the whole doing very well. The point about this group is that it has, if anything, rather a preferred position on the job market." In a very limited sense, in the specific type of example that Mr. Moynihan gives, this may be true. However, from the standpoint of implications for action, as we try to distinguish, let us say, the Negro part of the poverty question from cultural poverty in general, it seems to me that the most important differentiation that may be made is that there are at least two distinct kinds of problems which the Negro faces from a remediation standpoint. There is the problem, in the mass, of inadequate opportunity because of inadequate education, lack of occupational skills, family disorganization, etc. The other problem, one that is growing increasingly acute, is that the Negro who has achieved education and occupation is still far from his full position in the American social order. A good part, therefore, of the Negro problem in this sense is the problem of the white. Mr. Berry spoke of it as an image, and this is an essential part of it. I think, however, that there is something much more fundamental than just image-building in the Madison Avenue sense; that is, even if the education and the occupation are held constant, the income of the Negro is still fractional in relation to the white of the same education and the same occupation. In this respect, it might be misleading, even if accurate on this specific point, Mr. Moynihan, to say that the Negro middle class is doing very well. I think the unique part of the Negro problem is that even when the Negro acquires the advantages that limited opportunities precluded for him in the history of this nation, he still is far from achieving the full status that these symbols of education and occupation imply for the white population. This, it seems to me, is where the rub really lies.

We have two kinds of problems. One is compensatory. I will support compensatory education in the sense that what we are talking about is making up for deficiencies in opportunity, what we call cultural disadvantage—only in that sense does this phrase have any meaning to me—and in the sense that compensatory education is needed for white or Negro when there is disadvantaged cultural background. But in addition, the stigma—the Negro's position in the American society, even after he attains the educational and occupational characteristics—seems to me to be the unique aspect of the Negro problem to which we should very firmly address ourselves.

PARRIS: I think Mr. Hauser hit the nail on the head for us. I would

like to attempt to differentiate fundamentally between the two phrases: *compensatory treatment*, which means one thing, and *a special effort*, as there are special efforts required by government or by a private sector to do something on behalf of the individual Negro. There are compensatory treatments that must be given to the large masses of young people in the schools, the young people who, because of 300 years of deprivation, cannot make up. I hope, however, that we do not get confused as our *New York Times* friends got confused three years ago. Whitney Young talked about *special effort*, and everybody began to talk about *compensatory treatment*. We never used that phrase.

MOYNIHAN: I think that we have a very strong tendency in this country to rush past problems toward solutions. We have just begun to discuss this problem, and our first subject is compensatory treatment to solve it. The question is: *what* problem? I think that the most important thing to be done in this whole area is to clarify whether, as Mr. Hughes says, this is a special problem. I think it is, and I think that the special quality of the problem is not generally understood. I feel strongly that it is not understood in the federal government.

I think that until we can reach agreement on what is special about the problem, the solutions we get are likely to be solutions to different problems. For example, both Mr. Berry and Mr. Turner talked about the problem of the Negro male, and I think this is a problem, but the federal government does not know about it. I have spent four and a half years in the middle of this thing, and I think I know the federal government. The government knows about the problem of Negro employment, but the idea of the problem of the employment of the Negro male is a new problem. It has not occurred to anybody. In this respect, I can give you a very exact example of what compensatory treatment does.

Four years ago—it is no secret—we found that the Negro American was not employed in the federal government at very decent levels or in very good numbers. We decided to enact a very explicit policy that Negroes were more equal than others with regard to employment, and we set out to hire them. There was no question about it; given any doubt, it was resolved on behalf of the Negro. We made a specific effort to get Negroes.

When I was working on my paper for this conference, I called up our employment officer and asked him: "Could you tell me how many Negroes we have working in the Department of Labor?" He said: "There are 1,819." (Or whatever the precise figure was.) I said: "How many of them are women? How many are men?" And he practically said, without saying a word: "You mean, in Esther Peterson's department, you ask such a question? We do not discriminate against women." And it is true. However, being a calm, decent civil servant, he said: "It must be in the computer. I will get the information." And two weeks later he reported back to me something that seems immensely important. In the Department of Labor, at the nonprofessional levels—which will pay up to as much as \$8,500 a year and are good jobs—Negro women outnumber Negro men four to one.

This man, our employment officer, had been working very hard to solve the problem, and indeed he had. Nineteen per cent of our employees are Negro. This is a record of achievement. But had he helped the families of the Negro men whose wives he had hired, or had he hurt them? I do not know which he had done, but I know that he did not know he had the problem Mr. Berry tells us he had. And if that is the problem, we have to get that clear, or we are solving another problem.

You can stand in front of the Department of Labor any morning at eight-thirty, and it is a sight: spectacularly well-dressed, competent, beautiful young women, in expensive clothes, getting out of the front seats of taxicabs, going up to work on the third floor on carpeting, spending the day on the phone with the Attorney General and seeing ambassadors, then coming home and asking the old man, what did you do today?

BERRY: Or else they cannot find a husband who fits their station.

REDDING: This goes back, of course, to another problem. The Negro women in America have been educated at the expense of the men, simply because they have been more welcome in the labor market. Something seems to need some attention here.

PETTIGREW: I think this male-female matter, particularly in the labor force, is a crucial point; but I would like to go back to what Mr. Hauser was saying in terms of two different problems. I thought he put it well, but, in defense of what Mr. Moynihan has in his paper, I think an additional point can be made. I also made a similar point in my paper, so I am defending mine as well as Mr. Moynihan's.

While there are two distinctly different problems, I think that so far the Negro American revolution has clearly made progress only on one—the upgrading of people who already have skills. Essentially, we can predict that the Negro American middle class will be in the affluent mid-stream in fifteen or twenty years. This is where real progress is being made, and many well-intentioned whites look around and see this conspicuous progress and feel that the revolution is really quite a success. In point of fact, it is hardly touching the second problem. I think perhaps that Mr. Moynihan was really implying not that there is no problem remaining at the middle-class state, but that this is where progress is in fact being pushed, and that the second—the other Negro America—has really been ignored not just by government, but by the revolution itself.

WILSON: Let me try to restate the answer to the question on compensatory treatment. It seems to me that Mr. Moynihan is right in urging us to think clearly about our objectives. Perhaps the way to do this, without losing sight of the compensatory issue, is to say that this is one of two factors we must keep in mind. On the one hand, we are having this meeting, and many more meetings will be held, because there is something special. We are not sure exactly how it is special in all the details, but we sense that it *is* special. Perhaps compensatory treatment in some sense is called for.

The other factor that we have to keep in mind, which Mr. Berry men-

tioned, is that we are dealing here with the Negro male head of household. The reason that his employment is crucial, it seems to me, is that this is the way we give self-respect to men; we make them breadwinners and heads of household, capable of enduring unemployment or even poverty without the disintegration or the loss of self-respect that now is the real pathology of this issue. It is possible to devise all sorts of compensatory treatments that will make the self-respect problem worse, not better. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is in a real sense a compensatory project in the United States today, and I think it is subsidizing many of the worst features of the problem. I do not want to reject it—we have to do something—but it is a far cry from an ideal solution. There are many other compensatory strategies, various make-work and public-welfare programs, which could make the self-respect problem worse. Mr. Moynihan gave us an example from the Department of Labor.

We have the need for a special effort, because there is something special here; but we also have to define that special effort so that it is likely to increase the self-respect, stability, and economic power of the Negro male. If we think of these as two constraints, perhaps we will have a greater range for exploration than if we take compensatory treatment in some sense as our objective or as what we are trying to maximize.

GEERTZ: I want to address myself to the problem that was raised by Mr. Hauser, Mr. Berry, and Mr. Pettigrew. It is essentially a class problem. The thing that struck me about the three papers on this problem was the lack of attention—although I think the data are there—to internal social stratification within the Negro community. We all spend a great deal of time on the relationship between the whole society and the Negro's position in it, but we do not know very much about what the Negro middle class is, what it means to talk about the Negro middle class, how big it is, what it is doing, etc. I think it is a very serious question that Mr. Moynihan and Mr. Pettigrew raised—about the sort of vicious cycle in which some parts of the Negro community are gaining from the revolution while others are not. We really know very little about who belongs where and how many people are in what categories. We still, I think, have an image of the Negro middle class from Franklin Frazier's work, which after all was done a long time ago. We do not really have much sense of how and on what basis the internal social stratification of the Negroes is organized.

I think the problem that Mr. Berry raised is very important. The whole question about what is called in anthropology the matricentral family, or the matrifocal problem, has been studied very comparatively. The "absent father," the concentration on women and sometimes on the line of women as the core of the family, has been found associated with any kind of a class system where there is either a quasi-industrial or a quasi-modern situation and an ascriptive occupational role system for the male, no matter what sort of system it is. This supports what Mr. Berry said very strongly. This phenomenon has been studied in the Caribbean by Raymond Smith. It has been studied in Central America. My wife studied it in Java. (Incidentally, as a footnote, I do not particu-

larly believe in the culture of poverty. I think it has been established for Mexico. Whether it will hold true for Harlem is, I think, a very, very big question.) And there are some aspects of it which are very clear. One thing that is clear is that there is a relationship between a certain kind of class system—an ascriptive class occupational system—and this kind of family structure.

To go back to my other problem, if we look into the social stratification within the American Negro community and try to see if there are differences in family organization between middle-class and lower-class Negroes, then assuming we can figure out what this means—figure out who is in what category and what it means to be a middle-class Negro within the Negro community—we will get somewhere. This is the one thing the papers (which I think are of very high caliber) have not given the attention it deserves. “The Negro population,” *“the Negro American,”* is not conceptually differentiated enough by us. We do not have enough grasp of the differentiation—culturally, structurally, and so on—of the Negro population from within, the internal view of it. I think this is a good place to start, because the whole problem of stratification has been raised here. It is obviously central. What we know about the stratification system of the Negro community as such, rather than the position of the Negro community in the wider society of which we are all fairly clear, is very little. I think that more attention might be given to figuring out how many middle-class Negro Americans there are, what it means to say a Negro American is middle-class, what middle-class means in this kind of subsociety.

PARSONS: I strongly endorse that. It seems to me some very interesting themes have begun to emerge. I would like first, relative to Mr. Hauser's comment on the general culture of poverty, to raise the question of the significance that will be highlighted by Appalachia versus Harlem and South-Side Chicago or, of course, the Black Belt of Alabama versus Harlem and South-Side Chicago, of the significance of the shift of the poor-Negro center of gravity from the rural area to the big city. This is a distinction not only with respect to the culture of poverty itself, but with respect to the forces to which these people are exposed. That is, I think the general upgrading process of immigrant populations in this country has been almost directly a function of their locating in the big urban community, where they are exposed to quite different forces from those of the rural situation. However, there is also the vicious-circle phenomenon.

Several remarks have been made by several people about the status of the nonpoor Negro groups and their relation to the whole Negro community. It seems to me this raises an exceedingly important question. There is now quite a bit of knowledge of the fact that, even though previously disadvantaged groups—perhaps none of them as severely disadvantaged as the Negro—have made their way very substantially in American society, they still retain (as the Moynihan and Glazer study of New York shows) not merely image identity but a very considerable structurally differentiated position in the society. There is a Jewish subsociety in the big

city. It is not merely a Jewish subculture. There is still an Irish subsociety, merging over into a more general Catholic subsociety.

My own view is that the problem of compensatory treatment must be linked with the problem of what the higher level, relatively specific niche for Negro leadership and higher-status Negro groups in the society can evolve toward and is evolving toward. I think the color-blind formula neglects the importance of this kind of differentiatedness, that there should be a distinction between status levels. By status level, there is no group in the whole society, not excluding the white Protestant Anglo-Saxons, that is equal to the Jews, if you take some sort of an ethnic criterion. The Jews are the highest major group in the whole society. On the other hand, Jews are not randomly distributed through the higher reaches of society, and they have a community solidarity of their own. My prediction would be that the Negro evolution is going to have more of this character than that of a random distribution. At least I think we need to consider these problems. They link up very closely with what Mr. Geertz was saying about the differentiation of the Negro community.

GRAUBARD: The point that Mr. Moynihan raised is a very legitimate one. It does seem that these four papers see "the" problem differently. Perhaps Mr. Moynihan should speak for himself, but I think the implication of his paper is that the thing to pay first attention to is the family. The implication of Mr. Tobin's paper is that the thing to pay first attention to is unemployment. Mr. Hauser does not make it quite as clear, but I think that the matter of birth rate and the deprivation that occurs within the family is the problem that he is particularly struck by. Mr. Fein, because his is more a profile paper, has simply tried to show all the social and economic disabilities that continue to prevail. It seems to me that the question that Mr. Moynihan has raised does need some further exploration. What is the problem, so to speak, that we will choose to emphasize in this volume?

COHEN: While I was pushing for preferential treatment, I was not neglecting the fact that there is a constellation of problems, each of which must receive attention. I was merely talking about preferential treatment as a policy.

I believe that in the papers there is one problem which is not adequately emphasized. It is referred to, but it deserves, I think, a more important place. The problem is education, a chance at the beginning. As I look at the area in New York in which I live, the schools to which my children go, I see a generation of Negro youngsters who, barring some miracle, are largely headed for the scrap heap. This is duplicated in major cities around the country. I think we are beginning to deal with the problem through Operation Head Start and other means, but we only dimly perceive, I think, the kind of heroic measures that are necessary. This aspect of the problem of providing educated and trained people who fit into the economy of our society is not adequately dealt with.

ROSSI: I would like to sound a skeptical note concerning the meaning of

the patterns of family disorganization which are presently characteristic of the Negro population. There is a serious question of whether such disorganization is a symptom or a cause. In the history of sociological concern with social problems, we have gone through at least one earlier period of intense concern with family disorganization, blaming this condition and its prevalence for a wide variety of other "pathological manifestations," ranging from poverty to mental disorder. The general conclusion which was drawn from a decade's research in the thirties was that family disorganization was a symptomatic rather than fundamental cause. If the same reasoning were to apply to the disorganization presently manifested by Negro families, then Mr. Tobin's paper would seem to me to have sounded the proper note: Raise the economic position of the Negro population and its family structure will take care of itself. There is another reason for emphasizing the view of family disorganization as symptom rather than cause: the family, as such, is a very difficult institution to affect directly. An over-emphasis on this factor tends to make the case look hopeless, while an emphasis on elements of the life chances of Negroes which in turn would strengthen family structure presents a much more optimistic picture. The problem is what are the social policies, which, if instituted, would improve the position of the Negro population and at the same time improve the general level of Negro family life. If we take Mr. Moynihan's statistics seriously, bolstering the economic position of Negro males would help a great deal as would strengthening the institutions of social control in Negro areas. We know too little whether it is necessary to have a male in the household in order to achieve proper socialization. Certainly, we know quite definitely that children from homes in which mothers are employed full-time are not different in a variety of ways from those whose mothers are full-time housewives. I expect that we would find the presence or absence of a father equally unimportant, even though from our middle-class Freud-saturated viewpoint it doesn't look right.

HAUSER: I would like to support the emphasis on education, suggested by Mr. Cohen, as perhaps one of the major points, certainly with respect to program and remediation, that is to be involved. But I think it must be put into a context. I do not think we can pick any one of these things without having in mind the entire constellation.

I do not know whether others were similarly struck with this, but having accepted this assignment, in playing around with what the data might show, in deriving what I did from Orshansky's special tabulation on poverty, I ran into what to me is the most horrible statistic I have ever run into in some thirty-five years of statisticking. I refer to the fact that in Negro families with children under eighteen years of age, 62 per cent of all the children in these families are being reared in poverty, by the 22-cents-per-meal definition that Sargent Shriver has now adopted. In the Negro families with five or more children, we get an astonishing figure: 81 per cent of all those children are being reared in poverty. If we adopt the somewhat more rigorous definition of poverty, the one that provides the luxury of 26-cents-per-meal-per-capita, then the figure is almost com-

plete: 94 per cent of all the Negro children in families with five or more children are in poverty.

I will close with this thought. There are some who feel that much of the worrying about antipoverty programs is nonsense, because the only trouble with the poor is that they need more money. Someone has estimated that it would take about \$13 billion. Why don't we appropriate the money, give it to them, and forget about all this other nonsense? I think one of the things that should be brought home here is that the solution to the problem of the poor is not simply more money, that money alone does not cure poverty. There is an interaction of a whole constellation of factors, including family disorganization, including the lack of education and skill, including the stigma attached to the status, which is doubled, as Mr. Berry has said, when the face is black; and all these things have to be treated as a bundle.

HUGHES: It must be stressed that the structure of the modern labor force and the way of getting into it have changed. Apprenticeship is disappearing, and schooling is taking its place.

It has been mentioned that we now have a new kind of labor force and that the way of getting into it is changing. I hope that the labor-force experts will consider the future of the Negro in terms of what the labor force is going to be and how one is going to get into it. The Negro's integration into the economy has to be in terms of the economy as it is *going* to be.

BERRY: I certainly agree with Mr. Hauser that money is not everything; but I am reminded of a comment that our national director has made, a comment I certainly agree with also. He said it is much better for a Negro to be able to say "I is rich" than "I am poor."

When we were discussing what the data show, it occurred to me that among the most important things that could come out of this conference are the things that the data do not show. For instance, we know where Negroes are in terms of earning level; they earn a little over half as much as their white brothers. One of the things, it seems to me, that is awfully important is an assault on the color tax on the darker brother—how much more we charge him for the same things, how much more we charge him to live. It is clearest in housing, but it exists in everything else—in interest rates, in shoddy merchandise, and in shyster merchants who prey upon the darker brother and take from him in greater proportion the little that he has been able to attain. Thus, when Mr. Hauser talks about the 22-cent meal, in the Negro neighborhood it may end up being an 18-cent meal; but the Negro paid 22 cents for it, so his kids are still in trouble.

I would hope that when we talk about a special effort (and I do not care whether it is a special effort or preferential treatment), it is not just education. It has to be education and jobs, too. It has to be education and jobs for the Negro *male*. We can do all these things in Operation Head Start. We can do compensatory education. But if the family structure is still not there, we have not done very much. We have not done very

much at all for the children, if we do not help the family structure mean what it is supposed to mean, according to the rules that Negroes have to play the game with—the white middle-class rules.

HAUSER: You should add not only education and jobs, but education, jobs, *and* the same level of income. We are now getting the Negro who has the education and has the job that looks the same as the professional job in a classification system, but he still gets 60 per cent of the income.

BERRY: It is worse than that in Chicago, Mr. Hauser, because at the median level in 1960 the white high-school dropout was earning 10 per cent more than the Negro college graduate.

HAUSER: We might add this note. One of our graduate students working with Mr. Rossi at the National Opinion Research Center has actually been able to estimate the cost of being a Negro. On the average, it costs \$1,000 a year.

MOYNIHAN: I do not want to leave the subject of family structure. I do not insist for a moment that this is the most important thing. What is clear is that this is the most important discontinuity between the white world and the Negro world and, secondly, that most of us assume that this is important. But is it important, and if so, in what way? Mr. Berry clearly thinks that this is fundamentally important. Mr. Rossi raises the question: Is it at all? I do not think there was any difference between Dr. Tobin's paper and my paper. I assume he was saying that employment is fundamental because that is how families live, and I was saying employment is fundamental because that is how families live. But then, it seems to me that there is some evidence over the past five years, and maybe it is a trend in the last fifteen, that these very direct relationships between family structure and employment are beginning to break down.

Until recently, the rise and fall in family indicators have followed just beautifully the rise and fall in male unemployment, but suddenly the connection is breaking. I have a chart in my paper which shows the number of new AFDC cases and the Negro male unemployment rate. I could also have shown the figures on married families, husband's absence, or a dozen other such things, and you would see that they all work together very well. In the past five years, however, that connection has begun to break down. So I think we have to raise the question whether employment will do the job it could have done fifteen years ago with respect to family structure. The thing I would like to hear from this group is, what about it? Is family structure so fundamentally related to employment that until the Negro family is in roughly comparable circumstances with the white family, we are not going to get comparable results?

COLES: For the last four or five years, I have been following some families in both rural and urban situations in the South and in the North. It is interesting what happens if, for instance, a Negro migrant family or sharecropper family wants to get out of the rural area and come into the city. The whole family situation changes. I think that a lot of us want to enforce legislation that will prevent migrant children from working. We are

very concerned with their education. I am not so sure, however, that in taking migrant children away from their mothers and putting them into school systems in the South, we are really solving much. I think I am getting around to the idea that Mr. Rossi brought up earlier, suggesting that we think about whether the matriarchal family actually is detrimental and, if so, where and when.

I think that in the rural areas it is one thing to talk about a matriarchal family and whether it is detrimental or not, and in the urban situation it is quite another. The families I have seen seem to function quite well—so long as we look at it in terms of what they are facing and what they want to do and how they get along with one another—in, say, Belle Glade, Florida, or the Black Belt of Alabama. Then they go up to Boston or New York. The mother no longer is with her children working in the fields. She tries to get a job and probably does, as a maid. The children are left alone. The family starts disintegrating. The father, if there is one, goes on relief, or the whole family goes on relief.

We are appalled by the fact that in the rural areas families make less than \$1,000 a year working; but they *are* working and they *are* together, even if they are wandering all over the country in a disorganized state as *we* look at it. What happens when they come into the cities—and this is where we ought to think of it in terms of rural-urban as well as black-white and all the others—is that the families, I think, disintegrate. They are unprepared for the kind of city living that we experience, that we know about, and that we tend to think of in terms of “America.” I think the millions of people who have only in the last twenty or thirty years—one or two generations at the most—come into the cities have not quite made the adaptation from rural living, with all of its implications for family structure, to the urban situation. The consequent disintegration in the city of this kind of family structure is something that we might talk about.

TURNER: One of the issues that we are impressed with in these four papers is the notion of the powerlessness of the Negro, powerlessness in terms of the ability to cope with the present system. This is almost a cliché, and I hesitate to use it except that it is a meaningful cliché. We assume here, and I think correctly, that closing the gap between Negro and white, with reference to the indices that we have been discussing, is a desirable thing.

The importance of the family may be that it provides certain kinds of resources that are not otherwise available for coping with the system. The family can provide a continuity of resources over a period of generations. In a sense, a family of the type being discussed needs to multiply resource and power over a period of time and without some mechanism by which these can get passed along it is very difficult to accumulate a sufficient depth of resources to enable the family to break through to reasonably stable and independent living. The family also provides a kind of discipline that is important for minority groups; that is, it helps in setting up long-term goals and in making the sacrifices without too much hardship, and thus it enables its members to regain resources to cope with and get on top of the system. The family provides, further, a

peculiar kind of socialization, not just socialization into a class structure, but the socialization into a minority group that is coping effectively with the system, which is a distinct function.

We are not talking about family, then, so much in terms of whether or not people get along with each other in the family and whether there is love, etc., but really in terms of whether or not that family is able to provide protection, able to provide the socialization functions, and able to provide the basic necessities of life which people need to cope with the system. This is why family becomes important. It is a cell from which energy has to come and for which we so far have not been able to develop very much in the way of substitutes. If we look at minority groups in a variety of cultures such as Hawaii we find that some type of family structure has been used very much in these ways to enable minority groups to cope more effectively with whatever dominant culture they were in.

PARSONS: I think the Jewish family is classic.

HANDLIN: I agree with what Mr. Turner says; but I really would like to get back to Dr. Coles' point, because I am sure he did not wish to imply that the fact that the family is more adequate in the rural setting is the reason it should stay in the rural setting. The fact is that, although the family is more adequate there, these people prefer to come to the city. They see some gains in migration that outweigh the solidarity of the status they had in the rural setting. I myself believe that most disorders are an incident in rural-urban migration. They have a particular force on the Negro group because of its history and culture, but comparable disorders appeared in this stage of urban migration even among the Jewish immigrants, to whom Mr. Parsons referred.

The reason this is important is that there may be a basis for doubting that simple gross increase in income is going to solve these problems. Sometimes an increase in income increases the incidence of disorder in family life. Whether the net effect of raising the income is to strengthen the family solidarity or not depends a good deal on the way in which it comes, the direction in which it is channeled, and the effects it has on the functional role of the individuals in the family.

Measures to reduce the rate of unemployment are intrinsically useful and worth pursuing, but I am not sure that simply a reduction in the rate of unemployment from 5 per cent to 3 per cent is going to have much effect on the Negro or even that it will have much effect on the problem.

WILSON: I am not sure whether there is an answer to this question. If it is answerable, I would hope that this might be a supplementary paper that we could bring into the volume. It seems to me that we are trying to differentiate, as Mr. Geertz said we ought to, if not the whole Negro American culture, then at least the lower-income groups. There are those who are simply pathologically poor, who would not benefit either from welfare programs or from a gross increase in income. There are those who are on the edge, perhaps, where the male is functionally illiterate, and even though there are jobs as cab drivers in his city, he cannot get

one because he cannot read a street sign. If we can change that strategic factor, we can change a great deal. There are others who have low incomes but strong families and, as was pointed out, can cope. I think that coping is an absolutely crucial element in this.

I do not think that the literature we have available before us provides us with any sense of the magnitudes involved here. Can we differentiate the lower-income groups into the pathological, the marginally pathological, and the nonpathological? It seems to me that what we are trying to do here, whether we call it special treatment or not, is not to make lower-income Negroes middle-income Negroes. We are trying to convert the pathological poor into the stable poor, to permit them not only to cope but to advance. Is there a body of data, which we could consider now and which could be brought into this volume, which would give us some sense of the magnitudes involved in these various groups? Also, what are the determinants of them? Why does a particular family or individual wind up in one group of poor rather than in another?

BERRY: Mr. Wilson, it is also very important, in terms of looking at this poverty effort, to determine whether we are concerned with improving the *condition* of the poor or their *status*.

GEERTZ: That is almost exactly what I was going to say. I would like to say a little bit more, however. When I was talking before about the relationship between the male role in society and the type of family, all I intended was to connect it with status, particularly with whether status is ascribed or achieved—whether there is much mobility, whether it is possible for people to move up. If the male cannot move up—if he does not have the mobility and the status of a family is not dependent on this—the family tends to become matricentral. So the question, to go to Professor Handlin's point, certainly is not simply one of income; that is, just having more money would not necessarily strengthen the family. In this society, occupational mobility is the main route to status. So the reason that, in a poverty program, we should not just distribute the largess is that it will have no effect upon the stratification system. If it is distributed through the occupational system, it will have a fundamental effect upon the stratification system and a fundamental effect upon the family.

This comes back to something else. (I cannot remember who said this.) The real point, I think, is where we are going to attack in an attempt to reconstruct the Negro family, which, I agree with Mr. Berry, is absolutely critical. I think that attacking the problem through the occupational system and through employment is obviously strategic. It is not income as such, although income is obviously correlated with it. It is income that flows through the occupational system which will change the status of the Negro male, and *that* will change the status of the family. To be perfectly honest, I can, as an anthropologist, think of no other way in which one could directly affect the family, except perhaps through some kind of social work, which I think is useful only in the short run. In the long run, unless the Negro male's position in the occupational structure changes, nothing much else is going to change.

HAUSER: I just want to make a footnote reference to the desirability of differentiating within the Negro community on a class or stratification basis. I think the point that Mr. Geertz made and that Mr. Wilson spoke to is a fundamental one. The unfortunate thing is that at the moment these suggestions are, I think, proposals for research to be done, rather than for analysis of data which now exist. I want to add, however, that the tapes which are now available on a sample basis through the Census Bureau may permit tabulations specifically aimed at at least exploiting what the Census can tell us about this. It will tell us more than anything we yet have. Presumably this cannot be done for purposes of *Dædalus* in September; but if there is some by-product of this discussion, it might well be to point up the importance of at least exploiting what is available through the Census Bureau along these lines.

Partly to get Mr. Tobin to enter the conversation, I want to add another footnote. It is ironic that the best way, if we follow the logic in Mr. Tobin's paper, to improve the status of the Negro on the economic front—and certainly the best way that our society has yet discovered—is to find some way to get into a war. My own analysis of fluctuations in the unemployment rates and differentials between white and nonwhite over the years has shown very conclusively that the Negro never has it so good as in a war.

TOBIN: From an economic point of view, it was not the fact that we were in a war that made the Negro's occupational and economic status improve relatively to the white's during the decade 1940-50. It was the existence of a tight labor market. The tight labor market was created by the war, but war is not the only way to create a tight labor market. We can create it in peacetime if we have the will to do so. We did have a tight labor market from 1946 to 1956. I think that many of the difficulties which seem so pressing to us today, we would not find so pressing if during the subsequent years, from 1957 to now, we had run the economy at the same degree of high pressure as during the first ten years after the war, even if not at the wartime degree of high pressure. We can see, also, that before the war, in the Depression, when the economy was very loosely run, much of the progress that had previously occurred in the relative status of the Negro was wiped out. Then the war brought it back, broke new ground.

I would like to comment on Mr. Wilson's remark which, I think, had to do with the question whether there are types of poverty, or groups who are in poverty situations, which general economic progress, prosperity, low unemployment, etc., will not affect. Undoubtedly there are such groups. However, that is not our problem here today. The main problem is in respect to *Negro* economic status. It is certainly true that in a society in general, we run into diminishing returns in the reduction of poverty from general economic progress. We get more and more hard cases who, because of personal disabilities of one kind or another, are not going to be helped by general progress. They will constitute a larger share of the poor, and it is much harder to pull them up just by prosperity.

That would seem not to be the case with Negroes. I saw a study

of Locke Anderson's on the relationship between the median incomes of various groups in the society and general, or over-all, median income. There are some groups whose income has almost no relationship at all to the general median income. The median income for the society as a whole can go up, and nothing happens to the median income of farmers, for example. They are insensitive to general prosperity. But the median income of Negroes is highly sensitive to general prosperity. A 1 per cent increase in general median income increases the median income of non-whites by 1.5 per cent, according to Anderson's calculations. So we have not yet come to the stage where we have reduced Negro poverty to such a hard core that it is not going to be touched by prosperity. Since we have not done enough, we are still in a phase where the returns from general prosperity are very high for the Negro. This means that a change from 5 per cent to 3 per cent unemployment is much more dramatic than those numbers indicate. It means a lot more than just putting 2 per cent of the labor force back to work. I have tried to explain that in my paper. It means that the whole tone of the economy is different.

One further comment concerns just plain income as against income received through employment—through occupational upgrading and so on. Obviously the latter is what we prefer; the ultimate objective is to make the general economy and the earning capacities of Negroes such that they will *earn* incomes comparable to the rest of the population through the labor market, through the occupational structure. However, I would not discount the value of just plain income, because it seems to me that conditions of life also affect future earning capacity. Alleviating inequality in consumption standards, even by just plain handouts, if you want to call them that, can help to get the next generation of Negroes and even some of the current generation into the position where they can earn their incomes from occupation rather than handout. So I do not think it is right to discount improvements, for example, in Aid for Dependent Children, to make public assistance not only more generous but less demoralizing.

HUGHES: I have a statistical question for Mr. Tobin and the others. In view of the so-called Frazier effect, does median income as a measure mean the same for Negroes as for whites? Has anybody gone into whether the measure has the same meaning for Negroes as for whites?

HAUSER: Median income has a lot of different meanings, certainly on a family basis, because Negro family income is more apt to be the result of multiple workers than is white family income. This, therefore, can have a quite different meaning for each person involved, as well as for the entire familial unit, from the standpoint of consumption patterns and needs, including what we might think of as overhead needs for getting that family income, quite apart from the other discussion that Mr. Moynihan goes into.

HUGHES: I meant median as such. How about the distribution around the Negro median income?

HAUSER: It is a distorted distribution.

WILSON: I am not an economist, but I would like to be presumptuous enough to agree with Mr. Tobin in calling attention to the fact that we ought not to discount aggregate demand. Surely if there is any one thing we can do, that one thing must be to reduce unemployment and to create the maximum number of job opportunities at all skill levels. My concern, however, is with the figures Mr. Moynihan gives, the ones that Mr. Hauser just alluded to. These figures trouble me. We should try to figure out now—at a time when the unemployment rate is relatively high and we have a considerable amount of political interest in dealing with poverty—how much of what we regard as the low-income Negro problem would disappear with an increase in economic activity and employment; for at a time when the unemployment rate has fallen, we may have lost, because of our political structure (something we may want to discuss later on), the impetus for dealing with the problem. We may then discover it cannot be eliminated by aggregate methods.

I have a feeling that because of the fact that income is earned rather differently by Negroes than by whites—because of multiple workers, because of the importance of the Negro woman as a wage earner, because of discriminatory patterns—that it behooves us now to make a judgment as to how big this category is of Negro families who would not be substantially improved by the reduction in unemployment from 5 to 3 per cent. I quite agree that reducing unemployment is an extraordinarily important thing both for Negroes and for whites, but the question is, for how many Negroes. I have a feeling that if we do not make the judgment now and try to design the policy in that area now, the political steam which we can now generate around the 5 per cent unemployment figure may be lost to us.

FEIN: I can think of no area, in the whole gamut of things that one ought to do, where it would be less important to make that judgment in advance. I say that for two reasons. First, I can think of no area—education, health, etc.—where one could get progress as rapidly as in lowering the unemployment rate, if one decided to do it. If it were going to take us twenty-five years to see the effects of the program and then we had to redesign the program, that would be a case where we would have to make guesses. But this can take such a short period of time that we can afford the luxury of doing it and seeing what happens. Second, as for the political steam that would disappear, I have yet to discern the political steam that has been generated by the 5 per cent unemployment rate. I do not see the political steam that is trying to lower it to 3 per cent; so I am afraid we would not even lose very much of that.

MOYNIHAN: I really am depressed by that comment. I can speak on that point, because we have with us today one of the men responsible for our problem: Professor Tobin. When we came down to Washington four and a half years ago, everybody talked about unemployment, unemployment, unemployment. We had to get through something about unemployment; and indeed when President Kennedy took office, there

were more people out of work than at any moment since the Depression. What turned out was that "unemployment" was the shorthand for "economic growth."

The country just had not been growing in the 1950's. We had barely been keeping pace with our population. We got ourselves three men on the Council of Economic Advisers who tried playing around with the economy, and within fourteen days of their arrival—it is a statistical fact—the economy began to grow and has not stopped growing for fifty-four months. In the last fifty-four months we have raised our level of GNP by \$150 billion. The country is swimming in money. The problem most people are thinking about is *too much* money—too many automobiles, etc.

Suddenly, once we solved the problem of economic growth, we found, at least from the Department of Labor's point of view, that people were no longer that interested in the problem of unemployment. We can go on with 5 per cent unemployment for the rest of our lives as far as the country is concerned, if we go on adding GNP at the rate of 5 per cent a year. I do not think we can get anybody in this country very interested in unemployment as such. How can anybody be interested? No one believes the figures. On the other hand, the fact of poverty is still there. The fact of welfare, of course, is unmistakably there. In any event, you can blame Mr. Tobin for our present dilemma.

TOBIN: I do not know what I am being blamed for.

HAUSER: Economic growth.

TOBIN: After all, Mr. Moynihan, it was not just GNP. I do not know if you are interpreting the results of the past four years as evidence that increasing aggregate demand does not alleviate the problem of unemployment. That is just plain wrong, because it has reduced it considerably in all groups.

You make me feel like a doctor who tells a patient that he ought to take three pills a day, and the patient takes one and then comes back and says, "Look, I've been taking one, and I feel much better; but I am still not all well." So the doctor is to blame?

PARSONS: There is one rather specific point I would like to make. We hear a great deal about the importance of job qualifications and, specifically, educational qualifications. Wouldn't the judgment of the hard-core problem and many of the repercussions of measures to increase employment have to depend on the selectivity of demand for labor with respect to qualifications? There are several people here, I am sure, who could comment on this.

HAUSER: I want to propose something for general reaction. I think it is relevant here. Reduction of unemployment still does not solve the problem of the Negro American. In Cook County, for example, the proportion of Negroes on welfare and relief—that is, unemployed—is something like three times the proportion of Negroes in the population. The question is—and this combines remedies in a way in which they are generally

not put together—in focusing on the economic problem of the Negro American simultaneously with tremendous growth, whether we may find the need for perhaps deliberately designing what we call, in the developing areas, intensive labor projects. Because of the factor that Mr. Hughes was stressing a little while ago, the increasing differentially higher rate of displacement of the Negro by reason of his particular status and his arrival at a time when a lesser skill involves a greater economic penalty than was true of immigrants before him, we may have to design labor projects to give the Negro who is uneducated, unskilled, and, in a sense, uneducable if he is above some adult age (it is getting to be thirty-five in some industries) something to do by which he could get an income other than a handout.

If I may mention one specific case, take the packing-house workers. This packing-house union worked out an arrangement for retraining, presumably to get their workers transferred from the packing houses to other industries, and with retraining, they remain indefinitely unemployed. The notion I want to present is that although I agree completely with Mr. Tobin's aggregative approach, I think we may again have a special situation, requiring special treatment, which may mean we have to have a WPA or a PWA program or its equivalent, simultaneously with all the other things we have.

I would offer one other remark, Mr. Tobin. Looking at the four recessions we have had since the end of the war, I think that in each case if there had not been a USSR we should have invented one, because it turned out to be the best contracyclical device that our economy has yet discovered. The Berlin Wall, Korea, Sputnik—these are, somehow or other, statistically very much associated with the increase in government expenditures that took us or helped take us out of each of the recessions we have experienced since the end of the war. It may be that Vietnam and the Dominican Republic are preventing us from a further recession by continued prolongation of this economic growth.

TOBIN: I do not think that is entirely fair. It is certainly true that the political climate has been such that government expenditures for defense purposes are more easily passed through Congress—they seem more legitimate somehow—than other kinds of government expenditures. However, Sputnik was followed by a period of curtailment of government expenditures. This was one of the reasons for the recession of 1960. The more recent progress in the economy has been due to tax cuts rather than to increase in government expenditures. Government expenditure is not the only way to do the job.

HAUSER: We took this tax cut, though, before we had a recession.

TOBIN: We do not have to have recessions.

HAUSER: I am not disagreeing with you; if anything, I am just emphasizing the importance of going beyond what we have yet done to achieve this objective on a peacetime basis.

TOBIN: I think that is a very good point, because the War on Poverty

and the Great Society—presuming that foreign involvements do not divert us from all this—give us an opportunity for the kind of legitimate expansionary fiscal policy, other than war, which we can and should exploit in two ways. First, we should be able to exploit it just from an aggregate-demand point of view, to get the kind of continuing fiscal stimulus to the economy that we need on a global level. Then we should be able to exploit it to see that the nature of the expenditures is such that they do, in a specific manner, the job of the War on Poverty that we want to get done anyway. For example, the last tax cut was a purely fiscal measure, to beef up aggregate demand. It has little to be said for it in terms of equity, in terms of structural reform, in terms of improving the position of low-income groups such as the Negroes. Some aspects of it do; but basically it was a neutral tax cut for the economy as a whole. I know that Secretary Dillon, when he left office, said that the most important job remaining in the tax field was better treatment at the low-income end. If we can harness the need for future fiscal stimulus to better income-maintenance programs and to other expenditures which would do some of the specific jobs we are interested in—not just transfers or tax deductions—then we can kill two birds with one stone.

COHEN: I think the implications of Mr. Wilson's remarks are that we require some kind of over-all strategy, and I think there are a number of interlocking strategies which might add up to a grand design. Mr. Tobin has given us a strategy in the economic field. We need one in education; and we need one in the social field to deal with problems of housing, family, self-image, etc. I think we are lacking in these other strategies, none of which can be effective by itself. Regarding Mr. Tobin's strategy, I feel that it is lacking in that it accepts the fact of a large, permanently unemployed group. I believe his point on assuring a living standard in the absence of an earning capacity makes that assumption; and, therefore, I strongly endorse Mr. Hauser's point that we must have in our society the capacity to provide jobs for those who are physically able.

BERRY: It seems to me that in our discussion this morning, we are talking about this business of improving conditions—feed the people and work them in some kind of way; and we have not touched upon the thing that probably just does not allow statistical measurement—the spiritual and emotional destruction of members of the minority group that we are discussing. I am talking about Negroes here. This emotional destruction, in terms of the way in which we live, is probably more devastating than whether a guy misses a meal or not and maybe much more permanent than being unemployed for a short period of time.

I am back to this whole business of the image, of the attitude of those who are in decision-making positions in white society. I just do not believe we are going to solve the problem we are after, unless we change the attitude of those who are dictating the program. The attitude, it seems to me, is one of just the relief kind of thing or letting Negroes work. Even if everybody is working, if we do not rearrange some of these status symbols, we are right back where we were, because the man,

even though he has been improved as low man on the totem pole, still suffers the emotional destruction.

REDDING: I would like to ask Mr. Berry a question. I gather from what you have said that you are implying that one of the things we have failed to look at is the ghetto and the effect of the ghetto upon the Negro. I think that this is certainly something that ought to be looked into. I believe that many of the more peripheral problems could be solved if the ghetto problem could be solved.

BERRY: I would agree to that, except I think the great black ghettos in America and the white ghettos, too, are destructive. (Most white people live in a ghetto and do not know it, but they are behind the gate. The white ghettos are a little bit more polished than the ghettos that Negroes live in.) The black ghettos, with all their destructive forces, are a symptom of the more basic attitudinal thing that I am talking about. I think that the most important single factor that can be known about an individual in these United States is not his talent, his character, or even his money, but his color—even when one gets high up. Let me give you an example. All of you, I expect, have heard the name Dr. Percy Julian, world-renowned chemist, who has worked on cortisone, rubber-based paint, and so on. He is a Negro, a Ph.D., leads a very productive life, is rich, and has a pretty wife. He bought a house outside the ghetto, and the white people tried to burn the damn thing down. Now, what more, in terms of American requirements for success, can one have besides being a Ph.D. and rich and an inventor and having a pretty wife? He has nothing else coming. And they still want to burn the man's house down just because he is brown.

FEIN: Let us talk for a moment to a point that Mr. Hauser made about WPA projects, and so on. Without in any sense saying "no" to those, I would just suggest that some of the terms he used to suggest the need for such projects are terms that are really a function of the last ten years in our economy. I do not recall terms such as *uneducable* during the early 1940's, and one of the reasons that I do not recall them (part of it is my youth) is that they were not used. They were not used because we designed the job around the man, rather than trying to design the man for the particular job.

HAUSER: You are wrong about that. You are young. We had a hard core in the 1930's.

FEIN: Yes, but it was an awful lot smaller than what we now think is the hard core. I think if we tried to see how small that hard core really was, by a tight labor market that put a big burden on business to search for labor and to redesign jobs and to do its own educating of the uneducable, we might find that the hard core was something we could deal with a lot more easily because it was a lot smaller.

GRAUBARD: I think Mr. Pettigrew has something to say.

PETTIGREW: I would like just to mention this problem of attitude, although

I am sure it will come up in later sessions and in other papers. As a social psychologist, I have a vested interest in the concept of attitudes; but, nevertheless, I am disturbed a little by the implication of what Mr. Berry is saying. I think one of the great fallacies we have had in the field of race relations for many, many decades has been to worry about attitudes rather than about conditions. It is a crude but, I think, generally correct statement to say that attitudes are more often a result than a cause of most of our race-relation situations. We have to worry about the more basic issues which until recently were never even considered as part of race-relation concerns. The attitudes will take care of themselves, once we have a *fait accompli*.

BERRY: Can I respond to that? I think I almost agree with you, but I disagree in terms of a program design. I agree with you in terms of the attitude-versus-behavior discussion, when we are talking about people all over. But when we are talking about people such as us, who are sitting around here, thinking about designing a program, then the attitude that we take in terms of what we are trying to do, or the attitude that the decision-makers in the federal government take in terms of what they are trying to do, is crucial. They decide what to do, then go out and do it; and the people have to live with it, and their attitudes will be changed, as you say. But if *we* do not approach it with the proper attitude, *we* being the decision-makers now—us white guys I am talking about—then we are not likely to come up with a very good program. That is all.

PETTIGREW: You make a better case for social psychology than I can.

BERRY: I don't mind helping you guys here.

TURNER: The focus of our discussion at this particular point is trying to understand the relationship of economic strategy to whatever our ultimate aim or goal is. It seems to me we have two issues. One issue, and I think perhaps the foremost one for the Negro, is that he become randomly distributed throughout whatever opportunities and advantages and burdens there are in society. It seems to me that this issue is the core problem. There is a second issue. Most people would like for the burdens of society to be reduced to that minimum level determined by our knowledge and resources. One of the pressing points made by all the papers is the slippage that occurs and the multiple reaction to deviations in our economic cycles that occur for the Negro. If you look at it in this sense, the question is what kind of economic strategy do we need to maintain a firm engagement of the Negro in our economic structure. We need a strategy which prevents the slippage as well as promotes advances in any given part of our economic structure. What I am saying is that we need multiple strategy. We cannot talk about one or the other; both are needed at this point. In this sense, employment alone, as an economic strategy, can only partially succeed. We have to supplement it with strategies which seek to randomize the Negro throughout the occupational and economic structure.

ROSSI: I want to comment on Mr. Berry's point on attitudes and, at the

same time, on Mr. Pettigrew's. If there is anything that is the least bit optimistic about the Negro's position in the United States since World War II, it is the fact that the attitudes of the white population have changed in a favorable direction. The white population has gone some distance, but they have not gone, certainly, all the way. Their behavior on various occasions all too known to us has not been of the highest. Why the attitudes toward American Negroes have changed at the same time that the position of the American Negro has shifted slightly and seems to be, in some respects, looking backward, we do not really understand. But attitudes toward all of the minority groups in American society have changed during the same period. We are shifting toward a more egalitarian society, at least in terms of our expressed beliefs; and this is a very important kind of climate, in which there are discussions of this sort and discussions of policies for helping Negroes and other minority groups.

The second point I want to make is concerning employment. Mr. Hauser made a very important point, that we perhaps have to consider creating labor-intensive types of employment, particularly for persons who have relatively little in the way of skill at this point and are probably hard to train. It seems to me that one area of labor-intensive employment which we will have to develop in the future, simply because of a number of problems that are going to come up in our society in this respect, is people-handling employment of one kind or another. Whether people-handling requires skill or not is something I do not really know. But certainly we are moving increasingly into a more heavy development of our educational system, which is a people-handling type of employment. We have not developed a very good division of labor inside our educational system yet, but I suspect that will have to be on the way. If we are going to talk about a mass mental-health program—residential and day-care centers and the like—it will also involve people-handling. Whether we can employ uneducable persons, in Mr. Hauser's terms, or hire more persons without verbal and quantitative skills in these occupations, I do not know.

FEIN: Just a short comment. We have translated the decade of the 1940's and the progress into one word; we have used the word *employment*. I went back after I wrote the paper and charted all of the indicators that I used in the paper: male life expectancy, per cent infants born in hospitals, infant mortality, median school years completed. Every one of them, without exception, shows its sharpest progress during the 1940's. It is a bit of a shorthand—and I think an incorrect shorthand—to say that the 1940's affected only employment. Apparently, all these other things moved right along with the employment and the income. That point ought to be remembered in terms of a strategy, because although it would not be sufficient simply to increase employment and income, the other things happily come right along with employment.

MOYNIHAN: I still do not have an answer to my first question, and I am beginning to get worried that we are going to move on to another subject pretty soon. What about *family structure*? This country does not

need the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to tell us that full employment is important. That is a "law." We already have that. We all know about this. When we started to do the work for this paper, we assumed that what we could do with the family-structure situation was simply to show that the iron link between family structure and employment is just one more reason for doing something about employment. However, we began to get some data suggesting that we may have gone beyond the point where those simple relationships work, or work with the responsiveness with which they did earlier, and that we may have reached a point where the pathology is feeding on itself. I do not know. I am not sure of these terms. I just want to ask the question.

Let me state one general proposition; then I can give you some specifics of what we think about the family situation. In terms of absolute levels of ability, there is one pretty good test which is available to a great many people, theoretically all males: that is the Armed Forces Qualification Test, which all persons not in school and now turning eighteen take under Selective Service. It is a test that cuts off about the seventh or eighth grade of achievement. It is not an education test. It is not an intelligence test. It is a test of whether we can make a soldier out of someone for what it is worth to us to put in him. Of the Negro boys taking that test, 56 per cent fail it. Of those 56 per cent, half of them, for example, come from families of six or more children. That test seems to us to be a very hard indicator of ability. Anyone who does not pass that test just is not coping very well. We have found that there is a relationship between that kind of failure and family structure.

We have found that in about five or six specific indicators, for what they are worth, there is no question about it: the Negro family structure in this country has become weaker over the past fifteen years. The statistics are just as good as they used to be, I am sure. This thing is a steady weakening. We, for instance, calculated (it is not a rough calculation but a very uncertain one, I guess) that at least 56 per cent of the Negro children turning eighteen in this country have lived on AFDC at one time or another in their lives. Probably not much more than a third and surely less than 40 per cent of the Negro children turning eighteen have lived eighteen years with both their parents, as compared with, I think, 92 per cent of the whites. Is that right, Mr. Hauser?

HAUSER: Yes.

MOYNIHAN: The illegitimacy rate is soaring. In a central Harlem area last year, 44 per cent of the children born were illegitimate. The number of female family heads, broken families—all these things are there. The question is: Has that not reached a critical mass, so that it just no longer responds to the plain ups and downs that we have? I do not know.

HANDLIN: I had a comment on an earlier paper, but I would rather listen to someone else discuss Mr. Moynihan's paper.

HAUSER: Let me suggest a hypothesis that may provide a basis for discussion and a thought about Mr. Moynihan's question. A time perspective may be important. For one thing, as recently as 1910, 89 per cent of all

our Negroes still lived in the South, 73 per cent of them in rural areas. Within fifty years, which is less than one lifetime and less than the lifetime of a lot of us around this table, the Negro has become transformed from 73 per cent rural to 73 per cent urban and is now more urban than the white. I would judge that at the present time, 1965, at least a third of the Negroes now living in our metropolitan areas have not been there more than fifteen years. It may be more disproportionate than that.

My time perspective, Mr. Moynihan, is this. Look at the family structure in that rural slum South, where a good many of our present extant Negro population were born, reared, and from which they have migrated. Look at the problems of transition and readjustment as a result of the migration into the largest of our metropolitan areas, where half of that population is now resident. Look at the general economic and social setting in that situation. My point is that this transition may simply be the matrix in which this type of disorganization of which you are speaking is to be understood, that is, that these are simply frictions of this adjustment. My hypothesis—and I suggest it because I have seen this type of thing in Latin America—is that it is possible that the first opportunity for the Negro to acquire the sex patterns of behavior, the family structure which characterizes middle-class white society, has been only through the access to white society produced by this tremendous migration within the course of just this last human generation. And it is possible that the Negro is going to acquire the family structure characteristic of middle-class white society by reason of his urbanization and metropolitanization and is now merely showing transitional friction. In Latin America, the indigenous Indian is beginning to acquire family structure like the rest of his white society, only after the process of urbanization.

Let us put it in a simplistic way. We talk about urbanization's having transformed the traditional family, and it most assuredly did. It may be that urbanization is providing the only opportunity the Negro has had, in his three and a half centuries in this society, to acquire what we regard as the standard or norm with respect to family patterns.

EDWARDS: I think this problem ought to be seen precisely in the way Mr. Hauser describes it, and I think it has another implication for us. Given the indices which are mounting, we can look at them in terms of two points in time, or a number of points in time. I think the increasing disorganization is in large part directly attributable to the attempt, as Dr. Coles points out, of these families to cope with some of the problems of urban life. The time dimension becomes important, from my view of this problem, in the sense that while we talk about strategies, we had better get our sights straight as to how long this might take us, no matter what strategies we work out. How soon can we expect results from any given program or programs? This becomes very important. We can sit here and talk about what we can do, but we ought to think about how much effort it would take even if we do it in the most efficient way, even if we have the right answers. Many of the problems, particularly the problems in family life, are so deeply institutionalized that they are not going to change.

The intriguing thing about Mr. Wilson's question is whether we can separate out the hard core from, say, the deserving core, as a point to attack. I am not sure just what this takes. There are so many variables involved that the effort it would require to figure it out would be considerable. I am inclined to believe that the kinds of situational programs that we talked about, such as employment and education, all will have some impact, but the impact might be minimal in some areas, and it would take a long time for us to see visible results. We can measure it in terms of reduction of unemployment from 5 per cent to 3 per cent. This may really not have the fertilizing and salutary effects that we think this ought to have in family life, but we cannot neglect it. The truth of the matter is that many of the attitudes, many of the changes in relationships which will go on in these families, will be the direct result of programs which happen in the community. These things, in terms of the attitude question, will have a great deal to do with improving life conditions for the families—the kinds of images they get.

If I may, then, make my major point, it is that the time dimension becomes important—a hindsight view becomes important—in understanding this kind of transitional problem. I think we have to put a time dimension on the forward look, in terms of what we expect from given strategies. The results are not going to be as forthcoming as some of us hope, even if we design up a problem. It may well be that we are in the process now of having the kind of pains which may have great payoff. If we look at what has happened to the Negro, not relative to the white, but in terms of the *absolute* dimension, we get a different perspective on this problem, even from the 1940's. Instead of having linear developments in trying to close the gap between Negroes and whites, it may be that the Negro is in the process of acquiring the kinds of skill, sophistication, and knowledge which will take an exponential growth. This is the way I think the problem may well develop. But we have to have some notion as to what we can expect, given any kind of program. I think we are likely to set our sights too high on that.

GEERTZ: Although I quite agree with some of the points about transition, I want to cast a rather dim view on the optimistic notion that time heals all wounds. I think that the thesis implicit in Mr. Moynihan's comments is that absence of policies in this area is in a sense strengthening the weakness of the Negro family. There is no reason at all that transitional states cannot go on for such a long time that they become almost unbearable. Although I think that in the long run urbanization will certainly change the Negro family, it does not seem to me that it will necessarily change it toward some established middle-class pattern that keeps reproducing as if there were some sort of evolution intrinsic in the whole system.

Along these same lines, I want to express my misgivings about a too strongly aggregative approach to these matters. Mr. Turner put forth what I think is one of the best definitions of integration I have heard: a random distribution of the burdens and opportunities of a society independent of race. I think the question to be asked of simply aggregative approaches

and strategies is whether they are achieving this. Mr. Fein pointed out that some things are indeed very much associated with, say, the rise in general employment; but these are just the things that he happens to have measured, and they also happen to be the things which are most directly tied to things such as income. My point, to reiterate, is that there are many things which are not being measured and, as Mr. Berry said, some things that cannot be measured. We still do not know whether occupational mobility, residential dispersion, type of family structure, self-image of people, attitudes, divorce rates, relief percentages, etc. really are as responsive to these aggregative strategies as some people say they are. Until we differentiate our problem and look at it in detail and look at the actual relationships between real variables, rather than rely either on aggregative notions entirely or on generalized social forces such as urbanism, I do not think we are going to understand what is up, and I do not think we are going to have a decent policy to deal with it. This, I gather, is the essence of Mr. Moynihan's remarks. Somehow or other, we need to know more about the specific things that play upon the Negro family.

BERRY: About Mr. Hauser's remarks on the transition of Negroes and the inversion of statistics on farm-living and city-living in a fifty-year period of time, I think there is something that is awfully important. I do not think that any people in the history of mankind has ever been required to make this transition as poorly prepared for it as the Negroes in the United States. The fact is that after Negroes make the transition, the further assault of the ghetto is upon them. The poor Negroes who live in the ghetto suffer from every type of social pathology that is known to man—slum shock. When we translate all the horrible statistics that Mr. Moynihan has given—which I am sure are mathematically true—it is not so shocking, considering the circumstances in which Negroes have lived, that 56 per cent of the kids fail the Selective Service test. The shocking thing, under the circumstances, is that 44 per cent *pass* it, because they do not have any business passing the test with what we have done to them. Rather than proving that Negroes are unable to do things, what this proves, I think, is that Negroes are a magnificent people. The fact that they are even here is magnificent, after 352 years of systematic brutalization and deprivation—and it has been systematic.

What we are trying to do is find out how to reverse this thing. How can we reverse it? We talk about how Negroes are going to move to the city, Mr. Hauser, and become urbanized and learn white middle-class standards and goals and values; but they are not going to do it if we keep them in compounds, because the only way toward acculturation is association with a culture. We bring Negroes into the city, then keep them in compounds. Then, worse than that, we build these damn high-rise public housing projects, which people do not live in, but infest. Again there is a double assault in the ghetto of poverty and of misery; and misery does feed on misery. These people, the black poor, who are crowded into the ghettos of our big cities in most instances do not have any opportunity to associate with white people except at a point of hostility.

They do not have any contact at all. Their teachers look down upon them. The school system says they are uneducable, although we find out they can be educated in tutorial centers when they get out of school—educated by unskilled people, as a matter of fact, which indicates something else. They are the last men hired. They are called names. Doors are slammed in their faces.

We have a lot of theories about American life, such as the melting-pot theory. Hell, Negroes did not get melted, because you did not let them into the pot; and the only way they are going to get melted is to get into the pot; and the only way they are going to get into the pot is through a design for an integrated society. What we have now, what we are practicing, is a design for human destruction. Any Negro youngster who comes out of the black-poor ghetto and makes it at all, without a brush with the law or without becoming an unwed father (which I think we ought to talk about as well as unwed mothers)—any kid who comes out of those damn, big slums in big cities and makes it all on his own is a big, fat accident. He is a cultural mutation.

COLES: I would like to recall something that happened last summer in McComb, because we have been talking about hard-core groups. In one of the most vicious areas in the state of Mississippi, and particularly in McComb, within a period of three months, there was a rather significant social change. At Oxford, Ohio, the leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) group that I was working with felt that they could not ask any volunteers to go into this area. They would have to go themselves and set an example. It looked like the most hopeless situation imaginable for that project. Then there was an explosion in the Freedom House, and it pretty nearly destroyed the building. We saw, for the first time within the Negro community, over 200 people come together around the Freedom House and then assemble in the church. This was a historic moment for the Negro community, let alone the state of Mississippi and McComb, because what happened was that the Negro community manifested a kind of cohesiveness and organization around the issue of protesting that surprised everyone.

By this time I had long since abandoned any interest in individual motivations, but I was curious about which people had come into this church from the Negro community. It turned out that the people who had gathered there were not rural farmers and their children (and there are many farms around there, some of them individually owned for generations and some of them sharecropper cabins with Negroes working there). These people were not the Negroes in the established structure of McComb, the teachers, the few professional men, storekeepers, or those who were employed. The pool halls had been emptied. What we would call the hard-core delinquents—the group that if I were a McComb Negro I would think of as a hard-core, difficult-to-work-with group—had assembled around that destroyed Freedom House and later in the church and had dragged their parents with them in the evening. (Incidentally, for the first time in that region and probably for the first time in the history of the state of Mississippi, they had police protection from the state.)

It made me wonder about what is hard core and what is not hard core. Here was a hard-core group of most-difficult-to-work-with Negro children and families, suddenly becoming the leaders of the Negro community and the leaders in a very important phase of the beginning of the breakdown of the structure of the McComb community, white and Negro. I wonder, therefore, when we talk about hard cores in the cities too, whether perhaps we should think of the structure of the Negro community and what we want broken down or what changes we want. I wonder if some of the delinquents whom we find most difficult might not be the basis for all kinds of possibilities for social change within the Negro community and, for that matter, from the point of view of solving this problem. We tend to think of the Negro community at times as a kind of undifferentiated alternative to the white community; but I think there were possibilities within the hard-core, most-difficult-to-work-with groups that are perhaps more hopeful than the established Negro community in both urban and rural areas.

PARSONS: I wonder if there is not some kind of a central position in the Moynihan-Hauser-Geertz discussion. It seems to me that Mr. Moynihan stated very clearly a very basic problem, that Mr. Hauser put it in perspective and pointed out a direction of possibility, and that Mr. Geertz then warned against the dangers and difficulties. I do not see that it is necessary to side with one of them, though according to temperament and how much you know you might be more inclined to do so. I feel very strongly, however, about one major point that ties in with Mr. Hauser's. If the goal is coming *into* the main structure of the society, by way of the urban social structure, and moving up from the predominantly lower-class position and dispersing through this structure, and, as Mr. Geertz said, above all through occupational opportunity and the educational and other qualifications for taking advantage of that, then this is a crucially important path. That is, if the dangers Mr. Geertz very rightly calls attention to are to be avoided or minimized, it has to be within *this* setting and not within a structurally different setting.

EDWARDS: My feeling is that occupation is one aspect of it, and it may be the most important; but the whole structure of opportunity must be opened up. This is the vital point about the urban community. The thing which has affected Negroes most, and caused the persistence of many of these family patterns which we see accentuated in the urban community at this point in time, is the great isolation which Negroes have suffered. The society is becoming a more open society. It is true in occupation, in terms of legislation, and in terms of all kinds of voluntary organizations. This must be implemented in large part by opening up the structure in other ways. Take the matter of housing. It would not matter if Negroes had good jobs, if they could not live where they wanted to live. Therefore, around this general point, we must see other things—a whole stream of forces which play upon the urban community. I think we must see the problem in that perspective. When Mr. Hauser says "urban community," I am sure that the notion is that some things are done better there. Whether we like it or not, this is going to be the arena.

PARSONS: And now the Negro group is exerting much stronger pressure than it ever did before.

MAYER: I would like to go back to one of the points that Mr. Moynihan made. It is an extremely important point which has not been sufficiently discussed and which indicates possible action. The statistics which he quoted on the Armed Forces Qualification Test results are impressive. They show clearly that despite all the difficulties poor families in general and Negro families in particular are faced with, despite, for example, the problem of children being brought up with a maternal head of family under aid to dependent children, as long as the number of children in the family is small, most of them manage to cope. They cope well when there is only one child. The great majority of them still do well if there are only two or three children. But when the size of the family goes up to four, five, and above, then nobody copes. Half of the children who cannot cope are from families of six or more. It is obvious to me that such data show as clearly as any the need to make voluntary birth-control information and material available, cheap, and very easy to obtain.

WILSON: I want to suggest, before we go on with some of our questions and disagreements, that this conference, as it has proceeded so far this morning, to me has been absolutely remarkable. I think that things have been said here that would not and, indeed, could not have been said ten years ago. The social psychologist is telling us that attitudes perhaps are not fundamental but can be changed by altering behaviors. A representative from the Labor Department has been telling us that family structure may be more important than employment. Although I do not think they have been given full credit for having said this, we have economists here telling us—in Mr. Tobin's paper, for example—that we can now produce for employment. We only lack the political will, and we must turn our attention not only to the problem of political will but to the problems of certain structural changes. We have had Mr. Tobin describing at some length the problem of preschool education and birth control, welfare payments and family allowance.

I think it is important, I should add, that we not divide up into the aggregators and the structuralists or the attitudinalists. It is very easy to try to push economists into being simply aggregators; I do not think the economic papers we have before us are simply aggregative at all.

All of these things, it seems to me, are things which would not have been said at a conference about Negroes or the problems of American society just a few years ago. I think they all point in a common direction. I think, also, that although we may disagree with the precise formulation that has been given to us, the problem of the family is coming to be a central issue here. In some way, we are going to be returning to this theme throughout the next day and a half, even, I suppose, when we begin to talk about politics. I just wanted to call attention to how far, if not *we* had come, then our disciplines had come, before we allow ourselves to resurrect certain clichés which might indicate divisions or backward tendencies which do not in fact exist.

FEIN: I was struck by some of the remarks that Mr. Edwards made about getting a time perspective and taking a look at the future. When I wrote my paper, I tried, as those of you who had an opportunity to read the paper will recall, to get some kind of a time perspective by looking not at differentials, but rather at how long ago the white reached the particular level that the Negro is only now attaining. When I wrote the paper I was appalled: (A) The gap, in terms of time, was widening. (B) It was a big gap, in terms of time. Therefore, even if rates of progress were stepped up, it would take some considerable time for the Negro to reach the level that the white now has—to reach equality even if the white made no further progress. But as I listen to the discussion this morning about the almost completely closed society and its various facets, I am reminded that one might have written my paper with a degree of optimism. When all is said and done, the Negro is *only*—and I hope that word is not misunderstood—twenty years behind the white. This suggests that the situation is bad, but it is not the kind of a situation that is hopeless. If you look at differentials, the income is 51 per cent; but if you look at the time horizon, it is sixteen or twenty years. That is a heck of a long time for a person born and living today, but it is only twenty years. If the Negro today is where the white was in 1945 it is *not* a completely closed society; and progress, particularly if one adds special efforts of one kind or another, can cut that time gap rather sharply in our lifetime. The focus of my paper is on the horribly long gap but perhaps optimism rather than pessimism is called for, because the gap is a heck of a lot shorter than many of the comments would imply—and can become much shorter not in a century but in our lifetime.

HANDLIN: I wish to make a comment on the observations made earlier about a closed society and the direction in which equal opportunities are likely to come. I want to enter a caveat against what has been said here—a point that I make more fully in the paper which you will have this afternoon. While there is a certain sense in which we speak of an open society as a desirable model and of random distribution as a goal toward which we ought to move, in actuality, right now and in the immediate future, the opening up of economic opportunity is more likely to come through the use of the organized power of the Negro as a *group* and through the claim for and establishment of the right to certain kinds of preferential treatment—through the development of the solidarity of the group in pursuit of these goals. From that point of view, to speak of randomness or integration is a little bit beyond the point. This is a group that has defined economic characteristics; and it will be using its power, so far as it gets that power, toward those ends. I think it is important to be cognizant of that as an actuality, at least in the immediate future.

HAUSER: I would like to make some brief observations on a number of points which have developed, but I do not think there is disagreement on those points. For example, Mr. Geertz went beyond what I had in mind, speaking about urbanization as a process, when he suggested that any automation in the urbanization process might preclude program and interference and intervention. This was not at all what I had in mind.

I think, on the contrary, that what I had in mind was well stated by Mr. Parsons. Similarly, with respect to the earlier consideration of perhaps adding labor-intensive types of projects to absorb the Negro, I certainly think we ought to depend as much as possible on a free market to develop these kinds of jobs. I am quite aware that with respect to such things as the hard core, the unemployables of the 1930's—and I am old enough to remember them—became almost completely employed in the 1940's. What makes a person unemployable is partly a function of the environment, including the full employment environment, in which he lives.

The key point I would like to make at this discussion, because I think it affects a number of other points that have come up, is something that I have in my paper and which puzzles me from the standpoint of the kind of program or the kind of policy that would get around it. Incidentally, my topic, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," was assigned to me; so I am not dealing with the problem as a whole, but with demographic factors. I was struck with the fact, which I think we would all agree on, that the demographic factor that opened up the opportunity for integration is *internal migration*. Internal migration took the Negro out of the ghettoized deep-slum South and put him into the metropolitan areas in the North, in the West, and also, as a matter of fact, in the South. Let me add that I define the term integration quite differently from the salt-and-pepper-distribution definition, as an opportunity for social interaction, for participation in a common life process—what is meant by assimilation or acculturation. The internal migration, I point out, was a necessary condition for setting in motion the wheels of integration, but it is not a sufficient condition.

The real problem, which appalls me and for which I do not see any quick answers, is that another aspect of this migration, the *magnitude* of it under the exigencies of the war, has produced vast enclaves of Negroes, far greater over shorter periods of time than anything we ever had in our foreign immigration. If we think just in terms of the physical measurement of the ghettos, the average Negro in a ghetto is at a considerable physical remove from any social interaction with the white in that metropolitan area. I think that, in terms of physical measurement alone, we may have transplanted the subcultural isolation of the rural South into such mass enclaves in the North as to negate the theoretical opportunity for social interaction. This may be the critical thing from the standpoint of effecting integration in any fundamental sense of acculturation or assimilation.

It is clear, since we have set down strategies, that one obvious answer is *open occupancy*. Let me say, incidentally, that this certainly must be stressed somewhere, wherever the programmatic aspects of this appear. But what also appalls me (and I am looking for answers here) is that I am utterly convinced that even if we had completely open occupancy, even if the Negro had the freedom to live wherever he pleased throughout these United States Negroes would still live in enclaves for an indefinite period ahead, certainly in the coming human generation. They would do this probably for the same reasons that our foreign groups lived in enclaves.

May I also enter a protest against the definition of integration as a random distribution of opportunities and burdens. This definition really fails to see the character of both the world and the society in which we live. We live in a pluralistic world. We live in a pluralistic society. To say that we will not have integration until we get a random distribution of Negroes is, in effect, to espouse a program of the type that they used historically in Canada with the Acadians. Yes, they got them integrated. They just intermixed them through the rest of the population to make sure they could not be in fifth column. I think the essence of integration in our kind of a pluralistic, free society lies not in the achievement of a random distribution, but in the achievement of a distribution that results from the fact that each person is absolutely free to determine for himself whether he will continue to live in an enclave or whether he will go out, so to speak, and live in the broader community. I do not think any of us is espousing forced legalistic random distribution of the Negro any more than this has been espoused in the past, but this has important implications. If the Negro, for a variety of reasons, continues to choose to live in the warmth of his own enclaves, obviously this will cut off or greatly retard any opportunity for social interaction of the meaningful kind that leads to integration.

Let me close with a big question, which at this point involves the Negro community itself, as well as the larger white community. How do we deal with the fact that, partly because of the pressures generated by World War II, after three and a half centuries of rural experience, within a period of fifty years the Negro has been drawn in a huge mass into a metropolitan society? Instead of having an isolated subcultural group in the South, do we now have indigestible enclaves in the North? Have isolation and lack of opportunities for integration simply been transferred to a different physical setting?

TOBIN: First, I want to agree very strongly with what Mr. Wilson has said. There is no conflict between aggregative diagnosis and aggregative remedies and specific diagnoses and specific structural remedies. On the other hand, those of us who emphasize the global environment, or the total picture, do so because it often seems that people have a rather near-sighted view of specific problems. I am always afraid of too specific an approach to such problems. It is like punching a pillow: We solve one problem here, and another pops up somewhere else. But as long as we are agreed, Mr. Turner, that both can go along together and need to go along together, I do not think there is any conflict.

Mr. Moynihan raised a very interesting question. I do not think it has been answered yet. He asks whether something is happening to the family structure in the Negro community that is somehow dissociated from the general economic environment. I am not sure that the statistics necessarily show that this *has* happened. It may be that the disintegration of the family, as shown in his diagram, does not have just a simple contemporaneous relationship to unemployment and other variables, but is a more complicated product of lags, accumulations of past unemployment, and so on. Anyway, we have the problem. Not being an authority, I am not

sure how to do anything about it, aside from making general and specific economic improvements in the employment situation. I should think, however, that the problem of getting Negro men to assume the family role and to take it seriously, as is normally done in the rest of the society, is associated with the lack of job opportunities for them and the intermittency of their employment. Society puts a good deal of stress on economic achievement as the proper function of the man. When the man is unsuccessful because of discrimination, unemployment, or other things, I should think it would have some influence on creating the problems that Mr. Moynihan is talking about. I think that beyond trying to improve that situation in terms of economic opportunities, we must consider other specific things that can be done. There was some mention of family limitation. We ought to get that more openly on the table. Social policies in this realm could be adopted.

I have one further comment, on the idea of labor-intensive employment. One could set up employment projects, similar to WPA, in which the products of the employment would not meet the test of the market place. It would be done specifically to provide employment and income. I can see, also, where that might be a better way, in terms of self-respect, than passing out income dissociated from employment. But it would still be a stop-gap measure. If Negroes and other poor people in this society are going to earn the American standard of living, it is not going to be in labor-intensive employment in the long run. It is going to be in capital-intensive employment. It is only capital-intensive employment that can provide the kind of income that is the objective of the aspirations of people in this country.

HAUSER: It would be transitional at best.

TURNER: I would simply reiterate that a goal or *the* goal of trying to distribute the Negro randomly through opportunities and burdens is a different problem from trying to raise the median level of income for the Negro from \$3,000 to \$5,000. They may be related; and, in part, our difficulty is how do we relate the two strategies of, on the one hand, raising the level of income and, on the other hand, raising the level of status or equalizing status. Going back to Mr. Wilson's earlier remarks, I think that unless we perceive these goals as being different although related, we may get into trouble in trying to develop strategies for them.

GEERTZ: I just want to say a couple of words, since I somehow started all this. The first has to do with random distribution. I was talking and Mr. Turner, I assume, was talking about distribution in qualitative terms and not just random distribution of people through the society. I still think this is the most reasonable definition of integration—rather more reasonable than assimilation into white middle-class standards. But that just depends upon what you think we ought to have.

I do want to clear up, though, one thing which I thought I had said. Perhaps I was misunderstood. I am not against aggregative approaches at all. I was not opposing them. I was pointing out that we must be sure that the aggregative policies that are proposed will change the vari-

ables we want to change and not just the ones we can measure. I am not against a tight labor market. I am just very doubtful that it will wash away all our sins. I am not sure that it will do all those things that it is claimed to be able to do. It will have some effect on some of the things that Mr. Fein measured, but I am not so sure that some of these policies will have effects on things which are very important to us in this whole area.

My point was not that I am opposed to the two strategies, but that I think we should not try to test always aggregate measures. It seems to me a kind of circular argument. I want to be able at least to get at structural measures.

I wanted to say something else, about pluralism; but I have said enough already. I am a little bit doubtful about some aspects of the notion of pluralism based upon race, as a permanent feature of this society.

SESSION II

GRAUBARD: It seems to me that we should now proceed with some of the other papers, returning to those of this morning when they seem relevant. I suggest we consider now the papers of Mr. Parsons, Mr. Pettigrew, and Dr. Coles.

I do not know how one can attempt to set forth in very brief form Mr. Parsons' argument; but, having said that it cannot be done, I would like at least to discuss some of his major themes which are relevant to the things we have already talked about and to those we will be talking about before this meeting is over. Mr. Parsons' principal concern is with the question: How can the Negro be made a fully participating citizen in our society? While he sees that legal rights and political participation in a society constitute necessary conditions for full inclusion in the societal community, he says that they are not in themselves sufficient conditions, even when taken together. What is required in order for them to become sufficient is the social component, the addition of social welfare, so that in fact certain handicaps that the Negro suffers will become more or less manageable. Mr. Parsons discusses the way in which the Negro today may have inherited the status of the immigrant as the immigrant has himself moved up. The difference, however, between the Negro's position and that of certain earlier immigrant groups is that the Negro has to start by acquiring the most elementary components of legal and political citizenship. He has begun to do this, essentially through the intervention of the federal government. This has been accomplished by legislation and court action. Mr. Parsons reflects on the causes of poverty and the role of poverty in keeping the Negro outside of the societal community. He considers family structure and the extent to which, in the absence of adequate family support and other institutions to help the Negro, the Negro is disadvantaged in a way that earlier immigrant groups were not. Mr. Parsons then proceeds to describe those conditions that must exist in society if the Negro is in fact to be included. He lists several, not the least important being that there exists in the society a commitment to values which make inclusion desirable. This feeling, obviously, must exist among

whites as well as among Negroes. Both political and economic measures are clearly necessary; economic measures will not be sufficient.

Mr. Pettigrew begins with a discussion of racial roles and of relations between the races. According to Mr. Pettigrew, both Negroes and whites are capable of confusing their roles. Whites flatter themselves into believing that they are superior. Negroes may, by the way in which whites comport themselves, imagine themselves to be inferior. Organized churches have not been a conspicuous source of interracial contact within the United States—a point made again by Father Fichter. The educational institutions that exist today provide only limited interracial contact. In fact, as *de jure* segregation of schools decreases, *de facto* segregation is increasing. The employment pattern is not encouraging. Socioeconomic status does not seem to determine the attitudes of people in the area of housing. Mr. Pettigrew finds that in the matter of integrated housing there is a tendency for the white, middle-class, educated man to react to this not very differently than the way people of lesser education and lesser economic means do. There is a discussion of the white and the Negro Southerner. I think both because Mr. Pettigrew is a Southerner and because he feels that historically both the white and the Negro Southerner are members of the same subculture, he sees that there are reasons to hope that integration will occur in the South more quickly than it will in the North. In fact, integration, particularly of the residential variety, is not so far from being a possibility there as it is in the North. He urges us to realize that, in itself, increased contact between Negro and white will not produce understanding. Then he cites the definitions that Gordon Allport presents of those conditions which, in fact, do lead to trust between peoples who are brought into contact. It is not enough, he points out, simply to reduce anti-Negro prejudices in white society. Another very important point that he makes is that the U. S. government is not the only sponsor of institutional protection for the Negro, but it has become the prime agent of planned change.

Dr. Coles is concerned with describing the psychological concerns and character of Negroes, especially Negro children. He particularly wants to show the conditions of life that a Negro child experiences. The presence of danger—the acceptance of danger—is part of the Negro child's life in a way that it is not a part of the white child's life. This, as Dr. Coles points out, creates a specific sensitivity in the Negro child to certain problems and to certain forces. Negro youths, from a very early moment in their lives, have to gauge their relations to white persons. One of the most important tasks to face the social scientist today, he says, is learning how individual members of an aggrieved class of people can accomplish some sort of order or coherence in life, how they can manage to exist within the society, how they can manage to cope with the society. Much of the evidence Dr. Coles brings to bear on this problem comes from his study of migrant workers, many of whom are totally unequipped for our white middle-class world. Individuality, he says, remains one of the strong elements in Negro character despite the common suffering that they have been exposed to.

I cannot possibly do justice to these three papers in such brief com-

ments. Perhaps I should leave it to Mr. Parsons, Mr. Pettigrew, and Dr. Coles to say a few more words.

PARSONS: There are one or two points I would like to make. First, it seems to me that Mr. Berry made a remark that is basically a theme statement for what I am talking about. However, I think that I would put it rather more strongly than he did. It should not be "all right" to be non-white. It should be taken for granted that the basic community is composed of various groups which have historically been characterized as white and nonwhite. I think we can say that this has progressed very considerably. Take the case of Dr. Julian, which Mr. Berry mentioned earlier. Given a level of value characteristics in other respects, then racial color becomes irrelevant. This bears very strongly on the legal side of the problem, but not only on the legal side.

It seems to me this leads over into a point that I discussed in the intermission with Professor Tobin. I think he and I are both putting forward aggregative aspects of the total problem: that the definition of the national community is in a sense analogous to the state of the economy; that the opportunity for full acceptance in the national community for any particular group is enhanced if the community itself is in a relatively self-confident and, if you will, expansive mood; and that this is a very important generalized condition that is difficult to pin down for specific groups.

I very much want to latch onto a discussion of the temporal dimension, which both Messrs. Hauser and Edwards brought up earlier. While in many respects the problem we are dealing with is unique, it is not totally isolated in our history. I think it could even be that, in the perspective of the present moment, most of us tend to underestimate how problematical the status of other groups has been. They were, to be sure, white; but they were not unequivocally acceptable from various previous points of view. I single out the groups that became very prominent in very large numbers relative to the population of the time, to so-called new immigration at the turn of the century, and particularly the Eastern European Jewish group and the overwhelmingly peasant, predominantly Roman Catholic groups. There are many, many complications to this, but I have the very strong opinion that, however much more difficult the Negro inclusion problem may be, having been through the phases that American society has been through with these other groups is an immense asset that ought to be taken into account in considering what conditions will most facilitate the full inclusion of the Negro group. I will not say that it was a necessary condition or that it was sufficient, but it is certainly a strongly favorable condition. Those are a few of the keynotes of my paper. I think we will also come back in this discussion to the question of attitudes and symbols and the role of the movement in clarifying those symbols of inclusion.

GRAUBARD: Mr. Pettigrew, do you want to add something about your paper?

PETTIGREW: My chore was to concern myself with contact between Ne-

groes and whites as I think was brought out this morning. I tried to document the notion that there has been, ironically, proportionately less contact between Negroes and whites during this last twenty-year period of enormous and important social change in race relations. Then I tried to project it to 1984, to pick a fateful year. I do not think family integration, or contact at the family level, is going to increase significantly, although probably we will see the end of laws banning it in twenty states of the union. I do not see that religion will be a major source of contact in future years. I see work as the major source of contact and education as the next.

Housing will still be largely segregated, rather intensely segregated, even in 1984. But we will have a pattern of token housing desegregation in the suburbs, and whites looking around in their own neighborhoods will think there has been enormous racial change. Their own neighborhoods will have gone from no Negroes at all to an "invasion" of two or three Negro families. This will create a pattern in the suburbs of token desegregation of virtually all facilities; but, while this is going on, the ghetto will be growing ever bigger and will not have been cracked by 1984. What I am guessing is that housing will be the toughest single realm to crack. As Mr. Graubard mentioned, one of the reasons I say this is that unlike all other attitudes toward all other realms, this one does not significantly relate to education and status. Resistance to this is just as strong among the college-educated as among the grammar-school-educated.

I have tried to hook this up with the idea of stigma. I am always bothered by any comparison of the Negro American group with any other American group, simply because I believe that, given American history, the stigma against the Negro is absolutely unique. The fading out of this stigma is going to be a difficult process. We have never had a stigma comparable to it for immigrant groups, for any Roman Catholic groups, Jewish groups, or anyone else, including Indians, although it may be that the Indian group comes as close to having something comparable as any group we can think of. I predict that the stigma will be with us for a long time to come, but that it will fade. There is evidence, of course, that it has been fading, as Mr. Rossi mentioned earlier, at a verbal level and that it will start fading in many other ways. But it will be slow.

This leads to change considerations. I tried to talk about a "success vs. test" dilemma. (I would like to have some criticism on this for the re-writing.) It seems to me that people who plan private and public interventions in race relations are always faced with this dilemma. Will they skim off the cream in a kind of *success* alternative, whereby the program can hardly fail but will barely touch the problem? Or will they tackle the real *test* of the program, whereby the program may fail because it cannot crack the really hard part of the problem? I argue for a joint strategy to keep the program alive and also to evolve some way of tackling the hard-core issue.

I end by making a distinction which I see now was also being made by a lot of other people in their papers. We mentioned it this morning. The progress we have seen and will continue to see will be the progress

of the middle-class Negro American. By 1984 he will be rather firmly entrenched in affluent America. It will be very conspicuous progress, as far as whites are concerned. It will be obvious to whites. The first of the problems Mr. Hauser distinguished this morning will not be licked by 1984, but that is where we will see the dramatic progress in the next twenty years. It is "the other Negro America," in which I have not really seen any significant breakthroughs yet, that concerns me.

COLES: I have tried to put together some impressions that have come of living in a region that I was not born to but have lived in now for six years. In the middle 1950's, when I came to this area as a psychiatrist, I was put into Mississippi in charge of an Air Force psychiatric hospital. I grew very fond of the region and stayed down there to study what happens to white and Negro children in desegregated schools in New Orleans, Atlanta, Little Rock, and other cities in the South. Consequently, I spent my time moving around in a station wagon from Negro home to Negro home and from white home to white home, living there and, I guess, becoming more of an anthropologist than a clinician. I soon extended this work to some interest in the sit-in movement. I worked with the youth there for four years. I attached myself to them, lived with them, and tried to find out what happens to them and to the people whom they confront. More recently I have been trying to see what happens to people who are migrant farm workers and sharecroppers. All this was done by talking with people, drawing pictures with children, and making other such attempts to carry a clinical office procedure into the everyday world and its problems.

The thing that has impressed me (I think perhaps I am getting at it in this paper) is some of my own education—the extraordinary depths of my misconceptions, as I look back at my education. How utterly ignorant I was, although supposedly trained in a field which presumes some sensitivity to human beings. I think that in that sense this paper presents an attempt to come to terms with my own past and my own difficulties educationally. I recall reading Kardiner and Ovesey's *The Mark of Oppression*, for instance, years ago as I was getting ready to work in this field. At that time it seemed like a great eye-opener to me, and I have heard stirrings here today that reflect the thesis of that book. Even more recently I read *Slavery* by Elkins and was quite taken with that at first. But both of these books and, indeed, a lot of my kind of thinking perhaps fail to do justice to what happens to people in life.

All I can find now, after reading *The Mark of Oppression*, is that there is a mark of oppression and that this is what happens to people. Somehow, however, I do not find that a lot of the Negro children I have met are anywhere comparably damaged. I am not so sure that they are any worse off than people in middle-class suburbs. I do not even know how to contend with this kind of ambiguity. I just reviewed a book called *They Harvest Despair*, by Dale Wright. It describes the plight of the migrant worker—unquestionably a plight when looked at from one point of view. However, I do not think I have ever seen despair in migrant workers, though I have seen it in myself and in a lot of us. I think that

what I am trying to get at in this paper is, how do we deal with this kind of a situation? How do we deal with our own ways of thinking in confronting other people, whose lives are perhaps so different from ours that sometimes we are simply forced into endless repetitions of our own assumptions? Perhaps it is too much of a task to undo them and push them aside to look at other people.

But I think, after all, I am trying to find some connection between what we call *the* Negro and all of us. I am tired of hearing that only such and such a person can understand such and such another person. I went down South, and I kept on hearing from white people that you have to be a Southerner to understand what the South is like. To Negro people, you have to be a Negro to understand what it is like to be a Negro. I suppose I say to my patients that you have to be a psychiatrist to understand what is really going on in a patient and the patient feels that you have to be a patient to really know what suffering is. Somehow, many of the generalizations that we make today about all kinds of conditions and people and situations seem to be lacking in some kind of connection with what happens to *all of us*. I guess I wrote my paper with the idea of trying to undo this notion of my own mind about large groups of people and their characteristics and to bring in some appreciation for ambiguity and paradox in life—not celebrating it unnecessarily, but perhaps reveling in the mystery of it all.

WOODWARD: Both in reading Dr. Coles' article and in talking with him, I have been struck with the fascinating way in which he challenges so many of our conceptualizations of problems. I think it is a rare thing that such first-hand experience with the problems we are dealing with is brought before us. I hope that the conference can explore some of the implications of these experiences. As he says, it seems to be impossible to reconcile some experience with the people in the most oppressed spots—the Mississippi Delta, Lee County (Va.)—with, say, the Kardiner and Ovesey reportage, which I think predisposes us to a kind of fatalism about the effects of the Negro's experience in America. The implications of slavery and of segregation in the past have fallen into a pattern of pessimism and despair that a fresh experience with these people does not bear out at all.

If Dr. Coles is correct, it seems to me we need to rethink a lot of our basic assumptions about what is going on and to rethink our conceptions of the capacity of the Negro. Even in the oppressed part of the South, he finds Negroes endowed with spontaneity, gaiety, lightheartedness, courage, and indomitable optimism. These people have hope, perhaps because they have such a low level of expectation. But they are not despairing people. They are not hopeless people by any means. The type of leadership that they have produced in the last ten years has indicated that they have great potentiality. If Kardiner and Ovesey were right about them, we would never have had the leadership and the movement we have. I would like to see some of these things explored.

REDDING: I have been worrying about Dr. Coles' paper because I am not at all sure of the size of his sample. I am worried, also, because certainly

one of the acknowledged protective devices that the Negroes have used is to block out from their contacts with white people what they really feel and what they really think. They are inclined to say what they think the white man wants them to say. In the book *The Mark of Oppression*, there was a much wider sampling. I wonder if this does not tend to render that book's conclusions more valid than the conclusions to which Dr. Coles comes.

COLES: *The Mark of Oppression* is based on the case histories of twenty-five people, as I understand it, only half of whom were seen longer than three months.

REDDING: But under conditions quite different from the conditions under which you saw people.

COLES: This paper failed to describe the conditions, but I will be glad to state them. This is based on individual work over four year's time and with 32 cases studied intensively, and numerous others less so. I spent three years with individual families and saw them weekly, two and three times a week in the case of several of the children. It was over a long period of time and not just a matter of going from one person to the other and talking to each briefly. I honestly feel that I heard quite a wide range of feelings expressed, not simply a kind of stereo-typed or immediately social or tell-me-what-I-want-to-hear response. In the case of the New Orleans children, we lived there for three years and saw them every week for three years, with some exceptions. This was a long-range study in depth, as was *The Mark of Oppression*. We used a similar kind of clinical technique and had the same problems of sampling that any clinical work has, from Freud's down to the present time. This is a legitimate area of discussion—what value does the clinical case history have?—and, of course, one that Kardiner and Ovesey talk about in their book. It was not, by any means, an impressionistic kind of tour of the South.

PETTIGREW: I do not think we necessarily have an either-or problem. I think it is perfectly possible, in fact I suspect probable, that both studies are right in describing certain segments of Negro America. In the case of Kardiner and Ovesey, they had only twenty-five cases, but indeed they actually (and they tell about it quite openly in the book) selected most of their cases for known pathology. They were looking for trouble, and they found it. That was the aim of the study. They also worked in Harlem. They had a Northern sample. You worked primarily in the South, Dr. Coles, and you did not go out looking for pathology. You took the people as you found them. I would suggest that perhaps your findings actually have more generality, but I would also say that there is a regional difference, which I tried to talk about just a little in my paper.

In the real psychological sense, there is probably more hope in the South than in the North among Negroes today, and this has been true for some time now. There are some survey data relevant to this. We talked to protest leaders. They will tell you they can organize a Selma with one-tenth the effort—well, they are not even sure they could organ-

ize Harlem. They certainly have not managed to yet. In the sense of the pathology, the mark of oppression in some ways may be more severe in the North than in the South, given the level of aspiration. That gets into the basic thing we have to consider, the relative deprivation that Professor Woodward alluded to. The fact is that the aspiration levels of Negro Northerners have been high for some time, but Negro Northerners—at least “the other Negro America” segment of the group—have not made conspicuous progress. About two-thirds of Northern Negro communities have not made significant progress. They have not seen *de facto* segregation break down in front of their eyes. Negroes in the South, and many of the Negroes Dr. Coles talked to, are living through a very exciting part of Negro Southern history. They see *de jure* segregation falling down right in front of their eyes. They can see progress.

This was just too late to include in my paper, but I will include it in my revision. A Gallup survey published the other day shows that in fifteen months, between 1963 and about six weeks ago, Negroes in the South say they are much better off. I forget the exact form of the question. It was something to the effect of “Do you get fair treatment?” In 1963, nine out of ten said they get unfair treatment, and in the last poll a few weeks ago, seven out of ten said they get unfair treatment in the South. There was no change whatsoever among Negro Northerners. There are many differences in the Kardiner-Ovesey data, but I believe that the regional difference is the big one. We need not, however, assume that one of the studies has to be wrong. I rather suspect that both studies found what they were looking for.

EDWARDS: Would there be an age differential, too, since the Kardiner-Ovesey subjects were somewhat older? Your perspective for the most part was on children, as I remember it. It might make a difference in terms of the spirit you capture, as one can see in working with adolescents, who in the nature of the case might be a little less starry about this.

COLES: I worked with the sit-in students, who are pretty well into their twenties, and with the parents of the children. I do not think it is just a matter of the children's age.

HUGHES: I want to throw in a point on American ideology about social problems. We seem to have an idea that we have a better case for proving injustice if we can show that it makes people sick. There is a tendency to say injustice produces neurosis. Then if we find out it is not so, we think we are not so bad off. There is not necessarily any relationship between neurosis and injustice.

MAYER: I am in favor of Dr. Coles' method. The approach to normal human psychology has often been one of extrapolation from psychiatric studies of abnormal cases, and the field of normal psychology has suffered from this. Considering the pressures put on Negroes, it is not surprising that if we look for pathology we find it. This does not mean that if we do not see acute pathology in some people, it must be there in milder form. It may simply show that people are different; while a relatively small

number of people will be very much affected, a large number of people will not be affected to the same extent or may not be affected at all.

BERRY: We are certainly indebted to Dr. Coles for some fresh insights. I see merit in a good many of the points he made, including the business that we hear so often: "You have to be a Negro to understand what happens to Negroes." It is not entirely true that you have to be a Negro to understand Negroes, but it sure as hell helps. Even the people who go and live with Negroes and take pills to darken their faces never quite establish whatever it is they are going after, because they can always quit taking the pills. They can always go back to being white again. It is an experimental kind of thing, which is by no means the real thing because we do not have any black-no-more pills. As far as we know, we have to battle this out the whole way with each individual Negro. He is the experiment. He is under the microscope. He is not the one who is looking through the microscope. There is a great deal of difference. I see the Negroes in the city. I see "the other Negro America" that Mr. Pettigrew talks about. And I see both despair and desperation among these people as they live in the city.

I see *despair* as a part of the other Negro America, which has been so mistreated. The other Negro American is not fighting any more. He is like the blanket Indian who is determined, I guess, just to sit out this life. This is partly what throws some of our unemployment statistics off, because this group of people is out of the labor market. They are not even looking for jobs, so they get dropped from the statistics. When we say that Negro unemployment runs two and a half times that of white, we are low. That is just what the figure says. If you add what I think is a corrective, an additional 4 per cent for the discouraged workers whom we just forgot all about, the people who are not looking for jobs and therefore are not counted any more, then we are running three and a half to one in terms of unemployment.

The *desperation* also must be there. I am differentiating desperation from despair. Desperation drives people *toward* doing things. I do not think the people in the South whom Dr. Coles has studied would be driven to take the risks they have taken except through desperation. I do not think the people whom we admire so much in the South today—the people who run the risk of getting shot to go register to vote—are people who have not been driven to something.

But I am looking at this from the standpoint of how the other Negro America appears in the big cities. I think that racial troubles are related to all of the statistics we have been talking about: the statistics on illegitimacy, on broken homes. And we should add alcoholism and narcotics addiction. Those things did not just happen. I think the only explanation is that Negroes, who have been driven to seek some kind of respite from the permanency of the pain of living as black Americans, have found that there is some relief in alcohol, some relief in narcotics, and still further relief in trying to live in fantasy. I would just like to ask Dr. Coles if he might not rethink a little bit about this notion that seems to indicate that there may be some merit in getting the hell kicked out of

you. If we used this background to seek some strategy, I would be very frightened of it.

COLES: I do not think, first of all, that I want to put myself out of business. I think I have seen plenty of psychopathology. However, I think that, in all honesty, one has to look at a particular life and come to a conclusion about it. I never saw addiction among the migrant workers and tenant farmers I studied for two years. I see it in Harlem all the time and in Boston, where I am now; but I did not see it in the rural people. I saw other things in them. I do not think I am trying to say that there is any virtue in social, economic, or political oppression. Nor have I failed in this paper to point out what happens to people who have lived as the various people I have described have lived.

The only point that I am trying to get across is that we must find out, for instance, when desperation starts in people. One way of doing it is to take clinical histories, to get to know someone like James Forman, as I have for five years. What is desperate about him? When did he start being desperate? How did he feel ten years ago, fifteen years ago? What are his memories of growing up? How does he recall his childhood and now experience his present life? I think if you did this, you would find that James Forman at twenty and James Forman at thirty-five are two different people. This does not mean that the oppression was any better or worse than it is or has been; it means that history has developed, that the society has changed, that James Forman is of a certain age, and that at a particular moment in his life something happened that got him engaged with a moment of history that produced things that we all know about. I think that the oppression is a historical fact. We know about that. I have never denied it. But I think it is of concern to us to find out what happens to people in ongoing history so that one way of behaving at one moment may become transmuted into another way of behaving at another moment. What happens, for instance, which makes people become desperate or despairing, when in the past they have been curbed and maybe even frolicsome in the midst of being curbed.

If you were to ask me what it means when we see the drunken happy times amongst migrant workers on Saturday night, I would not hesitate to go into a psychoanalytic description of the roots of this kind of behavior. I almost take that for granted. But I do not think that in our present culture this is the kind of thing to emphasize. It is all too well known. I do think it is important to look at lives with some sense of concern for the changes that occur in them, not only as a function of childhood memories, but as a function of situational things. In McComb, Mississippi, last year there were a group of people who behaved in a certain way, regardless of their childhood experiences and, for that matter, regardless of whether they were in despair or were not in despair. The crucial issue was not so much the despair as the dynamiting, the actions of the segregationists, and a whole series of individual incidents that challenged people—and they *were* people as well as Negroes. I think this may be an impossible problem. If what I have written is taken as a justification for persecution, then, of course, it is a dismal failure.

The other thing I want to suggest is that we look at the problem of urban living versus rural living; I think it is terribly important. We have a group of people who have been historically, socially, and culturally conditioned to one kind of life. But history and events have moved these people, in this massive migration that we all have been talking about. It is not enough simply to point out that suffering has occurred.

BERRY: It is a fact that in seeking ways of improving life in these United States, if people are going to follow the food line, then they have to go where they can work, no matter how beautiful the rural countryside is. It seems to me to be absolutely ridiculous to recommend as a strategy that people go back to live on the farm. I am back to my point of this morning: If one is going to succeed in this society as we know it, then one is going to have to be able to play the game by the rules of this society. One rule of this society has been to have very little concern for the individual. The individual has to go where the factory is. If they move the factory and a person wants to work, he moves, too. To hell with his family ties and the ground that he lives on.

My only objection to this aspect of what you have said, Dr. Coles, is not that it is not interesting, but that I do not see how it will help us get where we are trying to go. I think we are trying to seek a program of human renewal for Negroes in the United States, so that they can function according to the rules which middle-class white people have made. The white people say that the Negroes must live by those rules, but they do not let the Negroes come in to find out what the rules are.

FLEMING: I would like to move from this point to a point of strategy—something that might help us move forward. I think Mr. Pettigrew's point, that there is an important regional difference, is worth paying some attention to and maybe more than he has already paid in his paper. Impressionistically speaking (my sample is one, myself), I think that there is a basic regional difference in that things are moving in the South. There is visible progress. The enemy, so to speak, is more personal. There is a feeling that there is something you can get your hands on, something you can work against and with increasing success at the level at which the protest and response is going on in the South.

If we accept the notion that people gain strength, aspiration, and energy to strive from a sense of being able, at least potentially, to manipulate their environment and to cause a significant change in what happens to them, then I think we can understand the regional difference at least in part. Southern Negroes have much more of this kind of feeling than Negroes in the large, impersonal ghetto situation where it hardly seems worthwhile. The Negro in the ghetto does not know what to fight or how to fight it, and he does not see much tangible evidence that he is going to get anywhere by fighting it. This is not just a personal experience; it is a group experience. We talk a lot about *models*. The models for the Negro youngsters in the South are fairly numerous and getting more numerous all the time. They can look around and see Negroes who are getting elected to legislatures for the first time, Negroes who are achieving in a

number of ways—even if it is by leadership in the protest movement, a status, an importance, a kind of power. Even if the individual himself is not a wheel and is not manipulating his environment, his models are there.

This leads me, in a roundabout way, to a point of strategy. I think there is a danger that we will underplay the importance of the relatively small group of Negroes who are arriving at what we call middle-class status. These people, at least potentially, have to be the models for Negro youngsters, if we take as the goal their achievement of middle-class status—so they can play by the rules of the game, Mr. Berry. What is happening to this relatively small fraction of Negroes at this stage in American history seems to me to be terribly important. What is happening to them, as has been pointed out by Mr. Moynihan and others, is that they are doing relatively very well. I think we can make a good case for this. But the fact is that the opportunities that are opening to them are very recent and, as the housing situation and other situations indicate, still much too limited. Therefore, I do not think that the arrived Negro middle-class people are as yet a convincing model for, let us say, the ghetto-dwelling youngster. People are not convinced instantly.

Somebody suggested an analogy at our lunch break. In a laboratory situation, if the experimenter shocks the subject every time he tries to open the door to the food and then suddenly turns off the electricity, he does not expect the behavior to be instantly modified and the subject to accept on faith that he will not be shocked. This is approximately what we are doing with our expectations of instant conviction on the part of Negroes that new opportunities are open. We will have to produce a lot more convincing proof, if we expect to make use of examples and models, which, I think, are the only hope for breaking this vicious circle of the ghetto psychology and plight.

WOODWARD: The notion of desperation as the motive or explanation for conduct does not seem to me to be correct. People do not act the way the Negro has acted in the last few years when they are desperate. They have responded to conditions far worse than they now face with apathy, defeatism, and despair. People who show the courage, energy, and confidence that these people have shown cannot be said to be desperate people or people acting in desperation in quite the sense that you say, Mr. Berry.

BERRY: Part of our confusion is what we discussed this morning when someone asked us to analyze class structure within the Negro community. It seems to me that you are talking about *the* Negro, and I was talking about *some*. There have been acts of desperation and heroism throughout what we have called the revolution and earlier on the part of some people. But those who have design and who are leaders in the revolution were not part of the desperate people of whom I spoke. The people who have led the revolution are the middle-class people, whom I think you were referring to as apathetic. The whole revolution has been led by middle-class Negroes, not by lower-class Negroes and not by those people way down in the Deep South. You can name Martin

Luther King and all his deputies, James Farmer, James Forman, and all the other leaders. Most revolutions are not led by the people who are most depressed. I do not know of any revolution that was led by the people who were most depressed. The leaders are people who are riding the tide of expectation and are dissatisfied. The bird that is born in captivity does not really mind it. It is the bird that gets out of the cage occasionally and finds out a little bit about the world outside that is the most dissatisfied. So I suppose if we are going to have the kind of silly situation we live in now, we should have followed the rule of the old slave masters. If they wanted to punish a Negro, they taught him how to read.

COLES: A number of the children I have seen in the South have come from the very lowest rung of the socioeconomic ladder and have led their race into white schools. Of the four Negro girls in New Orleans, three of them were poor by any definition within the *Negro* community. Certainly many of the young people in the sit-in movements in Mississippi and Alabama do not come from the Negro middle class.

BERRY: We are not talking about the same thing. You are talking about some participants in the movement, and I was talking about the leaders. The leaders of the sit-in movements came from colleges.

COLES: I feel that there is some evidence that some of the leaders—leaders, I say, not participants—were not from the middle class.

COHEN: If I may, I would like to try to develop another subject. There seems to me to be a conflict between what Mr. Pettigrew has said and what Mr. Parsons has said about the relation, or lack of relation, of the Negro to the various immigrant groups in this country. I think this has strategic implications, because if the Negro is not like any other group, if the Negro has no relation to the history of any other group, then the Negroes as a group perhaps cannot be integrated into society in the same way as other groups have been. It seems to me that Mr. Pettigrew and Mr. Parsons were saying things that were somewhat different. I believe that Mr. Turner, in his paper, also has a different point of view. I hope that we will get some clarification.

GRAUBARD: Yes. I think we will also want to come back to Mr. Berry's and Dr. Coles' discussion.

GEERTZ: I was going to raise the same question as Mr. Cohen. I think the real issue is the one that Mr. Pettigrew raised. It is not so much that the Negroes are entirely different. But is there something added—this notion of stigma? I think there is, and I think it has not been characteristic of other groups. It is a different kind of an image, as Mr. Parsons pointed out very clearly. I do not want to argue this out in detail, but I think this is a really important issue to discuss: whether or not there is something very special and unique in terms of the stigma applied to the Negro.

BERRY: The attitude of the white people, that is what is unique.

HANDLIN: In my own view, this question can be exaggerated in the sense

that immigrant-derived groups were different from each other. It is only in a vague sense that we can speak of *the* immigrants. The Irish were different in their experience from the Jews, and the Germans were different from both, and so on. In that sense certainly the Negroes, who are more different in color as well as in sociocultural background, are not like any of the other immigrant groups. They are not like any of *the* immigrant groups. The question is whether the uniqueness of this group is so different from the uniqueness of other groups that there is no basis for meaningful comparison. I personally think that Negroes are different from Irish or Italians or Jews, but that there is enough in common in their experience to make it possible to talk about them in comparable terms.

Being very conscious of the stigma attached to the black man's color now, we perhaps underrate the character of the stigma that was attached to other groups of fifty or sixty years ago. The racial view of what was a white man in, say, 1910 excluded an Italian almost as decisively—and on racial-genetic grounds—as it does a Negro in 1965. That has changed, but I think it is important to be aware that it has been there. I think it is also important to be aware of the fact that there were periods when the Negroes' color in some parts of the country was weighed as a much less consequential factor of separateness than other people's divergent ethnic heritage. In the Northern cities, such as Boston, where there were small groups of Negroes between the Civil War and 1910, the carryover of abolitionist attitudes created a very favorable image of colored people. Insofar as I have been able to make any estimation of these matters, in that period the Negroes not only ranked higher in social and economic status than people such as the Italians, who were then just arriving, but also were considered less separate socially. Of course, that has changed. But I think it is a mistake to accept the stigma as fixed, unalterable, and part of the necessary character of the group.

PETTICREW: I have not argued that the stigma is unalterable. In fact, I said explicitly that I believe it is fading out, but fading out slowly. It may be the way I said it. I think Mr. Geertz just stated what I believe better than I stated it. I would not say the Negro's whole history was necessarily incomparable. Therefore, I did not detect a difference in my position from Mr. Parsons' position on this. We both talked about stigma, as a matter of fact. We wrote that independently. I do disagree with Professor Handlin rather sharply, because I think the stigma is unique; and because of the stigma, I think comparison is dangerous.

Take your own example, Mr. Handlin. You just cited the comparison with Italians. Italians were never slaves, particularly slaves in the American context; and I think slavery stamped this stigma in a very special way. If we believe Elkins, it was even a unique form of slavery which the United States perpetrated upon the Negro Americans. Evidence of this—and there are, of course, other reasons contributing to it—is that Puerto Ricans could have a housing dispersion in Chicago from 1950 to 1960 in a total degree greater than Negro Americans have managed in two generations in Chicago. Negro Americans in Texas have two more years median education than Mexican Americans, who come in with cultural and

language problems, yet make only two-thirds the median family income of Mexican Americans. It is very difficult to cut through data such as these and argue that there is not something really special and particularly potent that is applying to Negroes which does not apply to other admittedly discriminated against groups such as Puerto Ricans and Mexicans.

HANDLIN: You do not have to cut through those data to make the comparisons you have just made. You have made comparisons, and all you have to say is that these are comparable terms.

PARSONS: I think I am to some extent the man in the middle. I would not want to deny either point of view but to try to reconcile them by saying that I think they are comparable, not on any simple quantitative basis, but as qualitatively different types that are systematically related to each other. My own view is that "Negro-ness" has become the symbol of an inferiority of status and that none of the white ethnic groups which have preceded the Negro in a partly comparable status in the social system have had that particular primacy of stigma. However, it has seemed to me legitimate to relate the Negro stigma to the general stigma of presumptively foreign exclusiveness. The Catholic problem is much complicated by the ethnic diversity of the Catholic groups and the long period over which they have been important, but I think it has come to a certain head with reference to the problem of organizational solidarity within the society. In my paper I have called it "the state-within-the state emphasis" (in quotation marks, because it needs many qualifications). I think the Negro has in common the exclusion, because of a presumptive and largely projected relation to a value pattern of our society which creates a very difficult problem of admission and inclusion. I think the only thing I would want to commit myself to at the present point is that our having had relative success—and only relative, of course—with the other groups creates a somewhat more favorable climate for dealing with the most difficult. They are different kinds of situations, but they are systematically related rather than randomly related. Neither this group nor any of the others is completely unique.

HUGHES: I think Mr. Berry is right. The big thing in this country is that one should not be colored. I think we should perhaps look at the stigma, then look behind it at the culture. I happen to be descended from Appalachia people who were there before the land became as poor as it is now. I can tell you that while lots of people there have strong race feeling, once the race feeling is gone, they can talk to Negroes. There is a basic commonality of values. Of course, the difference is, given the stigma, that when the white boy from the South went North there might be a slight stigma on him, but he did not go through a long period of urban stigma. However, when the Negro comes up North, give him a few years of Northern urban life and that commonness that I think Mr. Woodward and I are both saying is there disappears.

But it is amazing, in spite of the stubbornness of this stigma, how completely it goes sometimes. I have known many cases of Southerners who one day or another simply said, "It is a fake," and acted the rest of

their lives as if the race stigma were a fake. And when they did, they may not have understood the Northern city Negroes (who have another kind of experience), but they were very effective, in the way of the Tom Pettigrews, I suppose, in understanding the problem very well. But I think we do have to distinguish the future of the stigma from the future of the Negro as an American with a value system, religion, and so on.

MAYER: If we are looking for a precedent in terms of evolving a strategy, I think we are much too marked by the title of Gunnar Myrdal's book, *An American Dilemma*. There is a much better simile to be found in Europe than is available in the history of the United States. For at least a thousand years Europeans were essentially divided between a noble class and serfs, and the serfs were slaves and had every stigma of slavery. They could be sold. They could be bought. There was no question of their marrying into the nobility, and, in fact, the nobility exercised every possible effort to preserve the purity of the race. Counting the quarters of nobility on all sides—parents, grandparents, great-grandparents—was not simply a matter of snobbishness; it was done to preserve what was felt to be (although the word did not exist) genetic superiority. This system broke down very slowly, in probably no less than 200 or 300 years, essentially through the intervention of the central government (the King) who made noblemen out of successful commoners. The rate accelerated to such an extent that suddenly at the end of the eighteenth century nobody believed in innate, hereditary superiority anymore, and the French Revolution occurred. It would be interesting to follow the way in which the extreme stigma of being a commoner as compared with being a nobleman disappeared. This may parallel what we are dealing with now. Thus, in many ways the problem of the Negroes in America now is much more similar to the problem that most of our great-grandparents had to face in Europe than it is to the problem of any of the particular minorities in American history.

HAUSER: Mr. Chairman, I think that here again the introduction of a time perspective may help in part to unscramble the problem. I also feel that I want to reinforce the position that Mr. Parsons indicated. I think much of our discussion is a little bit reminiscent of the controversy on idealism and nominalism, and I want to make a plea for conceptualism. The example we just heard from Dr. Mayer is very appropriate. Moreover, I think we can see it right in our own history. I would like to reinforce Mr. Handlin's point on this, because, having in mind the history of three and a half centuries, I doubt very much if this so-called stigma for the Negro today evokes more passionate, categorical, prejudicial response than the response, let us say, of the Pole who spat on the ground when a Jew was mentioned because a Jew was a Christ-killer. A Jew was never a slave, but he was a Christ-killer. (Something, by the way, for which he may soon be absolved. It depends on the vote.) It is clear that the Italian never was a slave, but the Italian was a gangster. If we went right down the list of possibilities, I doubt that we would find that the stigma with which the Negro lives is worse than, say, the stigma of papism in the mind of the

primitive fundamentalist Baptist. It would be a great mistake, in terms of a strategy, to assume that we are dealing with something that is tremendously more difficult to overcome than other problems which have been overcome in the course of two or three generations at the most, even within our own national history.

I would like to close with an implication for a strategy. I think a strategy is to be found in devising means of social interaction. Mr. Pettigrew discusses quite adequately, with special reference to the criteria of Allport, the strategy of social interaction that would maximize what I think has always been generically the answer to this kind of problem, namely, to provide a basis for interaction that will break down the categorical response, that will modify the imagery, that will show the stereotype to be in reality false. I think this is where the strategy must lie, and I think that this may be implemented by the four criteria which have been laid down by Allport, as reported by Mr. Pettigrew in his paper. This has very important implications as we turn to various sectors of interaction: education, work, housing, religion, and so on.

WOODWARD: I do not for a moment think of this stigma as ineradicable, unalterable, or constant. I agree with Mr. Handlin that it has varied from time to time, from region to region, and even from city to city. However, I am afraid this analogy with the various immigrant or ethnic groups does violence to my sense of the history of the problem. We forget that, except for the Indian, the Negro is the oldest ethnic group in this country—even older than the WASP's, because more of them have come over since the Negro ceased coming over than came over before. He may have entered the urban ghettos and the consciousness of urban scholars only in the last generation, but the Negro has largely descended from eighteenth-century Americans. Negroes were here long before the other groups had come in any appreciable numbers. Yet the Italians, the German groups, and all the rest of them have never had, relatively speaking, the impediments in marriage or in opportunities, the slavery experience, and the segregation experience. It seems to me unhelpful to insist on this comparison. I find myself in Mr. Pettigrew's camp.

TURNER: I think that I also agree with Mr. Pettigrew, but perhaps for different reasons. Probably I feel stronger about it than he does, but I hasten to add that this is not a discussion which will be settled for years to come.

UNIDENTIFIED: We could take a vote, too.

TURNER: There are, unfortunately, very few things decided by vote. But I think there is another way of looking at this. The stigma in the case of the American Negro has become and perhaps was originally the rationalization for locking in a kind of behavior which would permit exploitation of a group with lower status and with less ability to defend itself. I think that this will not change until the stigma becomes dysfunctional or, in other words, until it becomes too difficult to apply. There are two ways of approaching this problem: First, to create a situation where it is

impossible to conveniently identify the group to which one seeks to apply the stigma. Second, to create conditions under which it is no longer functionally important and no longer gainful to apply the stigma. To make it dysfunctional for whites to apply the stigma to Negroes it is necessary to raise the ante. If it costs more to apply the stigma in this way such behavior would become dysfunctional.

It seems to me we cannot expect to have the Negro existing as a cultural group without carrying certain kinds of defense and protest functions. However, as we look at other cultural groups in this society we can see that while defense functions still exist to a certain extent their importance decreases as the individual members find acceptance in the total society.

When we talk about the application of the concept of cultural pluralism to the Negro there is another assumption which is argued and contended quite vigorously both within the Negro community and in the larger community—namely, that there is a Negro culture. Some people feel that there is. We speak of the Negro values of the Negro religion. I am inclined to feel less and less that a Negro culture exists and that to the extent that there are life patterns of feelings and behavior these may be more appropriately considered subcultural symbols. These subcultural symbols appear to be rapidly fading out and will probably disappear in a relatively short time. Essentially what one has left as a source of cohesion is a banding together for defense purposes. It seems to me that this is not enough for distinguishing a cultural group. It may be enough to distinguish a group, but not necessarily a *cultural* group.

MOYNIHAN: I would like to suggest to Dr. Turner that there may be something that we can learn from a nonwhite group—it is right before our eyes and is really rather astonishing—along the lines of the strategy we discussed of making the stigma dysfunctional and perhaps finding that the problem of color disappears. I think it can be done in this country much more readily than we think—and I did not come here to be optimistic. I had been vaguely aware of this but had never thought much about it. I ran into it simply in trying to correct the “nonwhite” figure, which we use in the Labor Department, to produce the Negro figure. There is a racism in our statistics: A person is white; or there is something he does not have, and then he is nonwhite. That is how we divide everybody. But that nonwhite group contains one group of people whom, it seems to me, we should know more about than we do. I think it has to be said that no ethnic group in this country has ever been the subject of as much formal, federal, racist oppression as the Chinese or Japanese. A lot of it has also been local. I believe, for example, that to this day, statutes of the state of Idaho forbid the Chinese to vote. They can stand up with anybody’s sorrows. And yet the 1960 census tells us some fascinating things about these people. In the 1960 census, the Chinese and Japanese were lumped together, possibly because census-takers find they cannot tell a Chinaman from a Japanese. They all look alike.

BERRY: This is true. I mean, it is true that the census-takers cannot tell them apart.

MOYNIHAN: One fascinating thing is that the proportion of Chinese and Japanese with no education—zero years—is ten times the proportion of white people with no education. And that exact same set of people, in the exact same year, had more than twice the proportion of their population in college or graduate school as had whites, had twice the proportion of their population employed in professional capacities as had whites, and had more than twice the proportion of their population employed in managerial or proprietary positions as had whites. As a matter of fact, we in Washington have thought how useful it would be in this country if we broke down our statistics and reminded ourselves now and then that there is a group that is not Caucasian that is twice as smart and twice as successful. The Japanese and Chinese have one-half the unemployment rate of the whites. They have one-half the marriage-dissolution rate, divorce rate, broken-family rate of the whites.

I do not know what the truth is, but I have the impression that twenty-five years ago these people were colored. They were so colored that they were a race apart, and when World War II started, for example, we put the Japanese behind barbed wire. Those who protested were not heard because they were, after all, colored people. Twenty-five years later, it seems to me, they are not colored anymore, except in terms of our census data. Am I wrong that they have ceased to be colored? They are Japanese; but if daughter brings home a Japanese, father is more likely to see the high energy physicist than the Japanese. In any event, I think that having solved the class problem, we have solved a color problem.

GEERTZ: It is just as easy to argue that they never had the stigma, despite the formal oppression.

HUGHES: The statistics that Mr. Moynihan speaks of—the number of Japanese children in college, their unemployment, and all the other things—would have been essentially the case in 1920.

MOYNIHAN: I do not see how that could be.

HUGHES: It was, though. I know because I happened to have been interested in the Orientals in the twenties. Their marriages were not broken up. They were in business. There was a stigma, but they were in college just the same. And they were not in juvenile court.

HANDLIN: Yes, but the stigma was there. The resistance to intermarriage was strong. The barriers to social contact were formidable.

UNIDENTIFIED: They were different, though.

PETTIGREW: The Chinese and Japanese were never slaves.

GEERTZ: That is right. It is not the same.

HANDLIN: The exact same points were made about the Chinese. They were excluded in 1882 because they were coolies—unfree. The big difference is the number. I think a very consequential fact in dealing with the Negroes is that there are nearly 20 million of them. It is much easier

to accommodate a very small group and to adjust to their presence than it is to accommodate and adjust to nearly a tenth of the population.

HAUSER: Add concentration to that, Mr. Handlin—numbers and concentration. These are very important.

EDWARDS: So that I will not be misunderstood, I want to say in the beginning that I recognize the uniqueness of the Negro problem. I recognize that there are some handicaps, in terms of lack of opportunity, which the Negroes suffer at this point in history. Conditions are somewhat different now from when the earlier immigrant groups were arriving. One of the differences is that those groups came at the latest when the Industrial Revolution was moving into high gear. The opportunity structure, certainly with regard to dirty work, was much greater, as Professor Hughes suggested.

But I think one thing we ought to direct our attention to is the fact that in looking at strategy and intervention we tend to take a very formal approach to the problem. This is reflected in the kind of reasoning which we employ: reasoning from specific cases which have happened in the past and projecting that into the future. It occurs to me that there are all kinds of unwitting and irrational things which are happening, which may not really solve the problem, but which will have some effect upon the problem, and these do not quite get into the equation. We do not fully assess some of the things that are happening and will happen in even larger numbers with more intensive effect in the future.

I am inclined to be a little bit pessimistic about any short-run, rapid gains; but I am not inclined to be quite so pessimistic as Mr. Pettigrew seems to be. However bad the situation seems today, as compared with when the great stream of immigrants came into our economy in the nineteenth century, we have never had a time in our history when the government has been so forceful in trying to redefine certain situations and, thus, at the same time, in contributing to the definition of what is desirable and what is undesirable. We say that one does not change race in quite that way, but changing the situation will have some impact upon race.

Look at the other end of the spectrum—go into some of the schools with the youngsters. I think we tend to minimize the generational problems. Obviously, we are going to have trouble as long as we have the present generation. Someone has said that death brings about social change. As the generations move on, we are going to have, I think, a tremendous wellspring of attitudes, feelings, and rapport which these youngsters are building up. I see the junior-high-school level and the senior-high-school level. We know that these youngsters get prejudices imposed upon them from parents and in all kinds of formal ways. But I think all of these things are erosive, and in time they have a tremendous impact upon the definition that is given.

It is difficult to predict from today's data. We cannot fully assess what the picture will be, with all the intervening variables that are likely to come into being. My feeling is that the stigmas of the past are going to have a profound influence and that we are going to make slow progress

for a time, but that after a period of time there will be a tremendous forward leap in terms of the feelings and the behaviors of people toward one another. I would not want to say when that will happen, but I think there is this constant building up at certain levels which we do not, in our formal approach to this problem, actually assess.

PARSONS: With reference to Mr. Turner's remarks, I want to say I think he was getting right on the track. This group solidarity, including the problem of a special group subculture, should not be considered in too exclusive an either-or context, relative to participation in other respects. Apropos of the Oriental, I am very fond of a little story. I happen to be a daytime inhabitant of a building of which the architect is Yamasaki. I was discussing this on one occasion with a colleague from the University of Washington, and the name Yamasaki came into the discussion. And my colleague said, "Oh yes, he is a Seattle boy, isn't he?" His Japanese origin was altogether secondary to his home town. I take this as a symbolic indication of what I would call pluralization. That is, Yamasaki is a Japanese American, but he is also a distinguished architect, and he is also a Seattle boy. I think this is beginning to happen with the upper group of Negro Americans. For example, to me Ralph Bunche is a distinguished Undersecretary of the United Nations. He is also a Negro American. One could run through Robert Weaver, Whitney Young, and a list of other Negro Americans who have become distinguished people. They have plural significances, just as when we mention Einstein as the symbolic distinguished theoretical physicist of this century, we might say, "Oh yes, of course, Einstein was a Jew, wasn't he?" But we would not necessarily say, "That Jew, Einstein, was also a distinguished physicist." I think we are moving in the direction of pluralization.

I myself feel strongly that it is important that the Negro American group develop an increasingly differentiated identity. I do not think that culture, in the narrower sense, is the only basis of it. I think that the very fact, which has been mentioned, of their common heritage of American Protestantism (and the role that religious leaders have taken in the movement) and their residence in the more general conscience of the nation are helping to establish a group identity. Another dimension of that seems to be very particularly the identification, which was brought out in Dr. Kilson's paper, with African nationalism and cultural development and, more broadly than that, with the nonwhite people all over the world. I have an impression that there is an opening which has already developed considerably, for moving out of the position of a status ascribed by the white majority in this country to one of much greater autonomy, which links into a number of different contexts.

Finally, I would like to question Mr. Woodward's implication of a very long involvement of the Negro with us. It seems to me, the segregated status in the South—which was the overwhelmingly predominant status until World War I—was such a special status that (perhaps I am overstating it), in effect, the mass Negro immigration is new immigration. It is not that it has been here for 300 years. There are, however, different aspects of this problem.

WILSON: I would like to make pretty much the same point that Mr. Parsons just made. To do so, I would like to return to our friends the Chinese and Japanese, whom Mr. Moynihan so auspiciously threw in. I suppose I return to them because I was raised in California where the Chinese and Japanese were *the* colored minority, in sufficient numbers and concentration in San Francisco and in Los Angeles, where I lived, that color bias and oppression were directed at them. There were no Negroes at that time, but there was a high concentration of Chinese and Japanese, as there is of Negroes in Boston today. The discrimination was rigid. It was sanctified by law. These people often could not own land in the state of California. They could not hold office. They were excluded from almost all aspects of life: economic, political, and social. It is interesting, in the light of Mr. Pettigrew's remark about projecting alter egos, that in the case of the Chinese and the Japanese we projected both an id and a superego. We thought the Chinese were lascivious. (Is it true what they say about Chinese women? What goes on in those Tong rituals?) At the same time, we thought they were crafty, wily, and deceitful. They really had a unique distinction. They were the combination Negro and Jew.

Now, after only one or two generations, while there are undoubtedly traces of discrimination, Chinese and Japanese move about with almost complete freedom in California. Things have even gone to the absurd point that in California last year, when the state put on the ballot a proposition that would make open-occupancy ordinances unconstitutional, some Chinese and Japanese voted for it. They did not want "colored" people—that is, Negroes—moving into their neighborhoods. This is an enormous change in one generation. It seems to me that if we had begun to analyze the problem a couple of years ago in terms of *stigma* (whatever this means), we would not have been able to predict this outcome. I do not think that the concept *stigma*, left undefined, is very helpful. What we are talking about here are *behaviors*.

A crucial fact, it seems to me, is that during this period—and I want to return a bit to this morning's conversation—these families were strong. They were in many cases, as Mr. Hughes quite rightly points out, overeducating their young at a very early age when the oppression was still very great. The fact that they came from, in some sense, whole cultures and were carriers of whole cultures and had memories of whole institutions and had experience in a wide range of business, political, and social life meant that they were able to develop and maintain a pattern of behaviors, which over time made it clear to whites that the crucial aspect of the Chinese and the Japanese was not their color. The crucial aspect was that these people were good customers. They were not criminals. They were good businessmen. You could deal with them. You could bargain with them.

It seems to me that, when we talk about the stigma of the Negro, it is easy to make references to slavery, 300 years, Africa, or color. But it seems to me it is more appropriate now to talk about behaviors and how much these behaviors differ in one group that is "colored" from those in another group that is "colored." I think that these behaviors are quite

different. I think that they are different because of the way one group has been treated as opposed to the other and also because of the fact that urbanization is only now occurring among Negroes whereas rapid urbanization occurred quite a long time ago among the Chinese and Japanese.

I am making a plea, therefore, on two points. One, might it be possible to avoid the word "stigma"? This word involves assumptions about what is in the mind of the beholder as well as what is burned in the soul of the beholder, and these assumptions, I think, have not been perfectly spelled out. Perhaps we ought to talk about the behaviors and the cultural residues which serve to confuse in people's minds judgments that ought to be based on achievement rather than ascriptive criteria. Two, might we return, if we are going to discuss the meaning of stigma, to some of the comments we were making this morning about the relationship between historical stigma and family structure, learned behavior patterns, and culture?

FEIN: Let me address my remarks specifically to Mr. Pettigrew. It strikes me that one could say almost facetiously that one man's stigma is another man's badge of honor. How the individual bearing the stigma reacts to it is important and is relevant to some of the remarks which have been made about group solidarity. The stigma can give strength. Certainly in the case of the Jews, the stigma (and I would not want to argue whether it was as great as the Negroes' stigma) gave the group some strength. Perhaps it was because the individual could choose whether or not he wanted to bear the stigma; he could leave the group. The Negro has not had this choice. The individual Jew who decided to stay with the group could gain a certain strength from the fact that he made that conscious decision. He could have spent some money to have the shape of his nose altered and ceased to be a Jew. No one would have known he had been a Jew, particularly if he moved to a new community. But if he did not choose to undergo the operation, he could gather some strength from the fact that he chose to remain with the group.

The Negro has to be a Negro; he cannot leave the group. But he does have one choice: He can choose to be involved in a group activity from which he can gather strength, namely, the civil rights movement. For the Negro this can play a most important role in shifting what was a stigma to a very positive thing. You know: "Were you in Selma?" or "Were you in the march on Washington?" and so on. There is at least the possibility that although the Negro cannot escape being a Negro, he can be identified as a special kind of Negro or he can lack that identification. If he takes that identification, he may gain strength from it.

COLES: That is just what I was going to bring out. Certainly one has seen this in student after student. I have heard them say words such as "I feel different" and "I have never felt like this before." I think this involvement—this feeling—has been very important. It also ties in with what was brought up earlier about the generational gap. Many of the children, even the six- and seven-year-olds, have fought their parents for the right

to go into schools. There are all the teenagers going into schools and the youths involved in the sit-in movements. On the other side of the street, one hears white children from segregationist homes saying, "This is a different country from what my parents have taught me it is." (I think that at some point we ought to bring in the influence of television on social change.) They see this. They feel it. And I think that what has been shared by both races in many of the Southern schools has been a sense of their own time, radically different from what either white or Negro people of another generation have ever known.

There is one other point I want to make. I think it ties in, by the way, with what Erik Erikson has called so beautifully "a more inclusive identity" that draws upon more than what has been and reaches out for something that has not yet come. I think of it in terms of an event that happened to one of the Negro children we were working with. This teenager from Atlanta went North to a school here in New England, and he found himself lonesome and homesick for Georgia. He eventually came in contact with several boys who were also from Georgia but who were white. He and three of these boys became friends, and they used to play records with Ray Charles singing "Georgia on My Mind." They were Southerners abroad. This was their identity. One heard them talking about *our* problems as Southerners (against the North). I would suspect that this has some implication for a strategy of how people can find things which have been pushed aside by history, events, or whatever, but which are latently possible for use in binding people together and making them think about one another in new ways.

BREEDEN: I find Mr. Pettigrew's *role* terminology more helpful than the *stigma* terminology. It takes two to make the play go on, and perhaps the experience of the Chinese in California is partly the result of their not playing the role which white people attempted to impose upon them. In our discussion of the history that makes the Negro stigma different, perhaps we are really saying that a role has a kind of permanence, first, in terms of the psychology of the Negro and white because of the history and, second, in terms of the institutions that it formed because of the long persistence of the role-play.

A point I would make regarding involvement in the civil rights movement is that since the movement has begun, not the phenomenon of "passing," but the phenomenon of "passing back again" has occurred with a number of people. I also have some information (completely unscientific) that during their six-week involvement in the organizational activities of the Boston school stay-out, youngsters who had no intention of going on to college suddenly decided that they could make it in this society. Before that involvement, they were playing another role. In terms of strategic considerations, I do find the concept of role useful. The concept of stigma seems to draw me away from strategic thinking.

ROSSI: There is one item of information I would like to throw in against the concept of stigma (which I think is merely reformulation of the old you-must-change-attitudes-before-we-can-get-anywhere argument). I emphasize again the real and very significant changes which have taken

place over the last twenty years. Take a look, for example, at the white college-student population and their participation in the civil rights movement. Participation may be minute in terms of the total undergraduate population, but it is certainly significant as far as the students' visibility is concerned. The amount of acceptance of interracial dating and even of interracial marriage in the college-student population, if we take that as a bellwether type of population, is really quite considerable. It is close to a majority who would accept for themselves and for others interracial dating; and it is a very sizable minority who would consider interracial marriage—providing their religions were all right. This is really a significant move, and it looks very much like the way in which the Orientals' position has changed. How long it is going to take before the fellows on the Northwest Side get it is, of course, up to the Catholic Church.

HAUSER: I am not too seriously concerned with whether or not we decide there is a stigma, as I do not think it is going to be very important from the standpoint of implications for strategy or program. However, focusing on what has been said, especially in Mr. Pettigrew's paper, I want to suggest that there is some bad demography and some bad human ecology that is being introduced as evidence for stigma. If you want to defend stigma, at least get rid of the argument—you used it orally, Mr. Pettigrew, as well as in your paper—that the relatively quick dispersion of the Puerto Rican indicates that, at least in terms of residential segregation, the Puerto Rican is faced with a different kind of problem. I think this is a very specious argument. You are talking about some 10,000, 15,000, or perhaps as many as 20,000 Puerto Ricans, as against 800,000 or more Negroes. I think that this is a specious argument; it does not prove stigma.

The other point I want to make is that, because there is a little bad sociology in what Mr. Woodward said, it may also be questionable history. I think it is correct to say that the Negro has been *with* us for three and a half centuries. I would argue, however, that he has been *among* us for less than one generation. He has been among us for a smaller amount of time than our twentieth-century immigrants, including the Italians, the Poles, and the Jews. He has not yet begun to have social interaction with us. I would say it would be relatively unimportant if he had been three and a half centuries in Asia or Alaska or Iceland, from the standpoint of what we are talking about: his integration, involving social interaction and participation in the common life. He happened to be in the rural, slum South.

Because I may have developed a phrase that makes sense, I will repeat it. The Negro has been with us for three and a half centuries, has been among us for less than a generation, and has not begun or, more accurately, is just beginning to enter the process of social interaction. I would argue that we can understand the stigma in terms of history, but I think it would be absurd to say that the history proves that there is a *special* stigma. The Negro's stigma may prove to be as eradicable as the stigma of any one of our immigrant groups.

COHEN: We, of course, are terribly unhappy about the present situation. At the same time, we are not serving a cause in failing to note the tremendous progress that has been made in the past twenty or twenty-five years. I have not seen the history of the past twenty-five years quoted adequately anywhere. I think a service would be performed if we stated it. I would like to suggest that we might be right in the midst of the same kind of change that has taken place with regard to other groups, whose status has changed rather rapidly as I think the Negro's status has changed. I believe even social interaction is now coming. I would like to challenge Mr. Pettigrew's statement that there is no difference among groups, regardless of their education, concerning their acceptance of a Negro as a neighbor. The data he quotes are from 1955. I would suggest that there has been a considerable change since then. I would also indicate to Mr. Berry that for every case of Percy Julian, who is upper-middle-class or perhaps upper-upper-class, I can show you fifteen or twenty cases of acceptance. Indeed, we are now getting to the point in suburban areas in New York where no party is complete without a Negro. When there is a sharing of responsibility for a party, one person brings the drinks, another brings the potato chips, a third brings the hot dogs, and a fourth person brings the Negro.

BERRY: I know some Negroes living in suburbia. And I know about this other danger that we run into when we first begin to make some inroads toward liberalization. We run into the situation Mr. Cohen is talking about: Instead of making the Negro a scapegoat all the time, we make a kind of pet out of him—which is just as bad.

UNIDENTIFIED: Is it as bad?

BERRY: Well, it is better for you guys. You get one. But the trouble is that when we fully achieve this concept, there will not be enough Negroes to go around.

I want to make a serious point about stigma. I am inclined to like the concept. I think that Mr. Pettigrew pointed the finger at the real problem that we are dealing with: *attitude*. I am not going to leave this, because the problem is the attitude of most white men, who look at color as a stigma. In terms of strategy, we talk about compensatory education and special training for the culturally deprived; but I think one of the strategies we need to develop is how to educate the so-called white culturally overprivileged. They are our trouble. Instead of putting all of our effort into trying to change the disprivileged Negro, we need to put some of our effort into trying to change the overprivileged white. He is likely to be the decision-maker, who is likely to live in the suburbs and run everything in the city without knowing what the hell he is doing. I would like to see us develop a special strategy to work on this class of white Americans.

TOBIN: This morning Mr. Turner defined integration as a sort of random distribution of Negroes in all strata of society.

UNIDENTIFIED: No. A random distribution of opportunities.

TOBIN: Not a forced randomization, but essentially a situation in which the probabilities of being in different strata and different occupations would not depend on race. They might depend on preference, but not on race. It seems to me it was a good definition. On the other hand, Mr. Parsons indicated, I think, that he would expect Negroes' entry into full participation to be similar to the entry of some of the immigrant groups. They might not be generally distributed or mixed through society. They might have subsocieties or subcultures; but they would still have high status. With that background, I think Mr. Woodward's remark about history was quite relevant. He indicates that it is much harder to find anything in the culture, tradition, and history of the Negro group to support them in a pluralistic role in society. The Jews, Irish, Italians, Orientals, and other groups had cultures, language, and perhaps even religions of their own. It seems to me that the Negroes do not have that same degree of independent tradition and culture to support them in any kind of full participation in the society, except complete integration into an America that is color-blind. I do not think Mr. Woodward's remarks had to do so much with the question of stigma as with whether it is possible for us to find any way in which the Negro can come into full status in this society other than by the society's becoming completely color-blind. The Negroes simply do not have the tradition that would enable them to follow the pattern of the Jews or the other groups which were mentioned.

UNIDENTIFIED: Maybe the civil rights movement gives them something for a while.

TOBIN: Maybe, but the whole purpose of the civil rights movement is to be only temporary. If it succeeds, it will cease to be an integrating force.

BERRY: In order to achieve the color-blindness that you seek, for a period of time we shall have to be positively and affirmatively color-conscious.

BREEDEN: Does the place that a group takes in American society depend more on the group's culture and tradition or more on the needs of the society into which it enters? I am not certain whether there is a historical and cultural determinism that leads a group into a place in American society, or whether there is at least interaction between the places that are there and the places that people are fitted for. Against some of the background we laid out this morning, I might suggest that the economic future and the kinds of places that will be there will have something to do with Negro assimilation or integration, as indeed various immigrant groups took places partly in relation to the development of the economy at the time when they came on the scene.

SESSION III

GRAUBARD: I know there is something Mr. Hughes would like to say, so I will begin by calling on him.

HUGHES: I think to some extent we have been spending our afternoon on

either-or. I suppose the American Negro suffers under the most stubborn, socially depriving stigma that we have ever applied in this country; even so, it applies only to some things. It does not apply, for instance, to mother's milk. And other people have suffered under other stigmata. We have to ask: To what kinds of participation, in what social roles, does the Negro stigma apply? It is obvious that these may change from time to time.

It is still true, for example, that a Negro man cannot be the grandfather of a white child. The child would not be white, even though he looked white. That is the way this particular stigma works. We do not allow biracial bilateral American kinship, although I think what Mr. Rossi said indicates that this rule might break down—that in Hyde Park (Chicago), Cambridge, or Greenwich Village, people might have biracial bilateral family reunions.

Canon Breeden also asked about the roles to which a given social stigma applies. It is quite clear that the racial stigma is not applied to as many roles as it used to be. But if we want to know what roles it does apply to, we have to determine what roles there are. What is the structure of our society? It seems to me that this was the big point in Mr. Parsons' paper. Although our society is very open in some ways, it consists of a lot of more or less closed and endogamous nuclei, which have a common style of life and common values. Maybe one can marry into them, or maybe one can marry out of them. It depends on how exclusive they are and on what happens to the intermarriage of the people in them.

I would like to hear some discussion about this; and I hope that, if there is any talk of stigma in the issue of *Dædalus*, it will be defined with regard to the various social roles to which it applies. For example, it does not seem to apply to Japanese architects in Washington. We say that Yamasaki is a Seattle boy and do not find it necessary to say that he is a Japanese boy. I do not think that we can define stigma without talking about the structure of the society.

PARSONS: I would like to follow that up by reemphasizing the very great importance of aggressive pluralization of the social structure in a dual sense. (This is sociological jargon, but it is hard to describe the phenomena without it.) For one thing, the individual participates in many different contexts, and the line of social development has been a progressive increase in the range and diversity of those contexts in which an individual participates. It is a well-established generalization that this phenomenon is a function of socioeconomic status *within* Negro society. The members of the lower groups participate very much less than the members of the higher groups.

The other dimension is that there is an even larger diversity of group structures than of individual participations, but the membership of these groups is segmental and partial for the members. It is not total. It is not that being a so-and-so, one participates in such-and-such groups and only such groups. One individual participates in one combination, and another individual participates in a different combination. This makes

it progressively less possible to categorize people by any one criterion. An individual is not a so-and-so; he is a *lot* of so-and-so's, as Mr. Hughes said.

It seems to me that, with this, the status of generalized inferiority, which has come to be the Negro status, becomes progressively more anomalous from a structural point of view. The whole problem of generalized inferiority has been masked in American society because the lowest status has been occupied for the most part (with pockets, such as Appalachia) by the most recent immigrant group. This has come to be viewed, therefore, as a temporary status. It may be a lifetime status for the immigrants; but their grandchildren will not, for the most part, be in that status. The Negro is the last, the end of the line. I do not think that we are going to have again the kind of mass immigration which we had in the late nineteenth century.

It seems to me that a combination of these circumstances makes the present situation particularly strainful. It is hardly conceivable—unless there were a general social breakdown—that the reduction of these strains would take the form of permanent consolidation of the inferiority status. This could have happened in the postbellum South, but I do not think it can happen with the movement of the center of gravity of the problem to the metropolitan North. That being the case, there is going to be very strong pressure to bring the Negro into the pluralization system. And the more he comes in, the less is it compatible with this generalized categorization.

BERRY: You know, we get new problems as we go along. We have been talking about the possibilities of breaking down things in the South when *de jure* is gone, but the Southerners are already coming up to Chicago to find out how to do it *de facto*.

PETTIGREW: I want to apologize for introducing the word *stigma*. In a meeting of people from many different fields, one of the problems is terminology. A term which has a special usage in a particular field may convey some other meaning to people from other fields. Many people took *stigma*, perhaps because of its connotation of "birthmark" or something like that, as implying immutability. The term does not have that connotation in social psychology. I am afraid that we wasted at least part of the afternoon on that misinterpretation. I still am going to use the term in my paper, but I will define it more carefully and will do so along the lines that Mr. Hughes has suggested.

I would like to come back to a point Canon Breeden raised earlier about the effects of the revolution on Negro Americans, as opposed to its effects on the structure, important as that is. It seems to me, on the basis of what social psychology knows now about changing people, that the movement almost replicates every ideal aspect of a situation which changes people. As Canon Breeden indicated, role terms help here. The revolution takes the "Negro role"—the role of inferiority—and stands it on its head. It pretty nearly requires the participant to violate the role in almost every particular. When you are supposed to be passive, you

are aggressive. When you are supposed to stay out because you are not wanted, you go in—particularly because you are not wanted. You have group support for it. You get group reward for it. It is publicly done. It has every known major characteristic for maximal change in the individual.

This has two implications. First, when 200,000 people marched down Pennsylvania Avenue, some people said that it probably did not change one Congressional vote. I think it did, as a matter of fact. Whether it did or did not—I will leave that to Mr. Wilson—it was still worth it. It was worth it if it lost a few votes, it seems to me, for the therapy it provided for 200,000 people, white and Negro.

The second implication is with respect to advice commonly given the Negro. No one here has reiterated this fallacy. Maybe, however, it is something we should emphasize in *Dædalus*, because it is often heard—even among reasonably well-intentioned people in American society. People say that the Negro ought to scrub up, that he ought to concern himself with improving himself and improving the ghetto, that he should stop wasting his time in the streets, in boycotting, and so on. I think, from the point of view of the maximum-change possibilities of participation in the movement, that he is doing two things simultaneously: changing the structure *and* changing himself by virtue of his participation.

BERRY: If they would let Negroes work, then they would have to picket on their own time, and there would be less of them picketing.

COHEN: What proportion of the Negro population is in the movement that you are talking about? You are speaking rather generally, Mr. Pettigrew.

PETTIGREW: I think, as I was saying earlier, that the affluent Negro America is getting most of the gains of the revolution so far. I think, also, that it is affluent Negro America that does most of the participating and, therefore, gets the gains that way, too. Dr. Coles mentioned that some lower-status Negro children did participate in changing the South. I think that is the exception and not the rule. A great need of the revolution is not only to change the structure for the other Negro America, but to gain widespread participation from lower-status Negroes. So far, I do not see any mass participation by lower-status Negroes. I would like to be corrected if anyone has data to the contrary.

KILSON: I think the young leaders, although most of them are people who somehow got a chance to go to college, are of lower-status families. James Forman is an example. Another is Thomas Atkins in Boston. His father was a steelworker in Gary, Indiana. Atkins was a college boy; he was a graduate student at Harvard University before he went into protest. There is an element of the lower-status factor that has leaped into the new leadership.

UNIDENTIFIED: By generation.

KILSON: Yes.

COLES: One of the big issues which is now attracting attention, and which probably has a lot of people worried for a number of reasons, is what the

role of these activists is going to be. A large number of them want to go into a kind of community work, in both rural and urban areas. They are really more concerned with challenging class structure than with dealing with the racial issue. On the other hand, there are the students who want to go to Washington and get embroiled in lobbying and similar activities. This has marked a decisive split in the sit-in movement and, I think, a very interesting one for us to think about. There are different implications, depending on which of these two tendencies predominates and which will be allowed to predominate in the kind of society that we have.

HAUSER: I am just going to add a footnote to the question that Mr. Pettigrew raised. If we look at the evidence there is, including the experience of Saul Alinsky, who organizes communities for "People's Organizations," we find not more than 6 per cent participation.

UNIDENTIFIED: That is a good deal.

HAUSER: Yes, it is.

UNIDENTIFIED: In national surveys, Negroes show about 5 per cent participation.

HAUSER: About 5 per cent? That is considerably greater participation than in labor unions.

UNIDENTIFIED: What do you mean by "participation"? Five per cent doing what?

UNIDENTIFIED: Five per cent reporting that they have participated in some way. It does not have to be in protest.

BERRY: However, I think there is a great error—even a tragic error—in thinking of the movement as just a demonstration. There is a whole lot to the movement besides walking down a street or sitting-in. It seems to me that, when we stop to think of the research, the education, the planning, the strategy, the raising of money and contributing of money, we have to conclude that there is a very, very, very high percentage of Negro participation in this revolution. We have to recognize that the revolution has a quiet drudgery side as well as the flamboyant demonstration side.

PETTIGREW: A third say that they have participated in a boycott by not buying something. So if we want to use that more general definition, then participation is much higher than 5 per cent.

GEERTZ: Not only that, but any social movement has leaders and activists and an audience. We have to think a great deal about what people who never go out in the street are learning from the Negro newspapers and, as someone mentioned, from television. How are they really seeing things? A lot is going on in the minds of people who do not say much and do not do much. It is a sort of reevaluation process. Certainly it has gone further with people who lead demonstrations. But a lot of people who would not go near a demonstration because they might get fired, never-

theless have gone through some very, very important psychological changes.

BERRY: I submit that the people who pay for a revolution are *in* the revolution. This is very characteristic of revolutions. This revolution is being paid for by middle-class Negroes and liberal whites.

HAUSER: We are talking about two different things here, incidentally. Participation in a revolution is quite different from active participation in an organization in the sense of attending membership meetings. Mr. Pettigrew said that 200,000 Negroes and whites got therapy out of the march on Washington. I think that 200,000 is a very small fraction of the number who were tremendously influenced by that march.

GEERTZ: Nationalism is very similar. For example, it was a very small, élite group which led Indonesia to independence, but the impact upon every peasant in Java was fantastic. I do not think one should make too rapid a judgment about what is really going on. The Dutch always said, "Who is in the movement? Just a few upper-middle-class, ex-civil-servant Javanese." And the Dutch were not wrong. Those were the people leading the movement—a handful of men. There were maybe fifty or a hundred of them, at the most. But the effect upon the society was rather more profound than that.

HUGHES: During the war, a man came out from the British propaganda office to Laval University in Quebec. He told a group of French Canadian professors, who were questioning him about Indian nationalism, that there was only some small percentage (one-fifth of one per cent, I think) in the Gandhi nationalist movement. At this, the French Canadians all laughed, knowing that one does not measure it that way. We have to say what the relationship is between the people who are active in the movement and the others.

It would be interesting to have a paper in *Dædalus* on the structure of the civil rights movement, with regard to both the people who are participating and the people who are not active but who are watching and listening and are deeply affected. This, it seems to me, is the new thing about the Negroes' interest in this country. There have long been NAACP's and Urban Leagues, but we have to determine what influence the movement has on all Negroes and on the society.

GRAUBARD: Actually, this is the theme of the article which Kenneth Clark has written, and Professor Clark has wired me to say that the paper is on its way.

UNIDENTIFIED: What is his subject?

GRAUBARD: His paper is essentially on the leadership and the way in which the protest movements have operated. It perhaps emphasizes leadership more than other things. That was what he was originally assigned, with the same freedom everyone else had to take that theme and develop it as he wished. But I have not yet seen the paper or an outline of it.

FLEMING: In trying to judge the significance of participation and leadership and structure, we have to look at the strategies of the movement. Strategy is what makes the difference. Mr. Pettigrew introduces another dimension. There may be, he says, a tremendous psychological effect on the participants. However, as far as immediate social change is concerned, maybe the participation in the movement needs to be big, or maybe it needs to be small. Maybe the movement needs to be heavily funded, or maybe it needs to be lightly funded. It depends on what the movement is supposed to do.

Mr. Turner mentioned the possibility of raising the pricetag on discrimination and segregation as one way of making the stigma dysfunctional. This is what has worked in the South. There is no question about it in my mind. It is about the only thing that has worked thus far. The problem is to find an equivalent technique that we can use as we begin to focus on the more subtle and more difficult economic and social conditions in the big cities of the North and, in time, of the South. If, in these discussions, we are looking for new ground to break, I hope that Professor Clark, if he is dealing with strategy, will address himself to this problem. I think there is a certain amount of floundering going on as to how a protest movement of this kind should address itself to that complex. How can we make it too expensive for the people in the North to go on, for example, preserving housing patterns?

WILSON: This is an area about which something ought to be said, but unfortunately there is not much that can be said. I do not think we will be able to find anything to say in time for the fall issue of *Dædalus*. We have to deal with the structure of the organization, the function of strategies, the many facets—some only dimly perceived—of the civil rights revolution. There seem to be two curves moving in opposite directions: As the intensity of the movement and the number of participants in the movement increase, the amount of *research* being done decreases radically. Not many people know much about the movement in any systematic sense, although everybody knows something about it, and a few people know a great deal about it from personal experience. There is also another factor. I think some Negroes, quite understandably, are getting a little research-shy. People are becoming, quite rightly, much more cautious about discussing these matters. They no longer regard themselves as bits of evidence which must be served up for the social scientists' inspection. I am not optimistic that we can produce an article on this subject right now. It would have to be a highly interpretive and, I think, highly speculative essay.

MAYER: I, too, would like something on this. It is very apparent that the character of the movement's leadership is changing so fast that it tends to make even recent research almost obsolete. If I may be autobiographical for a minute, just two weeks ago I stopped being the chairman of the Boston branch of the Northern Student Movement. I had a board which was made up of twelve people of whom nine were white and three were Negro. I am glad to say that we have now been replaced by another

group of whom eleven are Negro and one is white. This has an important implication. The Northern Student Movement has about 1,100 tutors from various colleges. Most of them are white, and they have been used to working under white leaders. They are now going to work under the leadership of Negroes. Such a change may have a profound effect on the Negro's view of himself.

HAUSER: I want to say a word about this notion of *cost* as a factor in getting behavior changed. Let me speak to the extreme, although that may not be what the people who have spoken about cost had in mind. Saul Alinsky believes that the bridge between white and black is green. He says that there is no other way except to make discrimination expensive. There are realms where this is probably true, especially where there is an institutionalized and legalized social order enforcing segregation, as in the South. However, given the trends since Franklin Roosevelt's day toward a welfare society and consciousness of issues, it might be well not only to emphasize the function of making the cost high, but also to emphasize the positive approach. We should get attitudes changed not simply because the price is too high not to change, but because it is the thing to do. There is mounting evidence that this may be characterizing at least large parts of the country. The white population is not utterly hopeless; it gives some signs of being educable on this front.

The changing attitudes of the white population is, by the way, one topic that is missing from the proposed issue of *Dædalus*. There is some very good information on changing attitudes. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) has twenty-two years' worth of information which might make a very good article.

BERRY: I am going to make a very brief comment on leadership and research. I was impressed with the comment that leadership is changing very rapidly. Some of it is (although some of it is still pretty stable). This caused me to comment to my colleagues at the National Urban League that the jobs of race leaders used to be for life, but now they are working on an hourly basis. They can be had any time.

I will give us a point on research. It seems to me that the activists—the direct actionists—are very interested in action research which has a point. I suspect that we have in Chicago the largest research department of any group working permanently in race relations. Our research has some meaning to people—real meaning, right now. It is intended to lead toward immediate programmatic activity for ourselves or some other group. All the direct actionists are very interested in this. But what they and some others of us are sick and tired of is the technique of researching the hell out of Negroes and never doing anything—using this, as it has been used in the past, as a tactic for delaying movement toward redress of wrongs. We do research, then appoint a committee to evaluate it, then let it die.

With respect to the cost factor, I do not think it is very vague. I think it is very clear. For instance, in housing, there is a way we can make discrimination cost. We know the way to make it cost. There is a

way we can make any kind of discrimination cost. We have more governmental tools today to make it cost than we ever had before. I am back again to attitude. When the government has the attitude that makes it want to use the tools which it has, then it will use them. Until it has the attitude that makes it want to do this, it will not do this. The implications of Title VI in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are so vast and so broad that the people who are supposed to do the implementing do not know what they mean. They are very reluctant to do anything, just as we never have lowered the boom with the President's Committee on Government Contract Compliance. Until we lower the boom, the discriminators in industry are not going to believe that the government means it.

We went all the way around Robin Hood's barn on the civil rights bill to make sure that we did not have housing in it. Maybe that was a strategy to get it through. But the President has powers on this, and we can use them. For instance, we are getting ready to submit a brief on site selection in public housing in Chicago. We believe that the selecting of sites in the middle of big ghettos is an intent to keep people separated and to intensify segregation; and we believe, therefore, that it is in conflict with the laws for any federal government money to be contributed to that.

There are a variety of ways of making discrimination costly. For instance, if we could ever change the custom so that stigma would be attached to the discriminator, as is happening now here and there, then people would not want to discriminate so much any more. I think we can determine quite a lot about what the costs are, and a whole lot of people who would discriminate for nothing will not discriminate for a quarter—and if it is a half-dollar, pretty soon they will say, "To hell with it, I have got to make change."

COLES: I want to mention something that happened last summer in Oxford, Ohio, when the students in the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) got together before we went to Mississippi. On the spot were several sociologists and a political scientist who had come down from the University of Wisconsin and the University of Michigan. There was a whole afternoon spent in discussing whether to allow these people to stay and, if so, what the implications were. Eventually the students voted not to let them stay. The students were concerned about how much should be known about ongoing activity in today's society, in which knowledge is widely disseminated even when it is published in relatively obscure journals. This is a problem. We no longer have people like de Tocqueville running around the country and writing essays which are very narrowly distributed. The concern of some of the students has been interesting to watch. I think that what we say and how it is interpreted may be a problem for all of us who are involved in this movement.

GRAUBARD: As I indicated this afternoon, I want to insert some of the outlines of the papers from people who are preparing papers and have not yet completed them. Professor Freund has consented to speak to us about the paper which he will write, and I would like to call on him now.

FREUND: I am very sorry that I do not have more prose to set before you. I did prepare a half-page outline, which I am passing around—and which makes me feel guilty of tokenism.

I have tried to deal with a very special segment of the general subject of the civil rights movement and the law and to relate the subject to more general considerations. The first theme I have in mind is the relation of the movement to general currents in the law. That has two aspects: first, what I call the pour-over from recent general reforms into the civil rights movement and, second, the pour-over from the civil rights movement into more general movements in the law.

Let me illustrate what I mean. In connection with the influence of general reform on the civil rights movement, one thinks of the great advances in criminal procedure under the aegis of the Constitution and the federal courts: the right to counsel, the tightening up of standards of voluntariness of confessions, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. All of these bear very directly and, in some communities, especially on the Negroes and the civil rights movement. The same thing is true of legislative programs. We talked at length this morning about the poverty program; and I dare say we will talk about educational changes—the relation of higher quality education and more relevant education to the movement.

Incidentally, this whole interplay seems to me to give opportunity for more collaboration, at least on the level of leadership, between the civil rights forces and the more general interests and concerns of other groups in the community. That is to say, there is no reason that the civil rights groups—the Negro leadership—should not become involved, as I think there are signs that they will be, in the effort to reform the law of bail in criminal cases or the effort to abolish capital punishment. It seems to me these areas of collaboration have some obvious general value for mutual understanding and cooperation.

The other aspect is the pour-over from the civil rights movement itself to the general currents in the law. Here we have had some very remarkable developments, indeed, which are perhaps less obvious. I am thinking, for example, of the development of the law of freedom of speech and press under the impact and the stimulus and the pressures of the civil rights movement. I am referring not merely to the law of demonstrations and public assembly, e.g., picketing, but even to freedom of the press itself. You recall the *New York Times* libel case of a year or two ago. It was a direct outgrowth of the civil rights movement because the material in question was an attack on the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, published as a political advertisement by a civil rights group. The verdict against the paper for \$500,000—an obvious threat to freedom of the press—was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. This made new ground, constitutionally speaking. It was not easy to find the constitutional ground for this, because some of the material in the advertisement, though false in rather trivial particulars, was nevertheless false. And the size of the verdict is ordinarily not a matter for the federal Court to review. But in the context of freedom of speech, the Court evolved some new constitutional doctrine to the effect that defama-

tion of a public official was not actionable at law unless it was knowingly false or done with reckless disregard of truth or falsity. This is a general development in the field of freedom of the press and was hailed by many, as well as by the *New York Times* itself.

However, there is a certain price we pay for this and a certain ambiguity rather typical of the liberal dilemma, if I may comment on that for a moment. Shortly before the *New York Times* decision, there was handed down in the state of Washington a libel verdict of \$40,000 against some Birchite groups and a local newspaper, in favor of John Goldmark, a very progressive member of the state legislature, who had incurred the wrath of the extreme right and was smeared as a Communist. The verdict of \$40,000 was a remarkably generous one in that particular community. Unhappily, the decision forced the district judge in Washington to set aside the verdict in favor of Goldmark. My point is that we have here a rather striking advance in general constitutional law precipitated by the civil rights movement.

Similarly, in connection with the legal representation of, I will not say indigents, but persons of moderate means, one of the crying needs is for more adequate and more steady representation not only in terms of court counseling, but in terms of advisory counseling. The NAACP got in trouble with the state of Virginia on the ground that its maintaining a panel of lawyers for civil rights cases was unlawful champerty and maintenance, in the old common law terms. A lay organization was being interposed between a man and his lawyer. The Supreme Court upset this decision; the court ruled in favor of the NAACP. This was another path-breaking decision so far as constitutional law is concerned. Within a year after that, the decision was applied in favor of the Railway Brotherhoods, which had a plan of maintaining a panel of lawyers for personal-injury cases. That plan had been declared illegal in almost every state where it had been tested. The Supreme Court, under the momentum of the NAACP case, felt obliged to apply the same principle, since the principles of law are neutral and not loaded. So we have had a very striking advance in what has been a crying need and an advance in the name of the Constitution, rather than by the more laborious process of state-by-state legislative and judicial reform.

Of course, there has been quite a change in the whole relationship of state and federal courts. Federal courts are not showing the same deference to state courts that they formerly did. Our whole concept of federal-state relations is undergoing reexamination under the impetus of the civil rights movement. So here again there is, or at least should be, a coalescence of interest from another direction, between the civil rights leadership and civil libertarian groups.

One looks for analogues to this fast-changing body of doctrine, and it is very hard to find one. One thinks, perhaps, of the effect of the Industrial Revolution on the law—employers' liability acts and workmen's compensation laws, for example. But the effect of the Industrial Revolution took much longer and was predominantly legislative rather than judicial. The reliance on the courts as the spearhead of change is quite new. Compare the attitude of the civil rights movement toward the courts today

and the attitude of labor toward the courts when they were having their revolution. At least before the Wagner National Labor Relations Act, the courts were stigmatized as the source of labor injunctions. Labor distrusted them and would have nothing to do with them. It took a while for labor's confidence to be established under the National Labor Relations Board, and, after all, there we had an administrative body which was intermediary between the litigant and the court.

So in all these ways, I think, the movement has had quite a remarkable effect on the doctrine, structure, attitudes, and presuppositions in this country toward the law and the court.

The other theme which I plan to deal with is what I call legal-ethical problems of equality. First of all, there is the problem, which was touched on this morning and perhaps deserves separate treatment in a paper, of preferential treatment versus color-blindness. The attractive phrase *color-blindness* was not invented by Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, but by Albion Tourgée. (Mr. Woodward will know Mr. Tourgée, the lawyer-author, who wrote a Reconstruction novel, *A Fool's Errand*.) The phrase came from a brief filed by Mr. Tourgée. It was taken up by Harlan in his dissent. And, of course, it was a rallying cry of late for the liberals in the civil rights movement. It served its purpose for a time, but we should remember that it is a phrase which is not in the Constitution. It is always dangerous to take such a piece of rhetoric as a touchstone. It is always dangerous to parse phrases which are not the basic source of one's doctrine.

Harlan himself—if I may digress—though he has been much canonized by civil rights leaders, was quite doctrinaire and, as we would think, unrealistic and illiberal in other respects in his cast of mind. For example, not only equal protection of the laws but freedom of contract became a shibboleth with him, as when he wrote the opinion holding that to outlaw yellow-dog contracts was unconstitutional since it violated the liberty of contract of worker and employer. He held that it was unconstitutional to classify businesses differently—cooperatives and corporations, for example—because it denied equal protection. I think he is an object lesson in the dangers of doctrinaire, absolute thinking, though in the case of color-blindness, as of the time, it looked to be a liberal and promising doctrine. The lesson, it seems to me, is that one need not be doctrinaire in order to be principled.

I think that violation of the principle of color-blindness, for the purpose of transition toward a greater equality, is perfectly consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and that it remains a discretionary matter of policy for school boards or for legislatures. Whether compensatory treatment is mandatory is a more difficult question which gets into complications that I do not have time to develop. That is, if imbalance was in some way caused by state action, if the state was responsible in some way, then the state may be under a duty—not merely a privilege but a duty—to redress it by preferential treatment. It seems to me that in cases of imbalance it would be appropriate to conduct inquiries into the extent to which some governmental agency was responsible in some form for the so-called *de facto* segregation.

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My final theme is not equality of treatment by the government, but rather equality of obligation on the part of the Negro civil rights movement—obligation of fidelity to law. This raises the whole problem of civil disobedience and how the law should deal with it. I would suggest that there are various evasive techniques available to the law for accommodating a moral defense to the mandates of the law. There are, by design, many discretionary elements or soft spots in the law to accommodate this sort of problem. One is the prosecutor's discretion as to whether or not to bring any proceedings. Consider the Boston school boycott. It is perfectly conceivable that we might have had a prosecution, but there was no necessity for it, and no step was taken to bring the matter to court. If a case is brought to court, there is discretion in the jury to acquit without being accountable in any way for acquittal. There is discretion in the judge to give a suspended sentence. There is discretion in the executive to pardon or commute. These evade the basic hard question, but they are useful.

I would also make a perhaps more fundamental and philosophical point. If we inquire into the basis of fidelity to the law, and we conclude that it rests on some philosophical premise of a social compact, that is, a reciprocity of rights and duties within the society, then if we find that one group has been systematically excluded from participation in the community, may there not be a legal as well as a moral exemption for them from accountability to the law, at least in respect of an effort to gain that kind of participation? When I say participation, I mean participation in the self-governing process, which would include not merely the right to vote but, I think, equal opportunity or appropriate opportunity for office-holding, for appointment to Civil Service, for places on the police force, in the probation service, and the various other policing and supervising and administrative activities of the state.

BERRY: Why not equal opportunity for participation anywhere where any government money is used? That is what Title VI is trying to achieve. You enumerated certain areas, and I presume that by enumerating certain ones you were excluding others.

FREUND: I was talking in terms of civil disobedience. You are making another point.

COHEN: Professor Freund, who would determine whether the civil disobedience was directed against a justifiable grievance? Who would decide, for example, whether an elected body should contain members of minority in proportionate numbers? Who would determine whether blocking traffic or putting an electric station out of commission was a justifiable kind of act? What lines can be drawn? I am not asking these questions in any unfriendly manner.

FREUND: I agree that this is difficult. In the first place, I did not mean that there ought to be a quota system of employment. That is too mechanical. As to what activities are justifiable, I said those related to the civil rights movement. I think we would have to apply some principle of

least force or least disruption possible. I am not suggesting that to burn the schoolhouse because it is segregated or to burn the city hall because Negroes are not employed is privileged. I take civil disobedience, in the classic sense, to be nonviolent, to be symbolic, to be aimed at the conscience. I do not have in mind upsetting subway cars or setting fire to buildings. I have in mind such a thing, let us say, as not sending children to school, which would be a violation, let us assume, of the school attendance laws. I am speaking of the kind of thing which is civil disobedience, which is an offense, and which is related to a lack of opportunity for participation. I am not now speaking of a school boycott in a city which has political participation by Negroes. I am thinking of communities where the Negro does not have the other outlets through the political process.

HAUSER: Would it be all right to burn a superintendent of school at the stake?

BERRY: I have a match.

FREUND: I think Martin Luther King could answer that one.

PETTIGREW: You mentioned, with respect to *de facto* school cases, that you think they will eventually hinge on whether there was government involvement in what brought about the *de facto* separation. Could that be involvement not by the school board itself, but by some other government agency?

FREUND: Yes. It is only a guess, but that is my meaning. There could be school board involvement, such as in deliberately choosing to build a new school in the midst of the Negro ghetto instead of on the edge. But there might also be, for example, state court enforcement of restrictive residential covenants. If that contributed to the *de facto* residential segregation, we could relate that to the school problem.

PETTIGREW: Or even use of urban-renewal funds to maximize ghettoization? That would include almost every city in the United States.

FREUND: If it were closely enough related to the particular school district case, I would so argue.

LERNER: Mr. Freund, do I understand that in your analysis you find it possible to get along without any resort to higher law concepts? Do you feel, on civil disobedience for example, that we can get along without the traditional higher law concept which the Supreme Court had in their contract property cases, and without the kind of higher law concept which the Southern whites keep invoking? There is no comparable higher law concept in your analysis.

FREUND: It seems to me that the Constitution cannot be divorced from higher law concepts. I think the whole concept of equality, which is both philosophical and constitutional (after all, we have an equal protection clause), is colored by higher law concepts. That is to say, one of

the things the civil rights movement has sharpened is our awareness that equal justice may be based not merely on the proportionality of need, merit, or achievement, but on inherent worth. Now, where do we get that? The Constitution does not spell out the criteria of equality. This has been a perennial philosophical problem, at least from Aristotle down. There is a choice of meaning. The idea of equality as meaning inherent worth of the clay human being in certain fundamental relationships, such as the right to life or the right to counsel, is both higher law and constitutional.

HUGHES: I would like to ask a question, which I am sure you can answer very quickly, Professor Freund. You have not mentioned one of the leading problems of Mangum's book, *The Legal Status of the Negro*: who is a Negro and how much is a Negro's reputation worth? Maybe the problem does not exist anymore; Mangum's book was published twenty-five years ago. Do I gather correctly that this problem is gone?

The other thing I would like to ask is this. You spoke of increasing recourse to the courts instead of legislation. Is this a general movement in other countries or only here and in Canada?

FREUND: That is a good question. I think that, at least throughout the Western world, there has been a definite trend in the direction of constitutionalism. So-called constitutional courts have been established since World War II at a great rate. Of course, Germany is an outstanding example. That court is very busy. They have a procedure called constitutional petition, which gets one right into the constitutional court for constitutional questions. Italy has just established a constitutional court. Without pretending to be an expert in the field, I would say that the movement has not been limited to this country. As an aftermath of the experience with totalitarianism, there has been an increased emphasis on constitutionalism, that is, on the judicial role.

BERRY: I have a small question. Am I correct in my belief that all constitutional rights are personal, that the rights belong to the individual and have nothing whatsoever to do with any subgrouping to which he might belong and against which prejudice might be lodged? And am I correct in my belief that all constitutional rights are present? I take that to mean "now," not "with all deliberate speed," for instance. If that is correct, what can be done to secure these rights for Negroes, Indians, and some other people *now*? It seems to me we could make a broader attack than this piecemeal thing we have been doing in the civil rights movement.

FREUND: What you say is true; but, as with most maxims, it has to be counterbalanced against other maxims. You know: The early bird catches the worm, but haste makes waste. Constitutional rights are personal and present. On the other hand, the remedy of injunction by a court of equity is an extraordinary remedy (I am quoting the maxims) lying in the discretion of the court. If one goes into court and asks for that extraordinary remedy, even in a constitutional case there is a certain leeway for the court to tailor its relief to the practicalities of the situation.

I think this was the technical ground for "deliberate speed." It was a suit in equity for an injunction, and historically and classically the chancellor has discretion as to the particular sanction or relief that he imposes. I think the federal courts are showing that at last they are getting a little impatient with "deliberate speed." I think this is one of the weaknesses of our excessive resort to the courts. It would have helped if Congress had laid down some guidelines, that is, if they had had compulsory plans of orderly desegregation. They could have done this under the enforcing power of the 14th Amendment. Now, perhaps, we are coming to it through the leverage of the conditions of the federal hand-out. This is perhaps the best way of all. I think the courts need help from the executive and legislative branches of government. This was also the issue in the poll-tax debate.

FISCHER: There is the new regulation which has been issued by the Commissioner of Education on the required desegregation of certain grades at certain times. Isn't this likely to make a very important change in the situation in the South with respect to schools?

FREUND: I would think so. It has a very good sanction which does not require endless litigation.

BERRY: That is making segregation cost.

FREUND: Money is one of the world's great civilizing agents.

WOODWARD: I wonder if the situation is quite so hopeful. We now have about 60,000 white children in schools with Negroes in the desegregated districts. About half of the districts are to be desegregated at this time. I wonder whether the new regulation won't simply produce that many more token desegregated districts. Is that too pessimistic a view? It seems to me that it is possible that this will happen.

EDWARDS: It is possible, and we may eventually have to come back to the courts in some way. However, the Commissioner's order is so specific that if he holds to the hard line, it is going to speed up the whole business, I think. The terminal date for complete compliance is 1967. All the school districts will now comply. I think we are going to see a great deal more policing in this instance.

What I am struck with is that when Mr. Griswold mentioned this as a possibility two years ago, in one of his soundings off as a member of the Civil Rights Commission, nobody paid any attention. Most of the people in Washington were strangely silent, as this was drastic. But two years later, we have this written into the Civil Rights Act. What is significant, I think, is that a whole series of things has happened in the intervening years that pushes this forward and gives it a kind of acceptance which it previously did not have. This is the speed with which this kind of activity can move. That is why I say that, as in any social movement, there are differential speeds on different fronts. Some things move rather rapidly, and others encounter more resistance. It is hard to say exactly how fast we are going in the total movement.

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I am very hopeful about this particular measure, because, although we are looking at education specifically, it is going to apply across the board. I think we are going to see all kinds of evasions, but we will see the countereffects since the government is committed. The net effect, I think, will be a big push forward.

WOODWARD: My colleague, Alexander Bickel, seems to be skeptical about the total results.

FLEMING: There is a further response to the question. We ought to note that there has been a recent convening of the Deep South governors by Governor Sanders of Georgia for precisely the purpose of slowing this thing down and diluting the effect of the Commissioner's guidelines or regulations. It seems to me that the only way to answer this is to make one's personal prediction of how firm President Johnson and those around him are going to be in implementing the thing. It is quite right that the Commissioner's criteria are remarkably strong and would produce more than the kind of token change you are talking about, if they are applied without dilution and evasion.

REDDING: It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that another paper is missing. We should have a paper on the resistance and the modes of resistance.

GRAUBARD: This will be discussed in one of tomorrow's oral reports.

HAUSER: I hope someone will cover the important contribution that Governor Wallace and Sheriff Clark are making to the acceleration that Mr. Edwards is talking about. If we did not have these people, I think we would want to invent them as instrumentalities to help.

FOLEY: I might mention, in this regard, that in Mississippi, about a month ago, I had a lengthy conversation with Governor Johnson. His attitude is, I think, quite progressive. There are quite a few marches going on in Mississippi right now, and the state of Mississippi is just permitting them. There is nothing being done about them. The marchers are not being harassed. And, therefore, we do not read about them in the news.

HAUSER: It's a pity. If they keep doing that, they will slow down the movement.

COHEN: Governor Johnson is not saying anything. He is speaking more to people from Washington than to people from Mississippi. But he is doing all kinds of things. He is firing anybody in the government service—including the state police—who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan. I agree that he and others in Mississippi are going to move as slowly as they possibly can. However, I think the civilizing influence of money is, indeed, bringing civilization to Mississippi.

FOLEY: I will give you a good illustration of the civilizing effect of money. I was the first head of a federal agency or department to go to Mississippi in four years. I had some good meetings in Greenville and in Jackson, where

about 150 businessmen and bankers showed up. However, when I got down to a city noted for its Ku Klux Klan activity, only 12 came and, prior to the meeting, did their best to avoid talking to me. I did not talk about civil rights. I just talked about how the Small Business Administration could help Mississippi with its economic development programs.

The person who had tried the hardest to avoid me was the mayor—apparently because I had stayed in a Negro motel the night before—but I noticed that after he heard what the Small Business Administration might do for business and community development in his city, he started talking to my Mississippi field director. So I kind of moseyed on over to ask him what was going on. He wanted a loan for his drugstore! Of course, I put that right at the top of my list, and I correspond with my field director every week to find out that the loan is coming.

HUGHES: Did you ask if he lets Negroes drink their Coca Cola inside the store?

FOLEY: He is going to have to if he gets an S.B.A. loan.

SESSION IV

GRAUBARD: This morning, I would like to change our method just a little. We have the papers of Mr. St. Clair Drake and Mr. John Hope Franklin, who are both out of the country. We also have with us ten other papers, some submitted as recently as last night, with the authors present. I hope that each of these authors will give a brief presentation of the argument in his paper. In addition, there are a few papers which have yet to be written. Perhaps these authors can tell us at somewhat greater length what they intend to discuss in their papers. I would like to treat the papers in groups, as we did yesterday; but I shall play this session somewhat by ear, for my greatest concern is that we get the maximum comment from you on the papers. Let me begin by asking Mr. Wilson to comment briefly on the argument in his paper.

WILSON: My paper is on the Negro in politics. It was largely written two months ago and, therefore, as someone said, is already out of date. Before it is printed, I suspect it will be completely out of date. At least with respect to my paper, I am hoping that *Dædalus* comes out in looseleaf binders.

This paper is essentially an examination of the prospects for a *Negro-white political coalition* on behalf of those interests which Negroes and whites may have in common. As an expository device, rather than as an effort to deal with a particular argument, I selected a recent article by Bayard Rustin, who in effect calls for a grand liberal coalition among Negroes, trade union leaders, white liberals, the intelligentsia and the like for the furtherment of socioeconomic change. He argues—quite rightly, I think—that the really significant problems facing the Negro are socioeconomic and that the accomplishments which can be attained by “a stroke of the President’s pen,” so to speak, or even in many places by a stroke of the mayor’s pen, are becoming fewer and fewer. The real prob-

lems involve the reconstruction of an economy, a society, and a cultural system, which will result in the further improvement in the life chances of Negroes in the mass.

I try to show that the recent pattern (at least the pattern with which I am familiar) in Negro politics is a pattern which has never rested upon any single grand coalition but is a shifting pattern of multiple coalitions. The most important dividing line in Negro politics is between North and South. The politics of the Negro in the South are quite different from those in the North. It is almost possible to write two different papers on the subject. And, within the South, the politics are quite different, depending on whether it is possible for Negroes to enter the party system and thus in some sense become professionalized politicians or whether they must act in an amateur political capacity, so to speak, as civic leaders trying to bargain with the white establishment for certain marginal changes.

The result in the South has been that the Negro vote has been quite independent. The result has not been what many social scientists, including myself, might have expected: that the Negro vote, once enfranchised in urban areas, would be very hard to mobilize because there would be no well-established and well-oiled party machinery in the Negro community to do this. On the contrary, it has proved possible to organize and direct the Negro vote with astonishing success. Examples of this were the Allen versus Maddox mayoralty election and the Weltner congressional election in Atlanta. The unanimity of the Negro vote is quite remarkable, and the turnout at the elections is not substantially different from the turnout of white voters.

Coalition in the South has, in most cases, followed one of two patterns. One has been, in a few small or rural areas, a corrupt coalition between local Negroes who enter into a tacit alliance with the county sheriff, largely for the purpose of maintaining the sheriff's illicit activities. Probably as many Negroes in the South have been registered to vote in order to maintain jai alai or pelota or the numbers game as (until recently) were registered as a result of Civil Rights Commission activities. This pattern of the manipulated vote, which Professor Alfred Clubok has talked about, is, of course, a special case and, I think, will be the declining case.

The more normal pattern is for the Negroes, when they are effective politically at all, to be a part of a *tacit* coalition with upper-middle-class and upper-class whites, particularly white businessmen. The Atlanta coalition, which I described at some length in my paper, is the classic example of this. Not in every city is such a coalition possible, because not in every city is there a cosmopolitan white bourgeoisie which places a high value on racial peace because of what they take to be the importance to the city of maintaining a good national image and encouraging industrial development. There are many communities that are dominated by the small, Main-Street merchants who have localistic rather than cosmopolitan orientation, who do not value rapid industrial development, who do not care about a national image, who are not involved with the federal government or with national corporations, and whose allegiance, there-

fore, is to the local pattern of influence. In such communities, it has often been much harder for the Negro to establish any effective coalition. In the South, in many cities and, indeed, in entire states, such as Mississippi, the absence of a cosmopolitan white bourgeoisie is one of the chief factors inhibiting further gains for Negro politics.

In the North, of course, that pattern has been quite different. Here the vote has not been independent. The vote has been committed, at least since the late 1930's, to the Democratic party, locally and nationally, with a few minor exceptions. The vote has largely been taken for granted. The question has not been the direction of the Negro vote, but the size of the Negro vote. The turnout has varied enormously, depending upon organization. In Chicago, in the machine wards, it is possible to get a very large turnout; similarly, in Philadelphia. There are communities in New York and California where there is no powerful organization, and the Negro turnout is often quite low. This bespeaks the fact that politics is intrinsically less interesting in the North, because the choice between candidates is never a choice between the segregationist and the integrationist or between people of differing degrees of commitment to segregation. The choice is between two people who nominally profess integrationist goals, but whose real activities are often seen—quite rightly, I think—as irrelevant to the interests and life chances of most Negroes. I do not think we have to erect any theory of alienation to account for the low turnout of Negro voters. It can be just as easily explained on the basis of rational self-interest.

The question is what form of organization will grow up to take the place of the now dying, almost dead, big-city political machines. In communities, such as Boston, which are notoriously disorganized, the civil rights movement probably speaks with the greatest authority. In other communities, leaders with various personal styles—Adam Clayton Powell and Cecil Moore, at one end; J. Raymond Jones and Augustus Hawkins, at the other extreme—have risen to play a kind of personalistic politics which has not been dependent upon the creation of a large organization. Here, when a coalition exists, it is again a multiple coalition. For certain issues, particularly the nomination of state-wide or national elective officials, the coalition traditionally has been with the trade unions at the leadership level. But there has never been any fusion of interest between rank-and-file Negroes and rank-and-file whites in the trade union movement.

On local matters involving the provision of services, the coalition is a quite different one, usually with the upper-class white suburbanite, who in county elections usually votes with the Negro on issues such as increasing medical care for the indigent and providing public facilities largely for lower-income people. Here the lower-middle-class white deserts the Negro coalition.

GRAUBARD: I think, perhaps, it would be best if we started by discussing Mr. Wilson's paper.

COHEN: Mr. Wilson, would you say that there was not a clear-cut choice in the last presidential election?

WILSON: In the 1964 election? Of course, there was a clear-cut choice.

COHEN: Would your theory hold that there was not a degree of self-interest anywhere on the part of Negroes voting for one candidate or the other?

WILSON: It was a very special election, Mr. Cohen. There had not been a similar election before; and, although the Democrats are going to be running against Barry Goldwater for the next twenty years in every Negro precinct, no matter who the Republicans nominate, there is not going to be quite the same kind of election again. In most elections for mayors, aldermen, and governors, the choice is not that clear; and I do not think it will be that clear again in elections for President.

COHEN: Was the turnout significantly different in this Presidential election?

WILSON: I do not have systematic information on turnout in this election. My impression from some communities is that it was somewhat higher but not significantly higher.

COHEN: Then I would suggest that, in addition to lack of self-interest, there might be other reasons for low turnout in some communities.

WILSON: I think this issue cuts both ways. On the one hand, we could say that it was in their self-interest to see that Goldwater was defeated. On the other hand, it was so clear that Mr. Goldwater was going to be defeated that the "I'll stay at home, let George vote" pattern may have taken over. We often get the highest turnout in close elections, rather than lopsided elections, so this is not a uniform pattern. In the case of a close election and a real choice, I would imagine we would get a very high turnout. However, given a meaningful choice in an election that no one for a moment thinks is going to be very close, we get this cancelling-out factor and, consequently, a somewhat but not significantly higher turnout.

PETTIGREW: In the South, the coalition of the upper-middle-class white with the Negro has not always been there, as Mr. Wilson knows. I have been studying, in terms of race, elections of the past twenty years in five Southern cities. In recent elections in all five cities, precisely the pattern which Mr. Wilson described has emerged in the 1960's, but it was not typically there in the late 1940's and early 1950's. What really catalyzes this pattern is precisely what he said. We can locate it in a time series of elections. The whites often are voting solidly together on straight race issues which do not cost anything; then suddenly the schools close or a factory announces that it is not coming, and within, say, six months the upper-middle class begins to have a higher turnout and flips over to the Negro position. The Negroes do not come to the whites; the whites come to the Negroes, in terms of the vote. The lower class and, particularly, the lower-middle class turn out very big during a crisis. They were, for example, very pro-Faubus, or Faubus's equivalent. But when the crisis

begins to fade and token desegregation has been accomplished, the turnout of the lower-middle class goes way down. Then the Negro and the upper-middle-class white coalition begins to look powerful, because they still continue their high turnout and control the elections.

WILSON: The coalition is triggered by something that cuts to the self-interest of the upper class, it seems to me. When economic advancement, maintenance of law and order, or their public image seems to be seriously threatened, this pattern and this coalition begin to form if demography permits it—that is, if the upper-class whites have not moved so far out of the city that they cannot be reached.

WOODWARD: This pattern of Negro and upper-class white coalition rings a lot of bells. It seems to me that this is the fourth massive participation of Negroes in Southern politics. There was Negro participation during radical Reconstruction in the 1870's, then in the independent party movements of the 1880's, and again in the Populist movement of the 1890's. In each of those cases, the ultimate result was polarization along racial lines; and it seems to me that we have indications of that happening now, as we have advocates of it on the state level. You said, Mr. Wilson, that the possibilities of radical Negro politics are remote. I think what you mean is that the possibility of their success is remote. I think there are certainly possibilities of experiments in this line.

WILSON: The experiments are most likely to occur in those states where the white resistance has been most extreme: in Mississippi and in parts of South Carolina and Alabama. We do undoubtedly hear the left militants of SNCC and CORE advocating a Negro party and a radical polarization. It is possible that they will try it in a serious way, but I think it will not succeed. Outside the Black Belt, there probably will not be an immediate effort to establish a party along racial lines, because the resistance has not been strong enough to force the Negroes back into a single strategy.

FICHTER: Besides discussing the political impact of businessmen and trade unions and the class position of people, in your paper, Mr. Wilson, you made a couple of passing references to organized religion. I wonder if you would discuss that a little bit, particularly in terms of the kind of influence that organized religion had in the Al Smith campaign as compared to the influence it is having in the civil rights movement.

WILSON: I think it is a different kind of religious participation. It seems to me that, on the white side, the churches have played a quite remarkable role in lobbying for civil rights legislation, in participating in the march on Washington, and in being willing in various local communities to picket city hall and the like. Mr. Berry was telling me that one of the most significant changes that has occurred in Chicago since I left is the willingness of the white ministers to speak out. I think there is quite a clear cleavage, however, between the churches which are either upper-class in style or which believe in the perfectibility of man here on earth and the fundamentalist sects. I am talking about Unitarians, Episco-

palians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists, as opposed to Baptists and Methodists. The activist group now is not the group, it seems to me, that was active in the Al Smith campaign. The point in my paper was that this group has had a considerable amount of influence on the political and moral climate of the country. They have made it extremely difficult to be publicly in favor of sin—very difficult to vote against civil rights measures, especially in communities with relatively few Negroes.

I think the churches are not effective and probably cannot be effective on some issues, such as developing welfare or income redistribution programs or dealing with the housing problem. I think that they are victims of internal inconsistencies in their own position: self-interest, on the one hand, versus ideology, on the other. But where the issue is clearly moral, where it is aimed at legislative enactment or the redress of grievances, I think the churches have been and will continue to be an extraordinarily effective force.

HUGHES: I want to ask a question on social structure. You were speaking of the upper class in the South. We hear a good deal of talk about the changing character of the class structure in the South. Kincheloe, who some years ago was president of Tougaloo College, near Jackson, Mississippi, said it was getting impossible to get trustees for his Negro college. The new vice-president organization-man type, who is now the upper class there, is afraid to be a friend of Negroes. The only white man he could get to defend him, the only man who felt secure in his position, was the Episcopal bishop. We do have some information and ideas on the change and the nature of the upper class, on who is secure in his position and who is afraid of the customers. I think it would be very relevant to Mr. Wilson's paper, and to Mr. Pettigrew's and Mr. Parsons' as well, to have this spelled out a little more.

BREEDEN: I wonder about the indigenous organization in Mississippi and the attempt to relate local political organization, through the Freedom Democratic party, to the national impetus. The challenging of the Mississippi delegation in Congress and the implementation of the 14th and 15th Amendments on that level seem to me to be an attempt to capitalize on the national strength that has had power in Congress and to relate it to local political organization in a very unique way.

WILSON: I agree that the impetus is there. The crucial problem that I see is that the cadres in Mississippi—COFO and SNCC and the like—fundamentally do not believe in organization. I am not sure they really believe in power. They are unable to organize; and while I know it is quite difficult to organize grass-root, door-to-door, precinct-by-precinct programs for voter registration, it seems to me that this is going to have to change. The ideology of the movement places a great value on anti-organizational norms, on voluntarism, on a Quaker-like sense of the meeting in the determination of policy and program. There is very loose coordination of the elements of the organization. Thus, there is an antipathy between the ideologies of the movement and the requisites for effective political organization. If it is going to be effective, the ideology will have

to be modified sufficiently so that some value is attached to organization.

BREEDEN: I think there is a transition taking place. It appears that the Freedom Democratic party's requirements for political organization are beginning to take precedence on the local scene.

FLEMING: I just want to add a caveat about the use of the word *coalition* in describing the white upper-middle class and the Negro voters in the South. In my observation (which is not universal), this is not so much a coalition as it is a concatenation of voting interests. These people do not get together and join their political interests. They are united through a candidate or an office-holder who plays on their respective self-interests, so that their votes come together at the ballot box. This is a little different from a coalition.

WILSON: Yes, I agree. I tried to use the term *tacit coalition*.

UNIDENTIFIED: Was the Atlanta coalition tacit?

WILSON: No, I think there was a bit more explicit coalition there. The Atlanta Negro Voters' League does sit down with Ivan Allen and, before him, with William Hartsfield.

FLEMING: But they are the candidates. They are the beneficiaries of these votes. That is, the two groups do not sit down *together*; they sit down with the man who stands to profit from their respective voting interests.

WILSON: Yes, but even that is a somewhat greater degree of deliberate coalition-making than the tacit coalition that we find in other communities. It is just a matter of degree.

BERRY: But Hartsfield is different from everybody else. He is indescribable in terms of categories.

FLEMING: He developed this thing in the South.

BRANTON: I, too, want to question the use of the word *coalition*. Certainly in Atlanta and throughout the rest of the South, Negroes are not called in at the decision-making level. They do not help to decide what candidates will be supported or what candidates will be offered. Almost without exception, including Atlanta, the political power structure gets together and selects the candidates; and then, after these candidates have been selected, Negro political leaders are invited in, and it is suggested to them that these candidates probably would be the best candidates for the Negroes to support. In many instances this is true. Negroes have no other choice but to go along with these candidates, who often are the more desirable candidates. But certainly this is no coalition.

I also want to question the accuracy of a couple of statements in Mr. Wilson's paper, and then I want to challenge one outright.

WILSON: There is one factual error. Let me admit to it now, in case it is on your agenda. I described Mr. Allen as a Republican. You have heard of Freudian slips. That was a Marxian slip. I know perfectly well that he is a Democrat.

BRANTON: That dispenses with one. There is another item I would like to question, although you may be right. In talking about Congressman Charles Weltner, you implied, Mr. Wilson, that when Congressman Weltner's district was divided, as a result of the redistricting, he ended up with a substantially higher percentage of Negro voters. I do not think this is true. In fact, you imply that Weltner ended up with all of Fulton County. Actually, Fulton County was divided, and its eastern portion was put into the Fourth District where James Mackay is now the congressman. This includes a rather substantial Negro area, including all the Auburn Avenue area, the area where most of Martin Luther King's parishioners live, and all of Atlanta which is in De Kalb County. So percentage-wise, I do not think that there has been any substantial change. It may well be that, eventually, with the effort on the part of the city of Atlanta to shift all the Negroes to the west side, through urban-renewal and other programs, Weltner may end up with substantially more Negroes in his district. But I do not think that is the case now.

WILSON: My recent percentages give him a higher Negro proportion, but I will doublecheck this because it was an estimate. I will not let this get into print unless I am sure it is right.

BRANTON: I was just checking that. You may be correct. But there is one thing that I really want to challenge. I note that you, as well as other authors, have talked about the rift and the split in the Negro civil rights groups. I have been working pretty closely with the national civil rights groups for the past three or four years, and, frankly, I just do not see the kind of split or rift that is frequently mentioned. The voter-education project, for example, was a cooperative effort in eleven Southern states. It involved five major civil rights organizations and a number of strictly local organizations. This project called for the very thing that certainly could create a rift: the division of monies and the allocation of areas in which to work. But I just did not find that kind of rift or that kind of complaint.

In July of 1963, seven or eight civil rights organizations formed two separate corporations: one under the Council of the United Civil Rights Leadership and another known as the Committee for Welfare, Education, and Legal Defense. These organizations have continued to exist since that time. (In fact, I just resigned two weeks ago as executive secretary of the Council of the United Civil Rights Leadership, because I am going to work for the federal government.) The heads of the major civil rights organizations meet about every month or six weeks. They sit down together. They talk about problems. They discuss strategies. They discuss ways of working together. But every time we turn around, somebody is writing an article about "the rift"—without referring to any specific example of it. I argue that, basically, that rift simply is not there.

If you are talking about a rift in a local situation, this is understandable. But what has happened is that the press, overnight, makes some local person an instant leader. There might be somebody leading a rent strike in Florida or somebody leading a proposed boycott of schools in Chicago or Boston, and the press runs out and interviews the person for

a story. He might be a local NAACP or CORE leader who has become disgruntled with the national leadership, so he issues a statement that his national leadership is going along with some conservative leadership in another organization. In order to retain the loyalty of the masses of local followers, the national leaders are sometimes forced to remain silent or, perhaps, to pay lip service to the local organizations. However, these situations certainly cannot be described as indicating rifts in the national civil rights groups or in the national leadership.

I would like to ask you, Mr. Wilson, to give me an example of what you were really pointing to when you mentioned that there is this rift and that the movement would surely divide. Where are they divided? Please give me some example of what you described as a split, because I just have not been able to see it.

WILSON: Mr. Branton, the words *rift* and *split* are yours, not mine. I do not believe they appear in the paper.

BRANTON: No, I do not believe that you used the actual words.

WILSON: I am not saying that there is a permanent cleavage that cuts through the movement and that everybody is choosing sides. However, in situation after situation calling for crucial strategic or tactical judgments, we find quite clear differences in organizational outlook and tactical sense. The ultimate objectives, at some level of generality, are surely identical or very nearly so; but when it came, for example, to the question of whether to accept the seating compromise at the Atlantic City convention of the Democratic party, there surely was disagreement. In the organization of and participation in the march on Washington, surely there was disagreement as to how this should be done and even as to whether it should be done.

In city after city (politics are largely localistic in our country, with most of the crucial decisions made on the local scene), whether it is with regard to a march, a picket line, or a boycott, we find differences of opinion. Indeed, I find it very hard to imagine a community—say, Chicago, a city with one million Negroes—which would have a single, united leadership structure. It seems to me that there is not a united leadership and could not be a united leadership, unless we assume a degree of homogeneity associated with race which I do not believe there is.

Of course, what one might see as rift, another might see as simply a trivial dispute or simply a question of emphasis or timing; so a good deal depends on how one phrases this. I find differences in emphasis, outlook, strategy, and tactics among SNCC, CORE, the Urban League, NAACP, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. They are not permanently divided. They do not disagree on ultimate goals. But they have quite different senses of with whom they should be allied and what the proper tactics are. I think it is quite appropriate, despite the fact that some newspapers like to capitalize on signs of dissension, to point out these things.

BERRY: I think that the way Mr. Wilson has described his understanding

of what is happening is entirely useful and acceptable. However, I think that the way in which it was placed in his paper is unfortunate. Mr. Wilson is now saying that it is perfectly natural that large groups of people have differences of opinion about timing and about tactics. That is right. This is not peculiar to the civil rights movement. But, as a matter of fact, I think that you will find that, on all important matters, every one of the major civil rights organizations is in absolute accord as to the goals.

The fact that there are differing approaches and differing tactics is altogether a useful thing. Those of us, for instance, in Urban League and SNCC get about as far apart as is possible. We in Urban League believe, as far as our program is concerned, in working for equality of opportunity through research and community organizations and negotiation and the manipulation of whatever power we can get hold of. SNCC is an organization which has been engaged in recruiting the magnificently undisciplined to do various things at various times. This does not mean for one minute that the Urban League does not support SNCC or CORE. It does not mean that at all. We have no monolithic leadership. This is the reason we talk about the "big seven" (although that is probably too few).

I think that in this issue of *Dædalus*, either in Mr. Wilson's paper or in some other paper, it ought to be pointed out that in the civil rights movement as we know it today, there is no more scrapping than one finds in a family. Everybody tried to make out big splits in Chicago—they are vying for leadership, and they are going to throw out this guy and put in that guy. This is newspaper talk. I told them at the time, "If you do not believe we are together—if you will not listen to me—then just jump on one of us and try to do something, and you will find out." And they did not jump on us. They at least believed that. In the civil rights movement, we say, in a homey way, that to build a democracy requires quite as many different skills as to build a house. We need the bulldozer and the architect and the plumber and the roofer; and if we did not have all these different skills and different approaches, we would get a funny-looking house. I think that those who are sophisticated in this movement respect one another and help one another, and I hope we get to the point where we can even love one another, because the battle is going to be tough enough that we will need to.

FIGHTER: I feel that there is an area of research which we are not getting at (maybe we cannot): the *ad hoc* decisions in a movement which is moving. This is not just a long-term organization; this is something that is happening every day and every week. I wondered about this in Selma, as I watched the people waiting for Martin Luther King to come. How did they go about making the decision to come to Selma? We really do not know. What is perhaps equally important is how the opposition makes its decisions. How have they made such terrible mistakes each time? Maybe they did not make the decisions; maybe they just happened.

I would like to push that a little further. It is not a question of rift so much as a question of decision. How do the two sides in this ongoing struggle come to the decisions which have to be made—often within an

hour or within a day—and then carried out? Do they meditate about whether a decision was successful or not before they make the next decision? Do they throw it open to the vote of everybody who happens to be on the church steps at the time? How do they do it? I think that we do not know.

WILSON: You are quite right. There is not any research on which we can draw, and it is a very important question.

REDDING: One of the papers touches on this business. I think the suggestion is that the decisions which are made by the activist groups are made with a definite effort to confuse the opposition, so that the opposition will make mistakes. I should not be surprised if this were true.

FIGHTER: Yes, but there are all kinds of levels here. For instance, standing outside the church at Selma was a circle of Unitarian ministers who were discussing very seriously the ethical aspect of defying a judgment of the court; and standing around a tree was a group of University of Chicago professors and clerics, led mainly by a couple of lawyers, trying to come to some other kind of a decision. In the end, practically everybody walked across the bridge.

BERRY: You see. You can't do anything until Martin Luther King comes.

HANDLIN: I agree with Mr. Berry that we frequently have expressions of solidarity. An attack on one civil rights group mobilizes the support of all. I think the Urban League has cooperated with SNCC, although I am not so sure that SNCC has cooperated with the Urban League. From what I read about the activist groups, it does not seem to me that SNCC has sustained quite that level of amity and collaboration.

What I would like to know is whether Mr. Berry really believes that the ultimate objectives of all these groups are the same. I know people in SNCC who are talking of the civil rights movement as a means toward an end. Is that the same objective as that of the leadership of the Urban League? There *are* different points of view. I do not see why there should not be. The blanket statement that everybody in civil rights is working toward the same end is just not true.

BERRY: You said *everybody* in civil rights, Mr. Handlin. I was talking about the civil rights *leadership*. I said categorically that all responsible civil rights groups were working toward the same objectives, and that is true. As for "everybody," I am sure that you know as well as I that in social science one just does not refer to "everybody," or "everything," or "forever." Those are forbidden words. You know it, and I know it. I do not know how to answer you, because I am flabbergasted by what you said. Ask me again in another way, will you?

HANDLIN: Let me put it another way. Do you think that the organized leadership of the organized civil rights movement could sit down and formulate a common set of objectives—what the good society is, and what the Negro's place in it should be?

BERRY: Surely.

GRAUBARD: I think we will get back to that when we discuss both Mr. Handlin's and Mr. Turner's papers. Mr. Cohen has been waiting to speak.

COHEN: Perhaps in a desire not to hurt the civil rights movement, we are glossing over this rift. There *are* rifts. I listened in Selma to some of the talk of the SNCC people; and, with some reserve, I should say that their comments about Martin Luther King were less than complimentary. In fact, their entire posture, which is beginning to take form, is, I think, at odds with the large part of the civil rights movement. I think it is gravitating toward what is formulated brilliantly in a forthcoming article, "New Styles in Leftism," by Irving Howe. I believe that there is a significant rift between this group and the rest of the civil rights movement and that this will become more apparent as time goes on. I do not think we should ignore this.

REDDING: But aren't you saying that SNCC is moving *out* of the civil rights movement? Isn't this what it amounts to?

COHEN: Yes, but they still consider themselves and are considered to be part of the civil rights movement, and they are getting substantial support as a civil rights organization.

HUGHES: May I raise a point of order as to the nature of this discussion? I would like to suggest that the purpose of our discussion is not really to reach any agreement, but to outline the different points of view so that the people who are writing papers will know what they are. It seems to me that our discussion is becoming a debate.

MOYNIHAN: It seems to me that there is a dualism in the civil rights movement which was reflected somewhat in Dr. Redding's remark that SNCC may be moving out of the civil rights movement. This may be a dualism which has relevance to the prospect of political alliances and which is also fundamental to American politics. We are a society founded on two political ideals: that of *liberty* and that of *equality*. These are not the same, and they are not attractive to the same people. Many an American who would carelessly die for liberty is appalled by equality. Many a person who is devoted to equality is rather troubled by liberty and would just as soon not have too much of it.

Through our history, liberty has been the American middle-class *beau idéal*, but equality has never had much social standing. (The Declaration of Independence begins with equality, but the Constitution does not mention it until 1868.) Nevertheless, however little the middle class may approve of equality in contrast with liberty, equality is a fundamental democratic urge. It keeps coming back; we cannot get rid of it. But when it does emerge, in various large movements such as the trade union movement, it is fiercely opposed. People who are bitterly opposed to it cannot understand why anybody would be for it.

The biggest single event of the civil rights movement, in my view of the last ten years, was when the white middle class of America suddenly

saw this as an issue of liberty. We moved uncompromisingly on behalf of the Negro American, because we will not let people's liberties be denied in this country. I think we have gone through a decade in which most of those liberties have been resoundingly confirmed. If need be, we can recreate Selma endlessly, and every Selma will lead to yet another law. The Southern whites cannot win on that issue. That issue is over.

The problem is equality. Who will fight for equality? Everybody is free to vote, but 56 per cent of the Negro youths fail the Selective Service test. That is not equality. Many times there is a semantic confusion. People talk about equality of opportunities, which is really a form of liberty. That gives people the right to take the test. It does not guarantee that they will pass in anything like equal proportions. In the North, we are going to have to ask ourselves questions about what we will do in the name of the equality which, it seems to me, the Negro movement is leading to. There will be demands which are not familiar and are not acceptable. For example, the demand for preferential treatment is a demand which is not acceptable to people who believe in liberty almost to the exclusion of equality. The *New York Times'* reaction to the idea of preferential treatment was one of horror.

Dr. Tobin says that we know how to create a tight labor market. I agree. We do not have to have 10 per cent unemployment of the Negroes in this country. We have chosen to have it. The decision not to have it would be a decision for forms of equality which, curiously, this country is very reluctant to accept but which, it seems to me, the civil rights movement must increasingly demand. Out of this comes a dualism and a rift not only perhaps within the movement, but possibly with people who, in most recent times, have been the closest allies of the movement.

LERNER: My question is partly linked with what Mr. Moynihan just said and partly moves away from it. Mr. Wilson has been talking, at least in part, about coalition politics or alliance politics; but there are, of course, two other kinds of political action. One is *balance-of-power action*, particularly, let us say, in New York, where the Liberal party has demonstrated its capacity to use it. I wonder to what extent Mr. Wilson feels that, not coalition politics, but balance-of-power politics is indicated for the future as an important political movement by the Negroes.

The second is independent political action. I wonder whether it is not true that once certain ideas are launched, they take on an importance of their own which they did not seem to have at the beginning. For example, there is a good deal of talk and thinking among those who want independent action: one, about the "Establishment" and, two, about the "Power Structure." Once we start talking about these concepts, they can be turned not only against the white establishment and the white power structure, but also against the Negro movement itself, the Negro establishment, and the Negro power structure. I wonder whether there is not, in those concepts, the germ of something which may produce a basic split inside of the movement both for freedom and for equality.

I have not studied nearly enough what is happening in SNCC and some of the other movements. However, I suspect strongly that there is,

especially among the younger people—not just younger Negroes, but also younger whites, particularly those on the left of the movement—a strong hostility to any kind of establishment, any kind of power structure. This may, in the calculable future, operate toward some kind of independent political action and toward some kind of action which, along Mr. Moynihan's lines, will not be content with anything except a radical egalitarianism. And it may operate for narrowly Negro purposes, rather than for purposes having to do with the total American cultural pattern.

WILSON: You are quite right that there are other political strategies besides coalition politics. As I read it, however, the history of American politics is overwhelmingly a history of coalition or alliance politics. As a political scientist, I tend to think of the alternatives in organizational terms. Perhaps this is too narrow a perspective. The balance-of-power strategy, as exemplified by the Liberal party of New York City, is a possibility in some cities. Certainly it has proved effective in New York, but there it has financial backing and organizational underpinning. I do not see any comparably strong and well-financed organizations that could do it, except on a very *ad hoc* basis, in the Negro community.

As for independent politics, I agree with you, Mr. Lerner. I, too, sense a strong antiestablishmentarian feeling. In certain parts of this movement, some people would like to run somebody against a Faubus and against Martin Luther King. Whether they are *in* civil rights or not, I will ignore for the moment. How this will manifest itself organizationally is what I cannot decide. I cannot imagine them doing what they might want to do: running Paul Goodman for President—or for anti-president. They cannot resurrect Albert Camus. I do not know how to respond to your question, although it is a very intelligent one, Mr. Lerner, because I cannot conceive of how this would express itself organizationally at the present time. I simply do not know.

COLES: When SNCC first opened its office in Atlanta in 1961, they had me stamping envelopes, because they were not about to trust anyone with anything more than that kind of job. Since then, of course, there have been all kinds of developments. I think it was a brilliant stroke when Robert Penn Warren entitled his book, *Who Speaks for the Negro?* We might extend the question to SNCC. I do not know who speaks for SNCC. I think there are many voices. SNCC was deliberately founded as, and still in many ways is, a coalition within itself, with all kinds of elements running around in it.

Some of this may be related to the whole problem of youth. In two years, half of the country will be under twenty-five. Youth is practically becoming a social issue in itself. There is not only the campus movement and its relationship to civil rights, but there are the problems of whether to lower the voting age, how to deal with young people, and how they, as a phenomenon in and an influence on our society, exist and get along.

I am aware of the hazards of extending psychiatric observations to political issues, but I would like to say this. I watched what happened in Atlantic City during the Democratic National Convention. I do not think

that anything I say by any means accounts for everything, but I did observe that a lot of these young people were exhausted. They were suffering from what I would call (and have called in professional journals) *battle fatigue*. They were bitter. They had been fighting—some of them for years. I call this *bitterness* because I think it is bitterness. Of course, this presents a problem for me, observing because I think observations have to be made, yet feeling a little worried about the use my observations will be put to by others, such as segregationists.

There should not be a controversy over the issue of rift, because, for certain goals, there is no rift in the movement. However, it makes no sense to deny that there are many ways of thinking and that these are very, very significant and are becoming even more significant. There is no question that, to some extent, SNCC serves as a medium for a lot of people, particularly white people, who are interested not only in civil rights, but in a lot of other things. They have never made any bones about it. There are also many people in SNCC who have no idea of what a lot of other people in SNCC are thinking about.

Last summer, in Ohio and in Mississippi, one was impressed by the wide variety of people who came. There was the whole range of American politics. There were the canny New Yorkers and Californians, the naive Midwesterners, the religiously motivated, and so on. Whether or not these people are dupes, I do not know. I will say that I was impressed by the honesty of some of the so-called leaders of SNCC in at least stating publicly what they wanted, in warning about the possibility of death, and in describing the circumstances that the project envisioned. I do not think there has always been such explicit honesty about ideology from some of the people in SNCC. But in ongoing history, caution, circumspection, and even artifice are not solely a function of SNCC. They are constantly practiced by the federal government and by both political parties. I think we have to relate the political stratagems of this organization to our national life and its political climate and the way things are done.

BREEDEN: I want to comment that it seems to me that a good deal of our discussion relates directly to Dr. Wilson's paper, in terms of the problems of political organization in Mississippi. One can talk abstractly about coalitions, etc.; but the raw fact is that if anyone tries to organize Negroes for political participation in Mississippi, he is putting his life on the line. This is a little different from coalition politics in New York City. It may not be entirely different, but it is sufficiently different to lead to a different intensity in terms of decision-making.

I would like to make one other point, also. It is, of course, difficult to say "SNCC" and have some single meaning attached to the name. However, I think it is true that there are very few places in the movement where direct political action is going on. We have generally looked at the civil rights movement as a kind of pressure-group movement, not as a direct-political-action movement. It is the development of some direct political action in many cities of Mississippi, and, of course, in the Freedom Democratic party, that means we are talking about different kinds of things, from the pressure group to the political party.

TURNER: I think the discussion serves to point out (for me, at least, since I have made some mention of possible areas of disagreement) the need to be quite clear about the nature of disagreement. For example, one distinguishes between disagreement among individuals and disagreement among organizations. One can distinguish between disagreement as to objectives or end goals and disagreement as to the means of achieving those goals. There is even another area of distinction which needs to be taken into account, namely, that the actual detail of the civil rights struggle varies in time, in dimension, and in scope from community to community, as well as within the same community, from time to time. Thus, we have the possibility of the misappropriate use of strategies and the misperception of what the appropriate strategies are, by people both within and outside of the situation.

PARSONS: I was very much impressed by Mr. Moynihan's statement. I think he put his finger on a very fundamental aspect of the whole situation. I myself am inclined to use the term *equality* teamed with the term *liberty*. I think that underlying American society there is a value complex in which these components stand in severe tension under certain circumstances, but are also intimately linked with one another. Lipset's recent book, *The First New Nation*, has a very illuminating treatment of that in the perspective of American history. My interpretation is that in the civil rights movement's post-World War II phase, the whole issue of the status of the Negro became a critical national issue in the context of this underlying value pattern. As Mr. Hughes stated yesterday, the development of our society had reached a point where the older insulations and compromises were no longer tenable. They generated just too much tension at certain points, and something had to give.

I would agree that we are completing the phase in which the components run along together. The problem of the South—denial of the more elementary civil rights, the legal rights and political voting rights—has masked the inherent tension in other areas. Now that it is approaching the phase of being a mopping-up operation, I quite agree that the case of the Southern segregationist is hopeless. There will be a lot of very nasty rear-guard action, but the segregationists cannot possibly win unless something very drastic happens to society as a whole. The problem, then, moves into the question of the institutionalization of basic equalities. This is a nationwide problem, and it is centered in the North. Mr. Moynihan put it very, very clearly. It is a crucial shift of phase in the general movement.

TURNER: I wonder if we should have a paper on this. Do we have anyone really touching on these ideas from a philosophical point of view?

GRAUBARD: Not explicitly and not even implicitly.

EDWARDS: Let me ask Mr. Wilson a question. He seems to be very pessimistic about Negroes' moving into elective office, largely because there is not enough capital in the Negro community and not enough solidarity among the civil rights leaders themselves. If we look at the present, this

pessimism may be warranted to some extent. But what about the future? I am referring, of course, to Mr. Lerner's point about the possibility of balance-of-power politics, as Negroes become registered increasingly in the South while residential segregation continues in the Southern cities.

WILSON: In revising my paper, I will look for indications of pessimism on that point and excise or revise them. I think it is quite clear that there is going to be a substantial movement of Negroes into elective office in the South. If I said otherwise, I will change it. I clearly foresee Negroes' moving into office, particularly partisan office. However, one of the disturbing points which I did not mention (I think I will, in my revision) is the fact that the South has fewer cities with partisan elections than almost any other region in the country. Nonpartisanship is going to work considerable hardship on Negroes, particularly when it is coupled with at-large elections. I have a feeling that in nonpartisan, at-large elections for city government offices, the Negro is going to have a hard time getting into office, because it will be easier to organize the vote on a Negro versus white basis. But in partisan elections for state representatives, for partisan local offices (for congressmen and so on) the Negro is certainly going to move into elective offices at increasing rates. The white politicians who are now in office will either have to change their tune or get out of office. Half the Southern congressional districts are 20 per cent or more Negro. We do not have to register many of those Negroes for the white politicians to get religion on the subject of at least obvious race-baiting. What their inner souls look like I will leave to their Creator.

FOLEY: I think that Mr. Moynihan's comments were extremely helpful. In effect, he is pointing out how many white Northerners will support the Negroes' right to vote, but not their right to live next door. One means liberty; the other means equality.

I suspect, however, that his comments do not apply to Mississippi and Alabama. This refers to something which Mr. Hughes was asking: What is going on in the Southern white upper class? For the last couple of months, as many of you probably know, the very wealthy white Southerner has been coming around. The Committee of One Hundred in Mississippi and the Committee of One Hundred in Alabama—the 100 top business leaders of each state—have come out publicly saying that while we may not like the Civil Rights Act, we somehow or other have to go along with it for the sake of peace and order. I do not think this is in response to the stimulus of liberty or of equality, but rather, in Mr. Lerner's terms, to the stimulus of the balance of power. This is not a coalition. It is more an accommodation.

There are different weights now on the balance scale. There is the weight of the civil rights movement. There is the weight of the federal government and the economics which that implies. There is the additional weight which both of these factors apply within the Democratic party, where a great change is taking place inasmuch as there has to be an integrated delegation at the next Democratic National Convention. So I suspect that in Mississippi and Alabama it is strictly a balance-of-power

politics, with no coalition yet. Something is going to have to take place in the next couple of years.

GEERTZ: In view of Mr. Lerner's comments on the antiestablishmentarian, new-left sort of approach of at least some wings in the civil rights movement and Dr. Coles' comments on youth becoming an issue, Mr. Wilson might want to add a section to his paper. Somewhat along the lines that Professor Freund developed yesterday, Mr. Wilson might consider the pour-over from the civil rights movement into general politics and vice versa.

What strikes me is the way in which a good deal of the civil rights action has become paradigmatic for other kinds of politics. For example, we now have teach-ins on the Vietnam issue and marches for all sorts of things. This pour-over from civil rights into the general political stream is interesting, as is, of course, the reverse—the appearance of suburban politics, the breakdown of political machines, etc.

I think this might make an interesting discussion. It also might provide a way to discuss the "rift" problem. Without worrying about the problem of ideological unity, we might be able to account for some of the variations that obviously do occur in the movement.

HAUSER: I find our discussion of the Negro in politics extremely stimulating (as all our discussions have been), but also a little bit frustrating. We have, at this point, taken Mr. Wilson's paper and cut it off from allied papers. It seems to me that in order to answer some of the questions which have been raised (for example, about the objectives of the civil rights movement and its various elements), we have to consider the question which Mr. Handlin raised about desegregation versus integration. On a macro-ideological level, there may be considerable basis for, if not rift, at least disagreement in positioning. However, it may have little or no implication, to the extent that the differences may not call for very much variation in the intermediate goals and specific objectives regarding education, employment, housing, etc.

I think, also, that even though the civil rights movement itself is not identified with a formal political party, it is a political movement. The paradigm to which Mr. Geertz has just referred and the analogy which was suggested by Mr. Freund's discussion yesterday seem to me to be very important. For example, I think that the Negro in Chicago has just achieved a major political victory, even though he is completely the captive of the Democratic machine. If we look at simply the formal political structure and the Negro's participation in it, we must conclude that the Negro has been ignored. What I am suggesting is that the Negro is a captive of the Democratic party. He has had no voice in the making of political decisions. In Chicago, he has been completely frustrated by his inability to get Mayor Daley to do anything on the educational front. Yet, it seems to me, we ought to make note of the political impact of the Negro through the civil rights movement—his political impact independent of his formal participation in formal political organizations.

Also involved here is the interesting dichotomization in the paper by

Mr. Turner and Mr. Young. I feel that it is a false and, in some ways, dangerous dichotomization of power versus acculturation as processes by which objectives may be achieved.

These kinds of considerations are relevant to a discussion of the Negro's role in politics. We should look at the politics in the broader sense, in terms of the informal and indirect effects as well as in terms of the formal political order.

GRAUBARD: I would like now, if I may, to ask Mr. Fleming to summarize for us the argument in his paper.

FLEMING: If Mr. Wilson thinks his paper is getting out of date, he should have *my* problems. Since this paper was finished, just one month ago, a number of things have happened to make it out of date. At least I know about one of them at the outset. I spoke of the coordination effort that Vice President Humphrey is heading, and I said that what comes of it will depend in considerable degree on the quality of the staff selected. For better or worse, that question has been resolved. We have with us the newly appointed executive secretary of the President's Council on Equal Opportunities: Mr. Wiley Branton. Of course, I will go on to say that I think the question has been resolved happily.

My paper, unlike virtually all the other papers, is not so much conceptual as it is narrative of a sequence of events in the federal approach to civil rights over the last four years. Reading the other papers and attending this conference have made me very conscious of the extent to which a concept is viewed as a luxury in the nonscholarly realm I inhabit. In fact, there is something suspect about concepts, and I do not have too many in my paper. I think that there are some concepts implicit in my attempt to sum up some nuts and bolts of federal civil rights action in the Kennedy-Johnson years; and, in the revision, I will try to summarize at the end some of the implications that seem to me to emerge from my view of what has happened since 1961 in the federal role.

The story I am trying to tell is one that everybody is familiar with in essence: the story of increasingly vigorous and far-reaching federal action, in large part in response to crisis and to the rising militance of the civil rights movement. Starting with the freedom rides, the ultimate target of protest and demonstration—even when ostensibly local, as in Selma—has been the federal government itself. Protests and demonstrations have been very largely efforts to enlist greater federal power behind the civil rights revolution, and they have been successful efforts to a large extent.

It seems to me that we can also observe weaknesses of one sort or another in this process. Civil rights people, liberals, others who are interested, and governmental figures themselves have often at least talked as though the *establishment* of a new principle of support for civil rights at the federal level—through legislation or executive action—was the same thing as the *implementation* of the principle. There is no doubt that we have had tremendous gains in these four years in the adoption of new concepts and new commitments at the federal level. However, in terms of the impact on the daily lives of people who suffer from discrimination, not much has happened yet. The tools are only now at hand, and even

yet there are a few conspicuous exceptions, as in the housing field, where there are no really effective federal tools. Therefore, the vigorous and skillful implementation of the federal civil rights programs—the achievement of the liberty part of the equation—must be the next major concentration at the federal level, in terms of civil rights *per se*. Also, I think that we can see that this is part of our political process: new programs, the passage of new legislation, the issuance of executive orders, and so on.

There has been a rather hearty collaboration among a number of elements, including the administration and civil rights groups, in arousing what may be regarded with hindsight as undue expectations. Everything has been a matter for great expectation. Knowledgeable people, however, have been able to foresee that most of the measures could not create instant and revolutionary improvements. I think that the tremendous importance attributed to the so-called stroke of the pen—the housing order that President Kennedy finally issued in 1962—was really a kind of mutual deception that everybody was playing on everybody else. It was seldom publicly described as what it was: the establishment of a good principle of federal commitment to equality in federally supported housing, with little prospect of a major impact on segregated housing in this country. In fact, there has been no major impact.

This has some implications which perhaps ought to be made clearer. I think we have to conclude, without impeaching anybody's intentions, that, relatively speaking, the excessive reliance on executive action—which was the apparent promise at the beginning of the Kennedy administration—has not worked well and, without a legislative mandate, probably cannot work well on those things that are external to the federal establishment itself. My reading of the events of the last four years is that not until there was a legislative mandate did the executive actions which were taken early in the Kennedy administration begin to be effective. They were not legitimized enough to be strongly pursued against the countervailing tendencies, priorities, and pressures.

We have a good bit of legislation now, and we are about to have some more in the voting field. However, there are a few gaps that are going to cause trouble sometime. Housing is one. Another is the whole problem of the physical safety of the people working for civil rights in the South. Protection is, as yet, a contested area and one for which a clear solution is not in sight. I think there is going to be pressure for much more drastic federal intervention to prevent violence or to bring to justice those guilty of violence—to protect the lives and liberties of people seeking to exercise their rights in the South and those trying to help them.

There is another interesting principle that has emerged in these four years. Many people are beginning to recognize the dependence of effective federal action on support in the private sector. President Kennedy recognized this the summer after Birmingham. I think President Johnson recognizes it by instinct. We may expect to see considerably more executive leadership directed toward trying to mobilize and animate important institutional forces in the private sector, including the civil rights forces. If it is not apparent now to thoughtful observers that the federal

government, because of the restraints and checks and balances which operate in the establishment, is as dependent on civil rights pressure to move in this field as it is on its own general commitment, then it never will be clear. I think there is no question that President Kennedy saw this very clearly. When Birmingham broke and a chain reaction hit the country, his first reaction was probably something to the effect of: "Now we can move." To speak of what the federal government ought to do, without recognizing the need for this kind of build-up of pressure and consensus as a prerequisite to strong federal action, is, I think, again to deceive ourselves. There has to be a lot more private support in the period to come. Presumably Mr. Branton, in addition to coordinating inside, will reach his coordinating tentacles outside to help forge this coalition of interests.

I end my paper with the note (which I do not try to develop) that the new ground to be broken is on the egalitarian question, rather than the libertarian question. This, of course, ties in with what Mr. Moynihan said. To a large degree, this is a Northern problem—a problem of the big urban areas outside the South. I think that in terms of establishing new principles, new concepts, and new approaches which will have a major effect on the lives of Negro Americans, this is the area in which President Johnson and his successors are going to have to innovate. As for the old Southern-civil-rights-problem syndrome, the tools are at hand; it only remains to use them effectively and courageously.

GRAUBARD: Thank you very much, Mr. Fleming. Incidentally, while all of that is implicit in your paper, I am delighted to hear from you that you intend to make it explicit.

BRANTON: I would like to ask Mr. Fleming a question. I understand that there is disagreement among legal scholars as to whether the President has the authority to extend the housing order to cover federal savings and loan associations and commercial banks. If this legal question cannot be resolved to any appreciable degree of satisfaction percentagewise among the lawyers, should the President go ahead and sign such an order and run the risk of having some federal judge throw it out?

FLEMING: I do not think that questions such as these are resolved percentagewise among lawyers; they are resolved qualitatively. Ultimately it has to be the President's own judgment as to whether he wants to do this. Maybe Mr. Freund would comment on this. I am not a lawyer and feel some diffidence about this. I find it hard, as a layman, to believe that the Supreme Court of the United States is going to invalidate a broadened executive order by the President.

There is another consideration that is a little too complicated, particularly for a nonlawyer, to go into at length. The problem is not simply one of the President's authority to broaden the order to cover those institutions through the regulatory agencies. It is also a question of whether those regulatory agencies can enforce the order. We are dealing with something that is several levels removed from federal authority. We have banks, which are themselves private institutions, making loans to private

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builders; and they are regulated by the independent federal regulatory bodies. The President is issuing an executive order to create a chain of responsibility right down the line to enforce this requirement.

This does present some knotty problems. I have, however, a strong sense of inevitability about this whole question. It seems to me that the federal responsibility for intervention in the housing field is so great and the problem so severe that one way or another, legitimately or illegitimately, by an executive order or by legislation, the housing issue is going to have to be reached. Right now there is no priority for it. The civil rights groups are not paying any attention to housing and are not putting on any pressure to speak of. The minute they do, this will become a tremendous issue.

BERRY: Can banks operate without federal insurance?

UNIDENTIFIED: Yes.

BERRY: What would happen to a bank without it? Could it operate successfully?

UNIDENTIFIED: Not with my money.

BERRY: All banks insure the first \$10,000.

UNIDENTIFIED: Not all of them.

UNIDENTIFIED: There are very few that do not. There are very few that are not covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

BERRY: My question is: Can banks operate *successfully* without federal insurance?

UNIDENTIFIED: No.

BERRY: Then the federal government has an awfully big club.

FLEMING: The problem is how to use it.

BERRY: They know how to use it.

BRANTON: I realize that there could be some enforcement problems; but I tend to believe that merely upon the issuance of an executive order, despite the fact that we may not be sure of enforcement provisions or regulations, the vast majority of Americans would conform. Is it good in your opinion, Mr. Fleming, to go ahead and issue such an order and iron out problems of enforcement and compliance at a later date?

FLEMING: That is my view. If we had to solve all the problems of enforcement before we took a step like this, we would not have half the tools we have today. For example, we are struggling right now, trying to figure out what Title VI means. I would not argue that we should not have passed Title VI until we had figured out all the nuts and bolts of making it effective.

BRANTON: Don't you think that we ought to move in that direction in the housing field?

FLEMING: Mr. Branton, I hope you will. I really do.

BRANTON: I get the point. Issue the housing order.

BREEDEN: I hope we will discuss the protection issue, also. If you recall, two issues were being raised in Selma: voting rights and protection. The protection issue was submerged in the voting rights issue. I think that this is a very weak statute, as Mr. Fleming points out; and the policy raises tremendous questions about the relations between federal authority and state and local authority. Nonetheless, it is critical. It also plays right back into the problem of ideological tension and alienation from the order. One begins to look at the Presidency and the establishment in a different way when one has to deal constantly with authority that does not seem to be used to protect fundamental rights.

FLEMING: Yes. I think this is one of those very sticky questions of federal-state relations which probably can be solved only by congressional action—that is, if this problem continues to be severe enough (as I think it will) for these tensions to continue. Any treatment of this question is a little difficult right now because the President does have the Attorney General at work trying to devise a new statute. As I suggested in my paper, I have a hunch that it is not going to go far enough to resolve the tension. But we cannot say that flatly, since we do not know what Mr. Katzenbach and his people will come up with. They are going to propose some legislative action in this field, and they probably will do it the day before the *Dædalus* issue comes out.

HUGHES: It seems to me that most of our talk in these two days—certainly Mr. Freund's presentation yesterday—indicates that solving the problems of liberty and equality involves basic questions about our Constitution and about the relationships among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. I hope that the effects of a problem such as this upon our Constitution and upon the balance of the three branches will be brought out. It would add great value to this issue.

GRAUBARD: I agree.

FOLEY: With regard to how we are going to enforce Title VI, I think there is an awful lot the executive can do without legislative support or judicial support. I am getting back, I guess, to Mr. Berry's emphasis on attitude. In our agency, the Small Business Administration, we make loans, two-thirds of which are made in participation with a bank. I had a task force working on the problem of how we were going to enforce Title VI in our agency, and they finally just despaired and said there was not anything to be done. I said that, indeed, we would just call the loans. They replied that we have never done that before, and I said that we were going to start.

The question, then, is how we are going to know which ones to call. (We make something like 10,000 or 11,000 loans a year.) The answer is that we will just use our common sense. I do not think that we are going to have too much of a problem in Minnesota, but I am going to watch it

in Mississippi. I am going to have a group traveling around, particularly emphasizing the South. We do not have to get 100 per cent of the discriminators. All I need is one in Mississippi, and every bank in that state is going to be on guard. The same will hold in Alabama. I do not think it is going to be too hard to catch one. And I cannot see that there is a legal issue in regard to savings and loan associations, because the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has jurisdiction over the savings and loan industry which is quite comparable to that of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. What I am saying is that I think the method of enforcement in all of these cases is withdrawal of federal support, and all we have to have is the determination of the federal agency to do it.

FLEMING: I agree with you, Mr. Foley. My point was that for rather large-scale innovations executive action is not as effective as legislative action. As you know, a lot of people urged President Kennedy to put into effect, in the absence of legislation, what is now Title VI, that is, the provision for withholding federal funds. But he declined to do this. I do not think that we could have had the Title VI program under an executive order. That was my point. An example of it is the executive order on employment which President Kennedy issued. The sanctions of the employment order are spelled out beautifully and at great length, yet there has not been a single hearing held or contract terminated under that executive order since 1961. Sanctions which reach out of the federal establishment itself simply do not seem to be strongly enforced in the absence of congressional backing. This has been the case up to now.

FOLEY: I wonder about that. In the Small Business Administration, our lawyers determined that Title VI only applies on loans that we make in participation with a bank and that it does not apply to the employment by the loan recipient. So I issued an administrative order that it was going to apply, and our lawyers have determined that this is entirely proper and legal. As a matter of fact, Senator Javits and Senator Hart argued, in a lengthy legal brief, that there was executive authority to cover these areas without Title VI. As some of you may remember, both Senator Javits and Senator Hart pushed the executive agencies to issue these orders prior to the passage of Title VI.

FLEMING: I am only generalizing from what has happened to date. We will watch the Small Business Administration for a new pattern.

COLES: I want to pick up a theme which was mentioned by Professor Freund yesterday and which applies to this paper. There is a contradiction, perhaps inevitable, in the feelings of many of the people in the civil rights movement. They urge the government on and ask things from it; yet they feel great suspicion and hostility to it. For instance, there is the demand that the FBI assume a new kind of role (which, I think, would make it an entirely different kind of organization), and yet there is intense suspicion of the FBI and its leader for a variety of reasons tied in with political views. There is the demand that congressmen set up inves-

tigations in certain areas, and yet there is intense suspicion of the Congress and its activities in this field. I think it might be interesting to discuss the rather ambivalent attitude of the civil rights movement toward the federal government and how this perhaps involves the whole problem of the liberal and his relationship to state authority. Certainly, one cannot help but notice the rather constant call for Mr. Hoover's help and, at the same time, denunciation of him.

WILSON: I would like to follow up precisely on that point. It seems to me that either in Mr. Fleming's paper or elsewhere we ought to develop this theme. Mr. Freund very suggestively alluded to it yesterday, when he talked about the liberal dilemma: our desire for government action for certain purposes, on the one hand, and our fear and concern about bureaucracy and proceedings not governed by due process of law, on the other hand. It seems to me this suggests an even larger question. The dilemma is not only for liberals, but for many people. Our government exists to serve many values, including integration. I have a feeling that, in our enthusiasm for how the federal government's powers may be used by vigorous administrators who seek certain objectives, we are overlooking the really profound questions of administrative law, fact determination, the rule of law, due process, and so on. We are talking about the disposition of millions of dollars and the lives of many, many people. We say that integration is so important that we will pull loans or we will stop this or that, but these are not the principles we conventionally apply to the government's activity when it is reaching into other areas of our life. Perhaps in other areas our enthusiasm for the ultimate goal is not as strong. I do not know the solution to this problem. I would simply like to see more attention given to some of the very troublesome questions about administrative proceedings and due process.

My second point is that I have a feeling that a bit more emphasis ought to be given to what can be accomplished in this country with the stroke of the pen, so to speak. I think we can do more than we have. In fact, I am in favor of almost all the measures that have been discussed here. I think I would be in favor of them even if they did not accomplish anything. We should not judge them on utilitarian grounds but, ultimately, on ethical grounds. It is right and just that the taxpayer's money not be used, even symbolically, in any way that would associate it with inequity. Nonetheless, there is a practical question; and I wonder if we can allude to it somehow. What real difference would it make in the housing market if the President's rule, which now covers 20 per cent of the lending activities, were extended to 100 per cent of the lending activities? I do not know that anybody can answer the question, but I have a feeling that we are not really focusing on it. Perhaps, in our enthusiasm for the method, we may lead the unsuspecting reader of this issue of *Dædalus* to believe that we are more sure than we are.

FLEMING: First of all, what we can do now is really to implement, to use the tools. They scarcely have been used yet. Title VII is not even in operation yet, and Title VI is really right at its inception. With regard to housing, I did not go into it in my paper because I did not know what

subjects would be covered and how they would be covered in other papers. What the broadening of the housing order can do, if vigorously implemented, is to open up the suburbs and the admittedly middle-income and higher-income housing to those Negroes who can afford it and want, or will want over a period of time, to move into those areas. I do not subscribe to the view that what happens to the relatively small percentage of Negroes who may be described as middle-class is unimportant. I think they are the models, the pace-setters. I think that what happens to them is going to condition the attitude toward race. They are the only hope we have of separating the concept of race from the concept of an under class. I think it is terribly important for this relatively small number of Negroes to have open access to the housing which they can afford. Obviously, this will not have much impact on the ghetto dweller.

WILSON: How does the housing order give them open access?

FLEMING: By covering the whole market, or at least the largest percentage of the market.

WILSON: Is the exclusionary principle clearly the financial one? There are many exclusionary weapons, ranging from zoning practices to community pressure to violence. Money is one element. If I had a sense of how important money was in the total housing market for these people, then I think I would have a sense of what the housing order is going to do.

BERRY: It seems to me that not all suburban housing is really expensive. When we talk about opening the suburbs for the few upper-middle-class Negroes, we are fooling ourselves. A good part of the housing in suburban developments is very ordinary housing, where ordinary working people live. Industry is going to the suburbs. Right now we are getting the kinds of people whom Mr. Cohen was talking about yesterday—the people in the \$35,000 bracket—and the white people bring them cake for coming out there. But there is considerable other housing, and Negroes in cities such as Chicago are paying blood money for rent which is much higher than the price of good suburban property. It is going to be more important than I think you indicated, Mr. Fleming.

FLEMING: I did say middle income or better—not just upper income.

BERRY: Even some lower-middle-income people can go out and work in plants such as we have building up around O'Hare Airport. Ordinary poor white people are living out there now. Of course, I am not sure that Negroes want to live with them.

It seems to me that whenever we talk about housing, we ought to emphasize the very great responsibility the federal government has in this area. They have this responsibility because they were so guilty of discriminating for so long. They even had restrictive covenants in the old FHA manual. I do not think that they ought to be allowed to forget that. They have a great responsibility to undo all the nastiness they did. Mr. Wilson raised a question about how far the government ought to go in lowering the boom in the application of the sanction. I do not think there

is any question about this. It seems to me, Mr. Wilson, that it is perfectly clear that we could say that no part of any tax dollar ought to be used for any discriminatory program or purpose at any time, period. It is just as plain as the nose on my face that the federal government operates with tax money, which is everybody's money and ought to be equally applied. Any government service which is paid for with tax money has this responsibility.

WILSON: That was not my question, but I agree with you. I said that justice requires that the federal government take a position quite similar to the one you are pronouncing. The only question is in the practicalities of determining whether discrimination actually occurred and what sanction ought to be applied. I would like to see attention given to the generally troublesome questions of administrative practice and administrative law. I do not think that we have alluded to these questions so far in this conference.

FOLEY: I can answer that very simply. There is an administrative proceeding to determine whether, for example, a loan should be called. If a person does not like the results of the administrative proceeding, he has all the judicial and legal recourse which he has in other matters. He can appeal it to the courts. So I do not see how any vigorous, aggressive action of an executive agency would deprive him of his legal rights.

TOBIN: I am just not informed about the mechanics of enforcing compliance with the housing order. It seems to me that the possibilities of evading this kind of order are tremendous. In principle, I certainly agree with Mr. Berry. The housing order should be enforced. But how, in fact, can it be done? This relates to Mr. Wilson's question. What are the administrative procedures to insure that the banks, the builders, etc., do not evade the order?

FLEMING: The chairman wishes us to address ourselves to that question, so I will take a shot at it. It is a big question, and I do not pretend to have the whole answer. As far as I know, nobody has thought through all the mechanics of enforcement. However, the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing, which is made up of some pretty savvy people, seems to feel that it can be mechanically accomplished. There is no question at all that this will be essentially a complaint-centered program, as our present housing order and Title VII provide for. It simply means that Negroes who feel that they are being discriminated against can file complaints, possibly with the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing. This has been one suggestion. The riding-herd on the complaints will be supervised by the President's Committee, though it will be a responsibility of the regulatory agency. The problem, Mr. Berry, as I see it, is to bridge the gap between the executive department and the regulatory agency, which has the direct relationship with the banks. It seems to me that, while it is complicated, it is feasible. And it is certainly better than not having the federal principle established.

UNIDENTIFIED: Has there been any significant shift in the borrowing mar-

ket—from FHA, VA, and so on, to the private sector—for building in the suburbs since the establishment of the order? The prediction at the onset of this order was that building would go down, but in fact it has gone up a little bit.

FLEMING: The FHA Commissioner says that there has not been any significant shift attributable to the executive order. The FHA market is soft; there is not much demand, and it has declined somewhat in the year since the order was issued. But nobody whom I have heard quoted attributes this in any significant degree to the executive order. We cannot really tell, until we get a much more vigorous program. It is not very hard to get an FHA guaranteed loan and go on with business as usual.

PARSONS: I have just a short point, but I think it is a very important one. Since the procedure is a complaint procedure—and it is in many of the state-level cases, too—the civil rights groups can play an extremely important part. A study (which Mr. Pettigrew and Mr. Wilson know about) of the antidiscrimination legislation in Massachusetts showed very conclusively that the increase in effectiveness, over the period since the anti-discrimination law for employment was passed a dozen or more years ago, is overwhelmingly a function of the support of the complainants by the civil rights groups. Isolated individuals do not dare use the procedure.

LERNER: I would like to go back to two, somewhat related, broader issues which were raised. First, I would like to comment on the supposed danger of using rather decisive administrative federal power—on the idea that it might react badly upon worthwhile movements. In the early days of the New Deal, we were deeply troubled by the use of New Deal power in ways which might prove ultimately damaging if used by others in power. I suppose all we can say is that power is always a double-edged sword. We have to grasp it anyway—even though, in some conceivable situations, it might cut against us.

The second issue, raised particularly by Dr. Coles, was the ambivalence of the civil rights people—their hostility toward some of the federal instrumentalities upon which they are trying to exert pressure. We might look at this historically, in terms of some previous movements. For example, all the reformist Marxist movements—but not the all-out Marxist movements—had this problem. The Democratic Socialists, for instance, always had the problem of having to put pressure upon the very political process which they were constantly saying was a decadent thing and would eventually have to disappear. I think that the civil rights people—all of us, both Negro Americans and white Americans—have to face this question and clarify it as the Marxists in the past had to clarify it. Similar ambivalences emerged in the anticolonial movements. In reading several recent volumes of Nehru's papers, it is clear that the people in the Gandhi-Nehru movement were troubled by the fact that they were being asked to get concessions from the very British government which they hated so deeply and which they were trying to overthrow. It would be useful to set the civil rights movement in the framework of past movements, such as the Marxist movements and anticolonial movements, and

of revolutionary movements in general. There have been not only problems of libertarianism and egalitarianism in American civilization, but also far-reaching problems in previous movements to which the civil rights movement is somewhat analogous.

GRAUBARD: As of now, there is no paper planned in that area.

FEIN: I would like to extend Mr. Wilson's point and tie it in with a comment which Mr. Hughes made earlier. Particularly if *Dædalus* has a significant readership in Europe (which I assume it does have), I think that there is a real need for a paper which would be broadly philosophical in terms of federal-state relations, traditional legislative-executive relations, and so on. I take it that the kind of dilemmas which Mr. Wilson poses are much broader than just the question of administrative rule and are related to the dilemma of, for example, supporting the House Un-American Activities Committee in an investigation of the Ku Klux Klan. This kind of issue, cast philosophically in the sorts of traditions that Mr. Hughes was alluding to, strikes me as a very worthwhile topic for a paper.

GRAUBARD: As you remember, we agreed that we would insert some oral reports. We do not yet have a paper from Mr. Edwards, so he is going to outline his paper for us now.

EDWARDS: I was asked to consider what the future may hold in terms of Negroes becoming perhaps a little more American. That is, given the differences in the structures of Negro and white society, what do I see as forces which carry with them hope for greater similarity, and what in the situation leads to discouragement that there will be a closer resemblance between Negro and white society? Mr. Graubard said, in writing to me, that although the paper might turn out to be a very pessimistic one, I should treat it as faithfully as I saw it.

I would suggest that there are two kinds of forces operating. On the one hand, some of the differences are going to disappear. The question is: How soon can this be accomplished? In terms of our planning here, what would be the strategy to speed up this process? On the other hand, deeply imbedded in the two structures are such great differences that it will be very difficult to change the structures so that they resemble one another in any greater measure in the foreseeable future. There are both forces of optimism and forces of pessimism. Over-all, I am inclined to take an optimistic view.

My first point is that we ought to look at the civil rights movement as part of a general movement—what I call the welfare movement in this country. It has been going on for a long time and has acquired increasing impetus. I think we clearly see this movement as beginning with the New Deal. For example, we had the passage of our first housing legislation in that period. We had Social Security. We had labor reform. Now we have Medicare and the War on Poverty.

I think that civil rights leaders should never take their eyes off of the intersection of the civil rights movement with this more general movement. Civil rights leaders often become so preoccupied with what they can do, in terms of the fruitful use of their time, that they lose this point.

That there has been this revolution in this country—a movement for the upgrading of the general well-being of Americans—is one of the things that leads me to an optimistic stance. This is a hopeful kind of sign for us.

In line with that is the fact that the major actor in this whole process has been the government. We have been talking about the failure of the government to use the full force of its power; but I think that as this movement goes forward, we do have the government playing a most significant role. My judgment is that, given the present leadership, it will become even more important in the future.

I do not think that we could have predicted, even as recently as 1956, many of the things which have come to pass. We were not able to foresee the intervening events. Look at the Kennedy administration, for example. Despite Mr. Kennedy's campaign promise to do away with discrimination in housing with "a stroke of the pen," he was hesitant in terms of playing the political game, as Mr. Fleming pointed out today. Mr. Kennedy promised to send civil rights legislation to Congress, but he held off until Birmingham. Of course, there was a rather swift movement after that.

More significant, I think, is that when the civil rights bill did get to the Congress, it was even improved upon. This meant that much of the force of government—both the executive-order type of force (which Mr. Kennedy was wont to rely upon) and the legislative type of force—was strongly in support of civil rights. And, of course, the courts were there even before the executive and legislative powers came into play. So, in general, if we look at the currents in which the civil rights movement is flowing, we have cause to be optimistic. Certainly it is not easy to turn back.

The third thing I would like to mention is that recently there has been a greater concern, largely because of self-interest, on the part of the white business community. I think we may expect considerable support from that sector of the community—to the end, perhaps, of eliminating some of the differences which we have been observing. With respect to civil rights legislation—on voting and public accommodations, in particular—the business community and, to some extent, the middle class in general in the South are more for compliance with what the government says is right than for maintenance of the established order. This is especially true in those parts of the South where we have had real conflict—in Alabama and in Mississippi. We now have committees which, I think, wield such power that they will be listened to.

I think one of the great differences between, say, South Carolina and Alabama is the fact that South Carolina learned very quickly from the mistakes which Alabama made—in public education, for example. It appeared that the admission of a Negro to Clemson College—about the same time that Governor Wallace was attempting to keep Negroes out of the University of Alabama—was attributable to the political power structure in South Carolina. Actually, the business leaders, who were greatly concerned about improving the general level of that state, had a great deal to do with the thrust which resulted in the admittance of Mr. Gantt to Clemson College without any trouble. This is significant, because we might well have predicted that South Carolina would follow the pattern

of Alabama and Mississippi. There were rumbles on the part of the segregationist groups, but they just never materialized. Such, I think, is the power which the business community is exerting. I think they will not only serve their own interests, but their voice and power may be felt in other segments of the community.

I think there is still another hopeful force for producing situations which will help to eliminate some of the major differences. The civil rights movement is attracting an increasingly larger segment of the white community. Perhaps they look at this, as Mr. Moynihan suggested, in terms of liberty rather than equality; but no matter how they look at it, when they give their support, they are offering tremendous promise for eliminating some of the differences. This is particularly true on the part of the present generation of whites—the young people. We should never overlook the participation of the whites in some of the symbolic or ritualistic features of the movement. For example, I do not know what proportion of the 200,000 people who marched on Washington represented the white community, but certainly the whites were there. They have been in Selma. They have been everywhere. In addition to its symbolic meaning, this is also translated into certain power features. Labor gave its support, for example. This is not a pure phenomenon (some people have said that the white liberals have backed up a little bit); but, over-all, into the civil rights movement have come larger numbers of whites, who give their support in funds and in action and who, in many cases, are willing to make some of the sacrifices and to take the extremely dangerous position of participating as the ministers and other people did in Selma, Alabama.

I think that the general tone of my paper will be one of optimism. However, we must accept the fact that this problem is going to be with us for a long time. There will be no early, quick resolution of the problem, although some aspects may yield a little more quickly than others. Establishing equality of opportunity in other areas may be tougher than in the area of public accommodations—the right to sit down at a counter, to ride a bus, and so on. So some aspects of the differences among Negroes and whites will disappear more quickly than others. I recently heard Professor Ginzberg of Columbia University say, in talking to young Negroes who identified with the civil rights movement, that the market place will be much tougher than some of the other areas and that we should really steel ourselves for the struggle ahead. I think he is right.

The differences which we want to resolve—differences in, say, class structure, opportunity, and family structure—have been conditioned in large part by the fact that Negroes and whites have lived separately for so long. Although Negroes have, to some extent, assimilated the American value structure, they do deviate in some important ways. The separation—or isolation—has, of course, led to the breakdown of communication and understanding. One of my old teachers used to say that those who live alike think alike. I suppose that those who live alike also tend to act alike. The ideal way to eliminate the differences, which have come about through isolation, would be to open up the opportunity structure so that Negroes and whites may have more similar distributions of whatever talents they have.

Let me say a word about education, because this touches upon the kinds of difficulties we face. We have some figures from Mr. Hauser and others on what the educational gap is at the present time. For example, in 1960, about 23 per cent of the Negro population, 25 years of age or over, had less than a fifth-grade education; almost one-quarter of the Negro population is functionally illiterate. We could take, as a figure for Negro-white comparison, the median years of education; but I deliberately select the functional illiteracy figure because I think it has a very definite meaning for us. These are the people who have a great deal of trouble in the job market. These are the people who are not prepared for jobs in our society at this time. The white figure is substantially lower than 23 per cent. This is a fundamental difference. What do we do about it? How quickly can this kind of differential be eliminated?

One sociologist has given some attention to the question of how long it would take for this educational difference to be eliminated if Negroes were given the maximum opportunity available. He estimates that if we began now to eliminate the school drop-out differential—if Negroes began to match whites in terms of the rate at which they attended school and stayed in school—educational equality would not be achieved in less than fifty years and, more likely, would take seventy-five years.

I think one of the things to be observed is that there are relationships among the several factors we talked about as features which distinguish the Negro community structure from the white community structure. Therefore, as we work in some of the problem areas, we may get some payoff in other areas as well. For example, if we work with education, we will get a payoff in occupation and income. No matter how we work, however, certain features will defy easy solution and will be minimally affected by solution of other problems. The housing problem, which is, as we have said, a particularly tough one, is a good example. Even if we opened up the market, we would have a considerable amount of segregated housing for a long time to come because of the income structure among Negroes. There is also the fact, which someone mentioned earlier, that many Negroes would want to live in predominantly Negro communities, even if they had other housing available to them. And, of course, there are still other psychological and social factors which would keep Negroes from moving—all the centripetal forces which will continue to operate because of the suspicions and differences which have been generated over the years. The Negro family is concerned, for example, about socialization and free interaction, especially among children; and Negro families are not always confident, when they move individually to a white community, that socialization is available to them.

No one has yet estimated, as far as I know, how long it might take to achieve a congruence of occupational distributions of Negroes and whites. (We cannot always predict occupational demand, but I suppose we can make reasonable guesses about the types of skills which will be in demand.) A great many forces are already operating which will help to eliminate the differences. One such force is the use of government power to insure that jobs are given to Negroes who are qualified for them. If we look at the occupational distribution, we see a heavy concentration of Ne-

groes at the bottom, in the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Closing the occupational gap is, to a great extent, dependent upon the opening up of opportunities for Negroes to learn the skills which are in demand. Then we must work to eliminate the discriminations which have operated traditionally. My feeling is that this will not come very soon, but that the extreme differences will gradually disappear.

Let me say a word about family structure. The structures are, indeed, different; but I think the differences are sometimes exaggerated. There is no doubt that the Negro father is absent more often than the white father—not only, may I remind you, because of desertion and divorce, but also because of death. Negro women become widows at much earlier ages, as well as in larger proportions, than white women. Nevertheless, only 21 per cent of all Negro families are headed by women. It is not a universal phenomenon. There are men at home, certainly, in the Negro middle class. We somehow have the idea that if the man has gone, it must be because there was serious lack of preparation for family living. A study by Lewis on child-rearing practices among lower-income families gives us a little clearer perception of what actually happens to the Negro male. From his interviews, Lewis found that a great many Negro males are very concerned about staying with their families. Only after a long period of time do they finally give up; and even after they have left, they really wish that some way could be found for them to go back to their families. I feel that anything which improved the education and the income-maintenance opportunities of Negroes would, in turn, help the family structures and thereby eliminate some of the differences in this area. I think, for example, that the early age at which many Negroes marry is, in part, a cause of the high attrition rates. Many young Negroes may well be resorting to marriage as a way out of the disappointments they experience as they try to attain education, and so on.

May I say, finally, that there is continued resistance to the acceptance of Negroes in a great many areas; but these resistances will gradually lose some of the force they now have. We have talked about the white backlash. We have talked about the concern of many liberal white people about having their children educated in schools with Negroes. I think that, as the government uses its force and as other opportunities arise for Negroes and white to associate, there will develop a structure in which there is more interaction. As Mr. Hauser said yesterday, we have, in effect, transported the Southern plantation to the city. We have a tremendous isolated reserve, which severely limits the opportunities for interaction between Negroes and whites. However, as Negro and white children begin to attend school together and begin to play together, as Negro and white parents become concerned about the same kinds of problems, and as Negroes move into housing communities where whites also live, there will develop the kind of interaction which leads to understanding. All these things will not happen at once; they will happen at different times and in different sectors. But they will happen, and they will help to eliminate some of the differences.

GRAUBARD: I think that the two papers which are perhaps closest to yours,

Mr. Edwards, are those of Mr. Turner and Mr. Handlin. I would like, therefore, to ask Mr. Turner and then Mr. Handlin to give brief résumés of their points of view. There are, of course, some very significant differences, as well as some similarities, among these three papers.

TURNER: Since my co-author, Mr. Whitney Young, happens to direct a national organization, I want to point out that we collaborated on some of the major ideas, but part of the paper represents my personal thinking and, due to his being out of the country, I have not had an opportunity to discuss all of the details with him. Out of sensitivity to the fact that he speaks for a national group, I emphasize that the views herein should not be construed as necessarily representing the views of the National Urban League.

Let me comment on the assumptions which we went on in preparing the paper. First, we assumed that, in talking about what society will look like if and when we have something called full participation of the Negro in it, we would get essentially what has developed around this table and what was put forth quite directly in Mr. Handlin's paper: a range of views. We tried to state the extremes of this range by the use of two concepts: *pluralistic* integration and *individual* integration. Our major point was that we cannot settle the argument about which type of integration is to be preferred. That is, we cannot settle it at this point in history, and we cannot settle it by discussion. Any serious attempt to do so would be dysfunctional to current efforts to move the Negro closer to full participation. It is helpful to look at the two points of view; but, in actuality, the next steps that have to be taken can lead to either end and are equally essential to both ends.

Second, it seems to us that the civil rights effort at this time is essentially attempting to achieve objectives within the over-all values and political and economic structure of the American society. It does not represent an attempt to alter the structure. Third, we assumed that, as in any kind of revolutionary effort, there is always a possibility that people will perceive that they have reached their goal before they have actually done so and that this can become dysfunctional. Fourth, we assumed that the obstacles to achieving full participation are multiple; and, therefore, multiple strategies have to be developed to overcome them. We are not advocating a single strategy in this paper.

Given these assumptions, we try to set forth a few basic ideas. One is that there is need at this time for an interim strategy or interim strategies to equalize the life chance of the Negro. This seemed to us to be a proximate type of goal, on which there is reasonable consensus among civil rights groups and among other people interested in this problem. We suggested two kinds of approaches to this. One approach is that which, in a sense, has as its end the shaping of society so that society becomes more receptive to the inclusion of a Negro on a basis which does not penalize him because of his color. The second approach is to try to help Negroes to cope more responsibly and instrumentally with the system as it happens to be at any given point in time.

We then set forth what seemed to be the basic requisites for launching

either of these strategies. They are derived by simply identifying what seems to be, in looking at the inter-group problem, the most overbearing variable: the powerlessness of the Negro, that is, his inability to get other people to behave differently toward him and, in some instances, to get his own group to behave differently for the advancement of group welfare. Therefore, we defined the basic requisite conditions as first of all the development and strengthening of sources of power. Three sources are identified, which seem significant: first, economic sources of power; second, political sources; and third, group solidarity and cohesion sources. (Obviously these overlap, but there are different aspects which require, in my opinion, different operational tactics.) Power in itself is insufficient; there has to be the will to use it. Power is always exerted at a cost, and the real question is whether or not the Negro can use power for group interests as opposed to individual interests and how quickly he can achieve that kind of discipline and control. Furthermore, with power and with the will to use it, there has to be a system which permits the deployment of power where it does the most good at the moment in the most expeditious way. Our concern is that the real issue of assuring continuity and a steady firming-up of the power potential of the Negro community may be imperfectly engaged at the present time. It seemed to us that this is the most essential requisite for sustained progress toward full participation in our society by the Negro.

HANDLIN: I attempted in my paper to draw some connection between questions of ultimate strategy and actual tactics. I realize there is a definition of integration which is different from that which I used in the paper. Mr. Hauser, for instance, spoke of integration as the maximization of opportunities for voluntary contact. That, of course, is not the meaning which I attached to the term integration. I have given it a narrower and somewhat different meaning in order to emphasize the character of the strategic goals and the differences of opinion that actually exist, in our discussion and in the United States, about the goals.

In order to show the effects of those strategic differences on tactics, I think it is useful to cite the definition of integration which Mr. Edwards gave. He put it in the form of a question: How can we eliminate the differences among the groups in American society so that they will more nearly resemble each other? In my paper, I tried to show how the necessities of the earlier stages of the conflict, particularly in its Southern context, produced a thrust toward this conception of integration. However, I feel this conception is not particularly relevant to the urban situation, which is now the main setting of Negro life and which will become increasingly the area in which the problem is most prominently located.

I do not agree with Dr. Turner that the question cannot be settled now. I think it is important to clarify these issues, precisely because they do have a direct bearing on tactical problems and on alternatives which are being raised right now. The prime deficiency that I see in the conception of integration as an elimination of differences is that it shows a lack of awareness of the actuality of what has here been referred to as *white society*—as if that were a homogeneous entity with a character which was

so explicit and so clearly delineated that it offered a model for Negro society. In my view, white America consists of a congeries of social subsystems. The Negro is misled insofar as he thinks he has a single model against which to pattern his development. In fact, there are clusters of quite different and separate models. Statistically, we constantly use the comparison of white and nonwhite. This is useful, but it is also deceptive. The "white" category only enables us to distinguish color. It is not in itself a useful indicator of the internal composition of the people who are called whites. When it comes to matters, for instance, of life style, income distribution, and patterns of behavior, at the points at which we place more exact forms of definition and description, we continually encounter signs of inner diversity.

I am primarily interested in establishing this because I think that the neglect of it has had an effect on the civil rights leadership, which has often been unable to control the situation or the direction of development precisely because it was unclear about the strategy. The point is also important because it has had an effect upon the development of communal institutions among Negroes. To put that at its simplest: The problem that often seems to have confronted the Negro community, in the half a century or so of its migration to an urban setting, is that of deciding to what extent any kind of autonomous internal action is an acceptance of segregation. My impression is that this fear of acceptance of segregation has inhibited, except in the civil rights movement itself, the development of the kind of solidarity to which Dr. Turner referred—particularly the development of institutional apparatus in which such solidarity is established.

In the paper, I tried briefly to point to the implications of these strategic questions for several of the immediate problems with which we have been concerned. It is significant, for instance, that in politics and in the area of employment Negroes have increasingly operated as groups. I see no reason, of course, that they should not. But I think it would clarify the issues for Negroes themselves and for others if their group action were recognized for what it is. In the area of employment, recognition of the identity of a Negro interest would be extremely helpful in developing the middle-class and professional groups, from which leadership ought to come. That leadership could be more effectively exercised if its identity with a group were firm.

To some extent, I am not as worried as Mr. Moynihan is about the problems and implications of equality. It is curious that no one in this two-day meeting has mentioned the biggest weapon we have for coping with that: the fact that the pie is getting bigger. The gross national product has grown and is capable of growing still bigger, so there will be more to divide. This may take a good deal of the edge off the necessities of dealing with that problem.

I believe that confusion about strategy has been most disruptive in the fields of education and housing. I can pose the issue most clearly in the form which I used in my paper: Is the primary objective more houses and better schools or racially balanced residences and schools? I am in favor of open occupancy and open enrollment. Anything that can be done to fur-

ther those ends is desirable and, indeed, will have a useful function in permitting full utilization of the educational and housing resources of the community. However, to make racial balance an end in itself, either in education or in housing, is in effect disruptive. The real problems are the improvement of the quality of the housing and of the education available to the Negro—whether it is racially balanced or not. And to the extent that emphasis on this alternative objective divides the effort and confuses the issue, I think it is an unfortunate emphasis. That it has divided the effort and has confused the issue can be seen in the experience of a number of cities over the past five years.

The point that perhaps deserves the most attention is the connection I attempt to draw between the problems of family life to which we referred yesterday—and which I think we all feel are important—and the character of the community, in this case, the Negro community. I think that these disorders in family life are the products of tensions which arise from rural-urban migration. I think that they are characteristic of other similar migrations. They are, of course, particularly extreme in the case of Negroes, but I think what has been more seriously lacking among Negroes is the pattern of autonomous institutions from *within* the group that can help to counter the effects of the disorders in family life with which we are concerned. As it is, the broken Negro family in need of help can turn only to the government—usually only to white people. This is a situation which is different from that of groups which have a variety of internal resources for supporting the solidarity and the discipline of the family. The difference, of course, is a product of history and of the character of the migration; but I think it is also a product of the slowness of the Negroes involved in this migration to accept the consequences of their identity as a group and to take up the tasks of community organization. That slowness is clearly related to the confusion about objectives—to the fear that any separate institution or any separate quality is a means of preserving segregation.

BREEDEN: The Negro community is not as lacking in internal structure—buffer structures, I suppose one might call them—as Mr. Handlin seems to be suggesting.

REDDING: I would like to say a couple of things. First of all, I spoke to Mr. Edwards about the possibility of discussing the active resistance—the people who do it from their guts. Having heard Mr. Handlin, I wonder whether we shouldn't, indeed, get some of these arguments against equality, liberty, balance. I think that Mr. Handlin's paper emphasizes, at least for me, the necessity for someone to find out what the white man's image of the Negro is and why people are constantly saying, "What does the Negro want?" It seems to me to indicate a distortion that needs to be brought into focus.

PETTIGREW: I do not entirely agree with Mr. Handlin, but I think it is useful to distinguish between *better* schools and housing and *racially balanced* schools and housing, as Professor Handlin has done for us. (This relates to the disagreement we had yesterday about whether we could do

things solely for the Negro.) I think the analogy with other groups causes us to make some unfounded statements about the Negro. Certainly, the lack of quality and the separation have been inseparably intertwined throughout Negro American history. They argue for balanced schools and balanced housing, because that is the only way that they have ever been able to achieve quality housing and schools. This has not been the case with many other groups. But again, it is the misleading analogy with other groups that would cause you to make this distinction and feel that it was a real one for strategy as applied to Negroes.

MAYER: I would like to address myself to the problem of the issue of *Dædalus* itself, because some of us feel there is a paper missing. We may have come to a curious paradox. First, we have heard a general statement—implicit although not analyzed—that there is no specific cultural tradition among Negroes in our country; but then that color as such is not by any means the only thing that distinguishes Negroes from the whites—in fact, that the Negro minority is somehow more different from the main stream of America than any other minority has been.

Listening to Professor Handlin, I almost feel that if the Negro minority does not have the culture or the social structure to buttress that last view, it is high time they got one by creating a well-structured and well-educated Liberia within the United States which could then be integrated with the country as a whole. It is possible that what we need is a paper on "What is a Negro?" Is it defined purely on a modified Nuremberg law basis? That is, is a Negro anybody who had a grandfather or a great-grandfather who was a Negro? Or do we have other definitions? Obviously, if the color of the skin is the only basis for social difference, and if we want to eliminate this, then we are in favor of general randomization. If, on the other hand, there are cultural traditions which Negroes want to preserve, then they may elect to stay grouped within their sub-community.

GRAUBARD: I want Mr. Handlin to have a chance to respond to a few of these comments.

HANDLIN: First, I did not mean to imply that I would create a segregated school in order to improve its quality. However, look at the experience of a place like Washington, D.C., where 85 per cent of the children are Negro. Most Washington schools are, by virtue of that fact, as racially imbalanced as schools get. Nevertheless, Washington has quality schools—attended primarily by Negroes. I do not think that there is anything in the mere fact of a school's having a preponderantly Negro population that prevents it from improving its quality. So it seems to me that an over-all demand for racial balance, as an end in itself, is not productive and sometimes is even self-defeating.

On Canon Breedén's point, I think probably I exaggerated for the purposes of argument and failed to take full account of the extent to which buffer structures do exist in the Negro community. But I think it is also important to consider the limited area in which they operate. Furthermore, they may not have a genuine function. It has been argued, for in-

stance, that there ought not to be a Negro press or that there ought not to be Negro churches.

WOODWARD: I think that Mr. Handlin has done us a service in pointing up this issue and even in exaggerating the implications of integration. I do think that the concept of integration has distinct implications for some elements of the civil rights movement. I think they come at the costs that he names, and I think they are terrible costs—surrendered identity—which can only be satisfied really by an eradication of the past. (I would like very much to draw Mr. Ellison into this discussion, because I think he has views that are very relevant to it.) I do not think we can really endorse that conception of integration, but neither can we endorse desegregation as a satisfactory American objective—let alone Negro objective—in this movement. I think to do so is to accept this equalization of the Negro minority with previous minorities which have been included in American society. I do not accept the picture that Mr. Handlin arrives at of the Negro in the Northern community before World War I. I think that that American society *was* a racist society, a white-supremacy society—North as well as South, though in different degrees—and that the Negro has always faced a very different kind of handicap and will continue to for a long time. Simple desegregation will not achieve the ends and the goals that we should envisage.

FICHTER: There is a fact emerging from our National Opinion Research Center (NORC) study of Negro colleges which certainly supports this notion. The Negro-college presidents are saying that they simply cannot wait for white students to come to their schools. The major problem is to improve these schools as going institutions at the present time. So many classrooms and college campuses are needed. We can talk all we want about integration and desegregation, but the major problem facing them is to improve the quality of the Negro colleges that now exist.

COHEN: I wonder if we can focus on our agreements and disagreements. I am not sure. First of all, I hope that Mr. Handlin will not use the word *integration* in the sense that he has used it, because this, I think, involves us in semantic confusion. I think we all agree that we want an open society, where Negroes can live where they wish, go to school where they wish, and identify with a group if they wish to or not identify with a group if they do not wish to. I think there is no disagreement about this. But it seems to me that we have some disagreement as to whether group identity should remain and whether it is desirable. It also seems to me that we are arguing whether we want, in the case of the Negro, cultural pluralism or the melting pot. We were asked if we wanted a well-structured and well-educated Liberia. In fact, we have a number of such enclaves in the United States. I would say, for example, that in some respects we have a well-structured, well-educated Israel in the United States. And I am shocked that there is any implication that no one would want a Negro community, as such, to continue and to be identified as a Negro community and to make its contribution to the United States as a

Negro community—which does not at all deny the right of an individual to move as he wishes in an open society.

With regard to racial balance, I think that to indicate that there is nothing wrong with segregation that quality would not cure is to ignore the history and the humiliation of the Negro. I grant that, in terms of education, rarely does desegregation by itself do anything for the child. But what desegregation does for the dignity of the Negro is crucial. There are a number of segregated Jewish schools around the country. I see nothing wrong with them with regard to quality. I do, however, see something wrong with them with regard to the possibility of contact with others. I think this is another factor in favor of racial balance.

BERRY: I do not know whether Mr. Handlin is arguing for segregation, apologizing for segregation, or recommending it. I think the paper says categorically that the goal of the civil rights movement is racial balance. I do not know where this goal comes from or who enunciated it other than Mr. Handlin; and I am a little distressed that some of the people around the table assume that to be the actual goal. In my association with the civil rights leadership, I have not known anyone to suggest that racial balance was the goal. I think what we are much more likely to be in agreement upon is the definition of integration which Mr. Turner gave us: equal access to the privileges and the responsibilities of American society. *Racial balance* is a term that has been used by those who wish to take a look at the extreme demands of a few very extreme people; and in no sense has it become an agreed upon thing. I hope that this paper will be the most rigorously amended of any that I have looked at.

HANDLIN: I think I should respond to a few of these questions and suggestions, and I would like to do so now. I agree with Mr. Woodward about the inadequacies of *desegregation*. I did not mean to imply by that term a purely negative attitude on the part of government or other agencies. Perhaps it would be better if I appropriated the term *integration* in Mr. Hauser's sense and used some other word for the other meaning of integration. I do not agree with Mr. Cohen that the issue is whether the Negro should retain a separate community. Individual Negroes have to decide whether they wish to preserve this identity. I do not see that anyone else is in a position to tell them what they should do. What I pointed out in my paper is that the Negro *is* separate. He does have an identity which is a product of his history. But the kind of community and the kind of organization that exist among Negroes are incomplete and fail to extend into a variety of areas, partly as a result of strategy and partly as a result of historical development. Again referring to Mr. Cohen's comment I agree that contacts are desirable. They are desirable on both sides. Society ought to maximize the opportunities for voluntary contacts. But I would emphasize the voluntariness of these contacts. There are contacts which are not desirable or useful, because they lead to conflict, they exacerbate, and they exaggerate differences. Under those circumstances, to say contact as such is useful is, I think, beside the point.

With reference to Mr. Berry's point, I do not remember saying that racial balance is the goal. I do think, for example, that in the develop-

ment of the discussions over school questions in New York City, what started as the demand of one sector became—because of internal pressures and because of the whole strategy and the way it unfolded—the demand of the civil rights movement in New York. The statement to which you refer, Mr. Berry, is: “No spokesman has fully articulated the implications of this point of view, but the thrust of integration, in the sense that I define it, is toward an organization of society in which every sector is radically balanced.” I think that the comments we have heard about the congruence of distributions illustrate that thrust. This is quite different from saying that the civil rights movement has adopted racial balance as its goal.

ELLISON: One thing that is not quite clear to me is the implication that Negroes have come together and decided that we want to lose our identity as quickly as possible. Where does that idea come from? I have encountered it in a number of places recently. One place (which almost frightened the pants off me) was in *Commentary*, where Mr. Nathan Glazer makes this assumption and follows it up with the rather frightening picture that all other immigrant and minority groups and some cultural groups in this country have somehow worked out an accommodation which respects the group identities of other peoples, but that Negroes are running wild, that we recognize no limit, and that we would like a total homogenization of the society. It is easy enough to see why Mr. Glazer would get off on that, because (as one of our participants also made very clear) he feels that Negroes have no culture.

I am not being defensive about this; I am trying to get at the logic of the assertion. If one assumes that a group, which has existed within this complicated society as long as ours, has failed to develop cultural patterns, views, structures, or whatever other sociological terms one may want to use, then it is quite logical to assume that they would want to get rid of that inhuman condition as quickly as possible. But I, as a novelist looking at Negro life in terms of its ceremonies, its rituals, and its rather complicated assertions and denials of identity, feel that there are many, many things we would fight to preserve.

There is something else which could be thought about along this line. There are great areas of this society which are available to Negroes who have a little consciousness. The contacts which exist are not limited to the roles which they might have. The human consciousness is there. Contacts are being made. Judgments are being rendered. Choices are being made. I know that in the life styles of any number of groups in the nation, there are many things which Negroes would certainly reject, not because they hold them in contempt, but because they do not satisfy our way of doing things and our feeling about things. Sociologists often assert that there is a Negro thing—a timbre of a voice, a style, a rhythm—in all of its positive and negative implications, the expression of a certain kind of American uniqueness. (I am not talking about Negritude. The Negro sociologists fall biggest for that.) If there is this uniqueness, why on earth would it not in some way be precious to the people who maintain it?

I would like to suggest what the fighting is about. For one thing, the

oversimplified and very often unfortunate slogans which are advanced in the civil rights movement act as slogans always do. Why do we demand that terrible, encyclopedic nuances be found in the slogans of the civil rights movement? No slogans have ever had that kind of complexity. They would not be slogans if they did. The other thing is that part of the struggle (which I have known now for some fifteen years) has always been not to get away from the Negro community, but to have the right to discover what one wanted on the outside and what one could conveniently get rid of on the inside. That seems to me very American. I think it is one of the assumptions which is implicit in a pluralistic society, and I see no particular reason for people to be upset by the possibility that we are actually going to achieve it.

TURNER: I would first like to address my remarks to Mr. Handlin's paper and then to make a couple of other observations. It does seem to me that Mr. Handlin's paper has been useful in focusing our attention on this issue. I agree, however, that in view of his remarks here this afternoon, it would be unfortunate to use some of the terms which he selected. It would appear from current usage that the term integration is not synonymous with the term racial balance. Also it may be helpful to us if you would define your meaning of the term desegregation.

It seems to me that there are a couple of other confusions which run through the paper and which you may wish to clarify. For one thing, racial balance, as it is commonly used, is a tactic—not a strategy, and, as has been pointed out, not a goal. There are differences in tactics and strategies and goals. It is possible, as has also been pointed out, that a particular tactic, such as racial balance, may be quite appropriate at a given point in time. The problem, for example, of how to get improved education in a particular school may hinge upon having integrated schools at that particular moment. In some other community, this may not be true. So if you are going to use this as an illustration, it seems to me that you also have to give the other kind of example to fully explicate your argument.

It also seems to me, not by your remarks, but by what you have written, that you undervalue the idea of equality. In part what Mr. Berry has been saying throughout these two days is that equality of opportunity is, in fact, a mate—part of a dual goal that the Negro is concerned with. He is not just concerned with improving his condition; he is concerned with equal access to opportunity. These are related but different kinds of ideas.

Maybe we need to have a paper on Negro culture. I do not understand what *our* way is of doing things. I can understand *your* way. I know *my* way. But I really do not know what *our* way means. It seems to me, however, that Mr. Handlin's picture of the white majority as being segmented, differentiated, and multidimensioned is true and that, furthermore, this picture is equally true of the Negro community. It also seems to me that if one loses identity as a Negro, he does not necessarily become nothing at all in terms of identity. There are other choices with which he may chose to identify. This is at least a possibility.

I do think that if we are going to propose a concept of pluralistic in-

tegration, we have to ask in all seriousness what conditions are required to make this work. I would suggest that it is difficult to maintain pluralistic integration except on a defense basis, unless the members of a cultural group have the capacity of losing that identity when they choose to move out into the larger society. I cite the experience in Nazi Germany as evidence of that.

MOYNIHAN: I think that if we confront this problem, we may do the most important thing to be done by this issue of *Dædalus*. A great many of the white people in this world have quite a different vision of what Negro demands, intentions, wishes, or probabilities are, as Dr. Redding has said. Furthermore, most of the whites do not have a very clear idea of what their own experience has been. I think that Mr. Handlin described that experience rather well.

A year and a half ago—Mr. Ellison mentioned it, and I will, too—Nathan Glazer and I published our book, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, in which we described this phenomenon in New York. We had one chance for a good review. Murray Kempton, a dear friend, was going to review the book in the *Herald Tribune*. And lo and behold, he froze at the typewriter, and four days and several bottles of whiskey later, he explained that there was not going to be a review. He said, "What am I going to say about a book that goes on for 300 pages complaining that Negroes are not Jews?"

I think they are not. But I do think that the gentlemen of color in this room should remember that the experience of a great many of us in our life has not been so very different in some respects from yours. There have been differences, but the differences have been part of a spectrum.

I grew up in Manhattan. Almost the first thing I learned was that we Irish were a put-upon, discriminated-against people. The second thing I learned was that the most awful thing that could happen to one of us was to go to school with people who were not of our own kind. I went to a segregated school system as a matter of desperate importance to us. Not to do so was to lose something of profound value.

This experience, although it is not very clear in the minds of many whites in the North, is nonetheless understood instinctively, at least well enough to lead us to the question Dr. Redding has come back to so many times: What is the nature of the Negroes' demand, and is it not, in fact, a traditional demand? I think that sometimes the slogans make it appear untraditional. I do not know whether it should or should not be traditional, but I think that it is.

FREUND: I noticed that at one point in his paper, Mr. Handlin seemed to join the issue of job preference with integrated schooling and integrated housing as expressions of integration in his definition. At another point, it seemed to me that he spoke of job preferences as a legitimate way of simply maximizing opportunities. I think there is some ambivalence in how he classified that—a small point, but perhaps indicative of a larger one, namely that there may be more agreement on program than on ideology and that similar programmatic actions may be motivated by different ideologies.

SESSION V

GRAUBARD: As you can imagine, the task of preparing the papers for publication is going to be a Herculean one. I will surely need your cooperation in many respects. Nothing would please me more than to have your personal accounts of the topics which you feel are missing. As I indicated in our first session, one of our hopes is that articles on those topics may be commissioned.

I know that there are several people who did not have a chance to speak this morning. I would like to start with Mr. Parsons, and then I will ask Mr. Hughes to speak.

PARSONS: I found the last phase of this morning's discussion particularly interesting. It seemed to me to point up much more sharply some of the things that were emerging yesterday about the background of Negro history in this country, the current nature of the Negro community, the immediate processes of transition which it has been very much in the middle of, and the possible direction of the future. I was very impressed by Mr. Ellison's point that there is a clearly distinctive Negro culture. This seems to me to be one aspect that is very much in need of attention. We need to have a clearer description of what Negro culture has been and is.

Despite all the complicated crosscurrents of the discussion initiated by Mr. Handlin, we seem to have reached a consensus that, within the framework of free access to opportunity, it is very unlikely and probably undesirable that a Negro solidarity should evaporate as an immediate function of the success of the movement. The unlikelihood seems to me to be very much reinforced by the fact that the movement itself creates solidarity. I think this is even true across the racial line, because the participation of whites, as has been emphasized at a number of points, itself reinforces the identification. There is a Negro cause with which it is important to identify oneself and which one should help as much as one can.

I would like simply to suggest that, for several reasons the historical position of the Negro group in this society gives them a very special mission (I think that word is not too strong) as the symbolic carrier, more than any other group, of the value of equality. Despite the many, many difficulties, some of which we have been surveying, the mission has, it seems to me, good prospects of very substantial success. Insofar as the mission is internally successful, it will be established as a collective entity which has made a contribution of the first order to what I think (as I tried to say in my paper) is one of the crucial problems of American society. The problem is not a Negro problem, but a general problem: the sense of what the necessary and appropriate meaning of equality is in this society. I think that this is altogether adequate ground on which to establish a highly valued collective identity, in which others may participate, but which is especially the Negro identity.

Furthermore, it seems to me that it has a very important implication in the world at large. Only the paper by Mr. Emerson and Mr. Kilson has had much to say about the relation of the racial situation in this country to that of the world at large. For understandable reasons, this conference

could not concern itself in any detail with this relation; but I think we are all aware that this is a very central reference point for the whole problem. My own feeling is (as another *Dædalus* enterprise is considering) that this is a very major issue in the world at large. Colonialism has been identified with white supremacy, perhaps not universally in the worst Southern segregationist sense, but certainly in the sense of the "white man's burden" and other well-known clichés. There is an inherent link between the position and the success of the Negro movement in American society and the position of the United States in the world.

For specifically racial reasons, the immediate reference is Africa. Africa is a symbol in many ways for the colored peoples, including our neighbors in Latin America. The Indian of Peru, for example, is not a white man by Spanish definitions. The mestizo is not quite a mulatto, but not altogether different from a mulatto in the Latin American world. The Asian world is something yet again. So I want to suggest that a collective Negro identity, which has achieved its basic goals internally or which is well on the way to achieving them, may be a terribly important link of American society to the rest of the world. This reinforces the notion that color-blindness—and, therefore, the disappearance of Negro identity—would not be a desirable thing. What would be desirable is development, along the line Mr. Cohen suggested, of groups within American society which have more and more got away from the invidious hierarchy of top dog, underdog, and discrimination to be a pluralistic variety within a society which has a certain underlying and fundamental egalitarianism. This ties in, of course, with the Moynihan-Glazer picture of New York.

HUGHES: I think it would be a pity if we were to put forward old race doctrines, but I do not think it would be bad to state what is known about race and about the nature of what is called the Negro race in this country. Although I do not think that any geneticist would claim to know exactly what the so-called American Negro gene pool is, I have heard it estimated at 25 per cent Anglo-Saxon. (I just this morning invented a word for American Negroes: NASP's.)

What I really want to say is related to both Mr. Handlin's and Mr. Parsons' arguments. It is about the structure of our society. Religious sects have settled all over this country—the Mennonites in Pennsylvania, for example—and they have survived. Why? It is not that all of the individuals stay with the group. A lot of the groups have very high birth rates, yet they remain about the same size. The nucleus remains. This is true of the Jewish community, which we have talked about. Not by a long shot are all the Jews born in this country, or people with Jewish parents, part of that society. And I estimate that there are probably more people of French Canadian descent in the United States than there are in the French Canadian world.

I think we have to see the American social structure as having lots of nuclei. We have, for example, an Irish nucleus; but a friend of mine, who is a rector of a church in Evanston, made Episcopalians out of forty Irishmen one year. (Religiously, they were downwardly mobile, but they thought that socially they were upwardly mobile.) I think we ought to

look at American society in these terms. We have many nuclei, but we also have a lot of people who do not really belong to any such nucleus. When I was a youngster in southern Ohio, if a Methodist, an Episcopalian, or a Presbyterian married a Lutheran, it was a mixed marriage. It would not be now, but it was then. I think we can imagine circumstances in which there could be what we now call interracial groups, that is, groups which would not be like the old interracial groups which had to shunt themselves off in a corner. We should watch for the possibility of new nuclei which are made up of people who do not want to fit into any of the others. Then if Negroes want to be Negroes, they can be; if they do not want to be, they do not have to be. Of course, Negroes probably will want to continue being Negroes, because social nuclei die hard. The only social nucleus that had died, as far as I know, is that of the Huguenots. I think we will have social nuclei of one kind or another for a long time to come. I think they are in the character of American society. And we should remember the possibility of creating new ones. I think, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Rossi was referring to a new social nucleus when he talked about the increasing interracial marriages around academic communities.

I do not think that anybody ought to tell anybody else whether or not he ought to create one of these social nuclei. I think it is his own business. However, I think we ought to be aware of the possibility that, in the fantastic sorting which has been the genius of our society, we might someday get some nuclei in which race did not count. That does not mean there would not be others in which race did count.

GRAUBARD: I would be pleased if that figured into your paper, Mr. Hughes.

HUGHES: That is the kind of fantastic thing—not based on any facts—that my paper is meant to be. I think, too, that we ought to look at the world scene, as Mr. Parsons just suggested. I do not think that we can escape the fact that, whatever we may think in this country, outside of the United States border, the impression (certainly in Canada) is that we are ready to send the Marines anywhere if the population is not completely white. We may not think so, but this is the image. This is the standard joke in England and Canada—and a bitter one. They are joking in Canada about how many Communists we have to find there before we send Marines to Canada, and the punch line is, "Oh no, our Communists are all white." If we are going to write about the problem of race in this country, we should consider the world view of the problem.

LERNER: Apropos of Mr. Moynihan's amusing story about Murray Kempton, I really do not think we want the Negroes to be like the Jews. What some of us may be driving at is that, in the American experience, the Jews managed to do two things: one, to retain a subcultural identity and, two, to achieve an impressive measure of access to life chances in the larger culture. This is also true of several of the other cultural minorities. The problem is to what extent these twin objectives can be maximized in the case of the Negro Americans. To the extent that the Jews have achieved them, these objectives have not been achieved easily. They have

been achieved with tears and grief. Unfortunately, a fair number of inner ghettos have been constructed. We have had to go through that.

The Jews are now deeply concerned about the extent to which their identity as a subculture may be in the process of being undercut. There is among them considerable anxiety about the possible or even probable obliteration of their identity in the calculable future. So I think we had better get rid of any notion that the Jews have a totally satisfactory solution of the problem.

Finally, what counts in having this subcultural identity is not so much the sense of warmth among ourselves (which has been, nonetheless, worthwhile) as the feeling that we have left some impact on the larger culture. I am suggesting, of course, that, for the Negro American, subcultural identity is important in developing a creativeness which in turn, leaves an impact on the larger culture. However, subcultural identity, in and of itself, is not so very important.

HUGHES: We must remember our history. Jewish culture existed. The American Negro just did not exist.

LERNER: Mr. Ellison does not agree with that.

HUGHES: Negro Americans are an American creation. They might want to be different, but that certainly is not the same thing as maintaining a 2,000-year-old culture.

PARSONS: Who says it is the *same* thing? It may, however, be an important thing and not a nonexistent. A culture does not have to be 2,000 years old.

HUGHES: My guess is that there *will* be an identifiable Negro nucleus in this country for a long time, but I hate to have anybody read a sermon on whether or not they *ought* to have one. I think it is their business. They ought to have the chance to choose whether to have it or not.

ELLISON: From reading American literature and from studying American culture, I feel that subcultures are basically American, regardless of where they come from, whether they are Jewish or Negro, whether they are urban or rural. Once we recognize that, we can get into the area of making distinctions. One concept that I wish we would get rid of is the concept of a main stream of American culture—which is an exact mirroring of segregation and second-class citizenship. I do not think that America works that way at all. I would remind us that before there was a United States, a nation, or a form of a state, there were Negroes in the colonies. The interaction among the diversified cultural groups helped to shape whatever it is we are who call ourselves Americans. This, I think, is a very important distinction to make.

I may have been only a busboy in a club in Oklahoma City, but I knew much more about some of the things that occurred there than some of the *nouveau riche* oilmen who were members of the club. When I worked for Jewish businessmen in Oklahoma City, I learned certain things, not because I embraced the religion and not because of my blood components, but because I was in cultural contact with a group of people

who were very expressive. This is America, as far as I know. I know no way of defining this reality out of existence.

Once we recognize this, where do we go from there? I find that if I am going to write something, I can very often tell where it comes from, in terms of both the traditions of the particular literary form and the traditions of the people around me. Someone should pay some attention to how the folk stories which are told about Negroes in one meeting might be told about Jews in another. There is a basic unity of the experience, despite all the other stuff. The whole problem about whether there is a Negro culture might be cleared up if we said that there were many idioms of American culture, including, certainly, a Negro idiom of American culture in the South. We can trace it in many, many ways. We can trace it in terms of speech idioms, in terms of manners, in terms of dress, in terms of cuisine, and so on. But it is American, and it has existed a long time. It has refinements and crudities. It has all the aspects of a cultural reality.

GRAUBARD: I would like to ask Mr. Fischer to make a few comments on his paper.

FISCHER: I suspect the one point on which all of us here would agree is that virtually everything we have talked about in these two days has its educational aspect in terms of implications for educational institutions and educational processes. Many of the things we have talked about rest wholly for their accomplishment on educational efforts. I am going to discuss in my paper (unless you talk me out of it) the three types of tasks which I think the schools need to work on and are working on now to a considerable degree. I will then go on to suggest some of the implications that flow out of these various categories of necessary work.

At what might be called the lowest level, it seems to me that the schools—I am speaking here primarily of the public elementary and secondary schools, although there are obvious extensions of these ideas into higher education—must undertake to assure instruction in desegregated, nondiscriminatory situations which will be equal in quality, in amount, and in accessibility to the instruction which is available to whites. There will, of course, be certain local and regional differences, as we have these differences in all aspects of American education; but certainly we cannot tolerate, in any sense, inequality of the opportunities which are available to Negroes and those which are available to any other group in our society.

A second task is to provide the distinctive (or call them, if you will, compensatory) types of education or training which are required to enable Negroes who are handicapped socially, culturally, historically (if you want to put it that way), or in any other way to attain the status from which they may participate and compete more effectively in the total American society.

The third general task is to provide opportunities for as many white and Negro students as possible to participate in racially integrated educational situations, under conditions that will be favorable to the development of productive and satisfying relationships. I think that last modifica-

tion is critically important, and I shall say more about it later, if we want to go into it.

Another point that I think we need to recognize is that there are differences in the difficulty of achieving the conditions for performing these three tasks. In one sense, the easiest will be the establishment of desegregated, nondiscriminatory opportunities. It may be argued that all we need to accomplish this task is more manpower, more facilities, more money, and, in some situations, the necessary legal support and protection.

The difficulty of providing special or compensatory educational opportunities has not yet been fully realized, I am afraid. Here we must develop, first of all, better understanding of the reasons that Negro Americans are educationally handicapped and the reasons that they are socially handicapped. We need to understand the underlying difficulties, so that appropriate educational responses may be provided. Lacking understanding of the causes, we lack even more notably any basis for providing the kinds of educational responses which have to be developed. At the least, we must expect to develop new teaching procedures, new instructional materials, and a number of new institutional arrangements in order to carry out the kinds of things that have to be done. Most particularly, we need to improve what we are doing in teacher education. We cannot hope to have the programs we need without teachers who are much more understanding and much more competent than the great majority of the teachers who are now working in the schools.

If we are to have genuinely effective integration of our educational institutions, we must face the most serious difficulties. The obstacles to be overcome are psychological, cultural, sociological, pedagogical, administrative, and political. I think that the difficulty of achieving integrated schools is now much less a matter of law than it is a matter of professional judgment and policy. We certainly have not yet put behind us all of the legal difficulties; there are still court decisions to be obtained. But, by and large, as we move from the relatively simple *de jure* situations into the *de facto* situations—the *de facto* ones which have no element of *de jure* weakness in them—we get into the area of professional judgment as to what constitutes good or better education or, if you will, equal educational opportunity. We run into a whole range of possibilities for the exercise of discretion in establishment of public policy.

Some of the possibilities which are available to us are already becoming visible in the beginnings that are now underway. We can see what is happening in preschool programs. Although a great deal more must happen than has yet occurred, we have seen at least the leading edge of some fairly promising compensatory programs. New teaching materials are also beginning to appear. Although much more slowly and in much less creative forms than we need, at least the beginnings have shown themselves. Some schools and school districts are approaching, gingerly, some of the problems of reorganization which must be tackled, but a great deal more must be done and on a much more fundamental scale than we have yet thought about. Some school districts are actually talking about educational parks which will bring into a large-scale, common school the

children of a whole community or a large part of the community. These are all indications of the kind of future that I think we can envision.

I think it is necessary to mention the hazards of school-district reorganization as these reorganizations begin to occur. I have been saying that I am confident that we shall see movement in two directions. One direction involves decentralization of schools. But there must also be a reorganization in the other direction to bring together school districts which are too small to provide adequate educational opportunities for their children. As these administrative redesign exercises are carried through, we must be very careful that we not set up hermetically sealed, self-contained subdistricts which will make it impossible to move children from one to another. If in New York City, for example, Harlem became a unit within the total city structure, so that youngsters living on the fringes of the Harlem community could not move into better integrated schools, I would count the decentralization process a loss, rather than a gain. One must be careful in setting up organizational patterns not to confuse efficiency of organization with the containment of student populations in some districts.

Quite aside from these things that I have been talking about, it seems to me that we must anticipate some very large-scale innovations. I am convinced that we are on the verge of some fundamental reforms in the control of public education in this country. I think the excessive localism of school control has seen its highest point and will now have to begin to be tempered by a much greater awareness of larger-scale concerns. Mr. Conant gets at this in his latest book, in which he argues for much stronger state departments of education, which would be ready to exercise some of the authority which ought to accompany the assertion of state sovereignty in education in this country. One aspect of this will be, I think, the merger of some overly small districts. But another part of it, I am convinced, will have to be the design of control arrangements which will make it possible for school systems to gain some degree of protection from sudden swings of public pressure and public concern. This is not to say that the schools should be freed of the need to respond to public pressures. There are people who are now saying that the superintendency of American schools is becoming a totally untenable position and is a job that only a fool would get into. To some degree they are right, because the system itself needs considerable alteration. I keep hoping that one of these days we will find a way to govern our schools which would be analogous to the governance of the better public universities, where there is a kind of responsiveness to the public will, but sufficient protection to avoid the necessity for the institution to respond continually to changes in the position of the wind vane. Schools cannot be as flexible or as adaptable as they should be in the present period, unless they have the stability which provides the basis for reasonable and sensible flexibility.

I mentioned the need for state authority to be asserted with somewhat more strength. There must also be a good deal more competence in state departments of education than we have been accustomed to in this country. There are a few good state departments, but it would not take the fingers of two hands to count virtually all of them.

At the same time that we have to assert the leadership of states in education, we shall also need to be recognizing the national dimension in public education in the very way in which we in this country have been loath to recognize it. This brings us to the question of what might happen if we had a Department of Education, with a Secretary in the Cabinet. I personally think that this is very likely to happen. There is reason to think that this will not happen in this session of the Congress, but that it might well happen in the next session. If so, Americans are going to have to reassess the traditional idea that there should be no connection between politics, in the ordinary sense, and the control of education. I think one cannot imagine any President having in his Cabinet a Secretary of Education whom the President viewed as an apolitical animal. Today education is very important in the total life of the country. We can no longer hope to have educational affairs divorced from the political affairs of the country in the way in which we have heretofore told ourselves they should be. Exactly what this will mean in the activities of the schools and higher educational institutions of the country, I do not yet foresee with any great clarity; but I am sure we are going to have to view this differently from the way we have before. This may very well strengthen the argument for building in new institutional safeguards and a new operating stability.

There will also be, I am convinced, the need for undertaking large-scale experimentation at the local level—developing schools for example, which will be able to meet the task of universal public education in a typical urban setting and which, at the same time, will be able to offer educational programs so good that the most discerning parents will want them for their own children. We do not yet have many, if any, schools in our large cities which can do a job of that breadth. I keep hoping that we will find the ways to set up such schools. I think the possibilities are now available under the new elementary and secondary act. It would, I think, be wholly feasible to set up in any large city an elementary school or a secondary school which would be under the joint control of a university and a group of citizens outside the public school system itself. Such a school might be managed so as to undertake the problem of educating the whole broad spectrum of the children of the community and so as to offer, at the same time, programs of sufficiently high quality to appeal to parents who want only the best kind of education for their children. Until we can find a way to set up a common school of that sort, the issue of the future of public education in this country will remain in doubt.

We shall have to find ways, of course, to deal with the special problems of the poverty-stricken areas, both in large cities and in rural areas. It may be that we shall need to do a good deal more than we have heretofore done to make it possible, on a financial basis, for individual students to continue their education. We have not really come to grips with that problem, although we are beginning to approach it in tentative ways.

Basic to everything else I have talked about, of course, is improvement of the education of teachers and administrators—not only those who will be entering the schools in the future, but most particularly those who are in the schools now. To hope to reform any institution by dealing only with

the young newcomers who enter means a delay of a generation in achieving anything like the degree of change that is required. We must undertake immediately—the time is already too late—very aggressive programs to deal with the people who are now in charge of the schools of the country. The problems that we have seen—we were talking about them yesterday and this morning—in Chicago and in New York indicate something of the weaknesses in the preparation of the leaders of the schools, particularly the school administrators, over the past generation. Most of the people who are now in charge of American public schools are woefully unprepared to deal with the currents of change. We have people who are reasonably good technicians and reasonably good managers, but they are by no means as well equipped as they should be to understand the forces which they can use or which they must oppose in the various communities.

This gives you a general notion of the way in which my thinking has been running. The essence of it is that the schools have to be made *inclusive*, they have to be made *relevant*, and they have to be made *effective*. Moving from those three words to the details which must be dealt with will be quite a job, but I am convinced that we have to try.

BERRY: I am immensely impressed with that presentation. I certainly agree that we need in our public schools an approach as massive as the Manhattan Project and as flamboyant as the Marshall Plan. But I wonder if you are going to say anything about the upgrading of textbooks and other teaching tools. Textbooks have been notoriously bad in failing to teach about American democracy in terms of race relations. Most of the people who teach kids now do not have the tools, and they learned out of the same bad books. They do not know anything either and have to have some help. I also wonder if you are going to touch upon integrating the teaching staffs in major cities—which is something we can do without getting involved with the sacrosanct “neighborhood” concept. And I wonder if you are going to comment on fair-employment practices within the school system, which has been about as discriminatory as any other kind of employer that I know of.

FISCHER: There are several aspects to this. One is the question of how teachers are qualified in the first place. The examinations which have been used, particularly in the larger cities, to establish eligibility lists for teachers have been objective but, in many cases, almost wholly irrelevant. As I said once, if you want objectivity, just weigh and measure people. This will give you quite objective bases on which to deal with them. Of course, their height and their weight have nothing at all to do with their teaching ability, but if it is objectivity you want, use that. Then use something else to get at their teaching competence.

The area of textbooks and other teaching materials is also enormously important today. I could argue that perhaps the greater importance, if there is to be a comparison made, is the development of materials for white children rather than for Negro children. Usually the argument is that we need better materials for the Negro children in order to give them self-respect. Of course, we need them. But we also need materials for the

white children, who have been very badly misinformed about the whole business of racial groups.

BERRY: That was really my concern. I did not want to have a special edition for the colored schools. We are going to get rid of the colored schools sometime, so we had better get a textbook which we can use for everybody.

FISCHER: Another point is that the textbooks, which are terribly inappropriate for big-city slum children who happen to be Negro, are almost equally inappropriate for big-city slum children who happen to be white. The books are just as unrealistic in, say, their illustrations for the slum white kids as they are for the slum Negro kids.

BERRY: Will you recommend the demise of Dick and Jane, please?

FISCHER: I was delighted to see, in our Teachers College bookstore window not many weeks ago, a display that was headed "Reading without Dick and Jane."

COHEN: I wonder, Dr. Fischer, if you are going to deal with this in general terms or if you are going to be specific. I believe that our problems in education are greater than they ever have been, because, for the first time, we recognize their dimensions. It seems that this generation is being presented the bill for past sins of our society. I wonder if you are going to indicate, in some detail, the extent of the bill which has to be paid. There have been many expositions on the need for education to overcome the problems of those who are disadvantaged and those who have been humiliated by the customs of our society. Are you going to discuss this in some detail? Are you going to spell out the needs in teacher education and the many actions which have to be taken in order to achieve this massive change you talk about?

FISCHER: I would hope to give enough illustrations to develop some air of reality about the whole business. I would not expect to be able to come up with a comprehensive survey of everything that is needed in all fifty states; but I think it is possible to cite such illustrations as the difference, in many school districts, between the provision for the education of physically normal children and the provision for the education of physically handicapped children. We have been offering compensatory education to children with various kinds of handicapping conditions for a long time. We have not given much recognition to social handicap or economic handicap, but we have done a good deal with deficient hearing ability, mental retardation, and so on. We have established the principle of differential expenditure for children with different kinds of educational needs. It is a firmly fixed part of the American school system. I see no reason that we should not extend this principle to children who have handicaps of a kind which we have not heretofore recognized.

COHEN: I just wanted to indicate briefly that I hope you will go into as much detail as possible. It would be a further contribution if you could give some idea of what this is going to cost. We already have a differential

in New York City. In Chicago, the differential is the other way around—those who most need it, get it least. But in New York City we at least have the intention, and we are doing something. I hope this will be included in your paper.

BREEDEN: It seems to me that the point that Mr. Fischer brought up toward the end—the need for providing universal public schools with quality education—sets the context for the initial questions about the particular needs of Negro Americans. I think it has not really been acknowledged that American schools are not universal. There is a myth that the American public school is universal.

With regard to Mr. Fischer's point about professional judgment, I would argue that professional judgment was a general factor in all areas of education and that in this difficult area of school integration, it is simply more frequently exposed. It is operative in other areas. For instance, when we talk about changing textbooks, we begin to expose a whole complex of judgments, decisions, political concerns, and so on.

EDWARDS: I wonder, Dr. Fischer, if you will discuss the civil rights movement as it has brought the educational problems to our attention. While we know that the transfer into our cities of large hordes of low-income people has put certain pressure upon the schools, if we look at the indicators—level of achievement, and so on—the school systems might be rated somewhat higher than in other years. However, since the school-desegregation decision, education has become a specific symbol, Negroes and others see it as a way up and out, as the avenue for mobility. So the civil rights movement has really played a part in this. I agree with a great many of the things you said, Dr. Fischer, but I should like to have them linked to the general civil rights movement. I wonder, also, if you intend to discuss the strategy which the civil rights movement has employed. I think that this might indicate in some way the kind of strategy we need in order to accomplish some of the things you feel should be done.

FISCHER: I do not know yet how that will be worked in. There is so much to be said on the subject of education, and there will be so little space in which to say it.

GRAUBARD: We will give you as much space as you want.

GEERTZ: I think there is another aspect that needs to be changed. It seems to me that the communities which support the schools need much more reliable information about what goes on inside the schools. We hear all kinds of myths about what is going on. I have two children, five and three years old; and I cannot figure out whether the schools in our community are any good. I do not quite know how to go about it. Yet it seems to me that there must be some objective information on how good the education is in various schools. There must be some way of making reliable, valid estimations. I wonder what may be done about this. I think the white fears of what is going on in integrated schools and, to some extent, the Negro notions of what is going on are often exaggerated. We

need a yardstick. When we talk about universities, we have some idea about them.

FISCHER: I sometimes wonder whether we know any more about universities than we do about lower schools.

GEERTZ: Maybe not.

FISCHER: The fact of the matter is that there is relatively little connection between the reputation an educational institution enjoys and what that institution actually has done. I have often said that until we can find a way to determine how much change and what kind of change a particular school makes in a child from the time it begins to work with him until it turns him over to somebody else, we will not know the difference between a good school and a bad one. Ordinarily, if one goes into a community and asks where the best school is, he will almost automatically be given the name of the school in the part of town which has the highest real-estate value, the best educated parents, the homes with the greatest number of books, and so on. Most schools today get good reputations either because they are very careful about whom they admit or because they are just plain lucky about the place in which they happen to have been built. There is very little correlation between the reputation a school enjoys and what the teachers of that school actually do. I keep asking my colleagues to come up with an educational equivalent of the economists' notion of value added by manufacturing. I keep hoping we will get something of that sort some day, but we are still not close to it.

MAYER: First, I would like to make a very brief point with regard to what Mr. Geertz just said. I have been looking at a book on criticisms of American public schools throughout history. The thesis was that criticism has been going on all along and that it tends to reflect the attitudes of people toward changes in society rather than any knowledge of the schools at a given time.

I also want to respond to a point which Mr. Edwards made about the role of the civil rights movement in focusing attention on the schools. I can give an example of a similar point, based on my own experience. We have been conducting a survey of the nutritional status of fourth-grade and fifth-grade children in Roxbury, which is an essentially Negro area in Boston. We have been impressed to find that by and large the children in Roxbury with the worst nutritional status are the white children. It looks as though, in terms of health and nutritional status, the part of the Roxbury community which is white is more depressed on the average than the part which is Negro. But apparently nobody bothered about these white children until there was enough pressure built up in terms of problems of Negroes, so that we, among other people, went to look into it. I think very much the same thing is happening in education.

COHEN: I think a dreadful thing is happening in some of our major cities—I shall talk specifically about New York—with regard to the myths that are perpetrated about the public schools. Perhaps some of you read Martin Mayer's article in the *New York Times* a week or so ago. Mr. Mayer is

rather sharp and, I think, given to rather abrupt judgment at times; but he did make one statement which I believe is true. He said that he has found magnificent things going on in every school that he has visited. This has also been my experience in New York. I think that the civil rights movement itself has been responsible—I can understand why—for creating a false impression of the schools. This, in turn, has resulted in flight of white people.

I visited one school which is at least 40 per cent Negro and Puerto Rican. It is one of the better elementary schools I have seen—and I lived in the suburbs for many years. How do you know that a school is good? Visit classrooms. Some teachers will even be delighted for you to teach a class on a subject in which you may be expert. You will see, if you sit in classes, that some of the teachers are really magnificent. I visited another school which is 70 per cent Negro and Puerto Rican, and I think most children are getting a wonderful education. I am appalled by the mythology which drives white people and middle-class Negroes out of the public schools. When one lives in Manhattan, middle- and upper-middle-class people are appalled that one even considers sending one's children to public schools. I think this is something we have to attack.

GEERTZ: My point was not really about my own kids. I was wondering whether an information program would eliminate some of this mythology. In the area in which I live, it is also very strong; and I think, as you do, that most of it is nonsense. Whatever the source of it may be—the civil rights movement or local whites—it seems to me that an information program would be a very important element in any real revision of the system.

COHEN: I did not mean that the civil rights movement was basically responsible for this.

WILSON: I would like to develop Mr. Geertz's question in a somewhat different direction. I, too, have a five-year-old boy, and I do not know whether the school I am sending him to is any good. I do not think that I could persuade the school to let me teach a course on politics. That is what they want to keep out of the schools. I would like Dr. Fischer to consider stating very explicitly what he believes we now know about the quality of education in different kinds of schools. Whether to divide the schools on racial lines or on some other basis, I leave to his judgment. And if he means what he says—if, as President of Teachers College, he really does not know how to measure what is going on in the schools—I hope he will say that, because I think this issue has to be faced squarely.

What is it we are trying to accomplish in the schools? I am a little bit troubled, because, as I listen to his prescriptions for what the school of the future ought to look like, I find much to be sympathetic with, but I also find some hard choices. He mentioned that he is in favor of decentralization, but against localism; that he wants both equal treatment and compensatory treatment; that he wants innovation, but not sudden change; that he wants responsiveness to the needs of the community, but greater immunity from political pressure. I say this not in criticism, because all

human values are somehow in conflict. A conflict between liberty and order is, in fact, one of the questions we have been concerned with throughout this conference. We find incompatible values everywhere. But in picking our way through them—in trying to find the balance point—we must consider what we know and what we can learn. I think if this were stated rather boldly for the edification of those readers who assume they know what is going on in the schools, we might be able to put these choices in a perspective which I did not think they had when I first heard the presentation.

BERRY: It seems to me that there are some ways of finding out how well the schools are doing, if schools do not hide the information. Every time schools hide information, they are immediately suspect, even if they are doing something good. Probably most of them that hide information have something to hide, as in Chicago. No wonder you could not find out anything in Chicago; Benjamin Willis would not let anything out except some distorted gobbledygook.

There are kids graduating from certified high schools, and when these kids try to get into college, they have to take remedial reading. In Chicago, we had some kids who had been on the honor roll and a couple who were valedictorians of their classes in Jim Crow schools, and they were found to be reading at the seventh-grade level when they went to junior college. We have a variety of ways of finding out things in Chicago. For instance, we are always trying to get Negroes jobs. We send the kids, who are high-school graduates—they have to have high-school diplomas even to sweep floors now—to the friendly employers, who want to hire them, and a great many of them cannot pass the tests that have sixth-grade arithmetic in them. We are not doing a good job.

I would say that there is another measurement which probably is the most important of all: What kind of society do the graduates of our schools produce? How come we got into all this mess we are in right now if our schools in the American community have been doing anything like the job they should do? I think Mr. Cohen is wrong in saying that schools in New York are excellent.

COHEN: I did not say that.

BERRY: Since I do not work in New York, most of the information that I get on the New York schools comes from publications of the New York Board of Education. Now, the New York Board of Education admits that they have some pretty tough problems, and never have I heard a board of education say that the problems were worse than they were. I do not think that there should be an implication that the civil rights movement has given a distorted opinion about the public schools and is therefore responsible for the flight of the bumblebees, or the WASP's. Bad public schools in the Chicago area have become bigger blockbusters than the real-estate speculators. I know many hundreds of white people in Chicago who have fled bad schools but wish that they could have good integrated schools. I do not think that the civil rights movement is in any way responsible for this flight, Mr. Cohen.

COHEN: Mr. Berry, you encourage me, by that kind of statement, to send my children to private schools. I do not think you have given us an objective account of the Chicago schools. You cannot tell me that everything that is happening in the Chicago schools is bad any more than I can tell you that everything that is happening in the New York schools is good. But there are, beyond question, a lot of wonderful things happening. There must be, by the very nature of things.

GRAUBARD: I do not want to cut this conversation off, except that I would like Mr. Foley to say a few words about the argument he is going to present in his paper. We can come back to this discussion afterward.

FOLEY: I was asked to write about the Negro in business and the forces impeding his integration into commerce and industry. Very little has been written about this subject. Very little is known about it. Probably it has its importance not in the number of Negro businessmen—because there are not many—but in terms of the American culture which has placed so much importance on businessmen or on business values. Rather than looking at the Negro white-collar worker or at the Negro in big business, I decided to take a look at the Negro entrepreneur. Because I have had some experience in the city of Philadelphia, I decided to pay particular attention to what is going on in that city.

There are myths carried by Negro businessmen and by Negroes in general. The first one has to do with the lack of credit; the second one, with the Jewish merchant; and the third one, with the state of poverty of the Negro community. We investigated these in terms of the Negro entrepreneur in Philadelphia.

In terms of financing, it is true that the Negro businessman has a tough time getting credit, but he does not have any more trouble getting credit than any other very small businessman. The Drexel Institute made an actual count of every Negro businessman in Philadelphia. (For those of you who are interested in the field of statistics: in 1960, the Census Bureau counted only about 1,600 self-employed Negro merchants in that city. There actually are about 4,200 Negro businessmen in Philadelphia.) There are no millionaires, but there are about 10 who may have a net worth of approximately \$100,000—which, in business circles, does not make them outstandingly successful, but does make them comfortable and secure. Nevertheless, 10 out of 4,200 obviously is not very many. Thus, when we talk about the Negro business community, we are talking about the familiar pattern of retail trades and services—very small businessmen, who in this country just cannot get credit. Sixty per cent of *all* the small businessmen of this type in Philadelphia just do not have any banking relationships.

Banks have branches in the Negro areas of Philadelphia, and they do make loans to Negroes. They make two types of loans: consumer loans and mortgage finance loans. They make them every day and have been for years. But they do not make business loans to Negroes for the same reason that they do not make them to the same type of white businessmen anywhere else in the city of Philadelphia: business loans are very risky loans. For instance, since World War II, one branch has been mak-

ing, on the average, fifty consumer loans a month to Negroes; but in its history it has made only two loans to Negro businessmen. I think it is very important to overcome the myth. It is true that Negro businessmen lack credit, but it is not because of a special prejudice peculiar to financial institutions. The banks are in the Negro area to make loans and, therefore, to make money. Very small businessmen—Negro or white—cannot get loans simply because of the risks to the banks.

With regard to the Jewish merchant, there seems to be a feeling among a lot of Negroes, particularly middle- and upper-class and educated Negroes, that the Jewish merchant is an unfair competitor. (There seems to be an even stronger feeling that there is a kind of nepotism taking place, that is, that he has inherited his business, that he will not sell to the Negro, that there is no way a Negro can break in.) We took a consumer survey on five different items. We asked eighty-four Negro housewives, in a very small, two- or three-block area in Philadelphia, where they bought these items. Seventy-five Negro housewives shopped exclusively at white grocery stores, and nine shopped exclusively at Negro grocery stores. This was also the case with drug stores. With cosmetics, there was a slight majority for white stores. With dry cleaning, there was a slight majority for Negro stores. With gasoline, there was a considerable majority for white stations.

We asked the women why they shopped in the white store or in the Negro store. The white store was always "lower priced." The Negro store was invariably "more convenient." When we compared the prices of nineteen various grocery items in white and Negro stores in that area, we found that the median prices of most of these articles were actually the same. There were four or five items which were higher priced in white stores, and three or four which were higher priced in Negro stores. This is something I am going to have to look into further. (I plan to compare many more items in many more stores and to do so (a) in terms of the quality of the merchandise, (b) in terms of not only the best Negro stores, but the second-rate and third-rate Negro stores, and (c) in terms of not only the white stores in the Negro area, but the white stores downtown and in the suburbs.) But we have found so far that the median prices in white stores are slightly higher than in Negro stores—contrary to the overwhelming impressions of the Negro housewives in the area. The Jewish merchant is not, in my judgment, an unfair competitor.

With regard to the poverty of the Negro community, we found that, although it is undoubtedly a poor area, there are many white merchants there who are making a very handsome profit.

It seemed that lack of financing, competition from Jewish merchants, and poverty were really not the reasons that there were not more Negro businessmen or that Negro businessmen were not more successful. I decided, therefore, to take a look at the history of Negro business in Philadelphia. It occurred to me that perhaps there was simply a short tradition. However, I found that there was a long tradition of Negro business in Philadelphia—as far as I know, longer than in any other city in the country. We traced Negro business back to 1789. By 1820, there were quite a few Negro businessmen in a small population of Negroes

in that city. There were several who were very wealthy and very prominent in the community. Then the European immigration started in the 1820's, and the first riot between immigrants and Negroes occurred in 1829. This rioting occurred every other year or so until the Civil War. (I think most people have forgotten about these riots that occurred in the City of Brotherly Love.) In 1836, Negroes were deprived of the right to vote in Philadelphia. This apparently had its effect, because the number of Negro businesses decreased from 344 in 1838 to 111 in 1849.

One thing to remember is that Negroes in Philadelphia did not live in a ghetto until about the 1890's. They served the general populace; they competed with white merchants. There were good, solid Negro businessmen, including a handful of very successful businessmen, before the Civil War. After the war, the migration northward gradually began; but there were still only 419 Negro businessmen in Philadelphia by 1896. About this time—right around the turn of the century—two things happened. First, there was the great migration; the Southern Negroes came North. The Negroes tended to live in small pockets, and as the migration increased, these pockets grew larger and larger, and a separate retail and service trades' economy gradually developed. Second, the white reaction in the North really set in about that time, and Negroes could no longer use public or commercial accommodations. By 1915, there was really a Negro ghetto. Given the ghetto market, the number of Negro businesses increased to about 1,200. Bear in mind that in 1838 there were 344 and in 1896 there were still only 419. In a matter of less than twenty years, there was a tremendous increase in Negro businesses because the ghetto had become large enough to support a separate economy and because Negroes were denied the privileges of both public accommodations and commercial places in downtown Philadelphia. There was a small rise in the number of Negro businesses during World War I and in the 1920's, a sudden fall, continuing during the Depression (which came first and lasted longest for Negro businesses), another small rise during World War II, and a steady but not significant rise since World War II.

Why is it that only 10 of the 4,200 Negro businessmen in Philadelphia are significantly successful? We cannot say that the Negro is inherently not capable. When he started on an even keel with the white merchant in the nineteenth century, he was in every business that the white merchant was in, and he was very successful. Furthermore, I am convinced from our agency's experience with a very liberal financing program that the Negro is, indeed, capable. My agency had previously made seven loans in ten years to Negro merchants in Philadelphia. We decided to experiment with a very liberal program and to break away from conventional lending standards, and last year we made ninety-eight loans to Negro businessmen. Only four are delinquent, and none has defaulted. This convinces me that there is a real potential in the type of management training and the type of liberal financing we provided. (This is now part of Title IV of the Poverty Act, by the way.)

I do not really know why the Negro businessmen are not successful. I think the lack of success probably relates to what Mr. Turner and several others have talked about: the feeling of powerlessness. An entrepre-

neur has to have several qualities: thrift, self-confidence, hope, riskiness. Many Negro businessmen seem to feel: "What's the use?" They never really stick with a problem long enough. I think it is the apathy and the tendency to give up so fast—characteristics of all of the social complexes within the Negro community—which probably have had an effect on the Negro as an entrepreneur.

PETTIGREW: I found Mr. Foley's paper very interesting, particularly so because there has been so very little current information on this subject. I would like to add a sort of cultural explanation, which does not, I think, conflict with anything Mr. Foley said.

The Negro is primarily Southern. Two-thirds of the Negroes who are living in the North and West today were born and raised in the South, where the tradition of entrepreneurship has not been highly developed. Many things which are seen as strangely Negro in the North or in the West—everything from speech to food—are in fact quite Southern, although there is a somewhat distinctive Negro Southern style. The lack of entrepreneurship comes, I think, from the Southern background. The Puerto Rican, for example, comes from a very different kind of culture, and he is hardly settled in a new block of East Harlem when he starts opening up shops at the bottom of every tenement house.

FOLEY: Yes, but all immigrant groups have had problems getting credit, getting started, getting locations; yet somehow there were always considerable numbers who broke through and became outstanding businessmen.

HANDLIN: It is true that some broke through—but different percentages in different groups. The amount of entrepreneurship was not the same, say, among the Irish as among the Armenians.

EDWARDS: If we look into fields of business other than small business, we will see, I think, the promise of tremendous changes.

BERRY: Mr. Foley, are you going to discuss in your paper: one, the very recent breakthroughs of Negroes into management-training programs in the larger businesses and, two, any understanding you may have of why Negroes have been kept out of business schools in this nation?

FOLEY: I was not going to go into that, Mr. Berry. I would say, in terms of devising a strategy, that Title IV of the Poverty Act may be helpful. In our agency, we are creating small-business development centers, which bring together very successful businessmen in the community to provide management-training courses for Negroes. Then we provide liberal financing. After the person gets the management training and the financing, we provide a counselor to stick with him through the first three or four months. I think that, in terms of advice and strategy, this social interaction may be helpful. Furthermore, I think we can stimulate some success symbols and perhaps a sense of achievement earlier than any of the other poverty programs.

Conference Transcript

PARSONS: Is there a special tendency among Negroes to go into service businesses?

FOLEY: Twenty-four per cent of all the Negro businesses in Philadelphia are beauty-culture shops. Eleven per cent are barber shops, and another eleven per cent are luncheonettes.

PARSONS: Barbering exclusively for Negroes? I was thinking that the Jewish tendency is to specialize in merchandising and finance. The Irish tendency is to specialize in contracting—taking advantage of high-ups in city government (not necessarily corrupted). Since the Negro has acquired a special position in certain service functions, I was wondering whether there was a tendency to specialize in catering and other things of that sort.

FOLEY: The Philadelphia caterer is a legendary figure, you know. There were, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, about eight or ten caterers in any one year who were self-sufficient. But there are only two good catering firms in Philadelphia now.

I ought to say that it is very obvious that in ten years there will probably be fewer Negro businesses than there are today. Hopefully, with our programs, we will make the existing businesses better, more competitive businesses.

UNIDENTIFIED: Did you count the illegal businesses?

FOLEY: It is kind of hard to count the illegal ones.

UNIDENTIFIED: Do you lend money to them?

FOLEY: I am afraid we probably do. We compared prices on thirteen or fourteen standard dry-cleaning items, and the Negro stores had much lower prices than the white stores. Yet the Negro housewife says she shops in Negro stores not because of the lower prices but because of the greater convenience. She says she shops in white stores because of lower prices—but, in fact, the prices are not lower. I happen to know, from confidential sources, that the dry-cleaning shops are standard numbers-game centers.

GRAUBARD: I would like now to ask Father Fichter to make a brief comment on his paper.

FICHTER: Do you mind if I take a few minutes to report the findings of a study on Negro students and the civil rights movement? In our NORC study of Negro college students, we have found that the civil rights movement is much more active in the South on the Negro private college campus than on the Negro public college campus. We have found that the students who do not participate are likely to be older, married, female, not so smart, and rather pessimistic. They get less awards and honors. They are more likely to be in natural sciences or in business study, while the leaders in the movement are more likely to be in the humanities or in the social sciences. It is interesting that three out of ten Negro college

students said that they are taking no part in the civil rights movement and that they are indifferent to whether or not their schools have more whites. About two out of ten Negro students call themselves leaders or active participants in the movement.

To get very briefly to my paper on religion and race, I think there are concepts here which are related to other concepts which we have discussed, such as the higher-law principle. We often hear that we ought to improve our race relations in order to lessen the dissensions in the local community, the economic costs, or the bad image of the American society. If we can speak about *pure motives*, I suppose we ought to speak about the ethical aspect from the point of view of the organized churches. Better human relations between the races are right and just and decent and proper and good. Ideally, these ought to be the reasons for better race relations in this society.

When we look at organized religion—the churches and the synagogues—we find some rather interesting structural differences with respect to types of human relations. There are, in organized religion, analogies to the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft idea, the difference between a craft union and an industrial union, and so on. In my paper, I discussed two rather simple questions: (1) the extent to which organized religion and the churchmen are interested in *outside integration*, that is, integration in the society outside of the religious body itself, and (2) the extent to which they are interested in and active in *inside integration*. We find that in outside integration, where the personal contact is the least and where the moral consensus is the clearest, the church leaders seem to be very active, very vocal, and perhaps very successful. The real problem is the lack of practice within the church congregation of what is often preached there. We find this across the board, in all types of churches and denominations. However, there is a significant difference between the informal, friendly, fellowship type of congregation which one finds as a kind of ideal among Protestant denominations and the formal, objective-worship, large-scale, secondary type of associational organization which is found in the Catholic Church. We Catholics talk about loving each other as members of a Christian community; but it seems that as long as a parishioner goes to Mass he doesn't feel that he has to pay attention to the other worshippers around him. As a man of God I hate to say this, but as a sociologist I see that this lack of personal fraternal concern makes it easier to integrate a Catholic congregation. For example, a Catholic parish church in New Orleans should find it easier to desegregate than a Methodist, Presbyterian, or Baptist church, where members are expected to have close personal relations. As a matter of fact, these Protestant congregations are not integrating successfully, whereas Catholic Negroes and whites do go to Mass together there. Catholic Negroes and whites in New Orleans are under the same bishop, they belong to the same diocese, they can attend services at any church they want to, even though they continue to have separate territorial parishes. Essentially, of course, I am looking at this problem sociologically rather than theologically.

COHEN: May I ask a question? Did you not consider the influence of the

religious institutions on the attitudes of white people? There are some data available, although perhaps they are not adequate.

FIGHTER: Do you mean their influence on their own membership or on white people in general?

COHEN: Both.

FIGHTER: If we look at the general influence of the religious bodies in the United States, we find, I think, that the moral impact has been tremendous, because it has reinforced the democratic notion that integration is something that ought to be achieved. We find a sort of handclasp between the political and the theological or the ethical. I think that the statements of bishops, of church councils, of Jewish organizations, of Martin Luther King, and so on have been influential in a reinforcing kind of way.

COLES: I want to add, without disagreeing with you, that even the integration of a Catholic Church can become complicated in parishes where the Church must contend with people like Leander Perez.

FIGHTER: Yes. That is a good example, because here we have an excommunicated Catholic, who is the dictator of the county. Perez has so much power that the several Negro families who sent their children to the parochial school had their water, gas, and electricity turned off. They lost their jobs. Then a fire bomb was thrown on the roof of the school. The priest wanted to get a building permit to repair the roof; but Leander Perez can say who gets a permit and who does not get a permit, so the priest could not get a permit to repair the roof. He called in workers from New Orleans to repair the roof anyway; and then he could not open the school because he made the repair without a permit. This is the extent to which the political power there can interfere with a religious group struggling to implement its principles of racial integration.

PETTIGREW: There are interesting data of Ringer's on what white Southerners—Protestant white, Catholic white, and Jewish white—thought other white Southerners' attitudes were toward desegregation. There was general opinion that the Catholics were the most liberal. In fact, they were not. They were not very different from the Protestants. The most liberal whites in the South (as we would guess on regular sociological grounds) were the Jews. But the Jews themselves thought the Catholics were the most liberal. Catholics themselves, even though they personally were not very liberal, thought that other Catholics were. This is an interesting example of pluralistic ignorance. I think it is caused partly by the visibility—not just to Catholics, but to many others—of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. I think that structural changes are often not reflected in attitudes for quite a while.

Six years ago, I said in a book that I did not expect much from the Church. In fact, I gave up studying it because it did not seem to me to be a very serious factor in the revolution. In point of fact, I think I overgeneralized; if I had it to do over again, I would not be quite so across-the-board negative. I think that in general the Church has failed, but it

has failed less than I thought it would. It seems to me that it was not just chance that the Reverend James Reeb, for example, had no parish. There are priests with parishes and ministers with congregations who participate in protest marches, but the overwhelming percentage are in one way or another marginal. They are not in the central structure of the Church. They do not have parishes, particularly big downtown parishes. They tend to be freer agents. I thought that the most interesting and significant thing of the Selma participation of the Roman Catholic Church was that bishops and cardinals began coming and began getting involved—directly intervening, despite the old tradition that one does not go into another man's diocese. (This was not particularly true of the Protestant churches, although one Episcopal bishop showed up.) I think it may be the beginning of something. Would you agree, Father Fichter?

FICHTER: I do not think you are using the right words. Actually, the more *local* a clergyman is, the less likely he is to be involved. You used the word *central*. The people who are in the central diocesan organization are participating. You will find men from the chancery office. You will find monsignors, and priests who are on college and university faculties. It is true, we do not have local parishes to take care of, but I don't think we can be called marginal. We are indeed freer to act, as you said. We do not have to face the local congregation which may be opposed to change in the racial pattern.

PETTIGREW: I did not mean geographically; I meant structurally.

UNIDENTIFIED: But the people who are going are the powers from the chancery, Mr. Pettigrew.

PETTIGREW: Yes, but that is a recent shift. That, I think, is what made the religious participation in the march from Selma to Montgomery particularly significant.

FICHTER: I think that there is a danger of underestimating the influence of the Negro clergymen. I think we all did, until Liston Pope started looking at the history of the Negro clergy. When we look at the leadership that came out of the Negro Church—long before 1954—we find that there was not simply conformity to the white customs. I think this began to be clear when we saw the bombing and burning of Negro churches. The white Southern segregationist no longer viewed the Negro Church as a desirable institution for keeping peace and order among Negro people. I think this point should be stressed, because we have tended all along to underrate the Negro clergy.

PARSONS: To the outsider, it was very striking that in the Selma episode there was public and conspicuous Catholic clerical participation, including not merely secular clergy, but regular clergy and nuns. I wonder if this was connected with some specific turn within the Church. Or was it just the point at which something, which had been going on informally, became overt?

FICHTER: I went down there with two priests, several other clergymen, and some university professors from Chicago. One of the questions which the others asked us Catholic priests was, "Did you clear this with the chancery?" We did not, as a matter of fact, think about seeking permission from the chancery. It was just the kind of thing we felt a citizen should respond to. I think that there was a spontaneous acceptance of Martin Luther King's invitation, which was phoned all over the country on the Monday after that bloody Sunday evening. People simply decided that they were going, and it worked out all right, and *then* came the approval by the bishops. At least, that is my interpretation.

PARSONS: Did the nuns go on their own?

FICHTER: No, Cardinal Ritter got hold of a plane from some industrialist in St. Louis, and he sent them down. So the first sisters who went had clearance right from the top. I am not sure about the ones who went after that.

HUGHES: You spoke of the formality and secondary nature of the Mass. Max Weber said long ago that the American Protestant congregation was the prototype of the voluntary association. There are, of course, many voluntary associations which are attached to the American Catholic parish. Negro and white Catholics worship together, but are they also moving toward engaging in the same *voluntary* parochial associations? Are you going to say anything about this in your paper?

FICHTER: I recognize that the great obstacle to integration in the Catholic Church in the South is the separate parish. If the separate Negro parish were eliminated, everything else would have to go—the mothers' club, the youth organization, the choir, the athletic teams. These are groups made up of voluntary members within the parish, but they don't have much chance to form and join such integrated groups if the parishes themselves remain formally segregated. I do mention this in the paper as a change that ought to be made promptly.

FEIN: When we start looking at the people who participate in civil rights in terms of their position or the discipline that they are studying, we should remember that there was a previous selection process. Indeed, it may well be that people in certain positions are in those positions *because* they are the very kinds of people who would be attracted to both things. It is probably not that humanities makes one active in civil rights, but that if one is the kind of person who is interested in humanities, he would also be interested in civil rights. I do not know if this is true in the Protestant or Catholic religious community; but I think that, in the Jewish religious community, representation from central organizations in Selma was a function not only of the freedom of central organizations but of the fact that many persons committed to such values as civil rights tend to leave local congregations and to go to work for central organizations.

ELLISON: Getting back to the role of the Negro church, I wonder if it is worth saying that these churches, during the periods when there was not

a lot of overt agitation, seemed to have a function not only of preserving hope, but of maintaining a certain kind of discipline on the basis of that hope. I think this is very important. Another thing which might be meaningful is that, in this particular period, some of the most alert Negro intellectuals—people who have some conception of what is going on in the total culture—happen to be Negro theologians.

FICHTER: There is a point that should be noted. In the South, the Negro clergymen who wanted to survive had to find a way of living with the white people in the community. But there was a time, in the 1930's and early 1940's, when Negro ministers became labor leaders.

ELLISON: They became Communists, too. It went right down the line. Very often the Negro leaders of the NAACP and the Urban League have been ministers. And much of the agitation within the Negro community has been seated within the Negro church.

FLEMING: I wanted to go back for a minute to the white clergy. I think that the mobile moral leadership which has developed lately has deflected attention from the continuing problem of the role of the local clergy in community change. Mr. Pettigrew's exacting standards are not being met and never have been met. I think it is worth noting that it is usually the business leaders in the South who make the decision that some social change is going to take place. They then look to the local religious leadership for moral validation of this step. It is certainly not an exciting kind of leadership, but it is interesting to watch the way in which it works. First, of course, there has to be some pragmatic, self-interest reason for changes. Then the laying on of hands, so to speak, by the religious leadership becomes an almost indispensable requirement. That still goes on, and I think it has been overlooked because of some of the more dramatic Selma-type developments.

TURNER: I agree that the role and the contribution of the theological side of the Negro church have been very important. However, I suspect that equally important is a simple sociological function. The Negro church, as an autonomous organization, under the least amount of surveillance by the majority group, was the one place where leadership could develop.

COLES: I have a brief comment which is relevant to this discussion. When the Negro migrant workers, whom I have seen in Belle Glade, Florida, get ready to go North in May, the lay ministers are always divided up as carefully as is the transportation. This is done so that on the road and up North no one will be without the exhilarating and, I think, consolidating and controlling services, which are sometimes held for hours at a time.

GRAUBARD: I would like now to turn to Mr. Kilson's paper.

KILSON: Rupert Emerson and I wrote this paper together. I laid out the main lines of attack in terms of Mr. Graubard's suggestions for points of reference, but Mr. Emerson and I are not altogether happy with the pa-

per. Part of the problem is that it is hard to delineate effectively and meaningfully the ways in which the postwar international world has affected the whole problem of American race relations—changes in governmental institutions resulting from changes in the status and the position of the United States on the international scene.

We begin with the proposition that the rise of self-assertion in both Asia and Africa has been the major force in bringing about a new perception of what the role of the government should be in trying to effect new patterns in American race relations. We considered, on another level, the question of how African self-assertion in particular has affected the Negro American's identity and self-awareness—how the Negro has gained a certain inspiration from the fact that the African situation is now, after several hundred years, emerging from the position of dependency upon the white Western world. I am not sure that one can determine precisely how African self-assertion has affected the Negro protest movement, but we suggest that in some way the average Negro has gained a new lease on life.

GRAUBARD: Mr. Ellison, would you tell us just a little about what you are hoping to do?

ELLISON: I must confess that I am utterly intimidated by trying to project what is to come. Nonetheless, I shall try to work from the basis of what I think I know about how Negroes actually function in this society. Of course, we function in many, many different ways, but I would like to reexamine our relationship to the total culture. I would like to examine some of the assumptions which we bring to this intricate relationship. I would also like to point out that each minority group, including Negroes, tries to impose its sense of the total experience upon everyone else. This is nothing to be frightened of. It is something which can be very, very creative for all of us. I think Mr. Lerner was saying pretty much the same thing when he described the Jewish experience.

I think that we all owe something to the total experience. I think that each of us has no special grasp upon reality, but that each of us lives a special part of it. It is owed to the rest. We all must learn from it. We all must be able to partake of it if we would. One of the great things about this country—one of the things which, I think, is a working assumption, although we deny it—is that any American can become, at least in a symbolic way, a member of any other group. This is how we actually work. I learned to walk in a certain way because I admired Milton Lewinson, who ran a clothing store in Oklahoma City. It was not just that I liked his walk. I liked his principles. He happened to be a Jew. But I know that that much of Milton Lewinson is Ralph Ellison. I know other people from whom I have taken certain attitudes of thought, interest in certain foods, certain literature, certain myths, and so on.

I think that this is the kind of society toward which we are working, a society in which there will be no stigma attached to taking advantage of this experience, no fear that to do so is to lose status. The feeling that I have about my own group is that it represents certain human values which are unique not in a Negritude sort of way, but in an American way.

Because the group has survived, because it has maintained its sense of itself through all these years, it can be of benefit to the total society, the total culture.

PARSONS: Do you apply that general doctrine even across the sex line?

ELLISON: Yes.

HUGHES: You are not saying, then, that one cannot understand a group unless he is a member of it.

ELLISON: I do not say that at all. I think that it is like the old argument about whether a white man can play jazz. If he has a talent and has respect enough for the complexity of the music and the culture and is willing to discipline himself to it, of course, he can. Any American can learn what is going on in the rest of the culture. I think that there are certain things which are accrued over so many years and which are so subtle that no outsider can take them on. But if there is anything viable about expression and cultural or artistic form, then it is available to all the people who will pay their dues.

One of the problems with Negroes—one of my own problems—is that, for all I know about this society, so much of it is not immediately available to me. I am not asking for integration; I am talking about something else. It is that there are certain patterns—certain ways of doing things—which Negroes who wait on tables or who work as domestics in the South will know even today. But it is not so easy to know these things here and now. These things should be known not simply on the domestic level, but in terms of business. I know, for instance, Percy James, who ran a cola bottling works in Oklahoma City, years and years ago when I was a boy. For certain definite reasons, he could not expand his business. I do not know whether prejudice was the basic reason, but part of it was sheer lack of financing ability—knowing how to capitalize, knowing how to join with a bigger group without being sucked in. There are many parts of this complex American society which Negroes have been kept away from. Even most of our novelists do not give enough of a report of how life is actually lived in the country for a Negro to pick up a novel and get some clues. The constrictions and the exclusiveness very often have gotten into our perception of social complexity. I hope that this conference is a beginning step in breaking down this kind of thing.

TURNER: I know that we are not giving you enough time in which to present your main thesis, Mr. Ellison, but I am really not sure what your central theme is. It seems to me that there is enough ambiguity in what you are saying for it to be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, you seemed to be talking about a socialization process which ought to be going on. On the other hand, you seemed to be saying that an individual depends upon some sort of subculture. I do not think you can be saying both of these things, and I think you really ought to be saying one of them.

ELLISON: I defend the subculture, because I have to work out of it, be-

cause it is precious to me, because I believe it is a vital contributing part of the total culture. I do not think I want to deny that. If I did, then I would have to throw away my typewriter and become a sociologist. I also believe that the subculture and the larger culture are interrelated. I wish that we would dispense with this idea that we are begging to get *in* somewhere. The main stream is in oneself. The main stream of American literature is in me, even though I am a Negro, because I possess more of Mark Twain than many white writers do.

GRAUBARD: I asked both Mr. Ellison and Mr. Hughes to describe a society in which reconciliation—integration, if you will—had taken place. It was obvious that Mr. Ellison and Mr. Hughes would approach this problem from very different professional and intellectual points of view. I wanted them to reflect on what the nature of such a society would be. If they wanted to talk about the kinds of family structures which would exist or the values which would exist, that was fine. I think that, in some sense, there are two nations which coexist in our society. I wanted Mr. Hughes and Mr. Ellison to talk about a time in the future when these two nations would no longer exist, when there would really be a single nation. I gave them great freedom to treat this in any way that they wanted to. The reason I chose Mr. Hughes was that this topic was very close to a suggestion which he had made at our original planning committee meeting. (And, as you know, nothing happens to any man who does not sometimes volunteer an idea.) I chose Mr. Ellison for reasons which I am sure are obvious to all of us who have long admired his work. I wanted him to describe, in the most imaginative way, what this kind of society might be.

HUGHES: I have been teaching at Brandeis University for four years. The school says it is nondenominational, but we all know that the spirit and impulse are very, very Jewish. I had never before lived in an environment like that. I was brought up in a very different way. We saved money to get an education, but we were afraid to have money and also afraid we would lose it, so we did not play games with it. Since being in this very Jewish environment, I have discovered that there is a whole culture in which money is something with which one plays exciting games. But, while I think that it is wonderful and exciting, I will never learn to play that game. I think that in a way this is what Mr. Ellison was talking about. There are many facets and nuances in culture, and many of us share one or another subculture. We can understand integration, and we can all contribute to it. It is not just a question of preserving everybody's folklore. It is something much more than that.

LENER: One does discover that money can be an exciting game among Jews—and I am a Jew. But the fact that I had to make this discovery at some point shows, I think, the diversity *inside* of the Jewish groups and inside of Brandeis. I suppose I have been more influenced in my own development by the nonpecuniary values—by other games which are more exciting to me.

I want to say that, unlike Mr. Turner, I am not distressed by the am-

biguity of what Mr. Ellison has said. I value it. There are in the American civilization pattern some things which involve ambiguities—some things in which the ambiguity value is a high value. I think I discovered this when I was trying to determine—very imperfectly—the total civilization pattern in America. Life does not come in clear-cut alternatives and choices, and we cannot impose compulsive alternatives and choices upon it.

I want to ask Mr. Ellison a question which has to do with the African movements. In your picture of American Negro life as you have been working in it and living in it, Mr. Ellison, to what extent have these identity revolutions in Africa had an impact not just on the civil rights movement, but on the sense of selfhood of the Negro American?

ELLISON: Let me put it this way. Africa has always figured somewhere in the American Negro's sense of himself—certainly since I have been in the world. The Garvey movement reached Oklahoma, and few people sold their farms and went off. (One newsdealer in Harlem never tired of telling me that but for that Marcus Garvey, he would have inherited a farm rich with oil wells.) For the most part, however, the Garvey movement was laughed at. I think the same thing is happening now. The assertion that the emerging nations of Africa have given all the stimulus to American Negroes seems very questionable when we examine how Negroes are actually operating, what their values are, what the techniques of protest are, and so on. When I see pictures of the march in Selma, I remember photographs which appeared in a crisis around 1919, when Negroes marched up Fifth Avenue carrying signs: "Am I not a man and a brother?" And when I think of that, I think back to abolitionist times. I think that what is going on now is coming out of an American Negro tradition and an accumulated discipline which go back many, many years.

Despite the Black Muslims, the stimulus is not to get away and not to find or to construct an African life style, but to become more a part of the American society. The problem for all of us—and I guess this is why I am not communicating with Mr. Turner—is that Negroes have a style of life which we have not been able to separate from segregation. But within the group, we act out, we make certain assertions, we have certain choices, and we have various social structurings which determine to a great extent how we act and what we desire. This is what we live. When we try to articulate it, when we try to define it, all we have is sociology. And the sociology is loaded. The concepts which are brought to bear are usually based on those of white, middle-class, Protestant values and life style. I know this has been said before, but I am saying it as one who looks at life through the disciplines of fiction and through the disciplines of the humanities as they come to focus in great literature.

What is going to happen now, I suspect, is that, as the society becomes more open, Negroes are going to become very arrogant. They are going to say, "This is all right, but it is not good enough." A friend, who is a critic of jazz, said recently, "No one ever thinks of the possibility that Duke Ellington might well have been a first-rate classical composer, but

that he was looking for something better." This is a shocking thing from one point of view, but not from another. For example, if I went back into the church, I would go back into a shouting Negro church. I am a fairly sophisticated man, but I think that more would be communicated to me through that form of communion than through some other.

KILSON: I think what I laid out in this paper on the African and American Negro is basically not very different from what Mr. Ellison has said. Mr. Emerson argued that I should try to indicate more specifically just how the postwar African self-assertion has worked its way into very concrete modes of the postwar Negro American social and political behavior. I just do not think it is possible. There are Negro Americans who do think that there has been a more direct, more complete, and more specific connection with the African reality; and they have gone to Africa to find out the why and the wherefore of it all. Those whom I have encountered—and I have encountered many Negro Americans of my postwar generation out in Africa—found very little. They found, by and large, a great deal of confusion which, indeed, can only be cleared up by coming back to what is really their culture, to what is really the situation and setting which has shaped them for whatever they may be.

BERRY: I have a couple of comments to make on the civil rights movement and efforts at reconciliation. I said yesterday—and still think today—that what we are trying to do is to make it all right to be non-white in the United States. From my experience in studying race relations in the United States, it seems to me that most Negroes do not want to stop being Negroes, but would like very much to get rid of the *encumbrance* of being a Negro in the United States. There has been a lot of weight put on this paint job we carry.

It also seems to me that in these efforts toward reconciliation, we are trying to alter a culture. And cultures, barring revolutions, alter slowly. In this country, we do not try to overthrow the old model; we tinker with it and try to make it better. We are tinkering with the old model now and trying to see if we cannot come up with a better model. It seems to me that in this new America, we will see more integration. We will see more participation in more areas on the part of Negroes. At the same time, we will have a lingering of segregation—of the Negro enclave. These things will go on simultaneously. What we will come out with in the end, I do not think anybody knows at this point. We do not have that good a crystal ball. As Negroes get more money and get better jobs, they will become more attractive people, because one way to become attractive in our society is to have some money that other people like to get from you. Ugly people can get very pretty according to American standards.

I have one last little point, something which has lingered with me for a good many years. When I was on the West Coast, I did a little survey on stereotyped notions about Negroes. There are a great many of them. Most of them are bad, but a few of them are affirmative. We tried them out on 145 Negro college graduates in the little town of Portland. We

listed the stereotypes and asked these people if each was true or false. We found that the Negroes whom we had engaged in this little study overwhelmingly rejected every one of the bad stereotypes and accepted every one of the positive ones.

PETTIGREW: I want to mention briefly some data which I published last year in my book on the Negro American. They might be of some help to you, Mr. Kilson, because they are related to one aspect of the influence of Africa. Controlling for education, in a random sample of adults in Roxbury, we found that skin color was the best single predictor of information about Africa, positive attitudes about Africa, and the feeling that new and emerging independent countries in Africa would be of aid to the Negro Americans' struggle for rights in the United States. The darker the respondent, the more he knew about Africa and the more convinced he was that the new countries in Africa were going to be of importance to Negro America; and that was in spite of the fact that, with education again controlled for, the darker respondents tended to have less other information. Because the darker respondents were more often Southern, more often had had poorer education, etc., they were less informed about other things; but they actually knew who Nkrumah was, who Haile Selassie was, etc., at a significance level above lighter respondents. That Africa is much more important to darker Negro Americans strikes me as consistent with the psychological interpretation of the meaning of Africa, in terms of identification.

KILSON: It also seems consistent with what we know about the kinds of groups who tend to be attracted to the Black Nationalist definition of the resolution of the Negro problem. The most active adherents and supporters of the Garvey movement were, I think, from among lower-class Negroes, who were also invariably the darker Negroes.

ELLISON: Mr. Pettigrew, is there any possibility that, in answering your questions about Africa, people were put on the defensive? That is, everybody seems to feel that he has to have a "homeland." In this country, no one is free not to have a homeland. Over and over again, this idea gets into the literature. One has to have some place to feel proud of. Well, I am proud of Abbeville, South Carolina, and Oklahoma City. That is enough for me.

KILSON: I am not sure that is enough for many people.

ELLISON: In my experience, by raising the possibility of Africa as a "homeland," we give Africa an importance on the symbolic level that it does not have in the actual thinking of people. Does that make any sense?

HUGHES: I think it makes a great deal of sense.

MOYNIHAN: Remember, Mr. Ellison, that an enormous number of Sicilians became Italians in America.

HUGHES: When, at the age of twenty I went to Chicago and worked in a steel mill, I had to be from somewhere. I thought I was from Ohio; but

since I was not from any of the places which they named, they said I must be from England. There is a great emphasis in this country on having a homeland. I had no sense of any except Ohio.

PETTIGREW: The Southern identity has been so strongly identified as white that if we say "a Southerner," people assume that we mean a white Southerner. I think that the term *Southerner* is only now beginning to get a little more meaning. I have suggested to Negro college students in the South the idea that they be called Southerners. It is, of course, an old white liberal trick, and they do not particularly care for the term. Nor would white segregationists like the term to apply to Negroes.

ELLISON: I used to pull the trick myself and talk about "us Southerners." Interestingly enough, I happened to call an elderly cousin of my father, and I asked him about my grandfather's home, a little farm in Abbeville, South Carolina. His first statement was, "That is a historical piece of property." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "It is right close to Secessionist Avenue. It all started right around there. Your grandfather owned historical property." The ambivalence was very much there.

We make so many assumptions. We assume that Negroes are not going to love the South. I suppose it is hard to contemplate an elasticity which allows us to survive these total efforts at brutalization during various periods and still to affirm the seasons, the landscape, the birds, and so on. This is the human reaction. I do not believe that we begin to understand Negroes or white Southerners until we take this into consideration. Love of the South is glamorized by the white Southerner; but the suggestion that a Negro may love the South is usually denied as an utterly outrageous idea.

GRAUBARD: Gentlemen, I want to say again how very grateful I am to all of you. I urge you, if you have any further suggestions, to send them along to me. If there is anything which you feel is conspicuously absent, I shall do my best to do something about it for the *Dædalus* issue and, more importantly, for the book. My thanks to all of you and, of course, our enormous gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation for supporting us in this venture.

Notes on Contributors

CHARLES ABRAMS, born in 1910 in Vilna, Poland, is Chairman of the Division of Urban Planning of the School of Architecture and Chairman of the Institute of Urban Environment at Columbia University. His principal books include *The Future of Housing* (1946), *Forbidden Neighbors* (1955), *Man's Struggle for Shelter* (1964), and *The City is the Frontier* (1965).

KENNETH BANCROFT CLARK, born in 1914 in the Panama Canal Zone, is Director of the Social Dynamics Research Institute and Professor of Psychology at the City College of the City University of New York. His principal books include *Prejudice and Your Child* (1955) and *Dark Ghetto* (1964). He was the editor of *The Negro Protest* (1964) and co-author, with Lawrence Plotkin, of *The Negro Student at Integrated Colleges* (1963).

ROBERT A. DENTLER, born in 1928 in Chicago, Illinois, is Deputy Director of the Center for Urban Education in New York City and Associate Professor of Sociology and Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. He is the co-author, with P. H. Rossi, of *The Politics of Urban Renewal* (1962); with P. Cutright, of *Hostage America* (1963); with N. W. Polsby and P. Smith, of *Politics and Social Life*; and, with M. E. Warshauer, of *Big City Dropouts and Illiterates* (1965).

G. FRANKLIN EDWARDS, born in 1915 in Charleston, South Carolina, is Professor of Sociology at Howard University. He is the author of *The Negro Professional Class* (1959) and of "Changes in Occupations as They Affect the Negro," in Arnold Rose (ed.), *Assuring Freedom to the Free* (1964). He is a consultant to the United States Office of Education.

ERIK H. ERIKSON, born in 1902 in Frankfurt-am-Main, of Danish parentage, is Professor of Human Development and Lecturer on Psychiatry at Harvard University. Among his publications are *Observations on the Yurok* (1943), *Childhood and Society* (1950), *Young Man Luther* (1958), *Identity and the Life Cycle* (1959), *Insight and Responsibility* (1964), and, as editor, *Youth: Change and Challenge* (1963).

JOHN H. FISCHER, born in 1910 in Baltimore, Maryland, is President of Teachers College, Columbia University. He has written numerous

articles which have appeared in educational journals and other periodicals. Mr. Fischer is currently chairman of the Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions of the New York State Department of Education.

EUGENE P. FOLEY, born in 1928 in Wabasha, Minnesota, is Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director of Economic Development. He was formerly Administrator of the Small Business Administration. He began his career in the practice of law in Minnesota.

EUNICE S. GRIER, born in 1927 in Stamford, Connecticut, is Acting Director of the Research Division of the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

GEORGE W. GRIER, born in 1927 in Abington, Pennsylvania, is Coordinator of the Anti-Poverty and Social Welfare Programs of the District of Columbia. Mr. and Mrs. Grier have written *Privately Developed Interracial Housing* (1960) as well as numerous monographs and articles for professional publication. They have served widely as consultants to federal, state, and local governments and private agencies on housing, human relations, and urban problems.

OSCAR HANDLIN, born in 1915 in New York City, is Winthrop Professor of History at Harvard University. Among his many publications are *Boston's Immigrants* (1941), *The Uprooted* (1951), *The American People in the Twentieth Century* (1954), and *Fire-Bell in the Night* (1964). He has also written numerous scholarly articles on educational and historical subjects.

LEE RAINWATER, born in 1928 in Oxford, Mississippi, is Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Washington University and a research associate in the University's Social Science Institute. He is the author of *And the Poor Get Children* (1960) and *Family Design: Marital Sexuality, Family Size and Contraception*; he is the co-author of *Workingman's Wife: Her Personality, World and Life Styles* (1959) and *The Professional Scientist* (1962).

PAUL B. SHEATSLEY, born in 1916 in New York City, is Director of the Survey Research Service of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. He is a contributor to *The Encyclopedia Americana* and *The Americana Annual* and has written articles for such publications as *Scientific American* and *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

Participants at the American Academy Conference on the Negro American

Biographical information on those participants at the conference who contributed articles to *Dædalus* can be found in the Notes on Contributors of Volumes 1 and 2 of "The Negro American."

Brief identifications of the other guests at the American Academy conference follow: Edwin C. Berry, Executive Director of the Chicago Urban League; Wiley Branton, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Washington, D. C.; Canon James P. Breeden, Commission on Religion and Race of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, New York; Oscar Cohen, Program Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, New York; Ralph Ellison, novelist and critic; Paul A. Freund, Carl M. Loeb University Professor at the Law School of Harvard University; Clifford Geertz, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago; Max Lerner, author, columnist, and Professor of American Civilization at Brandeis University; Dr. Jean Mayer, Professor of Nutrition and Lecturer on the History of Public Health at the Harvard School of Public Health; Guichard Parris, Director of Public Relations, National Urban League; Jay Saunders Redding, Professor of English, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia; Peter H. Rossi, Director of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago; and C. Vann Woodward, Sterling Professor of History at Yale University.

